Considering the most recent evidence regarding North Korea’s continued nuclear and missile development and reluctance to engage with the outside world except on its own terms, there is little prospect of regional neighbors or other countries responding in a significant way to humanitarian crises in North Korea. North Korea under Kim Jong Un is clearly following a familiar pattern of trying to ensure its own survival above all else in its own way. The only chance for citizens of North Korea to improve their human security is if the regime sees such a path as compatible with its own survival. In that sense, there is a chance that some economic reforms that allow for growth in North Korea’s economy and stability for the regime may, as a side effect, improve the lives of North Korean citizens. In addition to this, if some openness to outside information is allowed as part of these reforms, there is a possibility that North Korean citizens will understand their collective problems more coherently, and demand reforms in some way.37 There was some evidence of this happening after the currency reforms attempted by the regime in 2009, which led to reports of protests.38 It is also becoming ever clearer that many North Korean citizens have access to outside infor-mation39 in the form of pirated DVDs obtained from China or through the efforts of the United States and South Korea to broadcast information about the outside world into North Korea.
Apart from these potential domestic changes, there is a lack of any enthu-siasm among regional neighbors to deal with a regime that is perceived to break commitments regularly. North Korea’s only “ally,” China, is the only likely source of longer-term economic assistance, and the increasing frustration among Chinese policymakers and advisors regarding North
Korea’s nuclear program endangers that assistance. Nevertheless, North Korea–China trade seems to be booming,40 and this increase in trade may be the only hope for North Korean citizens to improve their humanitarian situation in the short to medium term.
Conclusion
This chapter has given an overview of the humanitarian issues in North Korea and regional responses to it. It has pointed out that international humanitarianism is not a well-established concept in East Asia. The limited humanitarian aid that has been forthcoming from North Korea’s regional neighbors is being reduced further as an indication of hardening attitudes toward North Korea generally, in particular due to its nuclear and missile programs, and its lack of good faith in implementing agreements. There is little public enthusiasm for humanitarian aid to North Korea; some dona-tions are carried out by private citizens through NGOs, but due to media coverage, many people in East Asia are mainly concerned with North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. In any case, NGOs as well as international organizations such as the WFP find it increasingly difficult to operate in North Korea due to regime-imposed restrictions.
The emerging doctrine of responsibility to protect is unlikely to be applied in the case of North Korea, as the UN Security Council has not endorsed intervention to prevent famine, even if the famine is the result of state neglect and mismanagement, as is the case in North Korea. There has been some movement on the idea of holding North Korea responsible at the ICC for other human rights abuses such as state-sanctioned torture and other violence, but in practical terms international intervention to deal with such abuse is highly unlikely due to the probable high military and human costs.
Furthermore, regional multilateralism is still in its infancy in East Asia, as many states in the region are still grappling with their own internal developmental issues. Most regional multilateral efforts have gone into trade and finance (excluding North Korea), and there is no regional multilateral coordination on humanitarian assistance. The Six-Party Talks forum is the closest thing to regional coordination on North Korea issues, but humani-tarian aid is not officially part of its agenda.
Humanitarian Implications of the North Korea Problem 49 It is not impossible to envision some sort of regional coordination on humanitarian assistance; however it is likely that this would have some con-nection with strategic aspects of dealing with North Korea’s denuclearization.
If real coordination could be implemented, there would be a better chance of using policy carrots and sticks more effectively to actually ensure that humanitarian aid reaches the parts of the country and North Korean society where it is needed. In the absence of regime transformation or collapse, the best hope to improve the humanitarian situation in North Korea may be expanded trade and investment links with China in particular.
Notes
1. For the purposes of this chapter, East Asia refers to Northeast as well as Southeast Asia.
2. UN, “Key Humanitarian Messages: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,”
15 March 2013, accessed 19 August 2014, http://kp.one.un.org/content /uploads/2013/03/Key-Humanitarian-Messages-for-DPRK-15-March -2013.pdf.
3. Heiner Bielefeldt, “‘Western’ Versus ‘Islamic’ Human Rights Conceptions?:
A Critique of Cultural Essentialism in the Discussion on Human Rights,”
Political Theory 28, no. 1 (2000).
4. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “OCHA on Message: Key Humanitarian Principles,” OCHA, April 2010, accessed 19 August 2014, https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM _HumPrinciple_English.pdf.
5. Michael N. Barnett, The Empire of Humanity : A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).
6. Utpal Vyas, “Regional Governance and Insitutions in Northeast Asia,” in Regional Indicators for Monitoring Regional Cooperation and Integration in East and Northeast Asia (Bangkok: United Nations [forthcoming]).
7. Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982); Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed., The Developmental State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
8. Oliver Buston and Kerry Smith, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013 (Bristol: Development Initiatives, 2013).
9. Cain Nunns, “Asian NGOs, Awash with Cash, Ride a Wave of Economic Growth,” Guardian, 26 July 2011, accessed 21 September 2014, http://www .theguardian.com/society/2011/jul/26/asian-ngos-tzu-chi-nunns.
10. Utpal Vyas, “Japan’s International NGOs: A Small but Growing Presence in Japan-China Relations,” Japan Forum 22, no. 3 (2010).
11. OCHA, “Typhoon Haiyan: Funding,” March 2013, http://www.unocha.org /crisis/typhoonhaiyan/funding (accessed 19 August 2014).
12. Shaun Waterman, “China Stops Oil Exports to North Korea, Possibly as Punishment for Nuclear Test,” Washington Times, 22 March 2013, accessed 21 September 2014, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/22 /china-stops-oil-exports-north-korea-possibly-punis/.
13. Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “Foreign Assistance to North Korea,” CRS Report R40095 (Washington, DC: United States Congressional Research Service, 2 April 2014), accessed 16 April 2014, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40095.pdf.
14. Stephan Haggard, Marcus Noland, and Erik Weeks, North Korea on the Precipice of Famine (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2008), 20, accessed 20 August 2014, http://www.iie.com /publications/papers/noland0508.pdf.
15. WFP, “Food Aid Information System,” accessed 19 August 2014, http://
www.wfp.org/fais/.
16. Haggard, Noland, and Weeks, North Korea on the Precipice of Famine.
17. Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “Foreign Assistance to North Korea” (Washington, DC: United States Congressional Research Service, 2 April 2014), 14, accessed 21 September 2014, http://www.refworld.org /docid/51d53c9f4.html.
18. Bay Fang, “Audit: Agencies in North Korea Broke UN Rules,” Chicago Tribune, 8 June 2007, accessed 27 March 2014, http://articles.chicagotribune .com/2007-06-08/news/0706080233_1_north-korea-undp-currency.
19. Cabinet Office of Japan, “Gaiko ni Kan Suru Yoron Chosa - Kita Chosen e no Kanshin Jiko [Opinion Survey on Foreign Policy - Items of Interest Regarding North Korea]” (2010), accessed 21 September 2014 (no longer available), http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h25/h25-gaiko/zh/z23.html.
20. Celia Hatton, “Is China Ready to Abandon North Korea?,” BBC News, 12 April 2013, accessed 21 September 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news /world-asia-china-22062589.
21. Heng Xie and Megha Rajagopalan, “Bank of China Closes Account of Key North Korean Bank,” Reuters, 7 May 2013, accessed 13 September 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/07/us-korea-north-china-bank -idUSBRE9460CX20130507.
22. Mi Ae Taylor and Mark E. Manyin, Non-Governmental Organizations’
Activities in North Korea, CRS Report R41749 (Washington, DC: United
Humanitarian Implications of the North Korea Problem 51
States Congressional Research Service, 25 March 2011), accessed 5 December 2013, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41749.pdf.
23. Edward P. Reed, “Unlikely Partners: Humanitarian Aid Agencies and North Korea,” in A New International Engagement Framework for North Korea?:
Contending Perspectives, eds. Ch‘ung-yong An, Nick Eberstadt, and Yong-son Yi (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Insitute of America, 2004); Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011); Hazel Smith, Overcoming Humanitarian Dilemmas in the DPRK (North Korea) (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, July 2002), accessed 13 September 2014, http://www.usip.org/publications /overcoming-humanitarian-dilemmas-in-the-dprk-north-korea.
24. Taylor and Manyin, Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in North Korea.
25. ICISS, “The Responsibility to Protect,” International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa, December 2001, accessed 5 December 2013, http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/18432/6 /IDL-18432.pdf.
26. Ibid., 33.
27. UN, “Resolution of the General Assembly 60/1 2005 World Summit Outcome,” 2005, p. 30, accessed 29 March 2014, http://www.refworld.org /docid/44168a910.html.
28. Human Rights Watch, “North Korea: UN Should Act on Atrocities Report,”
17 February 2014, accessed 2 September 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news /2014/02/17/north-korea-un-should-act-atrocities-report.
29. UNHRC, “Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” United Nations Human Rights Council, 7 February 2014, p. 11, accessed 25 September 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session25/
Documents/A-HRC-25-63_en.doc.
30. Manyin and Nikitin, “Foreign Assistance to North Korea,” 6.
31. Ibid., 9.
32. Ibid., 12.
33. “Scale of Yearly Chinese Unconditional Aid to North Korea Revealed,”
Dong-a Ilbo, 24 June 2012, accessed 8 April 2014, http://english.donga.com /srv/service.php3?biid=2012062508548; Waterman, “China Stops Oil Exports to North Korea, Possibly as Punishment for Nuclear Test.”
34. Manyin and Nikitin, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, 14.
35. Taylor and Manyin, Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in North Korea.
36. Nicholas Eberstadt, Western Aid: The Missing Link for North Korea’s Economic Revival? (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 26 April 2011), accessed 21 September 2014, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract _id=2022371.
37. Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 215.
38. Sang-Hun Choe, “North Korea Revalues Its Currency,” New York Times, 1 December 2009, accessed 17 September 2014, http://www.nytimes.com /2009/12/02/business/global/02korea.html.
39. Haggard and Noland, Witness to Transformation.
40. Aidan Foster-Carter, “South Korea Has Lost the North to China,” Financial Times, 20 February 2014, accessed 17 September 2014, http://www.ft.com /intl/cms/s/0/f8fca490-9a23-11e3-a407-00144feab7de.html#axzz3Daza2LIl.
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