Presently, th e Yugoslav area breeds p rim a rily poverty and social anom ie.3 I t is a w asteland excluded from European in te g ra tio n , n ot only p o litic a lly and econom ically, b ut also in term s o f civiliza tio n processes4.
The fin a l stage fo r the Yugoslav catastrophe was set in th e late 1980s. A t th e tim e , econom ic indicators d id not appear to lead to disaster.
Q uite the contrary, the last federal governm ent under p rim e m in is te r A nte M a rk o v id in tro d u ce d reform s th a t ju m p -sta rte d the national econom y in to som ething o f a boom .5 O f a ll eastern and southeastern states, Yugoslavia came closest to fu tu re m em bership in the E uropean C om m unity. Yet, w ith in a short tim e the reform ist M arkovié governm ent was sent in to o b liv - ion by the leaders o f ethnic chauvinist movements in the federal republics.
The powers o f a n ti-re fo rm ism , p ro vin cia lism , and n a tio n a l to ta lita ria n ism em erged victo rio u s.6
T h e ir p o litic a l programs were not based on pragm atic plans fo r m ar- ke t-o rie n te d econom ic changes and c iv il p o litic a l reform b u t on “ talism anic
E
renouncem ents.” 7 These consisted essentially o f prom ises to save the b io - )gical survival o f the nation w hich, in the irra tio n a l ideology o f the e th n ic chauvinism m ovem ents' leaders, was jeopardized by dem onic designs o f o th e r Yugoslav nations.Tw o im p o rta n t mechanisms provided fo r the hom ogenization o f the Yugoslav nations in to ethnic chauvinism movements. The firs t was the in - ve n tio n o f histories o f eternal antagonism betw een the nations reaching back in to th e dark ages.8 I t thereby became easier to in te rp re t th e u -tu rn from b u ild in g a m odern Yugoslav nation (in the p o litic a l, not e th n ic sense) tow ards m utual exterm ination as the in e vita b le re tu rn to a quasi-natural state o f relations between Serbs, Croats, Moslem s, and others. The second was dehum anization o f the adversary nation and tu rn in g it, in th e percep- tio n o f the masses, in to hordes o f satanic creatures.8
A t th e same tim e nation al rom anticism , m uch along n in e te e n th - ce n tu ry G erm an and o th e r w estern European prototypes, was prom oted by the authorities to become the o ffic ia lly approved c u ltu ra l m o d e l.10 A lm ost absolute com m and over mass m edia was essential fo r establishing d ire c t ru le o f pow er centers in the republics over homogeneous, a u tistic masses.
D espite the drastic change o f the dom inant p o litic a l paradigm in the post-Yugoslav states, pow er structures stayed m uch in place, especially in the h a rd core o f pow er in the Balkans, the security forces. The state appara- tus o f th e Yugoslav republics rem ained m ostly in ta ct d u rin g the m e ta m o
r-f
)hosis from C om m unist to e th n ic chauvinist status. The n o m in a lly new e a d e rs h ip s 11 in th e Yugoslav re p u b lics, in re a lity em anating fro m th e C om m unist p a rty nom enclature, sim ply phased o u t th e ir tra d itio n a l basic le g itim iz a tio n claim th a t th e y w ere th e guarantee o f social ju s tic e , and aaopted a new self-styled role as the w arrant o f national justice.T his som ersault in to a new p o litic a l le g itim iz a tio n posture co u ld n ot appear cre d ib le because, a fte r all, th ere were no young, p o litic a lly u n - tarnished new leaders around. The collective tra n sfo rm a tio n from perm is- sive com m unism to auth o rita ria n nationalism w ith in th e ranks o f le a d e r- ship in the Yugoslav republics was bound to be rid ic u le d by p u b lic o p in io n , had a rational p o litic a l dispute been perm itte d . B ut th is was not to be and,
th e re fo re , the venom o f e th n ic chauvinistic hatred was in je c te d in to the psychology o f the masses to make them p o litic a lly b lin d , d e a f and m u te .12 A t th e same tim e, the g rip o f a rig id state apparatus on a feeble society w ith little dem ocratic tra d itio n was excessively increased.
The key fa cto r in the disintegration o f the fo rm e r Yugoslav society and state was the “ unw illingness ana th e in a b ility o f th e p o litic a l e lite to lead th e process o f m odernization and system tra n sfo rm a tio n — nationalism Served as an in stru m e n t o f the C om m unist e lite to survive and to p ro fit fro m th e new situ a tio n .” 13
Regimes based on fear and hatred are not capable o f rational behav- io r .14 W hen econom ic cooperation and regional in te g ra tio n are discussed as ways o ut o f the Balkan p o litica l conflicts, it appears unavoidable to con- elude th a t no p o litic a l preconditions exist fo r th is o p tio n .19 E ven i f by some m iracle tne post-Yugoslav states w ould decide to enhance cooperation w ith th e outside w orld , it is d o u b tfu l th a t th e ir national economies and po- litic a i cultures, deform ed by w ar and authoritarian rule, could be m u tu a lly com patible o r w o rld co m p e titive .16
The im petus fo r a solution has to be introduced fro m th e outside.
B u t w hy should the outside w o rld care, especially a fte r th e Yugoslav na- tions p re fe rre d to vote fo r m u tu a lly assured a n n ih ila tio n 17 and fo r rem ain- in g subm issive to th e ir respective leaderships a fte r so m uch d e stru ctio n and k illin g ? A nd w hy should the national leaderships accept fo re ig n m edi- ta tio n i f it runs counter to th e ir interests?
A part from the general m oral outrage at the ongoing carnage in fo r- m er Yugoslavia, there are other, more com pelling reasons fo r ou tsid e in - te rve n tio n , especially from the W est.
One reason is th a t p ro vid in g re in te g ra tio n mechanism s fo r a s e lf- sustained recovery in the Yugoslav area is cheaper than spending W estern tax-payers' money on peacekeeping forces and hum anitarian aid.
A nother is th a t o th e r southeastern European states are negatively affected by the Yugoslav w ar in th e ir tra n sitio n tow ards m arket econom y and p o litic a l pluralism . Trade, tra ffic , econom ic cooperation, and a ll o th e r form s o f com m unication in the region are severely damaged by th e c o n flic t.
The shortest land connections between w estern and ce n tra l E urope and Greece, T urkey, and the M iddle East have been severed by the Yugoslav w ar.
A th ird reason has to do w ith broader security interests. A lth o u g h the Yugoslav w ar is s till only a regional co n flict, European and w o rld s ta - b ility are also at stake. A lbania and Bulgaria could be draw n in to th e new phase o f w ar i f it w ould spread south. Greece and T urkey appear poised to participate in a Balkan shoot out.
T he F rench-G erm an re la tio n s h ip ,18 th e new R ussian-A m erican partnership, th e fu tu re o f N A TO , even dom estic U.S. p o litic s — a ll have been adversely in fluenced by the c o n flic t in fo rm e r Yugoslavia. Russian foreign m in is te r A ndrey Kozyrev was not overstating w hen he repeatedly w arned th a t th is c o n flic t contains th e p o te n tia l fo r trig g e rin g W o rld W ar I I I .
F urtherm ore, i f one is to indulge in the new ly fashionable th eories
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about “ co n flicts o f c iv iliz a tio n s ,” there is a potential in the Yugoslav w ar even fo r such A rm ageddon-like scenarios.
N A T O secretary general W illy Claes recently voiced his b e lie f th a t Is la m ic fu n d a m e n ta lism poses a g re a te r th re a t to th e W est th a n C om m unism ever d id 19. There is almost no W estern d ip lo m a t w ho does not, in private conversations, p o in t out that fo r European standards, an in - to lera ble degree o f influence by Moslem fundam entalism is already estab- lished in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The fate o f Yugoslav Moslems is also an issue in th e in tra -Is la m ic co m p e titio n fo r prestige and power. M oderate and radical p o litic a l streams in T u rke y clash on the Bosnia issue. Even fundam entalist states like Ira n and Saudi A rabia com pete fo r in flu e n ce in Bosnia and th e n e ig h b o rin g Isla m ic com m unities.
Tw o c o n flic tin g approaches have emerged regarding how to p u t an end to th e dism em berm ent o f Federal Yugoslavia. O ne, o rig in a lly p ro - m oted by Germ an diplom acy under form er foreign m in iste r H a n s-D ie trich G enscher, was to stop the disintegration at the borders o f th e six co n - s titu e n t republics. The rig h t to self-determ ination was proclaim ed to be equal to th e rig h t to create separate national states as long as they pledged to tre a t nation al m in o ritie s aecently. T hrough G erm any’s pressure on o th e r E uropean countries to recognize the separatist repu blics, it has eventually become the general W estern approach, adopted fin a lly by the U .S .20 as w ell. I t is also, at least nom inally, the platform o f the five-pow er C ontact G roup fo r Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Bonn’s c h ie f argum ent fo r the arm w restling o f its partners to o pt fo r re c o g n itio n o f tn e breakaw ay re p u b lics was to p re c lu d e tn e
“ radicalizatíon o f the rig h t to self-determ ination by the Serbs” 21 and in th is m anner prevent fu rth e r c o n flic t and fragm entation in the region.22
In th e m eantim e, the in itia l G erm an/W estern approach has been abandoned both in the C ontact Group plan fo r Bosnia ana Herzegovina and th e Z~4 plan fo r C roatia. T e rrito ria l p a rtitio n o f the tw o fo rm er Yugoslav republics affected by w ar is the essence o f the plans, although th in ly ve ile d by ra th e r fantastic proposals, how to organize the fu tu re states to keep the pretense o f preserving existing intra-Yugoslav borders. The w a rrin g sides re je ct these plans exactly because o f th e ir herm aphrodite character. The Serbian side feels cheated o u t o f exacting a price fo r its m ilita ry victo ry, th e se lf-style d Serb states in Bosnia and K rajina, whereas the C roat and M oslem sides refuse to accept the loss o f th e ir sovereign states, recognized by th e in te rn a tio n a l com m unity.
T he o th e r basic approach was rarely elaborated in e x p lic it te rm s.
Professor Svetozar Stojanovic , c h ie f adviser to the fo rm e r p re sid e n t o f FRY D obrica Cosić, was one o f the few im portant figures to state p u b lic ly th a t “ o n ly a radical reorganization o f the state stru ctu re in the Balkans”
co u ld end the c o n flic t. T his concept o f radical reorganization means no th - in g less than new borders, in clu d in g the recognition o f A lbania’s claim s to some parts o f Kosovo. In the eyes o f the W estern public, th is plan am ounts to th e creation o f G reater Serbia, G reater Croatia, and G reater Albania, and possibly th e disappearance o f Bosnia, Herzegovina, and FYR M acedonia as
sovereign states.
Bearing in m ind the depth o f foreign involvem ent in the Yugoslav c o n flic t a fte r fo u r years o f war, reorganizing the Balkans entails a m odern rem ake o f the San Stefano and B erlin congresses o f 1878. In o th e r w ords, a deal has to be struck between great powers exerting th e ir influence to up - h o ld the interests o f th e ir particular client-states in the region.
The five powers determ ining now the fu tu re o f th e Yugoslav area have p u b licly rejected this radical approach, b ut have p riv a te ly in co rp o ra te d decisive elem ents o f it in the tw o existing peace plans and in th e ir own po- litic a i m aneuvering in the area.
S urprisingly enough, it was Germany, the fo re ig n pow er th a t had insisted on preserving the form er intern al borders o f th e Yugoslav federa- tio n to prevent fu rth e r conflicts, that in itia te d the creation o f new state en- titie s 23 o b lite ra tin g the form er borders. The U.S., having vowed n o t the accept the fru its of aggression, took over th is Germ an suggestion and gave life and guidance to the M oslem -C roat F e d e ra tio n in Bosnia and H erzegovina and its C onfederation w ith C roatia,24 and th is a fte r C roatia d id itsD est to grab as much as possible o f Bosnia, a fte r Bosnian Serbs, sup- p o rte d by Belgrade, launched th e ir attack on the Bosnian Moslems.
In practical term s, the U.S. and Germ any accepted and prom oted th e creation o f new state entities in the Yugoslav area.2*5 F u rth e rm o re , by signing a m ilita ry cooperation treaty w ith C roatia and p ro v id in g m ilita ry su p p o rt to th e M oslem governm ent in Sarajevo and tn e M oslem -C roat F ederation o f Bosnia and Herzegovina, and by establishing a v is ib le m ili- ta ry presence in Albania and Macedonia, the U.S. also m arked its new areas o f influence in the Balkans. Russia’s recent m ilita ry tre a ty w ith the FR Y rounded o ff th is new set o f dependencies.
Presently, the p o litica l stage in form er Yugoslavia is dom inated by e xtre m ist chauvinist leaders. They are involved in subordinate re la tio n - ships w ith outside powers. But events have proven th a t n e ith e r th e U.S.
and G erm any on one side nor Russia on the o th e r can exert fu ll rem ote co n tro l over the w ill o f th e ir protégés. Foreign influence s till prevents the w orst possible outcom e, a total war in the Balkans, b ut outside powers can- n ot im pose a se ttle m e n t.26 Both foreign pro te cto rs and th e ir Yugoslav clients have arrived at an impasse th a t could easily perpetuate th e present
Balkan entropy. A new approach appears appropriate.
In dealing w ith post-Yugoslav states, the outside powers, in co m p re - hensibly, have never addressed the roots o f the w ar, th e m ilita n t, a n ti- dem ocratic character o f the newly established regimes and th e ir alm ost to - ta l g rip on society. Foreign support to c iv il and dem ocratic p o litic a l a lte r- natives in th e new states is alm ost non-existent.27 A nd c iv il rig h ts and in d ivid u a l hum an rights seem to be a m arginal issue when foreign o fficia ls deal w ith post-Yugoslav leaders.
A strategy to drain the roots o f w ar w ould reject existing regim es as the sole representatives o f the new states and tre a t them fo r w hat they are, a u th o rita ria n and anti-dem ocratic aliens in the in te rn a tio n a l co m m u n ity.28 The new strategy w o u ld take up proposals developed by c iv il p o litic a l groups in post-Yugoslav states and grant them equal im portance. N ew ly
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form ed dependencies on foreign protectors could help overcome the resis- tance o f tne autocratic regimes to foreign in te rve n tio n in w hat they c o n - sider to be in te rn a l affairs.
F o r example, the Belgrade chapter o f the European m ovem ent has id e n tifie d in its charta o f Rights ana Freedom s29 ways and means fo r reintegrating the area. F or instance, the authors propose th a t every holder o f citizenship o f form er Yugoslavia w ould enjoy the same rights in a ll sue- cessor states. D iscrim in a to ry laws and practices against new foreigners should be abolished, and constant international co n tro l over human rights issues introduced....These and other proposals pursue a ro ll-b a ck strategy against e th n ic chauvinism by dem anding supra-national rig h ts and fre e - doms, m odeled on E U legislation.
C iv il p o litic a l parties, groups, in s titu tio n s and m edia in p o st- Yugoslav states, no m atter how m arginally relevant at th is stage, deserve support from the international com m unity. Peaceful change ana reintegra- tio n in the region depend on the emergence o f alternative p o litic a l options to the present hegemony o f authoritarian ethnic chauvinists.
Somewhere in the halls o f the Palais Des N ations in Geneva, the London Conference on form er Yugoslavia s till survives. Through an e ffo rt o f the p a rticip a tin g foreign powers and by drawing on the expertise o f civic p o litic a l parties and personalities in the post-Yugoslav states, th is fo ru m could be the birthplace o f a reintegration project fo r the area. Rather than a ttem p ting sim p listicly to slice form er Yugoslavia in to grotesque new e n ti- ties, the new plan should provide a general solution.
The starting p o in t must be the re h a b ilita tio n o f the rights and fre e - doms o f the in d ivid u a l and the lim ita tio n o f the pow er and im portance o f the nation-state.
N O T E S
1. Jens Reuter, “ Die Wirtschaftskrise in der BR Jugoslawien",
Südosteuropa
8 (1994).2. Handelsblatt, Düsseldorf, 20 July 1994.
3. According to an estimate by a W orld Bank economist, the Balkans and Poland would together need some U.S.$2.2 billion to bring the poor from far be- low to just to the poverty line. Branko Milanovič, "A Cost o f Transition: 50 M illio n New Poor and Growing Inequality,” in
Transition
(The W orld Bank, October 1994).4. In 1994 more than 2.1 m illion citizens o f Serbia did not consume the minimum necessary food. Almost 90% o f the population was poor or threatened by poverty. Aleksandra PoSarac, “ Poverty in Serbia 1990-1994,” Institute o f Economic Sciences, Belgrade (Vreme, 9 January 1995). PoSarac concludes that if the establishment o f civil society has free, independent, self-conscious, and au- tonomous citizens as a precondition, then at this moment the inhabitants o f Serbia do not qualify for this category
5. More than 50,000 private enterprises were established in 1990. Foreign investment in that year exceeded the sum o f all external capital inflow since
1978, when foreign investments were perm itted for the first tim e in post-war Yugoslavia.
6 See Dušan Janjić, "Nationalism, M inorities and the Chances o f a New Community,׳״ in Predrag Simić (ed.),
Crises and Reform
(Belgrade: 1994), p. 108ff.7. Glen Bowman, “Xenophobia, Fantasy and the Nation..."
Balkan Forum,
2 (1994, Skopje).8. A popular tune in the official ideology both in Serbia and Croatia varies the m o tif about the alleged role o f the respective nation as the
antem urale christianitatis,
i.e., the Serbs have to defend Europe from Islamic danger or the Croats perform an even more d ifficu lt task protecting Western civilization from both the Orthodox and Islamic vandals.9. Thus in the official propaganda, the names Serbs, Croats or Moslems were replaced by terror-causing codes
Cetaiks, U
sušms andMujāhedias
..Cetaiks,
andUsušās
were members of, respectively, Serb and Croat m ilitary formations in W orld War I I that indulged in extermination o f the other nation. The usage o fMujahedin
for Moslems is a new invention obviously influenced by Islamic ex- trem ist activities in the Middle East.10. 44The unavoidable sister o f brutality is sentimentality, o f course in its most turgid form ,” German-Jewish author Ralph Giordano in
Die zweite Schuld
, (München: 1990), p. 53.11. W ith the single exception o f Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the transfor- mation from the one-party to the one-nation state progressed under far more complex circumstances.
12. Obviously, Fascist and Nazi totalitarian movements served as models.
13. Janjić, p. 111.
14. A tragicomic example is the constant campaigns against dissident media.
In spite o f the fact for instance that
Nāša ВогЬл
in Serbia orFeral Tribune
in Croatia certainly have no power to overturn the government, such media are constantly satanized and presented as hate objects. Diversity and dissent are natural enemies to ethnic chauvinist regimes that have an inherent tendency towards totalitarian control over society.In spite o f the fact for instance that