French Constructions of European Identity

Dynamics in in- and exclusion of Estonia are equally visible in French frames.

Inclusion...

When evaluating the empirical results with regard to the processes of categorisation and comparison (Turner/Oakes 1989), an increased inclusion of Estonia into constructions of European identity may equally be stated.

First, the analysis of the framing perspective sheds light on the categorisation of the Self with respect to Estonia. The stability of the framing perspective Europe as a whole in both time periods suggests Estonia's perception as part of Europe independently of the current borders of the EU.

Second, as for the geopolitical categorisation of Estonia, several points indicate an increased inclusion into a common European sphere: (a) Her framing as Eastern European decreased; (b) her framing as part of Europe as a whole increased, starting from 2005 and may point at a greater easiness of inclusion compared to Germany where this frame first becomes current in 2007; (c) her framing in spontaneous spacial formations increases and indicates Estonia's relevance as a point of reference in Europe-wide comparisons; (d) even her increased association to Russia may partly be interpreted as inclusion: Estonian-Russian relations are exclusively covered after CEEE and indicate through the extension of newsworthiness an inclusion into a common sphere of institutional organisation, interests and experience. Furthermore, Estonia is partially included into a common European sphere as to norms and memory when Russia figures as the Other. As opposed to Germany, the inclusion seems thus to be less focused on political aspects of European identity (as defined

above).

Third, changes in the framing of Estonia through discourses on Eastern Europe provide evidence for her increased inclusion: (a) The overall amount of discourses on Eastern Europe diminished; (b) the textual structure of Estonia's depiction as backward post-CEEE frequently integrates her into a framework with both West-European and East-European states; (c) the learner discourse includes her as to institutional organisation and interests and, with reference to technological and societal innovation, as to norms and experience. More importantly, it sometimes suggests an entire re-definition of European identity through the depiction of the EU becoming a learner with CEEE. Increased inclusion is further suggested by (d) the significant decrease of the insecurity discourse despite Estonia's increased association to Russia and its including function as to institutional organisation and partially interests and experience. Last, (e) the absence of discourses on Eastern Europe with cultural topics, and the – with reference to Germany - particularly high coverage of Estonia with cultural topics after CEEE, demonstrate inclusion also with respect to cultural-historical aspects.

Last, the evaluation of the empirical results with respect to the process of comparison (Turner/Oakes 1989) allows only ambivalent conclusions. On the one hand, an increased inclusion may be stated as to Estonia's positive evaluation increased despite the introduction of the new, often negatively connoted coverage of her relations to Russia.

Furthermore, her ambivalent evaluation decreased, which may indicate that societal frames (Van Gorp 2007) are becoming more concrete for Estonia, previously part of a diffuse, distant EE space (Stark 2006). On the other hand, both phenomena may, at least partially, be explained through the higher number of short and very short articles after Estonia's EU accession and the fact that they leave less space for comprehensive, ambivalent, representation. Yet, Estonia's increased negative evaluation may not be interpreted as increased exclusion: it is mainly due to the coverage of relations with Russia only post-CEEE.

...with Limitations

Estonia's increased inclusion into a common European sphere is, however, limited also in France.

First, just as in Germany, Estonia's inclusion into a common European sphere is limited by her depiction as a “new” member: (a) Estonia remains othered from Europe as to norms and memory, although Russia is othered even stronger. This confirms the shift of Easternness further eastwards in recent Western constructions of European identity (Kuus 2007); (b) Estonia's depiction as a learner, despite increased inclusion during the accession period, continues to other her as to interests and memory and partially also as to norms and experience. Moreover, it often entails a patronizing tone reiterating Estonia's hierarchical inferiority; (c) discourses on Estonia as a place or source of insecurity continue to other her as to norms and partially as to experience and interests; (d) discourses on backwardness continue to other Estonia on a cultural/civilisational level with particular attention to moral backwardness. This focus on moral may be explained by the French ambition to spread certain values in the world (as outlined above) and to assist EE beyond a material development (Schuhman 1963 in Majza 2003). This position clearly others Estonia through her implied inferiority.

Second, a profound, ongoing disorientation concerning Estonia's status, belonging and features may be stated with regard to several points: (a) the national framing perspective is chosen with regard to Estonia even more frequently after CEEE than before, and especially during the accession period. France's national identity being particularly strong (see above), this may be interpreted as a return to a safe stance in times of insecurity through change. (b) Estonia's othering is often diffuse: brief, not very illustrated and connected to a large variety of topics, e.g. in Estonia's association to Russia, her depiction as a learner and as a place or source of insecurity. This is especially evident with regard to the aspects of European identity: Whereas for Germany a dominant political-economical inclusion can be stated, for France no clear delineation is possible and political-economical aspects alter in in- and exclusion with cultural-historical ones. Last, (c) Estonia's hierarchical non-positioning increases substantially and may indicate that journalists, being

unsure of where to position her, do not position her at all.

Ongoing Re-Definition

In France, the process of construction of European identity equally seems to currently be in a phase of profound re-construction. Several points suggest this with regard to homogenisation (Turner/Oakes 1989).

First, as to Estonia's geopolitical categorisation. the almost equal weight of all categories – apart form the categorisation as a nation – indicates a lack of consensus in France on Estonia's geopolitical categorisation. This appears even clearer when considering that Estonia's geopolitical framing showed clear patterns of preferred categorisation before CEEE. This abrupt and radical change may be related to the fact that France's relations with Estonia neither reach back a long time in history nor have been very profound (Stark 2006:104). Therefore, fewer societal frames (Van Gorp 2007) are already available for Estonia's framing: the need and the freedom to frame Estonia anew arises and results in a variety of equally weighted frames. This interpretation is strengthened by the emergence of new frames, like the Baltic State frame which only appeared in 2004 and gained popularity ever since. Last, the range of covered topics has almost doubled after CEEE and equally indicates decreased homogenisation and thus an ongoing re-definition of identity constructions.