The Fight against ‘Terrorism’ in the Horn Region and Its Implication towards the Afar-

The scenario in post-9/11 offered new opportunities to the Issa/Somali government of Djibouti. The war on terror is like ‘a new lease on life’ for the long lasting Issa dominancy in Djibouti. The strategic position of Djibouti yet again engrossed the attention of western powers. As Schermerhorn (2005:60) argued if “Djibouti did not exist, it would have to be created. Not only as a lifeline for Ethiopia but as a safety valve for the region and an insurance policy.” Thus, Schermerhorn, former U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti, continued to argue as “the premiums we have paid to keep that policy in force have constituted a worthwhile investment.” Indeed, Djibouti was arguing with French for increment of the military base rent income⁸⁹ and also was searching other alternatives to

89In February [2003], the French agreed to increase annual payments for the military base from $20m to

$34m. (Bollee 2003:483)

support its economy. Apart from the port service, Djibouti also brings its geo-strategy comparative advantage in the service market. Bollee (2003:483) wrote as “the [French]

military base costs about $160m per annum, not all of which goes to Djibouti. There are about $10m of scheduled local military spending and about $25m in economic aid.”

However, this is not sufficient, and the Djiboutian government has been dreaming for years of finding another wealthy patron. It courted Libya and the Arab League, Italy and Iraq, but did not succeed. Then came the global war against terrorism that according to Bollee (ibid) “has proved a bonanza for the mini-state on the Red Sea” by inviting potential customers including USA and Germany. Marchal (2005:282) described Djibouti’s ambition as follows: “it [Djibouti] quite effectively played the card of Japan and made sure to keep American and French interests alive.” Attilio (2004:630) in his part affirmed US interest in the region by stating as “in the Horn of Africa the United States is attempting to replace one set of shackles (anticommunism) with yet another (anti-Islamic fundamentalism).” Hence, as strongly argued by Schermerhorn (2005:49), after launching operations in Afghanistan in later 2001, “the United States solicited Djibouti as a host for American forces in [Camp Lemonier] and welcomed the country as a partner in the Global War on Terrorism.⁹⁰ In fact, this is not the first time that the United States has profited from Djibouti’s geographic relevance and accessibility; U.S.

forces transited frequently under an informal understanding during the Gulf War [1991]

and the UNOSOM/UNITAF peacekeeping exercise in Somalia [Operation Restore Hope for Somalia 1992].”

Overall, Djibouti is flourishing once again as the U.S. Central Command’s Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) based in its soil. CIA selected Djibouti for

90 As explained by Bollee (2003:483), “US made the first contacts as early as 20 September [2001], and US deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Mike Westphal arrived in Djibouti on 19 November 2001.

Eager to send its Kriegsmarine into warm waters it has not seen since the last war, Germany [too] signed a Memorandum of Understanding in early January 2002 to take part in the ‘war on terrorism’. By the end of the month, German soldiers had landed in Djibouti. In October of the same year there were 700 US troops at Camp Lemonier, and the US Army decided to create a Combined Joint Task Force under Major General Frank Sattler.” The Us ambassador in Djibouti, Schermerhorn (2005:50) has also announced that

‘reinvigorated bilateral relations were celebrated by U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s stop in Djibouti in late 2002 and a White House meeting between Guelleh and President Bush [On 20 January 2003], an event that resulted in promise of significant increases in U.S. aid. As highlighted in (Bollee 2003:483) “Undisclosed deal worth about $30m a year.”

the installation of a Voice of America transmitter “designed to enlighten the Arab masses on the merits of democracy” (Bollee 2003:484). These new developments in relation to

‘war on terror’ seem an assurance for the Issa/Somali regime in Djibouti as untouchable.

However, the FRUD leader, Mohamed Kadamy has warned that “in the Horn of Africa, the Western military presences are not always synonymous with stability.” The income Djibouti generated due to the new global order is a great advantage for the country however; uneven distribution of share of the pie might lead Djibouti to bloodshed again.

As many other countries of the world, the Djiboutian government is using the terrorism concept to suppress the internal problem. Apart from accusing the opposition parties, there is a report that the government in Djibouti handed over some Afars of Eritrean origin to the Asmara government by accusing them for involvement with terrorist organizations.⁹¹ In addition, in the name of the ‘war on terror’ weapons from AK-47 to anti-aircraft guns are flowing to the Horn region from various locations that ranges from the United States to Puntland and even the AU peacekeepers are reportedly involved.

Generally, as cited by Rotberg (2005:3) “its [anti-terrorism] earnest efforts are appropriately directed as much winning local hearts and minds as to military counter terror operations. The winning of hearts and minds is about strengthening good governance through the region and about making friends for the United States through the projection of soft power and the intelligent exercise of diplomacy.” Otherwise Djibouti herself is facing a local turmoil with similar forms of terrorism.

91 Even though the information could not be verified with any other sources, The Reporter Newspaper issued on 10 May 2008 has published that ‘Djibouti, which is in the middle of a border dispute with Eritrea, handed over five days ago, an Eritrean suspected of Ethiopian railroad bombing near Dire Dawa and allegedly with links to Al qaeda’s east Africa branch, a senior Djibouti security official told the media. The suspect, an Eritrean of Afar decent, was detained on January 3^rd this year and is being held in Djiboutian capital. He was under investigation regarding phone calls he reportedly made on his UAE GSM cell phone to some of the bombers responsible for the attack on Ethiopia.’

Box 9. Arms Flow to Somalia

Alain Charret has identified the major actors involved and the routes for the flow of arms in Somalia. According to his findings (Charret 2006), “The weapons continue to flow into Somalia, a country that is nevertheless subject to an international embargo [since 1992] decreed by the United Nations. […] Many of the weapons available on the market come from Yemen [official supplier for TFG] and anchored off on the coast of Puntland. The weapons are then collected in Bossaso where they take the direction of Mogadishu by road. There are several kinds of weapons, ranging from classic Kalashnikov AK-47, to different types of anti-aircraft guns. Eritrea [also]

provides equipment to opponents, as well as Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya. Meanwhile, Ethiopia provides weapons to the TFG. Thus, for example, in late March, one of the ten tons of weapons that were sent to Ethiopia to Jowhar, by the way, included mortars and anti-tank grenades. [Even America’

role is too high] recently reported that Porter Goss, director of the CIA, would have paid a brief visit to Somalia in February. A visit that was followed by the dispatch of American intelligence agents in Mogadishu. Their mission was to provide funds to certain warlords in the capital, in exchange for information about members of Al Qaeda in Somalia. For the moment, there is no indication that Washington has provided more than just money to those warlords. But in the current circumstances, it is highly probable that American money is used to buy arms.

Washington would thus, at least indirectly, contributed to the violation of the embargo.”

Astonishingly enough, AU also exacerbates the situation. As cited in (Lederer 2008) “‘elements’

of the African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia [AMISOM has over 2,500 Ugandan and Burundian troops] and the country's transitional government were involved in illegal trafficking.

[…] Somalia's breakaway northern regions of Puntland and Somaliland are other entry points for weapons.” Alain Charret (2006) further extended the list of countries involved in trafficking arms to Somalia by stating as “No fewer than seven states are accused of having supplied arms to the Islamic Courts Union (Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Syria and Saudi Arabia). Syria and Iran have delivered arms to Somali Islamists to thank them for sending hundreds of their fighters in southern Lebanon to help Hezbollah in repelling the latest Israeli offensive. On the other hand, the report highlights the presence of two Iranian nationals in the region of Dhusamareeb. Tehran has been obtained, in exchange for the supply of arms, permission to conduct field surveys to verify the presence of uranium in the basement.”