ARGUMENT BY COMPARISON

The parties in the original position reason by comparing two alternatives at the same time. They start with a Rawlsian conception and compare it to other available alternatives. This procedure is familiar from TJ. The stronger balance of reasons supports the chosen principles. Of course, the entire endeavor depends on the list of competing alternatives and the criteria for the filtering of alternatives.

The arguments are never fully conclusive but are taken to be reasonably conclusive.

The competing alternatives in this case are realism, liberalism and Rawlsian realistic utopia. The criteria for testing the alternatives are taken from TJ (JF: § 27-40). There are four criteria for each of the two comparisons. The competing conceptions are explicitly compared two at a time. Thereby, the strategies used to filter out theories are maximin rule, publicity, reciprocity and stability. We, the readers of Rawls’

work who are contemplating the entire arrangement, agree upon these criteria. “We” can be the members of currently existing liberal societies or currently existing decent societies. The construction of the original position and the criteria for the selection of adequate principles need to conform to our considered judgments about the principals for the global justice in the world.

To repeat: the comparison is done by the parties in the original position, under the veil of ignorance.

The parties are representatives of different societies. The original positions for the liberal peoples and for the decent peoples are two different processes. Hence, the representatives know that they represent either liberal or decent peoples, they just don’t know which one.

I first take the Rawlsian version and compare it with realism. The Rawlsian version clearly cuts better in both original positions. If the parties choose realism, once the veil lifts the members of the least powerful state will surely not be satisfied. If the parties in the original position apply the maximin rule to the case of human rights protection, they would be comparing the guaranteed minimum (Rawlsian version) with the arbitrary possibility of being protected if they pertain to the more powerful society (realisms version). Since maximin reasoning makes parties choose the best possibility in the worse-case scenario, it is clear that in both worse-cases, whether in the original position for the liberal society or in the original positions for the decent societies, parties will choose Rawlsian unconditional human rights protection. Furthermore, if the parties were to choose the principles they would most certainly abide by in political practice once the veil lifts, then they would not choose realistic conceptions of cooperation.

These do not provide for reciprocity nor do they secure stability. Hence, realism passes neither the test of maximin, nor those of publicity, reciprocity and stability.

The situation is somewhat more complicated when comparing the Rawlsian version with that of liberalism. Rawls’ philosophy owes much to liberalism. For once, a liberal conception is completely out of question for the representatives of the decent societies. However, since the original positions are separate I need to establish reasons that will lead the liberal societies to discredit it as well.

Under maximin reasoning, the liberal position wins, since it secures the most extensive amount of human rights protection and support for everyone, i.e. for the least advantaged. However, this reasoning is only valid if everyone is convinced and already a morally mature liberal. This means that individuals have reached the final stage of moral development in which they decided that the principles they want to follow are the liberal ones, and even more so these are the principles of comprehensive liberalism. For societies this means that their institutional arrangement is liberal, they have a homogenous internal culture⁷⁹ and their foreign policy is sensitive to the needs of other states and individuals.

Representatives of liberal societies under the veil of ignorance do not know what kind of liberal society they represent. To commit themselves in advance to the world of comprehensive liberals would add a premise of dogmatism and possibly endanger their own comprehensive religious doctrines.

Comprehensive liberalism, when forced from the outside, burdens the idea of self-determination and tolerance. Well-ordered societies take great pride in their historical achievements and the struggle for self-determination.⁸⁰ They are aware that true freedom can only be acquired if the process is done without authoritarian imposition or guidance. Hence, imposing liberal values on the rest of the world cannot bring stability and happiness. Furthermore, part of the idea of freedom is to constantly reflect on one’s institutions and values; thus, it may happen that liberals in due process adopt some political values from the decent peoples.

Comprehensive liberalism does not respect the idea of publicity; if declared publicly, those who have not reached the highest level of moral learning will feel deprived of the right to self-determination. It does not make institutions more stable; on the contrary, stability is a trait of institutions that allow questioning and “changing of mind”. Only in that way can all portions of society (even those on the lower stages of moral learning) grow attached to the institutions and show their allegiance. Finally, it does not account for the principle of reciprocity but rather for that of altruism or benevolence and in this way does not account for the idea of self-respect of all parties. Altruism is irreversible, non-reciprocal,

79This means that liberalism is practiced in all aspects of human life; it is not just a political doctrine. In Rawls´s philosophy, liberalism is explicitly political, and is connected to political institutions while privately one can practice various comprehensive doctrines. In the philosophy of comprehensive liberals like Kant and Mill, these two aspects, the political and the private, are not separated. According to them, liberalism is one comprehensive, all-embracing doctrine.

80Cf.§3, where I explain the establishment of the Peoples, i.e. the well-ordered societies.

one-way help. It is connected to any arbitrary individuals, simply because he/she is a human being and all human beings are to be treated as free and equal and therefore eligible for assistance. Liberal assistance requires a duty of beneficence: a supererogatory duty that imposes the liberal criterion on all individuals and societies everywhere.

The Rawlsian conception of cooperation and assistance vows not to be paternalistic. By supporting reasonable, but not necessarily liberal institutions, the Rawlsian conception escapes the objection of imperialism while at the same time accounting for the ideas of reciprocity, tolerance, self-determination and self-respect. The idea of stability is, in the Rawlsian conception, connected to the idea of moral learning: those who grow up in a well-ordered society develop an allegiance with the common institutions. After a time, this support is automatic, even enhanced with feelings of belonging and patriotism. A similar thing is expected to happen with the Rawlsian conception of global justice. Its third principle, which provides everyone with non-paternalistic development with due support, generates its own stability. It does not impose values on anybody while creating a general system of security, i.e.

insurance against calamities. Cooperating with those who do not share our values may at first be done out of pure self-interest, e.g. necessity of resources or necessity of their help. Later, however, if the system proves to be working successfully, cooperation with others will be for the sake of cooperation itself, or rather for the sake of the general prosperity it generates. The liberal conception of international relations cannot do this. It can generate support only from those who are convinced liberals. The others, i.e. non-liberal but decent peoples, would feel forced into cooperation, with certain conceptions being imposed on them without the space to negotiate the validity of their own view.

This concludes my survey of the two comparisons between Rawlsian liberal and realism’s conceptions of global justice. I hope to have clearly shown what the basic ideas of each conception are, as well as successfully managed to argue for the Rawlsian. If the original position, with the veil of ignorance and symmetrically situated parties, should be a device for deducing principles of justice, then Rawlsian principles are those to be deduced. Two separately conducted deliberations from the original position, one done by the liberal and one by the decent peoples, came to the same conclusion: Rawlsian principles are the optimal solution for a peaceful and consequently just world order.

In this chapter, I analyzed three perspectives on international relations: realism, idealism and Rawlsianism. These I presented to the parties in the original position. I hope I was able to show in a conclusive way that the parties prefer the Rawlsian conception.

Thereby, the conception called Rawlsian is not the one presented in Rawls’ work directly, but that is implicit to it. It supplements, or rather interprets it, making it richer and more capable of responding to

objections.

One may ask why I did not present the parties in the original position directly with the theories that object to Rawls’, i.e. that of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. The answer is that these theories all originated subsequent to Rawls’ theory. At the same time, cosmopolitanism has its roots in the long tradition of idealism, while communitarianism is rooted in the realist tradition. Hence, when presented in their simplest form, as was done here, liberalism and realism do account for cosmopolitanism and communitarianism respectively.

In the following chapter I will further elaborate on the third principle presented here. I take it to be a peculiarity of the Rawlsian conception and an important guideline for the development of contemporary international relations.

CHAPTER SIX

NON-PATERNALISTIC ASSISTANCE: PRINCIPLE OF SOLIDARITY

Rawls’ Law of Peoples regulates the relations between the well-ordered societies, which Rawls calls the Peoples. In order to be worthy of the name, the Peoples need to fulfill numerous conditions: in their internal affairs their institutions correspond to the conceptions of political justice of their population; in their foreign affairs they are reasonable, i.e. take into account the existence and active practice of the interests of others. Of fundamental interest to peoples is advancing the well-being of their population, though not at all costs. Peoples are lead by statesmen who are long-sighted and do not seek immediate benefit or power, but rather have a peaceful world of satisfied peoples as their final goal.

These Peoples, as we saw in the last chapter cooperate according to these three principles:

1. Peoples shall cooperate in protecting human rights.

2. Peoples shall cooperate with each other on a commercial basis.

3. Peoples shall offer non-paternalistic assistance to other societies.

The first principle is twofold. On the one hand, it imposes negative duties on all societies: they should respect human rights everywhere (in the sense of not harming them); on the other, the principle imposes positive duties, in the sense that the societies are obliged to actively work on the protection of human rights even if that means intervention--military or other. As I established in the previous chapter, positive duties are strictly connected to the specific human rights called basic human rights. Disrespect of these rights would lead us out of the theoretical framework of an ideal theory. Hence, it is important to stress this as an internal condition for the Society of Peoples.

The negative duties that societies have presuppose non-violation of a much broader palette of human rights. Non-violation in this respect comes down to the idea of toleration. To tolerate means to recognize others and their doctrines as members in good standing. It means that though one does not directly agree with the other, they are willing to accept the differences. These differences can be large or small depending on the society in question, and hence the list of respected human rights can also become ever longer through the dialog of societies and their practice of toleration. Respect for human rights, both as a negative and as a positive duty, is based on a general respect for human beings, on altruism, on internal values of each society; in that sense the societies that observe human rights do not expect any reciprocal gain from it.

The second principle is that of cooperation in its narrowest meaning. It refers to the business–like

arrangements between equal partners that epitomize the idea of treaties in their ideal form: consent from both parties is necessary and each knows its costs and benefits. Gain takes place on both sides, with the only difference being the goods that are gained. This principle is based on direct reciprocity; it is a simple tit-for-tat principle.

Finally, the third principle is a new emerging principle in international relations that consists of the positive duties, other than humanitarian ones, that societies have towards one another. Globalization has made us aware of different distant societies and their problems. Furthermore, it made those problems vivid and close to us. Any reasonable being cannot think that humanitarian assistance is enough to lead us to the peaceful world of satisfied peoples. Peoples are to develop institutions to support other societies, which may be Peoples or non-Peoples, in ways that are different from tit-for-tat reasoning and also different from purely altruistic humanitarian help. It is this ideally conceived principle that distinguishes Rawlsianism from other theories of global justice or international relations. It elaborates on the law of cooperation in its broad definition, i.e. not as being based on direct, but on counterfactual reciprocity. This principle comes into play when the work of positive humanitarian duties is done. It works together with the idea of toleration on enlarging the list of human rights respect and on making the societies fit for commercial cooperation. In that sense it is a transitional principle, which mostly deals with building of political conscience and political institutions. Without these, no commercial cooperation is possible. If this third principle is in place, then it is not important whether the list of human rights is long or short; this non-paternalistic assistance will account for duties that go beyond those of basic human rights.

In my view it is proper to call this third principle the principle of solidarity. I justify my terminological choice with the insight in the conceptual and terminological history of solidarity (cf. Appendix I).

However, since solidarity’s meaning has never been firmly fixed, I use its many historical appearances to interpret it in a modern, liberal, Rawlsian manner.