Conclusion: Alternative Scenarios for the peninsula

The analysis in the preceding section was structured based on the 11 SERs, de-fined to better assess differences within the peninsula in terms of social, economic, and environmental characteristics. This concept has proved useful in population projections, since it allows the application of more realistic assumptions regarding fertility, mortality, migration, and education for each of the 11 SERs.

The population of the Yucat´an peninsula will continue to grow during the 40-year projection period. Starting with a population of 2.4 million in the base 40-year, 1990, the population for the year 2030 obtained in the four scenarios ranges be-tween 6.4 million in the rapid development scenario and 8.2 million in the stag-nation scenario. Thus, over the course of the projection period, the population of the Yucat´an peninsula grows at an annual rate of 2.5% in the rapid development scenario and at 3.1% per year in the stagnation scenario. The central scenario and the stagnation scenario with educational efforts both yield a peninsula population of 7.3 million people at an average annual growth rate of 2.9%.

The demographic future of the peninsula will be closely linked to the region’s economic and tourism development and to the implications in terms of migration.

According to the scenarios envisaged here, the rate of natural increase would vary at the end of the projection period from 1.3% in the rapid development scenario to 2.6% in the stagnation scenario. The central scenario leads to a 2.0% rate of natural increase compared with 2.3% in the base-year period (see Table 7.6). These rates of population increase are offset by the migration trends implemented in the scenarios, as shown in Table 7.7. The crude migration rate in 1990–1995 was 1.6 per 100 people. At the end of the projection period, it is between 1.7 under the stagnation scenario and 2.0 under the rapid development scenario (1.8 under the central scenario). This means, for instance, that in the rapid development scenario, the growth rate (3.3%) in 2025–2030 will be twice the natural increase rate (1.3%).

This comparison is not only valid at the end of the projection period. Through most of the 1995–2030 period, the crude birth rate is lower than the crude migration rate under the central and rapid development scenarios, and only to 2005 under the stagnation scenario.

The age pyramid of the Yucat´an peninsula in the base year, 1990, shows a rela-tively small population aged 60 years and over (6.5% of total population) compared with the population in the 0–14 age group (38.9%). The median age of the popula-tion on the Yucat´an peninsula is 19.8, which indicates a young populapopula-tion structure.

Although there is an increase in the proportion of people aged 60 years and over in the next decades and in all four scenarios, aging is not yet on the peninsula’s agenda in 2030. The most significant change in the age structure is observed in the rapid development scenario, where 13.2% of the population is elderly in 2030. In the other scenarios, the percentage of people aged 60 years and over ranges between

Table 7.6. Rate of natural increase at state and peninsula levels, 1990–1995 and 2025–2030 (in %).

Scenario in 2025–2030

Base Rapid Stagnation

year develop- Stagna- with

educa-1990– ment tion Central tional efforts

Region 1995^a (I) (II) (III) (IV)

Yucat´an 2.22 1.23 2.63 1.98 1.77

Campeche 2.45 1.24 2.63 1.97 1.84

Quintana Roo 2.51 1.35 2.55 1.99 1.94

Peninsula 2.32 1.27 2.61 1.98 1.84

aSource: Garc´ıa de Fuentes et al., 1996.

Table 7.7. Crude migration rate at state and peninsula levels, 1990–1995 and 2025–

2030 (per 100 persons).

Scenario in 2025–2030

Base Rapid Stagnation

year develop- Stagna- with

educa-1990– ment tion Central tional efforts

Region 1995^a (I) (II) (III) (IV)

Yucat´an 0.46 0.87 0.71 0.78 0.78

Campeche 1.26 1.90 1.56 1.70 1.69

Quintana Roo 4.85 3.68 3.15 3.38 3.35

Peninsula 1.62 1.99 1.65 1.80 1.79

aSource: Garc´ıa de Fuentes et al., 1996.

8.7% and 10.7% in 2030 (up from 6.5% in the base year, 1990). This slow process of population aging in settings of low mortality and rapidly declining fertility is due to the heavy in-migration of labor force (especially those aged 20–35) to the penin-sula. The proportion of the 15–59 age group in the total population remains over 55% throughout the projection period and even reaches levels above 60% under the rapid development and central scenarios.

In the rapid development scenario, the proportion of children 0–14 years old declines most significantly, reaching the lowest projected level of 22.2%. In the other scenarios, the percentage of population aged 0–14 varies between 29.7% in the central scenario and 35.5% in the stagnation scenario, compared with 38.9% in the base year.

The population projections illustrate possible future educational developments on the Yucat´an peninsula in the next four decades. In the base year, 63% of the total population received a low level of education, 25% a medium level of education, and 12% a high level of education. All four scenarios show a substantial decline in the percentage of the population with a low level of education for both men and

women. Even under the stagnation scenario, which envisages a situation where levels of enrollment decline 20% from 1990–2015, there is actually an increase in the level of education of the whole population, with 46% of the people having medium and high levels of education in 2030 compared with 37% in 1990. The highest educational improvement on the Yucat´an peninsula is observed in the rapid development scenario, which combines educational advancement with low fertility and mortality rates. In this scenario, the percentage of the total population with a high level of education increases by a factor of 3, reaching 39% in 2030. Only in this scenario is the percentage of the population with a high level of education larger than the percentage of population with a low level and that with a medium level of education.

The second most substantial decline in the percentage of population with a low level of education is observed in the stagnation scenario with educational efforts.

The number of people with a high level of education in the projected period reaches 36% of the total population. If fertility rates conditional on education remain con-stant at 1990 levels but levels of enrollment reach European levels, then the total fertility rate will decline substantially, from 3.5 to 2.5, entirely on the basis of ed-ucation (using constant fertility differentials by eded-ucation). In this case, the new cohorts of women, benefiting from the increase in the enrollment rate, will enter their fertile years with higher levels of education and will adopt patterns of lower fertility reducing the overall fertility rates. The stagnation scenario and the stagna-tion with educastagna-tional efforts scenario differ only with respect to school enrollment rates. The age-specific fertility rates conditional on the educational attainment of mothers are not altered. Nonetheless, the former results in a population of 8.2 million in 2030, whereas in the latter scenario the population is 7.3 million.

Notes

[1] The 1990 census was the most recent one available when this study began in 1995.

Mexico completed another census in 1995 and data became available in 1996–1997.

[2] In the model, migration is considered as a projection assumption. See Section 7.4 for details.

[3] The fact that migration is independent of the scenarios is a drawback of this model. It was not the authors’ original intention to have one migration path, but rather to have one migration path calibrated to each scenario. However, the premature end of the project prevented further integration of the tourism and population models.

[4] Estimates of the annual migration rates by SER during the 1990–1995 period are from Garc´ıa de Fuentes et al. (1996).

[5] It should be kept in mind that fertility and mortality trends also have an effect on scenario results. In the stagnation scenario, fertility and mortality stagnate; in the development scenario, fertility and mortality decline. The trends assumed for fertility and mortality counteract the momentum effect and therefore mitigate its impact on education level.

Appendix 7A: