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Munich Personal RePEc Archive

A Corrigendum to "Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time"

Hashimoto, Tadashi

Stanford Graduate School of Business

September 2007

Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18124/

MPRA Paper No. 18124, posted 26 Oct 2009 14:38 UTC

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A Corrigendum to “Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time”

Tadashi Hashimoto

Stanford Graduate School of Business tadashih@stanford.edu

Abstract

Sannikov (2007) investigates properties of perfect public equilibria in continuous time repeated games. This note points out that the proof of Lemma 6, required for the proof of the main theorem (Theorem 2), contains an error in computing a Hes- sian matrix. A correct proof of Lemma 6 is provided using an additional innocuous assumption and a generalized version of Lemma 5.

The author is grateful to Yuliy Sannikov, Michihiro Kandori, Huiyu Li, Semyon Malamud and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.

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Sannikov (2007) makes an important contribution by formulating continuous time re- peated games with imperfect public monitoring and analysing properties of perfect public equilibria. However, the paper has an error in the computation of a Hessian matrix in the proof of Lemma 6, a lemma that is used in the proof of the main theorem (Theorem 2). In this note, we provide a correct proof of Lemma 6 by adding an innocuous assumption. In particular, we display the correct value of the Hessian matrix in equation (5) of this note.

We first show the following generalization of Lemma 5:

Lemma 5. For anya ̸∈ AN, α∈Rand any matrix B =Tφ+Nχthat enforces a, where T and N are orthogonal unit vectors,

4 ¯Q+ 2|α|

Ψ¯ |χ| ≥1− (|φ| − |α||χ|)2

|φ(a,T)|2 . (1)

Proof. From the proof of Lemma 5, 2 ¯Q

Ψ¯ |χ| ≥1− |φ|

|φ(a,T)|. (2)

Since |φ(a,T)| ≥Ψ for¯ a̸∈ AN, 2 ¯Q+|α|

Ψ¯ |χ| ≥ 2 ¯Q

Ψ¯ |χ|+ |α||χ|

|φ(a,T)| ≥1−|φ| − |α||χ|

|φ(a,T)| . (3)

Finally, (1) follows from the inequality 1−x≥ 12(1−x2).

Next, we modify Lemma 6 by adding property (iv) to the original statement. This modification does not affect the proof of Proposition 5, where Lemma 6 is used.

Lemma 6. It is impossible for a solution C of (36) of Sannikov (2007) with endpoints vL

and vH to satisfy the following properties simultaneously

(i) There is a unit vector Nˆ such that ∀x >0, vL+xNˆ ̸∈ E(r) and vH +xNˆ ̸∈ E(r).

(ii) For all w∈ C with an outward unit normal N, we have

vmaxN∈N

NvN <Nw.

(iii) C “cuts through” E(r), that is, there exists a point v ∈ C such that W0 =v +xN ∈ E(r) for some x >0.

(iv) infw∈CNNˆ (w) >0, where N(w) is the outward unit normal vector at w.

Proof. We use a prove by contradiction. Assume the existence of such a curve C. Then there must be a PPE that achieves point W0 =v+xNˆ ∈ E(r). We will show that such a PPE is impossible.

To ease computation, we first use the coordinate system where eachw∈R2is decomposed as w=wTˆTˆ +wNˆNˆ (Figure 1). We extendC toC′′ such that

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wTˆ wNˆ

C′′

w =wˆ

T+wˆ N wNˆ

wTˆ

ϕ(wˆ T)

f(w) vL vH

C v(w)

Figure 1: A graphical explanation of ϕ, f and v (*).

(i) C′′ is generated by a non-negative Lipschitz continuous curvature function ˜κ : C′′ → [0,∞), which is an extension of κ,

(ii) {C′′+xNˆ :x∈R} is a partition ofR2, and

(iii) infw∈C′′NNˆ (w)>0, where N(w) is the outward unit vector of C′′ atw∈ C′′.

Under this coordinate system, C′′ can be seen as a function ϕ(wTˆ). Define the function f : R2 → R by f(w) = wNˆ −ϕ(wTˆ), and let v(w) = w−f(w) ˆN. For each w, we set N(w) =N(v(w)). The tangent unit vector T(w) is similarly defined.

To apply Ito’s formula, we compute the first and second order derivatives of f. Since ˆ

N−ϕTˆ =N/TTˆ,

[∂f(w)/∂w1

∂f(w)/∂w2 ]

= [Tˆ

Nˆ ][

∂f(w)/∂wTˆ

∂f(w)/∂wNˆ ]

= N

TTˆ. (4) Similarly, usingϕ′′(wNˆ) = −˜κ/(TTˆ)3 and ˆT/TTˆ =T+γN,1 where γ =NTˆ/TTˆ, we have

[ ∂2f(w)/∂w122f(w)/∂w1∂w2

2f(w)/∂w2∂w12f(w)/∂w22

]

= κ˜

(TTˆ)2(T+γN)(T+γN) (5) We evaluatef(Wt) by Ito’s formula. Recall that ˘εtis orthogonal toZt, that is,⟨˘εi, Zj⟩= 0 for all i and j. By the fact that any purely discontinuous local martingale is orthogonal to

1The formula ϕ′′ = −˜κ/(TTˆ)3, or equivalently −˜κ= ϕ′′/|(1, ϕ)|3 is a well-known formula. See, for example, Korn and Korn (1968). Note that the negative sign before ˜κ arises because in Sannikov (2007) curvature capturesnegative changes in angles.

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any continuous local martingale, we have ⟨˘εic, Zj⟩ = 0. Applying Itˆo’s formula for semi- martingales, we obtain2

f(Wt)≥f(W0) +

t

0

µsds+

t

0

σsdZs+Mt (7) where

µt= r TTˆ

{

N(Wt−g(At)) + rκ 2

TBt+γNBt

2}

, (8)

σt= (r/TTˆ)NBs and Mt=∫t

0(r/TTˆ)Nd˘εt. Let τ = min{t :f(Wt)≤0}. We show that

µt≥rf(Wt)−K|σt| for all t < τ (9) almost surely, where K = 2 maxv∈V|v| · {4 ¯Q+ 2 supw∈C′′γ(w)}/Ψ. By the definition of¯ v,

N(Wt−g(At)) =NNˆf(Wt)−N(g(At)−v(Wt)). (10) If N(g(At)−v(Wt)) ≤ 0, then (9) trivially holds. In the case of N(g(At)−v(Wt)) > 0, At̸∈ AN by the assumption (ii). Equation (36) of Sannikov (2007) then implies

µt≥rf(Wt)− rN(g(At)−v(Wt)) TTˆ

{

1− (|TBt| − |γ(Wt)||NBt|)2

|φ(At,T)|2

}

(11) and (9) follows from Lemma 5.

By (9), we know

f(Wt)≥f(W0) +

t

0

rf(Ws)ds+

t

0

σsdZs +Mt (12) for t ≤ τ, where dZt = dZt−K(σt/|σt|)dt. By Girsanov’s theorem, we can construct a probability measure Q satisfying the following properties: Q is equivalent to the original measure; Zt is a Browinan motion under Q; and Mt is a martingale even under Q (*).

2See Theorem 9.35 of He et al. (1992). Itˆo’s formula gives us the following representation:

f(Wt) =f(W0) +

t

0

µtds+

t

0

σsdZs+Mt+Qt+Dt

where Qt= 12

i,j=1,2

t

0Ks−ws−i wjs−d⟨˘εic,ε˘jcs andDt=

0<s≤t{∆f(Ws)Df(Ws−)∆Ws}. First note thatDt0 becausef is convex. Also,Qt0 because

2Qt=

i,j=1,2

⟨ψi, ψjt=⟨ψ1+ψ2, ψ1+ψ2t0, (6)

whereψk is defined bykt =

Kt−wt−k kc(see Proposition 3.2.17 of Karatzas and Shreve 1991).

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Define stopping time T = min{t : f(Wt) ≤ f(W0)(1 +rt)/2}. Note that T has a uniform upper boundt >0 becausef(V) is bounded. Since T ≤τ, by (12),

f(WT)− f(W0)

2 (1 +rT)≥ f(W0)

2 +NT, (13)

where Nt=∫t

0 σsdZs +Mt. However, 0≥EQ

[

f(WT)− f(W0)

2 (1 +rT) ]

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≥EQ

[f(W0)

2 +NTt

]

≥ f(W0)

2 >0, (15)

where EQ[·] is the expectation operator under measure Q. This is a contradiction.

References

[1] He, S., J. Wang and J. Yan (1992): Semimartingale Theory and Stochastic Calculus, Science Press, CRC Press Inc.

[2] A. Korn and M. Korn (1968): Mathematical Handbook for Scientists and Engineers.

New York: McGraw-Hill.

[3] Sannikov, Y. (2007): “Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time,” Econometrica, 75, 1285-1329.

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