Aristotelian and Rawlsian Paradigm in A Global Context

“Globalization: the process by which businesses or other organizations develop international influence or start operating on an international scale. “

Oxford English Dictionary,

www.oed.com

What has been said so far corresponds to the concept of justice that regulates social relations within a domestic society, i.e. among a certain (limited) number of persons who, even if having different conceptions of personal good, in many cases share the same historical and religious heritage, same traditions and same concept of security. The application of either of the discussed paradigms of justice beyond this bounded society poses questions since the very scope of that “beyond” is under-defined.

The discussion about “international”, “transnational” or “global” justice points to the same problem which arises with the emerging of the process and the theories of so-called globalization. Hence, I start by explaining this process.

Globalization typically refers to the economic, social and political process that is characterized primarily

14Rawls follows Piaget and Kohlberg in their work on the moral development of a person. Rawls summarizes Kohlberg’s six stages of moral development into three: the morality of authority, morality of association and morality of principles. It is this third stage: morality of principles that is present in the just society and that accounts for the fully developed sense of justice.

Previous stages account for primitive societies. (TJ: 490-510; CP: 96-117).

by the expansion of markets, free flow of capital, investments, goods and services. As a consequence of globalization, the importance of national borders, or “bounded societies“, has been reduced. Nation-states have lost power and influence—even sovereignty—because they have to (or choose to) tailor their policies to the needs of mobile capital, which in turn has had consequences on the viability of social democracy. The welfare state has lost its independence, as it has been reduced to fit the wishes of business interests. Such behaviour is said to lead to the decline of national cultures and to the creation of one homogenized (or sometimes hybridized) world culture. National differences have become less marked as people consume culture from around the world rather than being dependent on that of their own nation. This is facilitated further by global electronic communications such as the Internet, TV broadcasts, migration, and tourism (Martell 2007: 175).

New actors like multinational corporations gain importance in a political, economic and social world.

New challenges that go beyond the single nation-state emerge: influence of external agents on the state’s market and culture; global warming of the atmosphere; new wars; health catastrophes, etc.

The process of globalization can be seen as involving “new forces“, i.e. the expenditure of markets, overreaching communication, general cultural accessibility, and challenges that exceed the powers of a nation-state, all of which point to the necessity for a new way of thinking about the world’s political and social structure. In sociology and political science there are three well-established schools of thinking about globalization. Globalists, or particularists, or cosmopolitans advocate that due to the globalization process as explained above, we should reformulate our social and political institutions so that they can account primarily for the individual and his well-being and move away from the methodological nationalism. On the other hand, so-called statists argue that exactly in spite of the “new forces”, national cultures, national identities and national economic sovereignty need to be preserved. Otherwise we will end up in a paternalistic, parochial world since the “new forces” are easily directed by the great economic powers. The third school, the so-called middle-way, acknowledges the existence of the “new forces” and works with them from a nation-state prospective. This third line of thinking suggests that the nation-state should consciously revise some of its sovereign powers, knowing that others will do so as well, and in that way remain the among the most important decision-makers on the world political scene.¹⁵

Let me now perform a specific kind of conceptual gymnastics and account for what has been said so far

15In sociology, the debate about the definition and effects of globalization is known as being three-tiered among globalists such as Colin Hey and David Marsh, who advocate the necessity for sociological thinking in terms of individuals; sceptics like Paul Krugman, who denies the disempowerment of states, rather they see cosmopolitan arguments as the way for big powers to impose their policies on the rest of the world; finally, the post-sceptics like David Held and Anthony McGrew advocate a more complex picture of globalization in which it is seen as occurring but without sweeping away all that came before it.

by putting the two concepts, ´global´ and ´justice´, together. By doing that I am trying to decipher the different theoretical meanings of the phrase. The result is an array of philosophical theories on global justice. The theories are presented in their simplified and very general versions. The categorization undertaken is an approximation and needs further qualification. It is to be taken only as an orientation point and not as a firm substantial analysis. However, I posit that it can be a useful tool in marking the terrain we are ascending. I present my reasoning schematically in Table 1. Theories differ in the paradigm of justice they adopt and the way they perceive the process of globalization.

Table 1.

Aristotelian¹⁶ paradigm Rawlsian paradigm Individual as a basic unit Libertarianism Cosmopolitanism Community as a basic unit Communitarianism Liberal Nationalism

“Relaxed-community” as a basic unit Capabilities approach Rawlsian approach

I start with the theories that adopt the Aristotelian model of justice and observe the notions that arise in their coping with the conceptual challenges of globalization. Taking the Aristotelian model of justice and interpreting ´global´ to mean strengthening the role of the individual leads to viewing and norming the world from a kind of global libertarian view. This philosophical line of thinking gives priority to individual freedom over all other values. It respects the contingencies of history, social circumstances and native endowments and uses them in favour of the one chief virtue, that of personal liberty. In this respect, libertarianism stipulates that individual rights and liberties are to be minimally coordinated by the state.

This view rejects any (or almost any) distributive mechanisms. If people respect each other’s liberty, all other social and political relations are going to be settled spontaneously. In that respect Hayek criticized the idea that institutions such as economic markets may be called just or unjust, they are, as Hayek states, a “spontaneous order“ of individual actions (Hayek 1976: 173). The doctrine of libertarianism works on the basis of the concept of natural entitlements, which are under-defined. They come down to the rights people simply have and are allowed to practice as long as these rights do not disturb others.

The obligations towards others are truncated to the respect for their negative liberties, i.e. not harming them, not intervening in their development (Nozick 1974: 179).

16I call these paradigms Aristotelian, or respectively Rawlsian and not Aristotle’s or Rawls´ because they refer to a way of thinking not the detailed elaboration of Aristotle’s or Rawls´ views. The distinction between “Rawlisan“ and “Rawls´“, or

“Aristotelian“ and “Aristotle’s“, will be used in this work analogue to the distinction Rawls makes between his usage of the words “Kantian“ and “Kant´s“ (CP: 304), i.e. when the direct reference to the theory of a certain philosopher is made, in the way that philosopher makes it, I will use possessive pattern like “Rawls´”; however if I make a reference to the way of thinking in the line with the philosophy of a particular philosopher I will use the adjective form, e.g. „Rawlsian“.

By stressing the importance of the minimal influence of the states, it seems natural for these philosophers to advocate institutional minimalism on a global scale. As in the national case, justice is a personal, subjective concept of first and foremost not harming others and developing one’s own capacities. The most important advocate of this view is Robert Nozick. Recently a new line of thinking emerged among libertarians, the so-called left-libertarians, who see a need for more global coercion when it comes to the distribution and usage of natural resources. These philosophers, like Michael Otzuka, Matthias Risse, and Philippe Van Parijs, advocate that a basic amount of natural resources should be divided evenly across the globe. Societies are then to be left on their own to either augment their “wealth” or to neglect it. The logic behind this reasoning is that though everybody should be left to find his/her own “right measure“, they should all have a true means to do so. Liberty as the utmost social value needs to be real liberty (Van Parijs 1998); meaning liberty which people can actually make use of. In order to actively practice their liberties, such as freedom of thought, people need to have their basic needs fulfilled. Van Parijs suggests that the basic income should be given to all at all times and then to be left to develop freely.

I cannot discuss here in great detail the postulates or the weak points of global libertarianism; it must suffice here to point to the basic problems with this view. First, classical libertarianism assumes something like the “invisible hand“ working on the world scale. However, with powerful world economies in sight it is not clear what would prevent the world from falling into either global despotism or global anarchism. Second, left-libertarianism faces the problem of how to decide what the basic needs across the globe are and how to deal with different capacities to use the bundle of commonly distributed goods. Different capacities may be caused by inconvenient natural circumstances, like environment or health disasters. Libertarianism does not offer provisions for dealing with these unexpected factors;

therefore, a libertarian conception of justice will not play a further role in our discussion.

An Aristotelian paradigm combined with the strong notion of society, and an awareness of the existence of different societies brings us to the so-called communitarian approach. The basic notion of this school of thought is that individuals are fully defined and shaped by their communities. Community, in which individuals live, shapes all their actions, as well as their psychology (MacIntyre 1981: 203-25).

Communitarians reject Rawls´ idea of persons as free and equal. Rawls´ person can choose, reflect and revise, “stand above and critically survey“ (Freeman 2006: 304) social institutions. In a communitarian view, actors engage in thinking as fully embedded personalities, defined and shaped by their social circumstances. Fundamental values that we cherish are simply given to us and on the face of them we pursue our own projects. The idea of the “unencumbered” self does not correspond to the image of an actual person. Commitment to certain values and traditions make people who they are

(Sandel 1982: 15-65). This kind of thinking in the time of globalization makes patriotic feelings even stronger and considers justice as a duty owed foremost to compatriots.

However, these philosophers are ready to defend the worldwide protection of human rights without national partiality. Human rights protection will have to be distinguished from other rights and duties in which compatriots have an advantage. Now, the justification for human rights and their legal enforcement should be left to each country, i.e. each culture to decide on its own. As Charles Taylor argues, we can find in all cultures condemnations of genocide, murder, torture and slavery, but the deep underlying values supporting these common conclusions will belong to the alternative mutually incompatible justifications based on different society’s value systems. (Taylor 1999: 125)

The middle-way sees the importance of the states but acknowledges that changes need to be made in their core values. On the other hand, taking justice to be primarily the matter of giving each what he/she deserves, or rather what one needs, is a so-called capabilities approach. Capabilities approach stresses different needs and wants people have and consequently sees them as being capable in different ways, other circumstances aside, in terms of achieving things. Any theory of justice needs to acknowledge that people are different and need different things in different amounts. This view takes such differences into account and works on the theoretical framework that would supply people with what they need for achieving what they are capable of. They criticize Rawls for not putting more stress on the differences among individuals and societies. Amartya Sen, who first introduced this line of thinking, argues that people value their ability to do certain things and to achieve certain types of beings. These ”doings“ and “beings“ he calls “functionings“.

Whether people will be capable of doing and achieving their functions depends a great deal on society (Sen 1988: 13), which empowers their capabilities. Thereby, the simple measurement of wealth or the amount of what Rawls calls basic goods does not suffice for the happiness of a person. Like Aristotle, Sen reiterates the familiar argument that wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking, for it is merely useful for the sake of something else (Sen, 1990: 44). Doing justice should be about quality of life, and in considering it we should consider what people are able to achieve. Sen observes that different people and societies typically differ in their capacity to convert income and commodities into valuable achievements. For example, a disabled person may require extra resources (wheelchairs, ramps, lifts, etc.) to achieve the same thing (moving around) as an able bodied person. Moreover, a child typically has very different nutritional requirements from a manual labourer, pregnant woman or someone with a parasitic disease. Similarly, the commodity requirements for more complex social achievements (such as “appearing in public without shame” or “entertaining family and friends”) typically depend on

“cultural” factors such as social convention, custom or status, and class (Sen 1985:25-26; 1990: 70-71).

Sen has also been praised for broadening the informational base of evaluation, refocusing on people as ends in themselves, recognizing human diversity (through differences in personal conversion functions), drawing attention to group disparities (such as those based on gender, race, class, caste or age) and acknowledging that different people, cultures and societies may have different values and aspirations.

The capabilities approach has been criticized from several different angles. In many cases key strengths are re-construed as potential weaknesses by critics. First, viewpoints about merits and needs differ and concrete measures of it are incomplete. Martha Nussbaum has done the most notable work on this aspect of the capabilities approach (Nussbaum 2000: 11-15). The second critique asks about the role of the state within the capabilities approach. Sen´s answer is that the focus of the state, or any institution for that matter (international organizations included), is to make human flourishing possible and not be focused on economic growth. Hence, national and international organizations should be focused on the development of human capabilities. Injustice is done when transnational arrangements are made that do not take serious consideration of the specific characteristics of societies. In other words, when the “right measure” between what others need and how much they can provide for themselves and be provided for, is ignored by the institutions in society. The capabilities approach will also be left out of further discussion.

Here I conclude the discussion of Aristotelian theories of justice and move to the Rawlsian. Thus, if we take the Rawlsian concept of justice as a starting point while interpreting ´global´ as an incentive for turning our political thinking away from the methodological nationalism and towards methodological individualism, then we come to advocate cosmopolitanism, voiced primarily by two of Rawls’ students, Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz.¹⁷ The key element of cosmopolitanism is a so-called “normative individualism“. Rawls uses this notion in his theory of justice, when he considers all individuals ”free“

and “equal“ and as adequate “sources of valid claims“. This means that it is these free and equal individuals, with their reflective powers and their different conceptions of good that decide upon the design of institutions under which they will live. As we already stated, just are those institutions that mitigate the consequences of contingent characteristics of individuals. Up to this point, cosmopolitans would agree with Rawls. The disagreement begins when they, Pogge, Beitz and other cosmopolitans, take this notion of mitigating contingencies to a global level.¹⁸ These philosophers are led by Pogge´s famous definition of cosmopolitanism:

17It is their version of cosmopolitanism that I will be further referring to as cosmopolitanism and will be discussing as paradigmatic of such. In recent years there has been a rise in number of philosophical writings that title themselves cosmopolitan and I find it necessary to stress that I focus my work on the version of cosmopolitan argument developed by Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz.

18The above mentioned cosmopolitan philosophers extended Rawls´ argument to a global level even before Rawls presented his own theory of global justice (Pogge 1994; Beitz 1979).

“Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First, individualism: the ultimate units of concern are human beings or persons- rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or citizens. Second, universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally- not merely to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, generality special status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone-not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or such like“ (Pogge 1992: 48).

What this means in practical terms is that on a global level the ultimate unit of concerns remains a human being, but the scope of contingencies that should be mitigated widens: the place of birth i.e.

country, culture, and tradition fall under the underserved inequalities which global order should respond to. Both philosophers were disappointed that Rawls did not apply his “difference principle“, a principle that mitigates undeserved inequalities on a domestic level, globally. Both, Pogge and Beitz, have developed their version of the global “difference principle“. Beitz introduces his “resource redistribution principle” (RRP), while Pogge presents his concept of “global resource dividend” (GRD). Beitz thinks that natural resources can be viewed in an analogy with human talents, and that some areas just happen to have ample resources while others do not. RRP should give each society a fair chance to establish just political institutions and an economy that can fulfil its members’ basic needs. However, this simple transfer can only happen if we take that societies are autarkic and solely dependable on their own resources. In the world that is already cooperating a great deal, some ex ante redistribution of resources is not possible; therefore, Beitz reformulates his principle into a simple global distribution principle, i.e. global difference principle. This will function in the same manner as the national difference principle does: a global original position will identify the group of the least advantaged and any profit made by those more advantaged is to be for the benefit of the group of least advantaged, wherever in

country, culture, and tradition fall under the underserved inequalities which global order should respond to. Both philosophers were disappointed that Rawls did not apply his “difference principle“, a principle that mitigates undeserved inequalities on a domestic level, globally. Both, Pogge and Beitz, have developed their version of the global “difference principle“. Beitz introduces his “resource redistribution principle” (RRP), while Pogge presents his concept of “global resource dividend” (GRD). Beitz thinks that natural resources can be viewed in an analogy with human talents, and that some areas just happen to have ample resources while others do not. RRP should give each society a fair chance to establish just political institutions and an economy that can fulfil its members’ basic needs. However, this simple transfer can only happen if we take that societies are autarkic and solely dependable on their own resources. In the world that is already cooperating a great deal, some ex ante redistribution of resources is not possible; therefore, Beitz reformulates his principle into a simple global distribution principle, i.e. global difference principle. This will function in the same manner as the national difference principle does: a global original position will identify the group of the least advantaged and any profit made by those more advantaged is to be for the benefit of the group of least advantaged, wherever in