Part II Empirical Analysis
7.4 Avenues for Future Research
An essential difficulty in the empirical study of PMSCs is the problem of data availability as well as the quality of the data that is available. Even though I have collected and selected the data that I have employed with special diligence, they do not possess the desired quality and do not always contain the desired information. Furthermore, the sample size in both empirical studies is relatively small, which makes it difficult to gain conclusive and robust findings. The findings of the empirical analyses should be therefore interpreted against this background. Future data collection is required in order to create broad and systematic datasets for future research and to be able to make robust, generalizable statements. In addition to the exact time period of PMSCs’ presence, it would be interesting to have information on the companies’ specific tasks (lethal or non-lethal), or the identity of their principals (the state itself, a rebel group, or a third party), or information on their employees (nationality, professional experience). On basis of these datasets, future research could continue the research conducted in this study and advance the knowledge of the impact of PMSCs on armed conflicts and thoroughly examine the causal mechanisms behind a spoiling or stabilizing role of PMSCs in armed conflicts. This dissertation has identified and examined two parameters that affect the effort level of PMSCs: the prospect of a bonus and rising variable costs. Future studies using broad and systematic datasets could clarify whether the relationship found in this study is robust and generalizable by examining different regions. Regarding the impact of rising variable costs on PMSCs, this study could not directly assess the long-term relationship between rising variable costs, the effort level of PMSCs and their profits. The impact of rising variable costs might have long-term implications for the performance and profits of PMSCs. Future studies could examine this black box.
Concluding, as this dissertation’s title suggests, PMSCs can principally affect armed conflicts in two different ways: They can either turn into spoilers and deteriorate the situation or they can contribute to stabilizing armed conflicts by performing in the best interest of all parties concerned.
However, which role they lastly play depends on contextual factors and an optimal arrangement of incentives and control mechanisms. The state - as still the major player at the national, regional and international level - bears not only special responsibility, but – as this dissertation has shown - has also different means available to create the necessary conditions. The academia, on the other hand, has the responsibility to explore contextual factors and the causal mechanisms in order to assist in identifying the means of the state and the necessary conditions it has to create.
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