1.1
The Berlin Climate Conference – Results and Assessment
1.1.1
Climate Politics Between Ecological Necessities and Political Restrictions
The signing of the Framework Convention on Cli-mate Change at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and its subsequent coming into force were a major step to-wards a global climate policy. The international com-munity declared through this convention that it is de-termined to pursue a global policy to protect the cli-mate:“The ultimate objective of this Convention is to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentra-tions in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the cli-mate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food pro-duction is not threatened and to enable economic de-velopment to proceed in a sustainable manner”
(Johnson, 1993).
The Convention for protecting the global climate has meanwhile been ratified by more than 120 states (as of April 1995). However, since it is explicitly a Framework Convention, it is still of necessity rather vague (WBGU, 1994; Enquete Commission, 1995b), both with respect to objectives as well as the defini-tion of the instruments for implementing and moni-toring the Convention. The significance of the Con-vention lies in the institutionalization of the climate policy process, the establishment of a legal frame-work and some general principles; further steps, es-pecially binding targets and schedules for the reduc-tion of greenhouse gases, will have to be specified at subsequent Conferences of the Parties.
It is against this background that the first Confer-ence of the Parties (COP-1), held in Berlin between
March 28 and April 7, 1995, should be evaluated.
The Conference failed to reach agreement on spe-cific measures for reducing CO2 emissions, despite the urgent need for such action as shown by the alarming scientific evidence for anthropogenic desta-bilization of the climate (IPCC, 1994; MPI, 1995; En-quete Commission, 1995b; WBGU, 1995). Despite the warnings by scientists about the disturbing trends, there has been constant increase from one year to the next in the use of fossil fuels and hence in the level of CO2 emissions on a worldwide scale (IEA, 1994). There is no empirical evidence for a change in this trend, nor can any such change be an-ticipated until now, reasons being e.g. the growth in world population and the expansion of the world economy.
According to calculations made by the Advisory Council, reducing greenhouse gases can be accom-plished by relatively small steps at first, but subse-quently high-level reductions over many decades would have to follow (see Section C 1.3). These cal-culations also show that the time-span remaining for these measures to take effect is extremely short, and for this reason the failure of the Berlin Climate Con-ference to reach agreement on appropriate reduction targets was very disappointing.
The sessions of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) prior to COP-1 had already damp-ened expectations. Some states had even taken the view that the non-binding and vague commitments in Article 4.2(a) and (b) of the Climate Convention were adequate.This assessment would have rendered obsolete any further steps toward an active climate protection policy. The Framework Convention on Climate Change itself, and the results of INC I-XI made the following demands on the Conference (Es-trada Oyuela, 1995; Merkel, 1995):
– The adequacy of commitments entered into hitherto must be reviewed. If such a review deter-mines that commitments are inadequate, further steps are to be laid down and a protocol drawn up containing binding commitments.
– A substantial mandate for the working out of a re-duction protocol is to be agreed upon.
1
– Agreement must be reached on whether and how the instrument of Joint Implementation referred to in the Climate Convention should be estab-lished.
– A decision has to be made on the financing mech-anism, and the reports of the industrialized coun-tries on their national climate protection policies are to be subjected to review.
– Agreement is to be reached on the voting proce-dures for the Conference of the Parties.
– An infrastructure (e.g. a secretariat) must be es-tablished for implementing the Framework Con-vention on Climate Change.
1.1.2
The Results of the First Conference of the Parties – An Overview
Article 4 of the Framework Convention on Cli-mate Change does not set a binding deadline for sta-bilizing CO2emissions at the 1990 level. The target year 2000 is only mentioned on the side, but does not represent any firm undertaking of the Convention, e.g. analogous to Montreal Protocol commitments.
Above all, no position is taken on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions after the turn of the cen-tury (post-2000 aim). Nor does Article 4 refer to other greenhouse gases. It is therefore of crucial im-portance that the Conference determined that previ-ous commitments were essentially inadequate. This resolution paved the way for the Mandate to work out a draft protocol for further reductions in green-house gases.
1 The Parties adopted the so-called “Berlin Man-date” (UN Document FCCC/CP/1995/L.14), which establishes a negotiation process with a view to adopting the results in time for the Third Conference of the Parties in 1997 for a protocol or other legal instrument with the fol-lowing contents:
- reductions in excess of the stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions already agreed upon,
- specified time-frames for achieving these ob-jectives could be 2005, 2010 and 2020, - a concept for concrete measures for reducing
greenhouse gases must be presented, - the industrialized countries provide a
com-mitment in relation to their historical and present responsibility as primary polluters for emission reductions,
- no commitments are envisaged for the devel-oping countries, but instead they are granted the right to sustainable development and hence a reasonable increase in greenhouse
gas emissions.
Even though many wishes remained unful-filled, these provisions of the Berlin Mandate can be considered an important partial success of the first Conference of the Parties.
2 A pilot phase for climate protection activities which are implemented jointly (Joint Imple-mentation) was launched (UN Document FCCC/CP/1995/L.13). This shall last for a max-imum of five years and serve to gather experi-ence on the basis of which binding criteria for the long-term application of this instrument for CO2reductions can be developed step by step.
Until such time as agreement is reached on ap-plication criteria, joint activities during the pilot phase shall be conducted under open condi-tions. Project organizers could be state bodies, private companies and non-governmental or-ganizations. Participants can be those states li-sted in Annex I to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (industrialized countries and countries with economies in transition), on a voluntary basis. Due to the absence of any binding international rules and in order to allay the fears expressed by developing countries in particular that industrialized countries would neglect to achieve reductions in their own countries in favor of Joint Implementation, no credits on national reduction targets can be claimed for reduced emissions achieved in other countries during the pilot phase. The Council expressly welcomes the fact that a con-sensus – albeit limited – was achieved in this highly controversial area, in that Joint Imple-mentation of climate protection projects offers substantial potential for additional climate pro-tection as well as for additional developmental impulses (see Section C 1.4.4).
3 The Parties did not manage to agree in Berlin on Rules of Procedure. The reason was dis-agreement regarding the voting mechanism to be chosen. However, in view of the conflicts which can be expected, a departure from the
“consensus procedure” (unanimous voting) would appear necessary. The Framework Con-vention on Climate Change already provides for a three-fourths majority vote for adopting amendments, so the logical conclusion is to in-clude majority voting in the Rules of Proce-dure.
4 The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) was maintained for a further four years as the finan-cial mechanism (UN Documents FCCC/CP/
1995/L.1 and FCCC/CP/1995/4). Its financial volume is now, therefore, totally inadequate (WBGU, 1994), and urgently requires
strength-The Results of the First Conference of the Parties – An Overview C 1.1.2 101
ening, in the view of the Council, on account of the major structural adjustments that can be ex-pected.
5 One important instrument for international cli-mate protection under the Framework Conven-tion on Climate Change is technology transfer (Articles 4.1, 4.5, 4.7, 4.9, 9.2 and 11.1 of the Convention; see also Section B 2). The industri-alized countries have a special responsibility for ensuring that technology and know-how is passed on to developing countries, as required by AGENDA 21 (Chapter 34). To ensure pro-gress in this field, the Secretariat of the Con-vention shall report on the status of technology transfer before COP-2 is held in 1996. In addi-tion, the requirements and conditions for suc-cessful technology transfer in accordance with the climate protection objectives will also be laid down and submitted as results for COP-2 (UN Document FCCC/CP/1995/L.10) (see also Section B 2).
6 Another factor that is important for the func-tioning of international conventions involves checks and controls as to whether or not emis-sion reductions are actually being achieved (verification). What is needed is standardiza-tion of the nastandardiza-tional communicastandardiza-tions, which have so far often proved of little use, in order to improve their relevance and comparability. It was therefore essential that the Conference of
the Parties agreed on commonly accepted methodologies for preparing national commu-nications. The Conference was able to reach agreement in this regard, refering to the propo-sals submitted by the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) e.g. on common measurement and assessment issues.
7 The choice of Bonn as the location for the Per-manent Secretariat of the Convention is linked to the hopes and expectations being placed in German policies for climate protection. This is the background for the national commitment that the Chancellor stated at the Berlin Confer-ence. This target is so high that its instrumental implementability must now be demanded to an even greater degree than before.
8 Some of the other activities directed at climate protection which occurred in Berlin during the Conference are also of importance. Two initia-tives deserve special mention: the establish-ment of a European Business Council for a Sus-tainable Energy Future (Box 22), aimed at strengthening initiative within the business community, which had hitherto been articu-lated at national level only, and the bundling of local government efforts to protect the climate in the International Council for Local Environ-mental Initiatives (Box 23).
BOX 22
European Business Council for a Sustainable Energy Future
The objective of this organization founded in Berlin is to strengthen, through an alliance of in-dustry representatives with environmental groups, administration and politicians, a form of economy that is tolerable for the climate, and to strengthen climate protection policies which are geared to sustainable development. The Business Council wishes to show that companies can re-spond to the demands of climate protection with the most modern, internationally competitive technologies, so that environmental protection considerations can improve economic success.
The earlier businesses recognize the trend toward environmentally benign technologies, the better equipped they will be to survive the international competition in energy efficiency.
The Business Council for a Sustainable Energy
Future, formed by companies and associations in the fields of electricity, gas, renewable energies and energy efficiency, was established in the USA as early as 1992. It takes action for rapid market introduction of low-CO2and CO2-free (regenera-tive) energy resources, and for increasing the en-ergy efficiency in industrialized and developing countries. This involves technologies and meas-ures such as automobile engines that do not burn mineral oils, renewable energy sources in the po-wer supply industry, greater use of combined heat and power generation and district heating, and, last but not least, a rethinking of research prior-ities in the energy field.
The Business Council pointed out at the Berlin Conference that climate protection measures should not be seen as a cost factor only, but that they can lead to economic benefits in the long term. The Council therefore advocates the intro-duction of energy taxes, greater support for re-newable energy sources and a departure from en-vironmentally damaging subsidies.
The Council’s summary assessment of the Berlin Conference is that it failed to fulfil the hopes placed in it at Rio de Janeiro: firstly, no protocol was estab-lished, and secondly, the wording of the Berlin Man-date gives rise to worries that the substance of the protocol to be adopted in two years might not match up to original expectations. On the other hand, there is no denying that the first Conference of the Parties, by acknowledging the inadequacy of the commit-ments and adopting the Mandate to draw up a proto-col by 1997, has taken the next steps for an effective climate protection policy. What is important now is that existing commitments and targets be maintained and developed further in determined fashion, in or-der that the Framework Convention on Climate Change become a powerful instrument for interna-tional climate protection.
1.2
The Relevance of the Human Factor to Climate A number of new scientific findings were pre-sented on the occasion of the Berlin Conference, all of which underscore the urgent need of political ac-tion to protect the climate. Particularly noteworthy are the model calculations of the Max Planck Insti-tute for Meteorology, Hamburg and the Hadley Cen-tre for Climate Prediction and Research, Bracknell, UK, as well as the interim report of the Intergovern-mental Panel on Climate Change, requested by the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the
Berlin Conference. The most important findings are summarized below.
1.2.1
Evidence for the Anthropogenic Greenhouse Effect
New model calculations and statistical analyses carried out by the Max Planck Institute for Meteor-ology in Hamburg have shown that there is a 95%
probability that the temperature changes of the last 30 years were not caused by natural fluctuations in climate. Even though the word “proof” was deliber-ately avoided in the discussion (Hasselmann as cited by Göpfert, 1995), the Council assumes that for such a high probability people are to be seen as the causal agents of global warming: only anthropogenic depo-sition of trace gases in the atmosphere is able to ex-plain the observed degree of radiative forcing.
In the study produced by von Hegerl et al. (1994), the observed trends of mean surface temperatures in the period since 1860 were tested using the so-called
“optimum fingerprint method” to see if they could be explained by natural climate variability. This method uses geographical patterns, whereby observations of regions with relatively low greenhouse gas signals relative to natural temperature variability are weigh-ted lower than regions with relatively large green-house gas signals relative to natural temperature var-iability. However, there is insufficient longitudinal data as yet to quantify these findings. The global
geo-BOX 23
ICLEI – International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives
ICLEI, the association of communal environ-mental protection initiatives, showed at the Mu-nicipal Leaders’ Summit on Climate Change held parallel to the Berlin Conference that there are al-ready numerous successful activities at local level worldwide, alongside the slow progress of interna-tional climate protection policies. 20 cities have al-ready committed themselves to a 20% reduction of CO2emissions by the year 2005.
Representatives of 160 cities from 65 countries (representing over 250 million people) at the Mu-nicipal Leaders’ Summit presented a large num-ber of local measures for protecting the climate.
These include stronger support for renewable en-ergies and ecological housing construction, as well
as improved energy efficiency of public facilities and buildings and greater use of less environmen-tally damaging transportation in cities. Because the participants, as local decision-makers, are clo-ser to individual decisions relating to environmen-tally sound action than politicians at national or international level, they demand greater involve-ment in energy sector decision-making and the creation of an appropriate national framework.
In their final communiqué, the participants at the Municipal Leaders’ Summit expressed strong support for the AOSIS protocol calling on devel-oped nations to commit themselves to a 20% re-duction in CO2 emissions. Non-industrialized countries are called on not to follow in the foot-steps of the industrialized countries, but instead to decouple economic growth and energy consump-tion by using renewable energy sources and in-creasing their energy efficiency.
103 Accounting for Anthropogenic Sulfate Aerosols in Global Circulation Models C 1.2.2
graphical pattern of natural climate variability was therefore simulated with climate models (global cou-pled ocean-atmosphere circulation model, simula-tion without anthropogenic disturbance).
Figure 12 shows that on the basis of an analysis of the 20-year mean trends since 1935, the variable se-lected for detection of the anthropogenic climate sig-nal in 1990 (this value corresponds to the trend for the period between 1971 and 1990) exceeds the threshold value equivalent to a statistical probability of 95% for such detection. The detection variable represents the geographical pattern of the observed temperature trend. The regions of the Earth that are not adequately represented in the observed data due to inadequate measurements were filtered out dur-ing the analysis. The development of the detection variable, shown as a function of natural climate vari-ability, is tested statistically against two data sets de-scribing climate variability, namely the observations adjusted to exclude anthropogenic disturbance and the temperature curves as predicted by the climate models (excluding anthropogenic disturbance). The data used to exclude anthropogenic disturbance from the observed data are simulated by the climate models with and without anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations (observations 1935-1985, Busi-ness-as-Usual emission scenario from 1985 onwards;
IPCC, 1990).
1.2.2
Accounting for Anthropogenic Sulfate Aerosols in Global Circulation Models
Anthropogenic impacts on climate due to green-house gas emissions are partially off-set by increased release of aerosols, although with considerable re-gional variations (WBGU, 1993). Aerosols interfere
with the radiation balance. Their strongest anthropo-genic sources are located in the industrialized regions of the northern hemisphere. This partial compensa-tion for global warming, which has not been taken into account by climate models to date, is considered to be one reason why model calculations have so far produced a temperature increase of 0.95 ±0.35 °C since the beginning of industrialization, whereas the actually observed temperature increase is only 0.45
±0.15 °C.
Efforts are now being made to examine the com-plex effect of aerosols on the climate using coupled ocean-atmosphere circulation models. However, the-re is still some uncertainty the-regarding the dithe-rect im-pact on climate of anthropogenic aerosols: estimates for the globally averaged effect produce a level of ra-diative forcing since pre-industrial times of between -0.25 and -1 W m-2 (Fig. 14; Charlson et al., 1992;
Kaufman and Chou, 1993; Kiehl and Briegleb, 1993).
It has been virtually impossible to quantify the indi-rect aerosol effect: an initial estimate for the global average is around -1.3 W m-2(Jones et al., 1994).
Despite the number of aerosol effects on climate
Despite the number of aerosol effects on climate