Debates continue in the United States on how to best address the growing difficulty of dealing with North Korea’s threats to US interests in the region.
The engagement versus deterrence debate still dominates the discussions about handling North Korea. While proponents of either side acknowledge both aspects are needed with North Korea, the arguments focus on which of these is most effective in getting North Korea to change its behavior. The growing threat from North Korea only strengthens the resolve of advocates
on each side. For those in favor of more engagement, multiple points of interaction should be used for engagement because the American with the most access in North Korea shouldn’t be Dennis Rodman, a former NBA basketball player.
For those who favor more deterrence and pressure, only stronger military coordination and sanctions against North Korea will make the leadership take new positions more favorable for normal relations with the international community. The feeling that North Korea has pursued nuclear weapons and missiles even during times of engagement suggests to this camp that concessions without reciprocity will not elicit the desired response from North Korea.
However, North Korea’s successes in its nuclear and missile programs have caused a new debate to start forming on the advantages and disadvantages of waiting out North Korea. Despite a willingness by the United States and South Korea to wait for a better opportunity to engage, advances in North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapons programs put pressure on the “strategic patience” and trustpolitik plans offered by Presidents Obama and Park. Each technological success of North Korea further complicates the situation, making the direct threat to the United States even more imminent. This timing discussion then connects back with the engagement versus pressure debate: because the threat to the United States has increased, Washington can’t afford to wait and must immediately either engage North Korea or increase the pressure on North Korea to give up its weapons.
The debate on how to handle North Korea also includes a debate on US-China relations. China’s ties to North Korea stem from the experience of fighting together in the Korean War, a growing economic relationship, and party and government interactions. These increasing ties have forced countries into acceding that any movement with North Korea, especially on nuclear weapons, will require help from China. Thus, as the US and China try to navigate a future where the two powers interact more across political and economic spheres, North Korea continues to be an area where the two sides have different interests. This causes contentious discussions on how each side should be doing more to convince North Korea it needs to cease provocations and eventually give up its nuclear weapons.
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and the United States 137 Whatever the debates may be regarding North Korea, there will likely be less disagreement on the most appealing solution to the United States.
A deal that provides a clear, quick path toward denuclearization and elimi-nation of the long-range missile threat would likely be close to an ideal solution for the United States. This agreement would also have to include extremely good monitoring access of the dismantlement of both the missile and nuclear weapons programs. Ideally, North Korea’s leadership would accept language similar to what was in the 29 February 2012 “Leap Day”
agreement, wherein the United States government “reaffirms that it does not have any hostile intent toward the DPRK,” as a security guarantee.15 North Korea would likely require some financial incentives to make a deal;
the United States would probably insist this aid be in a form that could be monitored. The United States could probably make an agreement where some sanctions it has placed on North Korea are removed; however, the United States would benefit greatly by having these sanction reductions occur later in the process after the dismantling of the weapons programs.
This solution would be even more appealing if the US government felt it would eventually help lead to peaceful unification under the principles of freedom, democracy, and a free market economy. These are values President Obama and South Korea Presidents Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung Bak identified as important for unification.16
While an optimal solution would likely have those components, finding the minimum aspects Washington would require to accept an agreement with North Korea would be difficult. Part of this complexity is that the North Korea threat against the United States has dramatically increased.
Thus, a minimum ask from the United States a decade ago is unlikely to fulfill the minimum requirement of today.
Finally, in light of North Korea’s record of noncompliance with treaties and agreements, combined with its attempts to evade monitoring of its nuclear and missile programs, Washington would likely need some ability to verify the closure of North Korea’s weapons development programs.
With all sides appearing to be at an impasse, Washington, Pyongyang, and Seoul have been investigating compromise positions that might lead to a diplomatic solution. Envoys for nations involved in the Six-Party Talks
have been traveling across the region trying to find an answer. Senior officials in the Obama administration still state they are waiting for North Korea to demonstrate a commitment to implementing the September 2005 statement and to create a path toward denuclearization.17
The timing of respective moves by Pyongyang and Washington could allow for flexibility on the US side. While the phrase “complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement” of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs was associated with the Bush administration, these are still the general aspects of a deal the US government seeks. Because of the difficulty in actually getting movement on any of those features, one could envision an understanding along the lines of a freeze on North Korea building nuclear weapons and missiles. This idea was the basis of the 29 February 2012 agree-ment. The statement released by the United States had North Korea agreeing to “implement a moratorium on long-range missile launches, nuclear tests and nuclear activities at Yongbyon, including uranium enrichment activities”
while the United States would provide North Korea with 240,000 metric tons of nutritional assistance.18 However, this deal was never implemented because one month later, North Korea announced it would attempt to put a satellite into space. Washington and much of the international community argued the launch was actually a missile test in violation of UN prohibitions on the DPRK. The US declared the Leap Day agreement nullified; less than two months later, the DPRK satellite launch ended in failure as well.
Many policy analysts argue a moratorium is not only possible, but is also the best deal the outside world is likely to get. Siegfried Hecker, former Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory and a Stanford University professor, has put forth an idea of the “three noes: no export, no more bombs, and no better bombs.”19 In November 2010, Dr. Hecker was invited to North Korea and was surprised to be shown a “modern uranium centrifuge facility at Yongbyon” with two thousand centrifuges that were “said to be producing low enriched uranium (LEU) destined for fuel for the new reactor.”20 After the revelation of this facility to Dr. Hecker, calculations started to change, as it was clear that North Korea had a uranium-enrichment program that could begin producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) necessary for a nuclear weapon, and that North Korea probably had another hidden uranium-enrichment facility.
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and the United States 139 Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, former US Ambassador to South Korea and former Special Representative for North Korea Policy, made an argu-ment similar to Hecker’s. Bosworth asserted that verifying North Korea’s complete dismantlement of its nuclear facilities and its missile capabilities would be an impossible task. Thus, he recommended a “standstill agree-ment” where North Korea would cease conducting nuclear tests and missile launches, which would in turn be easier for the United States and the international community to monitor.21
Some suggest an even longer path of engagement before North Korea would give up its nuclear weapons. Frank Jannuzi, President and CEO of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, advocated for a longer
“Helsinki-style engagement strategy” entailing numerous connections for dialogue and cooperation.22 Jannuzi hoped this process would bring about confidence-building measures along with opportunities for collaboration on other issues.23 He argued that a foundation of trust and understanding must precede efforts toward the denuclearization of North Korea.
In the absence of a moratorium on North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile launches, Pyongyang continues to improve its capabilities. As the DPRK’s weapons become more capable, it is more difficult for the US government to agree to a freeze that would allow North Korea to keep weapons in the short term in hopes that the longer process would lead to eventual dismantlement. The Leap Day agreement was an attempt at a moratorium-like deal to break the impasse; the deal’s collapse reduced the political capital within the Obama administration to attempt new ways to engage North Korea. These factors, along with North Korean provoca-tions toward the United States and South Korea and Pyongyang’s refusal to release captive US citizens, reduce the space for finding a nuanced way to reach the goal of a denuclearized North Korea.