The Carrot-plus-Stick Approach

Issa/Somalis crossed the Mero River border and reached to Afdem that is almost 147km deep intrusion from Mero.¹⁰¹ Indeed, apart from administrative restructuring and peace negotiations, the Imperial government also attempted to use military force to bring lasting resolution for the Afar-Issa/Somali age-old conflict.

‘Ethiopians troops recently killed a large number of Esa tribesmen, and although the massacre took place deep inside Ethiopia territory, beyond the bounds of the Haud and the reserved area, some of the people killed were British-protected Somalis.’

Indeed, the coercive measures taken by the central government ease the tension temporarily. However, after some years of relative stability, raids and counter raids are intensified since early 1960s. Accordingly, the Harar Governorate General reached a consensus on the necessity of using force to settle down the tension spread over the Awraja. In the meeting held on 11/7/1960 Dej. Kefle Yergetu, Governor General of Harar, talked about the relative stability of the Awraja for the last four years and reported about recent attacks launched by Issas against neighboring Adal and Oromo. According to the Minutes of this meeting the Governor said that ‘In last January 1957, Issas launched attack against the Adal and security forces and the higher court at Afdem decided on them to pay a total of 341,000 br as penalty for the damaged they have caused but they pay not more than 25,000 br yet. Furthermore, Issa elders deliberately corporate with the outlaws [...] the Ugaas gathered the people and told them to fight with the government security forces.’ This speech of the Governor indicates that some coercive actions seemed to bring fruit while due to lack of serious follow ups and mishandling of the case rather aggravated the conflict. The government fire brigade showed up again, put the fire out and went without reviewing what was happened yesterday. Therefore, this conflict is became sophisticated from time to time while the government was stuck with its task of fire brigade rescue service.

Issa/Somalis clearly understood the government weakness and thus abused the system by systematically pushing the government to circulate with the orbit the Somalis have created. They even changed the name of places they occupied in order to bring it as a

compensation on behalf of their relatives. On the hand, the Ethiopian Minister for Foreign Affairs has replied to the British embassy in a letter sent on 27/7/1956 Ref. no 663/IA/48 addressed to John Killick, Charge de Affair, her Britannica Majesty’s embassy stated as ‘regarding a police action which occurred near Errer during the first week in February, there is absolutely no evidence that the British protected nomadic Issa had penetrated so far in to the territory of Ethiopia beyond the grazing area and were consequently involved in the incident.[it] took place approximately 200 kms from the frontier.[According to the] contents of the ministry of interior’s report prepared shortly after the incident, the Issas had conducted a raid on the Adal and had stolen a large number of that tribes cattle. A small police detachment from Afdem proceeded to investigate the reports of the thefts and in the course of their investigations members of the Issa tribe opened fire upon police officers and two police constables were wounded. [Hence we believe that there was] no unnecessary force was employed.

justification for convincing government officials who have no background history of the case. Apart from arguing as ‘this is where our ancestors used to live’; re-naming of the occupied territories could also be used as a new source of evidence for the coming generation in order to strengthen their claim of ownership. When their elders or clan chiefs and sheiks died, the funeral place would automatically be named after the deceased.

According to Dej. Kefle Yergetu ‘Issa’s arrogance is a result of lack of disciplinary action from the government.’ Thus, he urged for punitive measure to be taken against the outlaws. Issa chiefs, on the other hand went far to threat government officials particularly during the independence of Somali Republic. For instance, in a meeting held on 18/7/1960 an Issa chief, Fit. Dehur Betel explained the situation he faced in his trip to Ambuli together with the Governor of the Adal and Issa Wereda, Ato Seife Sahlu, in which he warned government officials by saying that ‘Issas could definitely attack government forces if we [Issa chiefs] were not in the place together.’ Ugaas Hassen further confirmed as ‘in that incident [while government delegates visted Issa areas] Issas were ready to open attack on the military camp at Ambuli.’

Consequently, the government decided to mobilize a military force with a ‘special mission’ against the Issa. A confidential letter sent by Mehrete Ab Tedela, Sergeant from Campaign, Information and Training Department of the army on 22/7/1960 Ref. no.

19/20023/52 to Lt. Colonel Berhe Hadegu, Commander of the 12^th Infantry Division-Special Mission to Issa camped at Erer, stated that ‘according to the order from Governor General of Harar, your army is ordered to mobilize its force for a mission to eliminate the rebellion [which raised due to the propaganda from Mogadishu].’ After undertaking this punitive measure, however, Issas continue to resent to the government. Meanwhile, Awraja leaderships have attempted to remind Issas the stick of the government and warned them to cooperate in bringing lasting peace in the Awraja. On the other hand, the Awraja administration attempted to solve the problem by giving ‘carrot’ as well. As it is indicated on the Minute of a meeting led by Qegnazmach Sahlu Gebre Heywot, Governor of Adal, Issa and Garaguracha Awraja, held on 23/9/1960 Ugass Hassen argued that ‘the past three years relative peace, according to his believe, is achieved as a result of the

Governor’s strategy to give much money to the most known forty-five Issa outlaws and their leaders from all clans rather than elders sincere effort as you mentioned.’

Military actions against the Issas were intensified during the first Ethio-Somali war in which Issas mobilized massively by supporting Mogadishu. At the end of 1964, the army got an order to get rid off Issa outlaws ranges from 1500 to 5000. The General Governor of Harar, Lt. Colonel Tamrat Yegezu asked a green light for his mission from Emperor Haile Selassie. The military force urged to be ready for the ‘special mission to Issa’ was not only the ground force but it also include the Air force. According to the confidential letter sent by General Governor of Harar, Lt. Colonel Tamrat Yegezu on 28/10/1964 with Ref.no.1/766/1/72/17 addressed to 3rd Infantry Battalion explained the information he received from Governor of Erer Wereda about Issas all rounded preparation to launch severe attack against the Assahimera Adals around Gewane area and he urged to make the Air force ready as requested by the telegram sent by Brg. General Abebe Kebede. As a number of reports have been reached to the government about the Issa/Somali military strength in both logistic and training wise particularly after the independence of Somalia , government did not only took serious military measures but also had an attitude to balance the muscle of the two conflicting parties.

Subsequent to the appeal of Adal chiefs from Harar Governorate General that put forward to His Majesty on 23/12/1964 described the damage Afars incurred due to blunder committed by well equipped Issa’s, asked government support to defense themselves. Accordingly, the letter written on 27/1/1965 by Solomon Gebre Mariam, the Minister of Pen has informed Maj. General Debebe Haile Mariam, Commander of the Royal Bodyguard Force, about the order given by the Emperor, which is a permission to provide 100 guns for Afars through the Minister of Interior. Though the Emperor has rejected the planned massive military punitive measure against the Issa, he has chosen to

‘balance’ the Somalia Republic-backed Issas against the Afar pastoralists by granting them the pre-Italian period guns, 50 Dimotfor and 50 Mauzeer (local names).

Furthermore, in his way to Kulubi (The feast of Saint Gabriel in a church near to Dire Dawa), the Emperor gave order to grant 5000 br to Adals as compensation for the loss

they incurred due to the Issas successive blunder.¹⁰⁴ Somalis consider the Emperors stand for opposing the execution of the planned major military punitive measure as ‘kind nature of the king’ but from the Afars view giving them ‘old weapons and small sum of money while turn a blind eye for their attack by a foreign backed well-trained Somali fighters is considered as not only as oversimplification of the conflict but also a deliberate act of check and balance against the Muslim peripheral groups.’

Nevertheless, using force against Issa/Somalis persisted long to the age of the Imperial régime. Number of Letters exchanges between the local administrations and authorities in the centre indicated the urgency need of military measure against the Issa/Somali who reportedly accused for attacking Adals, killing policemen, raid the Ittu and Kerreyu Oromos land by crossing the Awash Bridge.¹⁰⁵ Even though the attempt brought no valuable result in resolving the conflict, the Emperor’s rewards of money and ranks (the carrot) to the Issa chieftains continued until the downfall of the Imperial government.

According to a letter written on 8/12/1972 Ref. no. 1/254/849/48 by Harar Governorate General addressed to Colonel Desta Gemeda, Governor of Dire Dawa, Issa and Gurgura Awraja, ‘with all the desire of His Majesty, two Issa clan chiefs, one was Ugaas Hassen, have been awarded agricultural tractors.’