Deliberation, social learning and neutrality

A third possibly relevant mechanism puts the quality of the process of will formation within institutions in focus. It relies on the assumption that access for APOs results in the interaction of actors from different constituencies on an equal footing. This creates repercussions on the style and forms of discussion and decision-making. As everyone has to agree to any possible decision, others have to be convinced by rational arguments.

Arguments have to be formulated in a way which theoretically allows all participants to agree to them (Steffek 2003: 265). The micro-mechanism underlying this type of social steering involves learning and persuasion based on arguing (Risse 2006: 183). Each participant in the process presents her arguments and has to grapple with counter-arguments. During this process, new evidence and arguments may induce actors to redefine their preferences (Beisheim & Dingwerth 2010: 81). Ideally, this process leads to a reasoned consensus of which all participants are convinced instead of a bargained compromise which only reflects the relative power positions of participants. Thus, it has been argued that consensus decision-making in itself already adds to institutional legitimacy (Tamm Hallström & Boström 2010: 154–156).

These assumptions strongly build on theories of deliberative democracy. Deliberation refers to the process of how decisions are made, namely through a “process of public reasoning geared toward generating decisions or opinions about how to resolve shared problems” (Brown 2010: 513). In other words, deliberation is about the collective discussion of problems and finding of solutions in the public sphere. Deliberative theory presumes that the political space for deliberation must be inclusive in the sense that all actors affected by policy outcomes (or all relevant points of view) participate (Rosenberg 2007: 9). Given the past fallacies of third-party NGOs in representing affected populations (see Section 1.1.2), the direct participation by APOs thus should improve the deliberative quality of negotiation in transnational institutions. While ideal deliberation is demanding and difficult to institutionalize (Warren 2007: 276–277), it has been assumed that observing some deliberative elements can suffice to improve the process of decision-making (Beisheim & Dingwerth 2010: 81).

In the longer run, cooperative interaction between participants also has the potential to positively affect social relationships. Thus, Boström (2006: 356) argues that organizations in which different constituencies interact have the “ability to overcome particularistic interests and to enhance solidarity as well as to provide forms for exchange and mutual learning”. The argument is that repeated interaction over time between a wide range of actors can result in mutual trust and social learning, as well as in common expectations about proper behavior. This helps to solve conflicts and increases the participating actors’ willingness to find compromises.⁶⁸

While the mechanisms of trust building and social learning affect the relationships between constituencies, sustained interaction also creates repercussions on the level of outcomes. If actors with different interests interact to come to common solutions, this will enhance perceptions of an institution as being neutral towards specific interests (Boström 2006). While this perspective acknowledges that each actor group may participate in an institution motivated by its specific interests, the balanced representation of different constituencies assures that no group can impose their views regarding an issue. As a consequence, the institution is perceived as being neutral to specific interests. In other words, the establishment of a balance of power is considered in itself as a source of credibility of the institution (Boström 2006: 355).

However, if one group comes to dominate decision-making, it is no longer assured that the process is steered towards finding effective solutions. Consequentially, institutional legitimacy will be jeopardized if one party becomes too dominant (Boström 2006: 356–

358).⁶⁹ In this regard, even if decision-making rights are formally equal, differences in resources of participants may result in power imbalances and distort the quality of the process. For example, Brown (2010) has shown with regard to the Global Fund that the political and economic power of donor states led to a marginalization of other participants. Thus, due to the comparative weakness of APOs (Hasenclever & Narr

68 In this context, APOs also pass legitimacy-related information to local populations. This is especially relevant when legitimacy-related mechanisms take place at the individual level. For example, social learning is an individual experience. These experiences need to be passed on to a broader constituency or audience in order to become influential for a broader share of actors (Beisheim & Dingwerth 2010: 80).

69 This concern is not restricted to the participation of presumably weak CSOs on an equal footing with stronger state actors. Tanja Börzel (2010) has pointed to the fact that when weak governments engage in institutionalized cooperation with non-state actors, they might be unable to resist private actor pressure to adopt policies that do not serve the public interest, or even lack the necessary information to judge what lies in the public interest. Thus, a lack of government capacity and power can equally result in a loss of credibility of the respective institution.

2019), this mechanism might be rather difficult to function properly in the case of APO participation. What is more, it relies on participation on an equal footing. The more equal participants of an institution are, the more the institution will be perceived as credible, and the higher the chance that deliberation might occur. At the same time, deliberation is more likely to occur in smaller groups (Papadopoulos & Warin 2007:

451). Thus, I assume that the depth of access is central with regard to the functioning of this mechanism and its impact on perceptions of legitimacy.

Figure 7: Hypothesis specified to sustained interaction. Source: author’s elaborations.

In sum, the mechanism assumes that when APOs gain deep access, different constituencies interact as equals. This, on the one hand, improves the decision-making process, as in the end the best argument prevails, and participants build dependable relationships among each other. On the other hand, it enhances interpretations of the institution as being impartial. Thus, perceptions of legitimacy are enhanced (see Figure 7). The third hypothesis regarding possible links between APO access modes and perceptions of legitimacy specified to interaction on an equal footing and the establishment of a power balance is thus:

H.M3: The deeper access for APOs, the stronger perceptions of legitimacy will be. Through this access, APOs participate as equals with other participants. As a result, arguing and reasoned consensus prevails in deliberation and in the longer run leads to mutual trust between constituencies. Moreover, the institution will be perceived as impartial. This results in perceptions of high legitimacy by constituencies.

Possible observable evidence of this mechanism could be the following: Regarding interaction on an equal footing or a power balance, one might look for specific institutional safeguards to ensure equal participation. Moreover, one might ask for perceptions of participants regarding equal opportunities to influence outcomes. If this mechanisms bears relevance, I assume that participants would highlight the open exchange of opinions and arguments and the space provided for discussion as one

advantage connected to their involvement. Regarding arguing and reasoned consensus, one could look for expressions of respect for alternative perspectives as well as for evidence of de facto change of positions: Do participants admit having gained new insights and alternative perspectives? Do they care about giving reasons and explain their positions? Do they value and praise consensus decision-making? In turn, the absence of clear bargaining, horse-trading, and open protest would also foster the perception that arguing and deliberation are at work. With a view to social learning, I expect that participants would report about an improvement of relationships between constituencies or the establishment of a collective identity. As trust develops over time, this should be especially the case with regard to long-term participants. Moreover, I will look for evaluations which praise the respective institution or its outcomes as impartial and neutral.