The first Communication on China (1995): Threats, challenges and

The EU’s first strategy on China, which was issued in 1995, needs to be read against the background of the first EU Asia Strategy, which was issued one year earlier. The China Strategy itself states that it defines the “EU’s relationship with China in the spirit of the

‘new Asia strategy’” (European Commission 1995a: 3).

The central point of concern for the EU in its Asia Strategy is the possibility to lose out

“on the economic miracle taking place in Asia” because of the “strong competition”

from Japan and the United States in the Asian markets (European Commission 1994:

11). For the EU, it is therefore “a matter of urgency to strengthen its economic presence in Asia in order to maintain its leading role in the world economy” (ibid.: 1; emphasis added). Being unsuccessful in this regard “will have political costs, and at the very least it will exacerbate the calls for more defensive policies from those who view Asia as a threat rather than as a valuable partner, which in turn will further reduce the benefits to be gained from Asia, and so on, in a spiral of decline” (ibid.: 11). This last quote is interesting as it indicates that it is not Asia which is seen as a threat, but the possibility that Asia could be seen as a threat is the actual worrying concern for the EU.⁶⁰

These overall concerns, however, need to be presented “in the framework of the political and security balance of power in the region”, as the end of the cold war “has created a regional environment of unparalleled political fluidity” (ibid.: 1f.). At the same time, military budgets are growing, being a potential source of conflicts in a region with a number of unresolved territorial conflicts (cf. ibid.: 6).

That is to say, the values to be secured are the EU’s leading role in the world economy as well as political and security-political stability in Asia. “The maintenance of peace and stability in Asia is an important factor [...] for the protection of the Union’s interests in this region, including the economic ones [...]” (ibid.: 5).

Threats to regional stability in Asia come from, “rapid economic growth, territorial disputes, increasingly ambitious armament programs, the potential for distrust in such a large region and the weakness of the multilateral organizations for political consultations” (ibid.: 7). In order to preserve stability in Asia, not only the role of the US as “the key player” in terms of security – at least “at the present moment” – is important (ibid.: 5). It is also necessary to “support efforts by Asian countries to cooperate at the regional and sub-regional level such as the ASEAN Regional Forum with a view to enhancing peace and security in the region [...]” (ibid.: 2). That is to say, not only the EU is the provider of its own security (in terms of preserving its leading role in the global economy), but by being associated in the management of regional and

60 This point should be kept in mind for the discussion of the alleged change of the EU’s security policies towards China in the context of the 2006 Communication. Although the EU is more specific and

outspoken with its criticism on China, it does not construct China as a threat – the contrary is true: given the criticism towards China and the growing dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the relationship, the EU reinforces its liberal-relational approach aiming to establish dialogues about the contested issues.

Therefore, it holds true that the actual threat is not China but the perception of China as a threat by the European public.

international security affairs (cf. ibid.: 2), Asian states themselves become security providers for the EU (in terms of, firstly, regional stability which, secondly, is vital for maintaining the leading global economic role).

The overall policy objectives of the EU are therefore “to strengthen the Union’s economic presence in Asia”, “to contribute to stability in Asia by promoting international co-operation and understanding”, “to promote economic development [in order] to contribute to poverty alleviation and sustainable growth”, as well as “to contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law”

(ibid.: 2).

Establishing political dialogues is central to EU responses to these threats and concerns.

Such dialogues need to be directed at establishing a “partnership of equals capable of playing a constructive and stabilizing role in the world” (ibid.: 1). The identification of consensus solutions is facilitated by generating a “greater understanding of each other’s viewpoints and problems” (ibid.: 11) – a theme that will be constantly recurring in the EU’s security discourse on China and (East) Asia. Especially dialogues with “those countries in the region which are prepared and able to make a significant contribution to the maintenance of the region’s peace and stability” are sought (ibid.: 6). Finally, the notion of “equal partnership” also applies to the global economy. The “maintenance of an open rule-based world trade system” is a vital interest of the EU (ibid.: 11). In order to achieve this goal, the Asian countries should be integrated into this system and “non-confrontational dialogues of equals” should be established in order to “consider jointly the growing number of global concerns” (ibid.: 11). After all, “we are all now partners in a global economy” (ibid.: 11).

The EU’s first strategy on China identified the question whether or not China can be integrated into the international community and associated in addressing the central global issues as a central challenge. Given the ever growing importance of China for

“world security and economic system at a time of greater economic interdependence and when global problems [...] require coordinated commitment from governments worldwide” it is vital that China takes part in the efforts to solve all these issues (European Commission 1995a: 3). The second challenge identified is China’s internal stability, which, if affected negatively, impacts on its ability to take over the mentioned responsibilities. “China’s political importance makes its stability of great concern both to its neighbours and to the world community at large” (ibid.: 3). China therefore

becomes a security provider for the EU’s concerns as its stability and constructive involvement is vital to address global and regional security issues. And regional security and stability, as mentioned above, are vital for the EU’s interest in maintaining its leading role in the world economy.

The responses to these challenges are in line with the Asia Strategy and underline that

“Europe must set itself the overriding general objective of promoting the fullest possible Chinese involvement in the international arena, whether on security, political, environmental, social or economic issues. We must also increase mutual understanding between Europeans and Chinese [...]” (ibid.: 5). China’s integration into the management of regional and global affairs is seen as vital for European interests in a stable Asian region as “China’s decisions on how to employ its economic and military weight will have an essential impact on this” (ibid.: 5). Political dialogues should therefore serve to “discuss mutual interests and find common ground on the full range of political and security issues” (ibid.: 6).

In order to achieve the internal stability of China the EU should engage in “supporting the development in China of institutions and a civil society based on the rule of law”

(ibid.: 5).

The Council’s endorsement of the Commission’s strategy on China underlines that – given the important role of China “both in the political and military field and in the economic field” – it is “a matter of priority for Europe to establish a relationship with China that will reflect the country’s actual and potential influence at world and regional level” (Council of the European Union 1995; emphasis added). A failure to associate China in the efforts to address the main global challenges would be an enormous setback. Simultaneously, China’s internal stability is considered to be “a matter of regional and global importance” (ibid.).

Speeches by Leon Brittan, commissioner for external relations and vice president of the European Commission from 1995 to 1999 reflect the basic constructions made by the Commission and Council documents.

In a speech held at the British Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies in September 1995, he made the case for “convergence” between Europe and Asia (Brittan 1995b). Faced with the rise of Asia, which is “dramatically changing the world balance of economic power”, it is essential to build up strong relationships with Asian countries and promoting European economic presence in the region: “To do otherwise [...] would

certainly be a recipe for ever steeper decline in European prosperity and in European standing worldwide” (ibid.). Given this situation, Brittan calls for a strong cooperative relationship between Europe and Asia as the two

face the same challenges and have common interests [...]. Our objective is a broad relationship, based on equality, on dialogue, on mutual support. We want to work on the basis of respect for differences between the Asian and European regions, and for diversity in each region. If we succeed in building a stronger partnership, we will put behind us the mutual mistrust and ignorance of the past and can help each other to contribute to a more stable, more prosperous and more secure future.

(ibid.)

Brittan makes one interesting point about achieving security by military means and by means of a dialogue: He states that European member states contributed to Asian regional security for example by being part of the Five Power Defence Arrangements.

He underlined, however, that the “best recent example of European engagement is over the Spratlys” (ibid.): Europe helped soothing this territorial conflict by getting all parties involved to the negotiation table during the ASEAN Regional Forum in Brunei.

Concerning the engagement with China, Brittan stated that it is “in Europe’s vital interest” – and therefore a source for major concern if unsuccessful – “to steer China into the world economic and political mainstream and away from isolation” (European Commission 1995b). In this speech, there is indeed the notion of “uncertainty” about China’s future behaviour (Brittan 1995a). This is, however, only a “part of the problem”, as after the Cold War the whole situation in the region is unclear, especially because of an uncertainty about the United States’ future plans of engagement in the region (ibid.). Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to ensure China’s participation in the existing international institutions, as this “will help cement reform within China itself as well as making China a source of stability in Asia and beyond” (ibid.). The double concern of China’s internal stability and contribution to regional and global stability becomes apparent here, too. Leon Brittan further underlined the need for the EU to closely cooperate with China in order to pursue its interests. Firstly, aiming at regional stability, support of the Chinese reform policies and the integration of China into the world economic system (especially in terms of a WTO accession) would foster the stability of China in terms of its internal stability and the continuation of its foreign

policy path of constructive engagement. And secondly, aiming at Europe’s economic presence, ensuring access to the Chinese market “where US and Japanese competition is already fierce” (European Commission 1995a: 5) is vital for Europe’s security: “We must be a dominant foreign presence there if we are to survive on world markets”

(Brittan 1995a; emphasis added).

5.1.1.2. The European Commission’s Communications on China (1998, 2001