Part II Empirical Analysis
6.3 Efficient Market Hypothesis
6.4.2 Case Selection
6.4.2.2 Afghanistan and Iraq
The following quote illustrates the magnitude of PMSCs’ involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq and explains why this study centres these two conflicts: “As of March 2011, DOD [US Department of Defence] had more contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq (155,000) than uniformed personnel (145,000). Contractors made up 52% of DOD’s workforce in Afghanistan and Iraq” - 18% of them being companies that exclusively offer (armed and unarmed) security services (see Figure 13 and Schwartz and Swain 2011:2).101 In the following, I give a general overview of PMSCs’ activities in
99 L-3 Communications is a prime defence contractor in C³ISR systems (a military term for Command, Control, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance).
100 For further information, see the testimony of Richard C. Nickerson before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (2009).
101 According to the US Congressional Research Service, armed services include static (site) security, convoy security, security escorts, and personal security details, whereas unarmed services include operational coordination, intelligence analysis, hostage negotiations, and security training (Schwartz, 2011:2).
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Afghanistan and Iraq. In the subsequent sections, I discuss the data collection process and the operationalization of the variables.
Afghanistan
PMSCs were an integral part of the US-led military operation in Afghanistan from the beginning (Rimli and Schmeidl, 2008:10). PMSCs in Afghanistan are hired by international military forces and governments, diplomatic agencies, international (non-)governmental organizations, as well as, the private sector. According to the US Congressional Research Service (2011), the use of these companies has vastly increased from 2009 on (see Figure 13). Currently, about 52 PMSCs are officially registered in Afghanistan. In March 2011, almost 19.000 private security contractor personnel were working only for the US Department of Defence in Afghanistan (Schwartz, 2011). However, the exact figures - regarding the total number of employees and the number of unregistered companies – are unknown.
In August 2010, Afghan president Hamid Karzai announced that the Afghan government aims at disbanding PMSCs from the country.102 The Afghan government aims at abolishing all foreign parallel and uncontrollable structures and institutions, particularly parallel security structures created by PMSCs (Giannini and Graaff, 2010). Critics argue that the immense presence of PMSCs in Afghanistan causes that funds – in terms of financial and human capital - are less spent in the national security sector, but are channelled to the private sector (Ayub et al., 2009). The most alarming aspect in this context is the indirect forwarding of international funds to Taliban and insurgency groups by PMSCs.
In 2010, it became public that it is customary for PMSCs to bribe Taliban and insurgency groups to allow convoys for safe passage along supply routes (Tierney, 2010). However, the question arises whether a continuation of post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian and development aid efforts without the support of PMSCs in high risk provinces is possible at all. Given the enormous outcry within the international community regarding the imminent waste of reconstruction and development projects in high risk provinces which would have had been cancelled otherwise, the Afghan government altered their decision and allowed PMSCs to continue working in Afghanistan (Rubin, 2010 ). However, as of 2012 the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) – an enterprise owned by the Afghan state under the authority of the Afghan Ministry of Interior – has started to take over
102 Particularly seven controversial companies were targeted for disbandment by the Presidential Decree: (1) NCL Security (originally established by the son of Afghan Defence Minister Rahim Wardak), (2) Strategic Security Solutions International (linked to the brother of First Vice President Marshal Fahim), (3) Watan Risk Management (closely linked to Karzai relative), (4) Elite (belongs to son of Sibghatullah Mojadedi), (5) Asia Security Group (founded by Karzai relative), (6) Logistic Solutions Group (linked to Afghan National Army division commander), and (7) Shepherd Security (linked to cousin of Head of the Afghan Olympic Committee 2012, formerly responsible for private security contractor registration in the Afghan Ministry of the Interior). For more information, see Afghanistan Analysts Network’s report “The Survival of the Private Security Companies” and The Killid Group’s report “Top Leaders Tied to Security Companies” (http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1582 and http://www.tkg.af/english/reports/political/234-top-leaders-tied-to-security-companies).
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the responsibility for security of humanitarian and reconstruction projects from PMSCs.104 According to the 16th quarterly report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), 36 PMSCs will continue providing security to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) until March 2013 (SIGAR, 2012:69).
Figure 13: Private Security Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq (2007 – 2011) 105 Iraq
When the so-called “Coalition of the Willing”, a military alliance between the US and UK, intervened in Iraq in March 2003 with the objective of destroying the alleged mass destruction weapons of Iraq, they were accompanied by numerous PMSCs. The number of PMSCs in relation to regular forces even increased in the course of the conflict: According to a US Congressional Research Service Report
“some 50 private security contractors employing more than 30,000 employees are working in Iraq for an array of clients, including governments, private industry, and international organizations such as the United Nations” (Elsea et al., 2008:3).106 Never before had a military intervention been backed up by such a large number of private contractors (Ortiz, 10b:28). The fact that private contractors were hired for such a broad set of services, ranging from logistics to military services, attaches a new
104 The Afghan Government launched a „Bridging Strategy“ which organizes the transition process from private security contractors to the APPF, for more information see Mohamadi and Ghani (2011).
105 Source: Schwartz (2011:7)
106 In Iraq PMSCs offer a broad range of military and security services to a manifold client base such as training of military and police, risk assessment and intelligence services, interrogations, translations, static guards, and armed convoy escorts.
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dimension to the term “privatized war”. The underestimation of the US administration regarding the number of troops necessary for providing security and stability in the aftermath of the combat operations, as well as, the urge for beginning reconstruction projects as soon as possible in spite of a deterioration of the security situation have been identified as major contributing causes for the enormous reliance on private security contractors in Iraq (Isenberg, 2007: 83).107 The case of Iraq illustrates the direct use of PMSCs by strong states, as well as, the risks involved: PMSCs’ activities in Iraq were accompanied by great public attention and a series of incidents which disclosed the challenges involved with using PMSCs. In March 2004, for instance, four employees of the US PMSC Blackwater were killed, their bodies dragged through the streets and then hung for display in Fallujah. In the same year, another incident came to public attention: Prisoners detained in the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad were physically, psychologically and sexually abused by US forces, as well as, private security contractors. In September 2007, Blackwater again hit the headlines when its employees shot and killed seventeen Iraqis in Baghdad. Due to a deficient judicial framework that surrounds PMSCs operations, prosecution of these criminal activities could not be pursued. These incidences clearly revealed the undissolved accountability, legal, management, oversight, and transparency issues related to contracting PMSCs. Thus, PMSCs’ activities in Iraq thoroughly unfold the complexity of hiring PMSCs which goes beyond legal issues and tackles ethical, political, and operational concerns. In December 2010, there were about 100 registered companies offering security services in Iraq (Schwartz, 2011:3). As a result of the transition activities, the overall number of private security contractors decreased from a peak of almost 16.000 in June 2009 to around 9.000 personnel in March 2011.