Coherence between instruments

The evaluations found relatively little overlap between the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) and other external financing instruments (EFIs) as they often fund different priorities or actions. In principle, the diversity of financing instruments allows for the design and implementation of programmes to be tailored to the needs and constraints of the different contexts (48). For instance:

 The IcSP and EIDHR can complement areas where the EDF falls short due to its relatively long programming horizon and the requirement to agree on the use of funds with the recipient government (32). They are designed to complement the EDF and DCI by allowing a degree of flexibility and increasing the EU’s ability to react quickly to emerging needs (33, 53, 54).

Moreover, they can be mobilised only when other EFIs cannot intervene, which increases their complementarity (53, 54).

 IcSP actions complemented the peace and security programming of other EFIs and EUTFs, but the extent to which this happened was variable (54). Actions and programmes under the IcSP were used to achieve the objectives of other EFIs, to fill gaps, as a forerunner for interventions by other (larger) instruments, and as a funding instrument of last resort (5, 33, 54). The lack of flexibility and lengthy procedures of most EFIs however hampered effective synergies with the IcSP (54).

 The EIDHR can intervene even when the government lacks the political will because its actions do not require partner government approval (53, 32). This, combined with the EIDHR’s focus on supporting CSOs and human rights defenders in challenging environments, makes the EIDHR highly complementary to other EFIs.⁶³

 The DCI can complement the EDF by enabling the EU to work on EU thematic priorities or at the pan-African level (52).

Box 16. Examples of successful use of multiple funding instruments

● In Togo, close cooperation between the different EU services led to coordinated actions, especially in political dialogue and projects in democratic governance. Funding from the EDF was supplemented by EU thematic programmes (Food Security, CSO-LA and Gender) and instruments (EIDHR and the Instrument for Stability). Availability of the different instruments enabled the EU to respond to a variety of situations and to intervene both in the short-term and in the longer term, which is crucial in a situation of fragility. (38)

● In Ethiopia, the EU capitalised on both its political dialogue on migration and the multiplicity of available instruments to maximise support to the sector over 2010-2016. The EU supported migration because of the role of Ethiopia as the main host for migrants and refugees in the Horn of Africa. Among other, it provided support to security through the APF and to migration through the Pan-African Programme (DCI programme), two important bilateral migration projects as well as other EDF funded projects. (32)

At a thematic level, there were positive examples of coordination and complementarity in many areas.

Thematic programmes were seen to fill gaps that could not be covered by geographical instruments in the areas of environment and climate change and social protection (17, 47).

62 The main external financing instruments (EFIs) reviewed in this section are the 11th EDF, the DCI, the IcSP, and the EIDHR (evaluation reports 32, 33, 52, 53, 54). Whereas none of these instruments focuses solely on Africa, they all support interventions on the continent. In addition, the EU Trust Fund for Africa and EIB interventions are also reviewed in this chapter (reports 4, 5, 14, 15). Finally, this section draws on several thematic and geographical evaluation reports (e.g. reports 16, 17, 35, 40, 48).

63 For instance, the Human Rights Crisis Facility provides confidential assistance to CSOs in countries (including in Sub-Saharan Africa) where public financial support would be impossible or put organisations and individuals at risk (53).

Table 22. Evidence of coherence between instruments from thematic evaluations

In terms of coherence of EU instruments, the evaluations report the following main findings.

At the level of design and programming, there are mechanisms to ensure complementarity and coordination between different units and instruments (1, 5, 40, 32, 52). The Quality Support Groups (QSG) process is important in this regard as it ensures interaction between units and enhances complementarity between instruments – although the levels of participation by the different units vary (1, 32, 40). Country fiches (produced by the EEAS and DEVCO) that provide an overall view of developments in each country and of the EU’s work, including the instruments used, were introduced under the 11th EDF to improve complementarity and minimise overlap (32).

Risks of thematic overlaps and duplication between instruments were identified, especially between the EDF and the DCI, and particularly in budget lines managed by Brussels (32, 52). There was also some ambiguity as to which given instrument should be used in a particular situation, e.g. in the field of democracy, civil society support and human rights (53, 17). The lack of coordination that was observed at times resulted in unexploited synergies in project implementation and there are examples of similar issues being addressed in the same country by different instruments (5, 35, 48). There were also difficulties to transition from using one instrument to another. This was due to differences between services and units in mandates, objectives and procedures (i.e. between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO) and a lack of synchronisation of timelines (16, 32).

Some evaluations suggest that one of the factors contributing to overlaps and duplication is the centralised and largely compartmentalised decision-making and programming in Brussels while the day-to-day management is in the EU Delegations (32, 48, 40, 52). In some cases, this set-up led to insufficient consultation of the EU Delegation in project selection and in projects that were not in line with the Delegation’s area of concentration and expertise (32). The lack of EU Delegation capacity and human resources affected the extent to which overlaps and complementarities could be addressed (32, 40). That these Delegations did not have a full overview of EU-funded programmes and projects resulted in inefficiencies and high transaction costs. This was a key limitation for the EU to translate its investment in regional cooperation and in Africa more generally into policy influence and transformative impact (35).

Lack of specific guidance for aid programming was a factor hindering complementarity and effective synergies between different instruments. While the 11th EDF and DCI regulations called for coherence, complementarities and synergies, the Programming Instructions did not give specific guidance on how to achieve this (32, 52). Also, in the case of the EUTF for Africa, despite the emphasis on ensuring complementarity with other instruments, the evaluation found no instructions on how to achieve this (5).

The following table summarises the main factors contributing or hindering complementarity between instruments.

Table 23. Enabling and inhibiting factors affecting complementarity and synergies between

● Mechanisms and procedures exist to ensure complementarity and coordination between different units and instruments (5, 40, 32, 52)

● A shared thematic/topical focus between thematic and geographic instruments (17)

Coordination and collaboration

● Close cooperation between EU services (16, 38)

Political commitment and ownership

 Political commitment to invest resources (in e.g. resilience) (16)

Instrument design and procedures

● Lack of collective strategy guiding the action of the various internal EU services and instruments (e.g. for peace and security) (48)

● Differences in procedures, programming cycles, organisational priorities and mandates leading to challenging transitions between different instruments (16, 32)

● Lack of flexibility and lengthy procedures (54)

● Lack of specific guidance at programming level and on which instrument should be used (5, 17, 32, 52, 53)

● Fragmentation of EU financing (e.g. in the resilience-building area) (16)

Coordination and collaboration

● Different decision and management centres (32) coupled with centralised and compartmentalised decision making (32, 48, 40, 52)

● Lack of resources, involvement or capacities at EU Delegation level (32, 17)

● Communication and coordination issues between Brussels and EU Delegations and in programming and project implementation (1, 32, 48, 40, 52)

Box 17. Key takeaways from the evaluations on coherence between EU instruments

● The evaluations found relatively little overlap between the 11th EDF and other EFIs, as they often funded different priorities or actions.

● At thematic level, there were positive examples of coordination and complementarity in e.g. the areas of rural and agricultural development and peace and security. Thematic programmes were seen to fill gaps that could not be covered by geographical instruments in the areas of environment and climate change and social protection.

● There are procedures, such as Quality Support Groups, to ensure complementarity and coherence at the level of design and programming. Still, the evaluations identified that specific programming guidance on how to achieve complementarity between instruments was absent.

● Some evaluations found risks of thematic overlaps between different instruments. One contributing factor to these overlaps was the insufficient coordination between Brussels and EU Delegations. The comparative advantages of all instruments the EU had at its disposal were not always clear.