Attitudes and Value Orientations of a Broader Social Concern

Attitudes toward voting

In this section, I explore class differences in attitudes toward voting. This assessment is based on the respondents degree of agreement or disagreement (scale 1–5) with the following four statements: (a) “Whether I vote or not makes no difference”; (b) “After being elected all parties are the same, so voting is pointless”; (c) “It is the duty of all citizens to vote”; and (d)

-0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4

Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite

a) System performance (Binary indicator)

-0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4

Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite

b) Infrastructure provision c) Public services (Index on scale 0 to 1) (Index on scale 0 to 1)

Ambivalent Attitudes towards Democracy among South Africa’s Middle Class 131

“Voting is meaningless because no politician can be trusted.” For statements (a), (b), and (c), I subsume the five answer options into a binary indicator variable, which takes on a value of one if the respondent disagrees or strongly disagrees with the statement, and zero otherwise.

For statement (c), I analogously construct a binary indicator variable, which takes on a value of one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement, and zero otherwise. For all four indicators, a value of one thus implies positive attitudes toward voting. The association between class and the four indicators is estimated using probit regression.

The average marginal effects for the five class categories are reported in Figure 5.3 below. The upwardly mobile strata and the elite display the firmest beliefs in voting as a meaningful tool to influence political processes. By contrast, the anxious – albeit comparable to the climbers in terms of standard of living, education, and employment – are closest in their attitudes the persistently poor.

Figure 5.3Relationship between class and attitudes toward voting

Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1. Each point shows the estimated marginal effect of class membership, with “Persistently Poor” being the base category. The dashed lines show the 95 per cent confidence intervals. For the full regression results, see Table D.13 in the Appendix D.6.

The detected patterns are confirmed when looking at the indicators individually (see Table D.14 in the Appendix D.6). The estimates show that especially upward social mobility, and to a lesser extent overall life satisfaction, are significantly positively correlated with a stronger belief in voting as an effective instrument to influence politics. Moreover, better educated respondents tend to show more positive attitudes toward voting.

-0.1

Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite

(Strongly) Disagree:

Support for civil liberties

I now look at people’s tolerance for government constraints on their rights as citizens, a critical limitation to the exercise of “effective democracy.”

The analysis builds on a set of five statements included in the SASAS questionnaire.

Respondents are asked to state their level of agreement with various views on how the country should be governed. The first four statements capture respondents’ support for civil liberties, while the fifth captures attitudes towards corruption. All five variables are measured on a five-point Likert scale recoded such that higher values indicate higher support for civil rights. For a detailed variable description, please refer to Appendix D.3.

Figure 5.4 reports the average marginal effects estimated for the five class categories. I find that those who perceive themselves as upwardly mobile tend to be less opposed to government constraints placed on the freedom of opinion and freedom of the press and media, and to be less likely to demand the immediate dismissal of corrupt politicians (see also Table D.16 in the Appendix D.6). When investigating the direct link between people’s civic values and the derived asset index, I furthermore find some support for a hump-shaped relationship between living standards and support for the freedom of association and freedom to protest (see Table D.16in the Appendix D.6).

Figure 5.4Relationship between class and civic values

Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1. Each point shows the estimated marginal effect of class membership, with “Persistently Poor” being the base category. The dashed lines show the 95 per cent confidence intervals. For the full regression results, see Table D.15 in the Appendix D.6.

-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3

Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite

Freedom of

opinion Freedom of

association Freedom of the

press and media Freedom to

protest Combating fraud

and corruption

Ambivalent Attitudes towards Democracy among South Africa’s Middle Class 133

In line with the theoretical argument on partisanship discussed in Section 5.2, there are reasons to suspect that the detected negative association between people’s perceptions of social mobility and support for the freedom of opinion, freedom of the press and media, and the dismissal of corrupt politicians may be driven by an affiliation of the upwardly mobile with the national government. In fact, I observe that the two upwardly mobile strata tend to feel closest to the governing African National Congress (ANC).⁵⁴ Table D.17in the Appendix D.6 investigates this channel. When controlling for this self-rated closeness, the negative association between upward mobility and support for the freedom of opinion and freedom of the press and media remains significant, but the estimated effect size decreases by about 3 percentage points. Furthermore, the negative effect on support for the dismissal of corrupt politicians turns insignificant.

Priorities for public policy

In this final part of my analysis, I assess the association between class and different public policy priorities. Specifically, I focus on a SASAS question that asks respondents to select the three most important challenges facing South Africa today from a list of 18 policy areas. I limit the analysis to the seven top challenges named by at least 10 per cent of all respondents:

(a) unemployment, (b) crime and safety, (c) poverty, (d) HIV/AIDS, (e) corruption, (f) service provision/delivery, and (g) education.

Figure 5.5 shows the results. Approximately three-quarters of all respondents select unemployment among the top three challenges. Class does not seem to have any impact on this choice. Naturally, those looking for a job place greater emphasis on this challenge. Crime and safety are most of a concern among the downwardly mobile anxious middle class, followed by the climbers. Poverty tends to be less of a concern among the better-off and the upwardly mobile. Interestingly, I find that the climbers are least likely to rank poverty among the most important challenges that South Africa is facing. The most relevant factors that relate to the selection of HIV/AIDS among the top three challenges are race and geography.⁵⁵ Interestingly, those with tertiary education are less likely to prioritise HIV/AIDS as a main concern (see Table D.19 in the Appendix D.6). In line with the findings presented in the previous section, I find a strong and significant negative association between mobility and

54 In fact, 62 per cent of the escapers and 54 per cent of the climbers report feeling “very close” or “quite close”

to the ANC, while the same is true for 49 per cent of the persistently poor, 31 per cent of the anxious and 13 per cent of the elite.

55 Due to considerably lower infection rates, white and coloured South Africans are found to be significantly less concerned with HIV/AIDS. While prevalence remains high among the general population, it infection rates vary markedly between regions.

prioritising corruption (see Table D.19 in the Appendix D.6). Last, I observe that materially better-off South Africans tend to prioritise education, and are less likely to prioritise basic service provision.

Figure 5.5Relationship between class and priorities for public policy

Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1+Q2. Each point shows the estimated marginal effect of class membership, with “Persistently Poor” being the base category. The dashed lines show the 95 per cent confidence intervals. For the full regression results, see Table D.18 in the Appendix D.6.

5.5. Conclusion

The positive relationship between the size of the middle class and democracy found in macro cross-country analyses has frequently been linked to this class’s pro-democratic attitudes (see, for example, Barro, 1999; Chun, Hasan, & Ulubasoglu, 2011; Easterly, 2001; Josten, 2013;

Loayza et al., 2012; Solimano, 2008). However, micro studies on the political values, attitudes and behaviours of the middle class find mixed results. While some studies find suggestive evidence consistent with pro-democratic civic and political engagement on the part of the middle class (see, for example, Cheeseman, 2015), others have, quite to the contrary, concluded that this class appears rather “apathetic” in terms of their political participation (Resnick, 2015).

This study helps to reconcile these two opposing views by allowing for heterogeneity within the groups of the poor and the middle class. I show how asymmetries in perceived chances of upward social mobility of different groups condition their political attitudes.

-0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2

Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite Escapers Anxious Climbers Elite

Unemployment Crime and

Safety Poverty HIV/AIDS Corruption Service

provision Education

Ambivalent Attitudes towards Democracy among South Africa’s Middle Class 135

Specifically, I find that the two upwardly mobile strata – the “escapers” and the “climbers” – show the strongest generic support for democratic rule. They also display the highest levels of trust in public institutions and inherit the firmest beliefs that voting is an effective tool to influence political processes in the country. By contrast, the downwardly mobile “anxious”

middle class – despite being comparable to the climbers in terms of their standard of living, levels of education, and employment – shows signs of political resignation. To this effect, their political attitudes are closest to the attitudes displayed by the persistently poor.

Some important messages emerge from these findings for the South African case.

Since the transition from apartheid to democracy, concerns about the quality of democracy have become increasingly central to political discourse in South Africa. In particular, the ANC’s dominant character and the lack of a system of opposition institutions, which are essential for the healthy functioning of democracy (Jung and Shapiro, 1995), have been exposed as the main threats to democratic consolidation and accountability (see also Giliomee

& Simkins, 1999). These concerns have intensified over the past decade, particularly due to several corruption scandals involving officeholders and increased government interference in the work of the media. This has resulted in the downgrading of South Africa’s press freedom status to “partly free” (Freedom House, 2010). Against this background, some commentators have placed high expectations on South Africa’s emerging (black) middle class to become a key agent in demanding greater political accountability and placing checks on government performance (Everatt, 2013, 2014). My findings caution against these expectations.

The results presented in this chapter imply that governmental performance is likely to be perceived differently by members of different social strata, who may be affected differently by government policies (see also Newton & Norris, 2000). Particularly those people who perceive themselves as upwardly mobile may have earned some of their privileges through the existing political system and therefore, on average, are less likely to take on a more critical or demanding stance in politics. That is, those who are doing well under the current government and expect to do even better in the future are more likely to tolerate government constraints on the freedom of opinion and freedom of the press and media and less likely to advocate for the immediate dismissal of corrupt politicians. In contrast, those who perceive themselves as being stuck or downwardly mobile are much less trusting of public institutions and less satisfied with governance performance. However, instead of raising their concerns, I find that those who have been cut off from opportunities to ascend the social ladder show signs of disillusionment about the influence of their vote on politics in the country and are thus more likely to opt out of the political process.

137 137

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