The continuous stability of EU security policy regarding China in need of

It has just been argued that parts of the literature claim to have observed a change in the EU’s security policy regarding China. The overview of the arguments in favour of such a change has shown that some of the arguments are even inherently contradictory.

Previous research of this author has shown – and the detailed analysis in Chapter 5 will underline this assessment – that the EU’s security-political approach regarding China has remained constant from the first policy paper in 1995 to the most recent policy papers (cf. Renner 2012). This is surprising because there are a variety of competing

5 There seems to be no general consensus about the way how to insert quotes into texts. This thesis therefore follows the Modern Language Association’s (MLA) rules, which prescribe that – among other things – quotes that are longer than four lines are inserted and the space between the lines remains

perceptions of China and thus competing visions of what security policy regarding China should look like.

Eberhard Sandschneider, for example, presents such competing perceptions and different ways of “constructing” China:

China holds up a mirror to us. However, we only see what we want to see.

Optimists and pessimists oppose each other with seemingly irreconcilable positions. We alternate between enthusiasm and fear, euphoria and consternation.

We argue about images of China which always tell more about ourselves than about China itself. However, euphoria and tunnel views are bad prerequisites for a successful dealing with Chinas rise. (Sandschneider 2007: 27)

He sketches out four types of positions regarding China in Western discussions: The

‘optimists’ are convinced that China’s rise is unstoppable and that a democratisation of the country is a necessary by-product of the economic development; the ‘pessimists’

predict a collapse of China due to the tremendous inner problems and instabilities; the

‘hawks’ expect China to become an aggressive power provoking military conflicts in East Asia; the ‘doves’, finally, are convinced that a power- and peaceful China will be integrated into the networks of international cooperation (cf. ibid.: 41).

Taking a look at the discussions on the Union-level and in the EU member states, one finds precisely such a variety of competing perceptions of China and thus competing visions of what security policy regarding China should look like.

The European Parliament traditionally is a rather critical observer of China, especially concerning its human rights situation.⁶ In Germany, the CDU/CSU-group in the German Bundestag, which was at that time part of the governing grand coalition, published an Asia Strategy in 2007 which was rather critical towards China. The strategy perceives China as a potential adversary with a competing political system and competing political values. It contains a basic uncertainty about China’s future behaviour. The strategy therefore recommends an alignment with the US and its allies on East Asian security. “In security-political terms, China could challenge the US and its allies in

6 To mention just a few recent statements of the European Parliament in this respect: Resolution on organ harvesting in China (European Parliament 2013), resolution on the case of Ai WeiWei in China (European Parliament 2011), resolution on human rights violations in China, notably the case of Liu Xiaobo

(European Parliament 2010), resolution on minority rights and application of the death penalty (European Parliament 2009).

Asia”⁷ (CDU/CSU-group 2007: 5). And it goes on:

With China we witness the emergence of an undemocratic, non-liberal state in the global economic and political system, the emergence of a state that – competing with the West – becomes a model for the development of other states. [...] Thus, China confronts the West more and more with fundamental questions about the desirable political order and presents itself as a model for an alternative political order that challenges the economic and political interests of Germany and the EU beyond the European borders.⁸ (ibid.: 7f.)

Any strategy for Asia and China can therefore only be successful “in close coordination with the US” (ibid.: 12). Thus, “we can, together with the US, make sure that the rise of China and other powers in Asia will not lead to a destabilization of this continent which would inescapably have tremendous global consequences” (ibid.: 15f.).

In Britain, too, there have been quite negative perspectives on China, as a look into parliamentary debates shows. During a plenary debate on China, David Atkinson MP, designated China as “the last of the evil empires in the world” (Atkinson 1994) and his colleague, Iain Duncan Smith MP seconded that “one of the biggest problems is that North Korea and China are at the apex of a chain of proliferation” (Smith 1994). One year later, David Winnick MP called China a “notorious police state” against which

“appeasement does not pay. It is about time we stopped supporting a notorious tyranny”

(Winnick 1995). And finally, as a last example among many others, John Maples called China in a debate on the Strategic Defence Review a “potential adversary” of the UK:

“Potential adversaries still include large states with powerful militaries whose future is uncertain, like Russia, or whose intentions are unknown, like China” (Maples 1998).

The security strategies of France and Britain, for example, comprise a variety of understandings of security. The imperatives of globalization and the immense complexity of the current global situation require a variety of political, economic and cultural strategies to achieve security for the nation as well as for a wider collective of

7 Own translation of the original text: „Sicherheitpolitisch könnte China die USA und ihre Verbündeten in Asien zukünftig herausfordern.“

8 Own translation of the original text: „Mit China steigt ein undemokratischer, nicht-liberaler Staat in der weltwirtschaftlichen und weltpolitischen Hierarchie auf, der sich zudem – in Konkurrenz zum Westen – zu einem eigenen ordnungspolitischen Modell für andere Staaten entwickelt. […] China stellt dem Western damit in zunehmendem Maße die Systemfrage und sieht sich als alternatives politisches

Ordnungsmodell, das die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Interessen Deutschlands und der EU außerhalb

states (cf. Government of the French Republic 2008: 13; cf. HM Government 2010: 22).

Still, the traditional understanding of security bound to military threats by hostile nations remains central to the strategies (cf. Government of the French Republic 2008:

16; cf. HM Government 2010: 22).

Given these critical perceptions of China that can be found in academic and parliamentary debates as well as the strands of traditional understandings of security in the national security strategies of the UK and France, one would expect that these critical perceptions also impact on the EU’s security discourse regarding China, for example in terms of elements of uncertainty about China’s motives, strategies of (military) containment of China and alignment with the US on security-political issues in (East) Asia.⁹

It is surprising, however, that despite these critical perceptions the EU’s perspective on China is not characterized by elements of uncertainty, strategies of (military) containment or alignment with US positions on security policy in (East) Asia. To the contrary, it is rather EU security policy with China than towards China: China is seen as a vital partner in addressing the security-political consequences of globalization and thus much effort is put into managing the relationship with China to keep it free from frictions. At some points it is even underlined that if China were to be perceived as a threat, this, in turn, would be the real threat to EU security. China’s internal stability and the stability of the wider East Asian region are also of great concern to the EU. Of course, not because of Samaritian motives, but in order to maintain the EU’s leading role in the world economy by contributing to the stability of one of its most important export markets. And this approach has remained constant over a period of 20 years (cf.

Renner 2012). This remarkable fact indeed requires explanation.

The second question that this thesis has to address is thus (as already formulated in the beginning of this section): Why has the EU’s security policy regarding China remained continuously stable over the last 20 years?

In the following chapter, I will develop the theoretical framework for this thesis. I will argue, first, that poststucturalism is particularly suited to address the two research questions. In the second section, I will develop a poststructuralist concept of causal explanation. Following this, I will develop four ideal-types of security in order to

9 And, if I may add on a personal note, the rapid change of the construction of Russia as an expansionist threat during the first half of the year 2014 underlines this assessment.

reconstruct the EU’s security discourse regarding China and in order to explain the EU’s security policy regarding China. Finally, I will develop two ideal-types of constellations of discourses which account for the stability of the EU’s security discourse regarding China. A summary of the argument will conclude the theory chapter.