3.2.1 Conceptualizing access modes for APOs
As outlined in Chapter one, the past decades have witnessed an increasing involvement of non-state actors in global policy-making generally, and of APOs more specifically.
However, there seems to be no standard model regarding the participation of NSAs; in contrast, a diversity of cooperation schemes can be observed. Therefore, corresponding research highlights that “‘involvement’ can mean very different things” (Fransen & Kolk 2007: 670). In this sense, an increasing number of studies (Boström 2006; Rittberger et al. 2008; Tallberg et al. 2013) have pointed to the importance of distinguishing between different degrees or qualities with regard to the participation of NSAs in global policy-making. The most coherent and elaborated concept for analyzing the plethora of forms of access of transnational actors to IOs stems from Jonas Tallberg and his colleagues (2013). Building on their work, I will outline my own approach to access and highlight why I additionally distinguish between open and inclusive access modes.
First, following Tallberg and colleagues (2013: 25), I use the term access to denominate the institutional design features which enable participation by organizations of affected people. In other words, access refers to the institutional structures which regulate the interaction between an IO and APOs (or other NSAs). In contrast, when I refer to participation, this describes how APOs de facto take advantage of existing structures for involvement. The term participation thus is used to describe concrete engagement of APOs through the access structures which are granted to them.
Access has a quantitative and a qualitative dimension (Brühl 2005: 272; Dingwerth 2007: 38–43; Tallberg et al. 2013: 26–27). Its qualitative dimension captures the type of rights which actors are entitled to exercise (depth of access). In turn, the quantitative dimension refers to who can obtain access (range of access). This distinction is highly relevant in practice, as in fact in many cases we observe high degrees of qualitative access for transnational actors in combination with a low degree of quantitative access, and vice versa (Tallberg et al. 2013: 96).57
57 In fact, Tallberg and colleagues (2013: 27–28) employ two additional dimensions of access, namely the codification of access, which refers to the level at which access is regulated (and thus to the difficulty to revoke access rights), and the permanence of access, which captures whether access is permanent or only
The qualitative dimension of access has often been conceptualized as a continuum. For example, Tallberg and colleagues (2013: 62–63) operate with a scale reaching from 0 (no rights) to 4 (autonomous involvement, p. ex. as full members) to categorize depth of access. I suggest that at least for the purpose of this study, one needs to further distinguish between open and inclusive access modes for affected people and their organizations. I speak of open access when APOs obtain participation rights as observers, but membership and the right to vote in governing institutions remain restricted to (governmental) members of the institution. In turn, I speak of inclusive access58 when rights obtained for affected actors include decision-making rights or membership in an institution on a (more or less) equal footing with member states.
In this regard, I assume that both forms of access might have different effects on legitimacy. In other words, I presume that inclusive access is not just a stronger version of open access, but might have different functions.59 For example, as will be argued below, very high numbers of affected actors with decision-making rights might lead to less effective outcomes or stalemate, whereas broad participation might be less risky when affected actors only give input to the proceedings. Moreover, empirically some institutions such as the PFII combine open and inclusive access features. Similarly, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria has a Board which brings together different constituencies, and additionally counts with a Global Partnership Forum held every two years which brings together higher numbers of stakeholder representatives (Brown 2010: 525). This co-existence of open and inclusive access features in one institution suggests that both access options might have different functions, as otherwise it would make no sense that they exist in parallel.
occurs ad hoc. While both dimensions certainly bear relevance in many cases, they were not taken into account in the context of this study because UN Indigenous-specific institutions do not vary in this regard.
Therefore, I assumed that I would not be able to observe the effect of these dimensions on institutional legitimacy in my case study. Given that the concept of access used in this study already distinguishes between open and inclusive modes, and qualitative and quantitative dimensions, I did not want to unnecessarily complicate the concept. However, it might be worthwhile to scrutinize on the effects of codification and permanence of access on legitimacy in further studies.
58 The term ‘inclusive’ is used following the concept of inclusiveness used by Rittberger et al. (2008: 18), who consider NSA membership as one defining feature of inclusive institutions. However, for them and a number of other authors, inclusiveness also implies the involvement of various types of institutional stakeholders within one institution (Boström 2006; Dingwerth 2007; Fransen and Kolk 2007), whereas here it specifies a specific type of access for NSAs, namely as members.
59 The assumption that open access is not just a weaker version of inclusive access also resonates with normative approaches which have argued that open and inclusive access modes have to be evaluated differently as regards their legitimacy (Steffek 2008; Erman 2018).
3.2.2 Degrees of open and inclusive access
As outlined above, I assume that open and inclusive forms of access differ with regard to their effects on legitimacy. However, both concepts again encompass a variety of cooperation arrangements reaching from very weak to strong forms. Therefore, in the following section I will elaborate on open and inclusive access with regard to their quantitative and qualitative dimensions, and how these can be used to differentiate between different degrees of access.
The quantitative dimension of open access refers to the share of activists and organizations of affected people who may obtain participation rights. In other words, this dimension captures whether all potentially interested affected actors are in fact endowed with participation rights. To distinguish between different degrees of quantitative open access, one therefore needs to look at accreditation procedures as well as at existing selection criteria which APOs need to comply with to be eligible for participation (Tallberg et al. 2013: 63). Moreover, it has to be taken into consideration that many APOs encounter specific challenges with regard to their resources and ability to mobilize. Therefore, APOs often remain underrepresented in institutions which allow for NSA participation, as global inequalities are often rather reproduced than countered by them (Raines 2003). Thus, an additional indicator for quantitative openness is the existence of institutional mechanisms for the empowerment of APOs such as travel subsidies or training courses (Steffek & Nanz 2008: 12). Quantitative open access is low when the admission policy by the institution is restricted, for example by explicitly naming certain actors for participation.60 It is medium, in contrast, when selection criteria by an institution are demanding and gaining access includes passing through comprehensive accreditation procedures that require extensive documentation about the activities or goals of APOs, which potentially excludes many of them. In turn, quantitative open access is high when accreditation procedures and selection criteria for APOs are rather a formality, and in practice all interested activists and organizations can gain access. Moreover, for quantitative open access to qualify as high, an institution needs to purposely reach out to its most marginalized constituencies.
60 Another example of a low degree of quantitative open access is when interacting NSAs are created by the respective IO, such as in the case of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) where many associated NGOs have been created by UNESCO itself (Martens 2001).
The qualitative dimension of open access covers the rights connected to participation that APOs may obtain. In this regard, I distinguish between three degrees of qualitative open access: It is low when APOs are reduced to a passive role as recipients of information, but are not allowed to provide input. Any meaningful consultation needs some forum for an exchange of views or an articulation of interests. Therefore, a medium degree of qualitative open access is reached when an organization holds special meetings for consultation of APOs, but keeps them outside formal meetings. This leaves them uninformed about the proceedings and on-going discussions between members. A high degree is characterized by active and direct access to formal meetings, including the right to speak at sessions (see Tallberg et al. 2013: 62).61
quantitative dimension: range of
Table 7:Degrees of open access and corresponding indicators. Source: adapted from Tallberg et al.
(2013: 62–64).
With regard to inclusive access, its quantitative dimension captures who can become a member of the respective institution. This includes both the number of individual actors which can function as members and represent affected people in an institution as compared to the total number of members; and the autonomy of affected constituencies in selecting who is going to represent them within an institution. Thus, I suggest that quantitative inclusive access of APOs is low when only a single actor representing
61 Both the right to attend and the right to speak in political meetings can be further divided into several sub-categories (Brühl 2005: 272–274). Non-state actors may be allowed to observe meetings from a separated room such as a balcony, or they may be admitted into the conference room, which gives them the opportunity to move freely between state delegates and lobby them. With regard to an entitlement to speak, there are differences of whether statements can be made only at specific moments of the
negotiations or during the whole process, and whether stakeholders can make individual statements or only common statements of certain groups are admitted. However, I argue that the categorization proposed in this study captures the main differences, and that a more fine-grained distinction is unnecessary for its purpose.
affected people obtains membership.62 In turn, it is medium when APOs make up a significant share of members, but these members either are selected by the institution and/or participate as individual expert members, as this suggest that links to the constituency are comparatively weak. Quantitative inclusive access is high when APO members constitute an important group within the total membership in terms of numbers, when variance between APO members accounts for differences within the constituency, and when they are selected by the constituency itself.
The qualitative dimension of inclusive access, by contrast, refers to the power of APOs in an institution. Power can be measured in absolute terms by looking at formal rights in the policy-making process, as proposed by Rittberger et al. (2008: 18–19). According to this approach, a high degree of inclusiveness is dependent on decision-making rights;
this is considered the most important part of the policy-making process, and the part that non-state actors so far have been excluded from. The right to vote in governing bodies is used as the indicator to determine whether actors have decision-making rights.
I argue that an additional dimension of power concerns the distribution of rights between members and their weight in an institution. This means taking into account whether participation rights in an institution are balanced between different actors. 63 In this regard, imbalances might be the result of weighted voting rights or exclusive veto rights of some actors. I argue that for qualitative inclusive access, power is relevant both in absolute and in relative terms. Thus, qualitative inclusive access is low when APOs obtain membership rights, but without gaining corresponding voting rights;64 it is medium when the distribution of decision-making rights clearly discriminates against APOs; and it is high if APOs participate in decision-making on a more or less equal footing. Table 8 summarizes the indicators of inclusive access identified above, specified with regard to their quantitative and qualitative dimensions.
62 For example, within the Global Fund’s Board out of twenty voting members only one is an APO representative, see
https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/2935/board_globalfundboard_operatingprocedures_en.pdf?u=63 6679305610000000, accessed 29.01.2019.
63 This is similar to what Brinkerhoff et al. (2011: 4) have called mutuality with regard to public-private partnerships. However, mutuality not only captures the relative power of participant groups, but also implies a “joint commitment to the partnership’s goals”. This is something not taken into account here as it is no institutional feature that can be purposely designed.
64 This is for example the case at UNAIDS, whose Board does include five members from NGOs and APOs, but voting rights remain restricted to the governmental members, see
http://www.unaids.org/en/whoweare/pcb, accessed 29.01.2019.
quantitative dimension: range of
access qualitative dimension: depth of access
Inclusive access low One member which is supposed to represent all
Table 8: Degrees of inclusive access and indicators. Source: author’s elaborations.
In contrast to Tallberg et al. (2013: 66–67), I purposely abstain from combining quantitative and qualitative elements of access into a composite index of access. Instead, I assume that both the quantitative and the qualitative dimensions of participation may impact on legitimacy in different ways. Thus, existing assumptions regarding the connection between APO access and legitimacy will have to be reviewed as regards the dimension of access to which they implicitly refer, as this is generally not specified. This task will be undertaken in the following.