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Abgrenzung
(Record of Achievement)
Das erste Kapitel "Political-economic determinants of education reform: Evidence on interest groups and student outcomes" habe ich ohne Hilfe Dritter und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt.
Das zweite Kapitel "Strategic compromise, policy bundling and interest group power" ist in Zusammenarbeit mit Dr. Luna Bellani von der Universität Konstanz entstanden. Der Anteil meiner eigenen Leistung bei der Erstellung dieser Arbeit beträgt 70 Prozent.
Das dritte Kapitel "Upward mobility and legislator support for education reforms" ist auch in Zusammenarbeit mit Dr. Luna Bellani. Der Anteil meiner eigenen Leistung bei der Erstellung dieser Arbeit beträgt 50 Prozent.