In responding to my colleagues, let me first state that as an anthropolo-gist (and one who works with both humans and other primates), and not a theologian, the arguments laid out by both Deane-Drummond and Arner suggest (to me) a dynamic theology, one that acts as a co-participant in the academy, engaging with other scholarly disciplines in a quest for bet-ter understanding. This assertion is an important one, as it locates our mutually interactive viewpoints in such a way that allows for fruitful and intellectually rigorous discourse while simultaneously allowing room for
some distinctive, even potentially incompatible, foundational commitments (Fuentes 2013).
Deane-Drummond and Arner both see morality as a prime locale for
‘science-theology’ dialogue and conclude that theology can indeed benefit from sincere interface with evolutionary approaches. However, each infers a slightly different mode of benefit (and some weakness) from such interac-tions, and it is in these inferences that anthropologically interesting ques-tions arise.
Deane-Drummond notes that it is “possible for human beings to allow all kinds of other creatures to be morally considerable, quite apart from whether such beings are thought to have any moral agency.” (132) She also sees a fer-tile ground in interspecies relationships as a venue for understanding the development and implementation of diverse moralities. It is in each species’
Umwelt, their self-worlds, that specific attitudes and patterns emerge (‘mo-ralities’ in this case), and the interfaces of these worlds create the possibili-ties and complexipossibili-ties of inter-morality(s). I consider Deane-Drummond’s differentiation between moral consideration and moral agency to be crucial.
I also agree with her (and Arner) that we need to move beyond simplistic searches for some form of moral ‘roots’ in other animals. Her call is then for a better understanding of inter-relations and thus of ourselves because much about who we are as humans becomes manifest in the ways in which we engage other species.
Arner is concerned with the primatologist Frans de Waal’s quest for the evolutionary origins of moral agency and takes him to task for a superficial engagement with theological approaches. Arner seeks to represent more faithfully a Christian perspective on the sources of morality and the com-plexities of being human. In short, Arner faults de Waal (and, by implica-tion, many other scientists who only nod to or deride Christian theology) for using a straw man argument of the nature and interpretation of sin.
Arner suggests fuller understandings of Christian theological approaches involve more nuanced notions of agency and the inclinations of human nature.
I take both of these contributions to highlight the need to better under-stand what humans ‘do’ with other humans and with animals and how that is related to our own construction of moral rights, agency, and outcomes.
The discourse on human morality (and its origins) is thus an inquiry into human agency and the deployment of what we term ‘moral behavior.’ Arner suggests theologians should heed Augustine’s four-part categories of humans as being “able to sin, unable not to sin, able not to sin, and unable to sin” as grounding for their engagement with evolutionary approaches to morality.
Arner suggests such an undertaking is a quest to understand God’s universal or ‘common’ grace as mediated to humans via an evolutionary cultivation of moral capacities. Deane-Drummond offers a related perspective according to which the Holy Spirit illuminates deeper meanings and provides grace that works with the capacities of humans to improve them.
Both of these are fascinating and well-developed perspectives. However, here is where many anthropologists might diverge from theologians, at least in the manner in which they begin their attempts to describe the underlying processes of human morality. In cross-cultural and cross-historical assess-ments there is wide diversity of what would fall under the heading of ‘moral’
in human societies. It is difficult, in an anthropological sense, to demon-strate that the term ‘human morality’ actually reflects a specific set of uni-versal human perceptions or actions, or a specific underlying potential to be illuminated and cultivated. Of course, this is not a fatal blow to the theologi-cal arguments or to the search for shared moral processes, as there remains a degree of complementarity in much of the perspectives at hand. How we (humans) see others and ourselves and what traditions, assumptions, and worldviews we draw on shapes how we describe and assess the actions and ideologies we call ‘moral.’ It is increasingly clear that social, historical, and institutional contexts and their related perceptual landscape matter greatly in the construction of human world views, and that these world views are potent driving forces in behavior for humans. ‘Morality’ is real and very im-portant for all humans, even if the details vary.
At the same time, as I noted in my essay, there is little debate that other animals can and do act altruistically on occasion and sometimes frequently, and that they can exhibit intense empathy and reciprocity. Both Deane-Drummond and Arner would agree with this but each might give a slightly different explanation for how this relates to human moral action and percep-tion. The former is ready to make some constructive use of the study of the human-other animal interface in order to explore the patterns and processes that emerge. She is prepared to search for signs of what could be called inter-moralities, which I understand as the partial fusion and / or leakage of spe-cies-specific moral perceptions and actions out to others. The latter would encourage us to look more closely at the particular traditions humans draw on, in this case specifically Christian theological traditions, to get a better understanding of how humans construct our moralities and what guiding processes are at play. I see value in both approaches and am glad to have the opportunity to engage in this sort of dialogue as it makes me a better anthro-pologist and offers an enriched view of the complex intellectual landscape of conceptualizations and constructions of morality.