The Guilds in Iran — an Overview
from the Earliest Beginnings till 1972
By W. M. Floor, Utrecht
The study of the guilds in Iran has hardly begun. Only a few studies
have been published as yet on this subject, not aU of which are satis¬
factory. There is a great need for further study, for there are many
lacunae in oiu: knowledge and some accounts are inaccurate. A recent
example is Issawi's inclusion of part of a study by Kuznbtsova in his
Economic History of Iran. This study indiscriminately uses material
from the 17th and 19th century, as well as sources on Armenian, Georgian
and Muslim guilds in the Russian Caucasus, to present a picture of the
guUds in Iran. The result is an unbalanced view, which does not present
a picture of the guilds in the 19th century, as Issawi has it.^
Many authors who write about Iran tell us that traders and artisans
form guilds. They, however, always fail to define what they mean by this
term, and implicitely assume that the reader knows what they mean.
Another error which obscures the issue is the fact that one did not
distinguish between guilds (professional organisations) and futuvvat
orders (spiritual organisations). Even when authors feel the need for a
definition, they do not formulate one themselves, but use what is known,
for instance, about European guilds as a yardstick to establish the fact
whether one has to do with a guild or not.* Unnecessary to say that
defining our starting point is necessary.
Though looking for differences between guilds in Europe and similar
organisations in Islamic countries is a valid method (did not Pietee
Geyl say : it is the differences which matter), I think that looking which
functions of guilds featured in all cultures and periods, and whether
these are to be found in one's particular country or period of interest,
is more promising. Comparative sociology provides us with an important
lead for such an approach. Sjobeeg contends that pre-industrial societies
''everywhere display strikingly similar social and ecological structures;
• IN.A. Kuznbtsova : Materu^ij k kharakteristike remeslennogo v iranakom
gorode XVIII-nachata XIX veka. Transl. by Cu. Issawi: The Economic
History of Iran ISOO— 1914. Chicago 1972, pp. 285—292.
2 See e.g. the excellent article by S. M. Stern : The Constitution of the
Islamic City. In: The Islamic City. Ed. A. H. Hourani & S. M. Stern.
Oxford 1970, pp. 45,46.
not necessarily in specific cultural content, but certainly in basic form,"*
and the same holds for the guilds in those societies. He distinguishes the
following functions of guilds which he found are universal. Guilds in the
first place have the monopoly of their particular occupation. Secondly,
they have rules for the selection of membership. Thirdly, it is only by the
guilds that personel in their occupation is trained. Fourthly, they see to it
that members maintain a certain standard of workmanship. Fifthly,
guilds are an important channel to voice political demands of the arti¬
sans. Sixthly, guild members may assist each other in economic life by
pooling resources. Seventhly, amongst guild members the idea of mutual
welfare is strong. Eighthly, guilds have a religious and ceremonial func¬
tion.* Apart from these functions guilds display a few more aspects which
are peculiar to them. I mean the election of their officers by the members ;
belonging to one branch of the urban economy; being taxed by the
government as a corporate body. Taking this structmal view of the
guild phenomenon gives us a better possibihty to decide what guilds in
different culture areas had in common, where they differed, or whether
guilds were special for some historical periods only. To make this theory
operational I woidd like to define a guild as : a group of towns people
engaged in the same occupation, who elect their own chief and officers,
who pay guild taxes, this group having fiscal and administrative func¬
tions. These I contend are the minimum factors which define whether
we have to do with a guild or not. In addition this group may have
social, economical, political, and religious functions. The fiscal and
administrative functions are ascribed functions, the other functions are
acquired ones.
As I said above, guilds functioned in pre-industrial societies. Such a
society is ruled by a small urban elite, and has a big illiteral agricultural
mass and a small urban population. The government concerns itself
mainly with (i) the maintenance of social control and of law and order,
(ii) the provision of pubhc services, and (iii) collecting taxes to be able
to do (i) and (ü).* In the economic sphere this means that the govern¬
ment had to interfere in economic life for several reasons. To carry out
public services and buildings, the government provided the planning
and organisation, often also the money by way of taxation, while it
demanded the population to provide the manpower. This mostly resulted
in corvees, which were also a kind of taxation. Further to maintain
order and security and to strengthen the stability of its rule the
government had to head off social unrest by insuring such important
economic facihties as the sufiiciency of bread, fuel, meat, fodder, and the
3 G. Sjobebg : The pre-indmirial city. Glencoe, 111. 1965, p. 5.
* Ibid., pp. 190—194. « Ibid., pp. 244—252.
The Guilds in Iran — an Overview from the Earliest Beginnings 101
like. The government based its right to obedience and the legitimacy of
its rale on the fact that it reigned in accordance with the divine laws
and the fact that it maintained justice and order. Therefore, on the
moral side of its rule the government had to guard the rights of the poor
against the wiles of the rich. In Islamic Iran, the symbol of the govern¬
ment's role in this respect was the overseer of the markets and morals,
the muhtasib.'^ It cannot be too often stressed that according to Muslim
law and tradition it was the government's right and duty to guard and
guide the people's interests, also in economic life.
Because of lack of hterate and other trained persons among the elite,
the latter had to fall back on qualified persons among the non-ehte part
of the population. Handbooks on market supervision sometimes recom¬
mend the appointment of a "rehable, trustworthy man from their own
profession."' That such recommandations were only given for some
crafts does not mean that such practices were restricted. For these books
only refer to a theoretical situation, while the actual practice was quite
different. To streamline the administration and get an efficient execution
of thc rules, the government had to get the population or groups to
co-operate with its administration. The best way to do this was to single
out groups among the population, whieh could be clearly distinguished
from other groups, and which had problems characteristic for one group
only. The government treated these groups each as a corporate body,
i.e. the government did not treat with individuals of such a group in
fiscal and other matters, but with the leaders of this group only. While
setting certain limitations the government allowed these groups to
regulate their own internal affairs, without rehnquishing its legitimate
right to interfere in, or control these activities. This could well mean
that a guild was controlled by a government overseer, while at the same
time the internal matters were completely their own affair. For example,
even though pohce handbooks do not mention rigid rules on apprentice¬
ship and admission to the guilds, this doesnot mean that such rules did
not exist.* The fact that pohce handbooks are not concerned with these
matters is significant too. For it means that the government either left
these matters to the guilds purposely, or was not interested in these
matters, as is clear in later periods. As far as the government was con¬
cerned goods had to have a certain standard for which it laid down
rules ; it was up to the guilds to make their products according to these
« On the muhtasib see: W. M. Floor: The Market Police in Qäjär Persia.
In: WI 13 (1972), pp. 213—229, esp. p. 222.
' Stern, pp. 42—43, esp. note 27.
8 S. D. Goitein: Studies in Islamio History and Institutions. Leiden 1966,
p. 267 ff.
rules. The government in the person of the mulitasib and other overseers
controlled the enactment of these rules. Thus it is rather the govern¬
ment than the artisans and traders which brings the guilds into being.
The tendency of pre-industrial government to foster occupational
groups accorded with the special interests of these groups, and thus
their formation was generated.
Guilds, then, grew out of corporate bodies of craftsmen, created by the
government for fiscal and administrative purposes. These corporate
bodies of artisans graduaUy began to distinguish themselves from other
similar corporate groups. In fact they differed already from such groups
as tribes and viUages by the fact that they were a branch of the urban
economy. In addition to the fact that they choose their own chief and
officers, the artisinal corporate bodies were taxed in a different way
from aU other economic groups in the city. They were the only ones who
paid guild taxes, i. e. were taxed as a group. Other groups such as the
whole-sale merchants (tujjär) were not, neither were such groups as
'ulamä' and entertainers.* It is only when corporate bodies of urban
economic groups, elect their own officers, and pay taxes not as indivi¬
duals but as a group, that we can speak about such a group being a guild.
These are, as I mentioned above, the minimum factors which mark off
guilds from other corporate groups. Apart from these minimum factors
guUds could acquire a certain set of functions which made them into
fuU-fledged guilds. It is easy to imagine that the common interests, the
common deliberations about taxes, mostly in their own habitual coffee
houses (pätüq), and the concentration in the same part of the bazaar
created a kind of social bond. The strongest social spirit was to be found
among those parts of guilds which were composed of an (ethnic) group.
Here probably, the ideal of mutual assistence prevailed stronger than
among other guilds. It is also likely that when a strong social bond
amongst guild members existed, this could lead to common action for
higher prices and to restrictions towards newcomers.
Occupation with the height ofthe taxes and prices had to lead towards
some sort of political action. For were these not subject to, sometimes
lengthy, negociations with the local government? It was then the bar¬
gaining power of the guUds, in other words their pohtical power, which
decided the issues in their favour or not. The fact that we do not always
find aU these functions represented by Mushm guilds did not mean that
these were not guüds. For these functions one could acquire, and some
9 W. M. Floor: The Guilds in Qäjär Persia, chapter six, diss. Leiden 1971
(not published), partly published in Persica 7 (1976), chapter four; on the
entertainers see : W. M. Floor : The Lüpls, A Social Phenomenon in Qäjär
Persia. In: WI 13 (1971), pp. 103—120.
The Guilds in Iran — an Overview from the Earliest Beginnings 103
did not. The number of these functions varied per guild and per period,
likewise the importance and intensity of these functions. One could say
that the increase of the number of acquired functions is an indication for
the strength and vitality of a guild. I contend that terms like sinf or
hirfa may be translated by "guild," if the groups denoted by these terms
satisfy the criteria of the minimum factors mentioned above. The fact
that "the powers of the medieval guilds in Europe in controlling the
industry were much wider than those of Islamic corporations," as Gibb
has it" is not a very convincing reason not to do so. Nobody is going to
call the trade unions of the 19th century something else than trade union,
just because their powers of controUing industry were much less than
those of the 20th century trade unions! One can, however, contend that
when European guilds acquired a certain degree of autonomy vis k vis
the government, and even wielded the power of city government, these
groups ended to be guilds and became a category apart. But then the two.
Islamic guilds and European municipal institution, cannot be compared
any more.
Guilds then are the natural outcome of pre-industrial society's struc-
tru"e. It is, therefore, my opinion that such theories as "guilds in Islamic Iran are of Sassanian origin, or of Carmatian or 'aqila system origin" are
spurious and not based on facts. The evidence adduced to prove that
guilds existed in Sassanian Iran is only guess work. For nothing is said
about the functions of the chiefs of trades and crafts, who are mentioned
in the texts. These officers could rather well be government officials.
The theories of Massignon have been dealt with by several authors so
there's no need to repeat their criticism.As Lambton did not put
forward her idea of the 'aqila system being the origin of Islamic guilds
very seriously, we leave it that way.^*
As to Islamic Iran we have no evidence that guilds existed before the
14th century. Yakoubovsky mentions a chief of the bakers in the 11th
century, but he gives unfortunately no source, nor an indication of the
function of this chief. !* It is interesting to read though, that this cliief
was trampled to death by elephants, because the bakers in Ghazna
wanted to fix higher prices for bread. This means that we have here a
M H. A. R. Gibb & H. Bowbn: Islamic Society and the West. 2 vols.
Oxford 1956, vol. 1, p. 281, note 5.
11 Tärlkh-i Irän az dawrän-i bästän tä sadda-yi hijdahum. Transl. from the
Russian by Kabim Kishävabz. 2 vols. Tehrän 1346 (1967), vol. 1, pp. 141—
144.
12 Stebn, o.o. ; C. Cahbn : Y-a-t-il des corporations professionelles dans le
monde musulmane classique ?, in Houbani, o.e.
1' A. K. S. Lambton: Islamic Society in Persia. Oxford 1954, p. 20.
" Tärlkh-i Irän, vol. 1, p. 277.
good example of an articulated group interest, for which the representative
of that group was put to death as an example to and punishment of
the group as a whole.i* Although very tempting, the evidence is not
conclusive to say that we really have a guild here.
It appears that on the eve of the Mongol invasion certain crafts in
Samarqand, Isfidjäb, and Merv practised the idea of mutual assistance
(nusra, yatanäsarüna). However, beyond this fact nothing is known
about this institution.^*
It seems that during the middle ages artisan life flourished in Iran, for
a great body of literature, known as shahr-i äshüb, praises the traders
and craftsmen. The first of these poems date from the 13th century.^'
But although we get interesting information on the existence of a great
many crafts and trades, the existence of such a diversity of occupations
does not necessarily mean the presence of guilds.i*
In the 13th century Ghäzän Khän appointed overseers (amin) over
certain crafts, who were obliged to deliver a certain quotum of arms."
This information is not without interest. It shows that at least certain
crafts were not just amorphous bodies of craftsmen, but formed clearly
seperate, and from each other distinguishable groups. Moreover having
been singled out by the government means that these groups had at
least the ascribed functions of thc guilds already. In discussions about
guilds this fact is often dismissed as not to the point, but I think that
this either means that we have here the beginnings of a guild or that
these groups already formed guilds, having already some acquired
functions. As we wül see below the fact that certain crafts in the 17th
century had government overseers, did not mean that these groups were
not guilds. So in this and similar cases the same may have been the case.
StiU we have not other facts to substantiate this supposition, and it is on
facts rather than on conjecture that we have to base our views.
Ihn Battütta in the 14th century, leaves no doubt about the fact that
guilds existed in Iran, flourishing in Isfahan and Shiräz. The corporations
knew a spirited social life, for each guild or individual member tried to
outdo the other in prowess and pomp 'The sultan Abü Ishäq had at one
time conceived the ambition to build a vaulted palace hke the Aywän
" Ibid. " Cahbn, o.e., p. 59.
" Ahmad Gulchin Ma'äni: Shahr-i äshüb dar shi'r-i färsl. Tehrän 1347
(1968).
18 This body of literatme has been studied by dr. Rii?Ä Qäsimi for material
on artisans and craftsmen. I have been unable to consult his dissertation
Plsha va Plshavarän dar Irän. Tehrän 1968, literary faculty.
" Rashidu'd-Din: Tärlkh-i Mubärak-i Ohäzänl. Ed. K. Jahn. London
1940, pp. 336—339.
The Guilds in Iran — an Overview from the Earliest Begiimings 105
lüsrä and ordered the inhabitants of Shiräz to undertake the digging
of its foundations. They set to work on this, each corporation of artisans
rivalling every other, and carried their rivalry to such lengths that they
made baskets of leather to carry the earth and covered them with lengths
of embroidered silk. They did the same with panniers and sacks on the
donkeys, and some made mattock of silver and lit quantities of candles.
"When they were digging they would put on their best garments and
fasten silk aprons around their waists, while the sultan would watch
their work from a balcony he had (there).It is true that we still don't
know a great many things about these groups, but we know that they
were subject to corvdes, an importants feature of guilds. Moreover Ibn
Battütta mentions that in Isfahan: "the members of each craft appoint
one of their members as headman over them, whom they caU kilü.""'^
Here we have another feature of the guilds, the chief elected by the
guild members. Therefore, we can assume that here we have to do with
guilds, of which we only know that they had a strong social function,
served as fiscal units, and that they elected their own chief. However, we
are not informed about their internal organisation, and what the func¬
tion of the kilü exactly entailed.
Information on the guilds in the 16— 18th century is somewhat more
copious. Under the Safavids each trade formed a guild headed by a
chief elected by the guild members. The guild heads did not have a shop
themselves, but got a salary paid by the guild. Ideally one of the oldest
and trustworthiest masters of the guild would be chosen as guild head,
in practice, however, this function was often hereditary. The guild head
was confirmed in his function by the kaläntar, who drew up a taHiqa
(certificate) and gave him a robe of honour after the guild head had
presented himself with his oflScial election document, which was legalized
by the naqib, the assistant of the kaläntar.^^ Guild leaders had some
judicial powers in guild matters, especially if these concerned disputes
among guild members. Complaints by clients could also be taken up
with the guild leader. This field, however, was also controlled by the
muhtasib. The guild leaders in those guilds who were subject to corvees
were more powerful than others, for they decided who and to what
extent had to contribute to the corv6es. Opposition was punished by
contribution to imaginary corvees.** Everyone wishing to start a shop
20 The Travels of Ibn Baftütia. Transl. by H. A. R. Gibb. 4 vols. Gam-
bridge 1902, vol. 2, p. 310.
21 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 295.
Tadhkirat al Mulük. Ed. V. Minoesky. London 1943, pp. 81,83;
J. Chaedin Voyages du Chevalier Chardin en Perse etc.. Ed. L. LANOLiis,
10 vols. Paris 1811, vol. 6, p. 119.
28 Ibid., vol. 6, pp. 119—1204.
addressed himself to the guild leader, stating his name and address,
which were registered. If no ohjections existed against the candidate he
was allowed to start working in exchange for a small sum. The only
limitation which could be made was that in several trades a certain
distance had to be kept between the shops, outside the area exclusively
occupied by the guild. 2*
As to fiscal purposes the guilds were put under the orders of the
kaläntar and naqib and for the corvees under the näzir-i buyütät (chief of
the royal household). Each year the kaläntar appointed someone to
convene aU guild leaders in the house of the naqib. Here they discussed
the bunicha or quota to be paid by each guild. This procedure called
bunicha bandi took place every first quarter of the year. When the quota
were fixed the naqib wrote these on a roll, sealed it and entrusted it to the
kaläntar's charge, whose duty it was to collect the guild taxes. It was he
who decided the installments in which the bunicha had to be paid. The
bunicha having been fixed the guild members assembled to allot to each
master (ustäd) his share ofthe burden. As base for the contribution the
annual income was taken. However, ample opportunity existed for
favouritism and frauds, esp. in those guilds which had to do corv6es.
Those guilds as the shoemakers, leather makers, who were exempt from
corvees, had to pay a lump sum in stead, known as kharj-i pädshäh. It
appears that some guilds were exclusively subject to corv6es and did
not pay other taxes. All the same the tax burden weighed heavier on
these guilds, than for those who paid in money.**
If the Shah wanted some work done, it was the näzir-i buyütät who
ordered the leaders of the guilds concerned to do the job. Corvees were
an oppressive burden, esp. for the masons. The guild leaders together
with guild elders ( rish safid ) decided who was going to contribute to the
corv6es. Those guilds who did not want to do the corv6es could buy off
this obligation for a year with the payment of a lump sum.**
In addition to the guild tax and the corv6es guilds had to pay the
expenses incurred by visits of ambassadors of foreign nations. This extra
burden was known as havädith.^'' The revenue from the giulds in Isfahan
(guild tax and havädith ) yielded 3000 tomans yearly.**
Under the Safavids the ascribed functions of the guilds appear to
have received special attention. The strict supervision over taxation by
" Ibid., vol. 4, p. 93.
" Ibid., vol. 4, p. 95; vol. 5, p. 405; Tadhkirat, pp. 81—83.
" Ibid., pp. 48, 181; Chardin, vol. 6, p. 120.
" R. DU Mans: Estat de la Perse en 1660. Ed. Ch. Schefer. Paris 1890,
p. 30.
" Tadhkirat, p. 65.
The Guilds in Iran — an Overview from the Earliest Beginnings 107
the kaläntar, over corv6es by the näzir, were the result of a strong
government policy. Outside the guilds a group of privileged artisans
worked in the 32 royal workshops, which each had their own chief.
These chiefs (bäshi ) along with other court officials were put in charge
of a certain number of guilds. For example the zargar bäshi (chief of the
goldsmithery) controlled all jewellers and goldsmiths of Isfahan.*' Thus
it appears that a certain number, may be 32, of main guilds existed.*"
The acquired functions of the guilds in Safavid Persia were weakly
developed. In fact the guilds were loosely organised. It appears that they
only assembled a few times a year, once to fix the bunicha, the other times
to discuss problems pertaining to their other interests. Chardin, how¬
ever, asserts that the guilds never convened.*^ This indicates that guild
life was very inconspicuous, for else this shrewd observer certainly
woidd have noticed it. That the guilds were not powerful is indicated by
their inability to fix minimum prices for their products, by the fact that
they did not control the standard of workmanship of their members, nor
had a rigid apprenticeship system. The period of apprenticeship differed
per guild; in fact no system existed. Someone eager to learn a trade was
commissioned by his parents to a master, who paid him a salary which
rose as his experience increased. Both sides could make an end to their
relationship, for no contractual obligations existed between master and
apprentice.**
As far as prices were concerned the guild leaders, convened by the
muhtasib, would draw up a price list (tas'ir-i ajnäs) together with the
muhtasib and the §ahib-i nasaq at the beginning of each month. Pubhc
criers (järchi ) would make pubhc the new list ; the muhtasib supervised
the enactment of the list and punished defaulters.** Another session
convened by the näzir-i buyütät was attended by the guild leaders, the
vazir of the workshops, the muhtasib and the mustawfi of Isfahan to fix
prices of goods which were bought by the chiefs of the royal workshops.
This was done once a year ; the prices were fixed in conformity with the
interests of the divän.^*
Although the above description is based on material which is valid
only for the situation in Isfahan, we can assume that in other cities
similar conditions prevailed. For it seems that in the provinces, in cities
hke Käshän and Kermän, guilds existed too.**
2» Ibid., p. 129, see also pp. 88, 89, 90, 96, 100.
»" Floor: The Guilds, chapter three.
" Chardin, vol. 4, p. 93, see, however, Tadhkirat, p. 81.
" Chardin, vol. 4, pp. 94—95.
s» Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 79—80; Tadhkirat, pp. 66, 67, 83, 150.
s« Ibid, p. 48. Ibid., p. 66
The guilds in Qäjär Persia (19th—20th century) have been studied
in detail by me ; I only wUl resume the findings of that study.** As in
former centuries each craft or trade formed a guild. The function of the
guild leader, which was often hereditary, had weakened compared with
Safavid times. The election of the guild leaders had to be confirmed by
the kaläntar. Everyone wishing to execute a profession had to become a
member ofthe corresponding guild. Even Europeans had to join, though
a special regulation was agreed upon by the Persian and European
governments. Though no formal apprenticeship system existed, one had
to be agreeable to the master. The same holds for those willing to become
a master. They presented themselves to the guild leader and could be
allowed to join in exchange for a small sum. In some guilds, however, a
master's certificate was demanded. EspeciaUy when entrance into a
guild was difficult. Some guilds had only a fixed number of members ;
each member could sell his right to set up his shop (haqq-i bunicha ) to
someone else, if the other members consented in having the new member.
It was in these guilds that some sort of apprenticeship system existed,
at the end of which one got a master's certificate. Thc guild leader and
the guild elders settled disputes amongst members, and punished mis¬
deeds, though their power had been crutaUed. They were responsible for
the behaviour of the guild members and for the carrying out of govern¬
ment rules.
With few exceptions these guilds did not have a strong social bond,
though habitual coffee houses pecuhar to one guUd abounded. Nor did
the guilds provide mutual assistance in case of difficulties, with one
notable exception, viz. the baker's guild in Tehrän. The guUds parti¬
cipated also in religious ceremonies, where many guilds had traditionaUy
their own places. However, of these activities the religious aspect was
more important than the guild aspect. In general individual g\iUd
members seem to have found fulfiUment of their social needs in district
organisations of various nature, rather than in their guild.
The guilds were taxed as a corporate body. The quota (bunicha ) was
fixed each year after negociations between the kaläntar and the guUd
leaders. Afterwards the guild members in a plenary assembly aUotted to
each member his share. The bunicha was paid in a varying number of
installments, either to the guild officers, or in the case of the haqq-i
bunicha guUds directly to the kaläntar. Some guilds were temporarily
exempted from paying their normal guild taxes. Gross negligence was
shown in assessing the bunicha, for these remained unaltered for a long
time. This, of course, was very obnoxious for these guilds whose member-
»• See note 9.
The Guilds in Iran -— an Overview from the Earhest Beginnings 109
ship had diminished. Tax reforms were proposed at the beginning of the
20th century, but nothing came off it.
The guilds never fixed minimum prices, though some of them control¬
led these prices fairly well. The kaläntar convened with leaders of the
guild to fix the monthly price list of life necessities. This was not very
effective, however, for apart from the fact that prices were often higher
than quoted in the price hst, this monthly custom seems to have fallen
into disuse towards the end of the 19th century. The inability to fix
minimum prices is related to the fact that guilds did not control the
standard of the products made or sold by their members. This was still
the task of the därügha and the muhtasib.
In pohtical hfe the guilds played a very modest role. Not being able
to assert themselves as an independent economic body vis ä vis the
government, they at best by their association coidd resist too demanding
a government, depending on the importance of the guild and the techni¬
ques employed they could in some cases infiuence the decision making of
the government. One of the most effective weapons used by the guilds
was the closing down of the bazaar, thereby paralyzing the economic
life in a city. It was only during the years 1905—1909 that guilds played
a rather infiuential role in politics, and then mainly in Tehrän. After
the granting of the constitution guilds provided the rank and file and the
elan to carry the day against Muhammad *Ali Shäh. In the Majlis the
guilds were represented by 32 delegates (22% of the total membership)
who backed by a central guild council (anjuman-i markazi-yi asnäf)
in Tehrän, in which 70 guild anjumans were represented. In other cities
local guild councils existed. The influence of these councils varied per
city and per year. When in 1909 the constitutionalists had won, the
guilds completely lost their power, because they were barred from
representation in the Majlis. The lack of having their own pohtical
program made itself felt now, as weU as the lack of tradition of indepen¬
dent political common action. The guilds produced no pohtical leaders,
they acted cohesively in politics only as long as their pohtical patrons
had a common basis to co-operate. Never again did the guilds acquire
the same political influence. The fight for the constitution was a brief
interlude only. Thereafter as before they were oidy pawns in their
patron's political schemes, which they backed in the hope of bettering
their bargaining power.
In 1926 when the Majlis passed a bill abohshing taxes on 230 guilds
and abohshing 46 other taxes relating to artisans and traders, the guilds
thenonwards were no longer treated as corporate bodies as regards
taxation.*' It was only 4 years later in 1931 that a new tax law was
3' Ibid., appendix E; see also Issawi, p. 285, note 3.
passed by the Majlis?^ Merchants, and guild members were divided
into resp. 4 and 3 categories. Guild members belonging to the first cate¬
gory had to pay annually 100 tomans, to the second category 48 tomans,
and to the third category 18 tomans. One belonged to the first category
if one earned more than 40.000 tomans annually, to the second category
if one earned between 20.000 and 40.000 tomans, to the 3d category if one
earned 5.000 to 20.000 tomans. Those earning less than 5.000 tomans
were exempt from taxation. In what way taxation was levied between
1927 and 1931 is not known to me. Probably some sort of deal was made
with the guilds. After 1931 taxes were levied on individual guild members ;
this must have been a difficult task since no statement of profit and sale
had to be shown. In 1948 this practice was reversed, and guilds were
once more taxed as a corporate body.*'
During the reign of Ridä Shäh (1925—1941) guilds were strictly con-
troUed by the government. If a guild wanted to hold a meeting, per¬
mission had to be asked beforehand, and the pohce would attend the
meeting.*' Although some guild leaders were deputed to the Majlis,
they represented not the guilds but a pohtical party, the role played by
the guilds was a minimal one.*' An upsurge of the guilds was to be
noted under Musaddiq, who by carefully organising and nursing the
bäzäris, disposed of a formidable force to be used in street demon¬
strations.** It was, therefore, not surprising that the government in the
post-Mu^addiq period wanted to bring the guilds under control. In 1958
the guilds got legal status by law of Mehr 1336.** In each town a craft or
trade could constitute itself into a guild, which after having been duly
notarized was the only guild of its sort to be allowed. Each guild then
would appoint a representative, who together formed the high council
of guilds (shürä-yi 'äli-yi asnäf ), of which the governor of the town was
the honorary chairman. In towns where too small a number of traders and
artisans existed to form several guilds, one all embracing guild could be
formed. Government control was strict, for all rules approved by the
high council or individual guilds had to be confirmed by the governor.
Moreover all dehberations by the high council could be attended by the
governor or his representative. Guild elections were held under the super-
38 Qänün-i mäUyät bar sharkathä va tijärat va ghairu, \2 Farvardln, 1309.
39 Lambton, p. 24.
" Ibid., p. 30, note 1.
*i Zahbä Shäji'i: Namäyandagän-i majlis shürä-yi milll dar bist va yak
dawra-yi gänüngudhärl. Tehrän 1344 (196.5), pp. 185—189.
*2 L. Bindee: Iran. Political Development in a Changing Society. Berkeley 1962, p. 185.
*3 A'lnnäma-yi tashkll-i ittihädlya-yi sinfi va tanzlm-i umür-i asnäf va
plshavarän. Mehr, 1336.
The Guilds in Iran — an Overview from the Earliest Beginnings 111
vision of the government. New guilds could only be formed with consent
of the high council and that of the governor. The number of 'oflScial'
guild members was put at 30 per guild. Controlhng the elections, the
govermnent had the guilds in their power by having their own men
appointed. It is for this reason that it happened several times that conflicts
arose between the government and the guilds when either of the two
broke off elections.**
The actual number of guild members was, of course, much higher than
thirty. The coffee and tea sellers guild in Tehrän is reported to have a
membership of 3—4000 in I960.** The bakers guUd alone had 804 barbari
bakers as members in 1971.*" Several guilds have an office, clerks, legal
advisors, while the leadership does not exercise their trade or craft
anymore. The high councils or thc individual guilds could regulate
matters hke holidays, business hours, protection of trade secrets, etc.
Furthermore they were supposed to see to it that services and goods
delivered by their members were of a certain quality. Their most impor¬
tant activities, however were centered on (1) negociating the amount of
taxes to be paid, (2) seeking bans on importation of competitive foreign
goods and (3) starting modern factories.*'
Each year the governors convened with the guild leaders to fix the
amount to be paid by each guild. Negociations could drag on for some
time, sometimes even years.** The amount of taxes to be paid was de¬
fined by such factors as political rehability, economic and/or financial
diflficulties and the like.*® After the amount had been fixed it was up to
the guild members themselves to decide who was going to and how
much.*"
Differences which had arisen between the government and the high
council of Tehrän guilds in 1968, made it necessary to review the relation-
ship between the guilds and the government. This resulted in the new
Guild Act of June 10, 1971.*! Representatives of the guilds called the
enactment of the new act a solution to the 50-year-old problems of the
guilds.** The act distinguishes between a fard-i asnäf (a legal person who
invests his capital in the production, sale, purchase, distribution or
performance of services or goods, which go wholly or partly directly to
** BiNDEK, pp. 186, 187. *" Ibid., p. 187.
*' Kayhan International Weekly, august 7, 1971, p. 2.
«' Binder, pp. 186, 187.
««Ibid.; N.Jacobs: The Sociology of Development. New York 1966,
pp. 88—92.
« Ibid., pp. 88—96. Ibid., p. 89.
*i Qänün-i nizäm-i sinfi, 20 Khurdäd, 1350.
'2 Kayhan intern., July 24, 1971, p. 2.
the consumer) ; a vä^iid-i sinfi (an economic or service unit, managed in a
fixed or itinerant place by a fard-i sinfi with a work permit) ; an itti-
hädiya-yi sinfi (a legal person formed by members of one guild, who, to
protect the rights and integrity of their craft render each other mutual
assitance.)
New members (fard-i sinfi) must apply for membership to the itti-
hddiya-yi sinfi. After permission from the utäq-i asnäf (see below) the new
member can start to work. Guild members must have a pricehst in their
shop, must give a receipt to their clients and are responsible for the
standard of workmanship. They must have an official working permit
from the utäq-i asnäf, which can be revoked if they are wanting in com¬
petence.
In every town guilds are to be formed, which become official after
registration. To form an ittihddiya-yi sinfi at least 50 väJ/,id-i sinfi are
required, as weU as the permission ofthe Icumisiyün-i nizärat (see below).
The rights and duties of an ittihädiya-yi sinfi are the following. It has to
execute all decisions made by the utäq-i asnäf; it may levy a contri¬
bution of 15% of the brute annual income of its members for the com¬
mon treasury; its budget is subject to approval by the utäq-i asnäf, as
well as all decisions taken by it; it must see to it that members keep
the fixed business hours. Furthermore it can form committees to settle
disputes between members, to investigate complaints by clients and to
control the standard of workmanship of its members. The rights and
duties of these committees are defined by the utäq-i asnäf s and have to be
approved by the kumisiyün-i nizärat. Disputes between an ittihädiya-yi
finfi and an utäq-i asnäf are settled by the kumisiyün-i nizärat. Disputes
between an itti^ädiya-yi sinfi and a fard-i sinfi by an utäq-i asnäf. Each
ittihädiya-yi sinfi is represented in its utäq-i asnäf by one delegate. The
ittihädiya-yi sinfi issues membership cards to its members, who all
have one vote. The income of an ittihädiya-yi sinfi is derived from
membership fees, fees for services rendered, assitance from the utäq-i
asnäf and presents.
The utäq-i asnäf is a legal person and a master-organisation of aU
guilds in a city. In Tehrän the utäq-i asnäf has at least 25 members, in
cities with a population larger than 250.000 15 members, seven members
in a town with more than 100.000, and 5 members in a town with less
than 100.000 inhabitants. The utäq-i asnäf elects from its membership a
governing council, which has in Tehrän 11 members and in the other
cities resp. 9, 5, and 3 members. The rights and duties of the utäq-i
asnäf are the following. The utäq must promote unity among the itti-
Jmdiya-yi §infis and provide leadership; it must co-operate with the
ittihädiya-yi sinf is to supervise the carrying out of their members' duties ;
The Guilds in Iran — an Overview from the Earliest Beginnings 113
it defines the rights of eaeh guild, subject to approval ofthe kumisiyün-i nizärat. Further it can revoke work permits ; it controls the maintenance of craft, hygienic, safety and assurance regulations as well as the elections
for the leadership of the guilds. Moreover it can propose mergers between
ittihädiya-yi sinfis. It collects statistics, and it constitutes a guild fund
to assist members. The work permit issued by the uiäq-i asnäf is trans¬
ferable.
In each city the kumisiyün-i nizärat is composed of the governor
(farmändär), representatives of the Ministry of Labour, of Rural Affairs,
of the city council, of the provincial council, of the utäq-i asnäf, and the
mayor. Its duties are to define the rights and duties of the guilds, to
approve of the duties of the committees formed to settle disputes, to
permit ittiJjtädiya-yi sinfis to merge or split and to approve the regula¬
tions decided upon by the utäq-i asnäf concerning prices of goods and
services.
Finally there is the fiay'at-i 'äli-yi nizärat (high supervisory board)
which is composed of the prime minister, the ministers of Economics,
Labour, Agriculture, Rural Affairs, the governor of Tehrän, the chief of
the state police, the chief of the utäq-i asnäf of Tehrän, and 5 indepen¬
dent experts in socio-economic and legal affairs. The task of this board is
to examine the regulations regarding the sources of income, the amount
of aasitance given by, and the administration of the communal guild
funds. Further to examine the need for the formation of companies to be
directed by the guilds. The board also can declare guild elections to be
unvalid and can dismiss a guild chief impeached by the kumisiyün-i
nizärat. Finally it settles disputes between the kumisiyün and the
utäq-i asnäf.
In towns where no utäq-i asnäf exists, the rights and duties of tliis
body are exercised by the mayor. As in former times the amount of
taxation due remains open to negociation.
The new Act differs in so far from the Guilds and Shopkeepers Act of
1958 that under the new Act the stabihzation of prices wiU be one of the
prime duties of the guilds. Furthermore with regard to internal affairs
the guilds have acquired more freedom than before. It is therefore that
Prime Minister Hoveyda said in 1971 that the co-operation ofthe guilds
was essential to the enactment of the new rules. Both sides, the govern¬
ment and the guilds, have to get used to the new relationship. Already
one month after publication of the Act the government had to warn the
guilds to stabihze prices.** Two weeks later the Municipality of Tehran
intervened fixing daily the prices for fruits and vegetables. The Muni¬
s' Ibid.
8 ZDMG 125/1
cipality suspended its price fixing policy after interference by Prime Minister Hoveyda.**
The guilds of today display many of the social patterns of the guilds
in former centuries. Many guilds stiU occupy certain bazaars and/or
streets. For instance in Tehrän, the simsars or dealers in second hand
goods are concentrated in the lower Hafiz Avenue and at the beginning
of Churchill Avenue.** Other guilds such as the bakers, butchers, and
greengrocers are spread out all over the city. Within the guilds there are
several close knit (ethnic) groups to be noted. A good example are the
greengrocers from thc district of Daryän (Ädharbayjän). Among this
group of succesfuU grocers a strong group cohesion exists. Because most
Daryänis are related to one another they pool their resources, refrain
from cut-throat competition and resort to bulk purchasing of many
items to cut down prices. Many shop assistants are young Daryänis
who hope to get a shop of their own. Because the Daryänis are so nume¬
rous and their business vast, they do not ask for bank credit, but have
their own money lenders among the Daryänis.*'
The government as well as controlhng the guilds via trusted men,
also uses its power to influence the guilds by interfering in economic
life, and by playing guilds off against one another. If prices are too high
the government can institute a strict price control. By relaxing these
measures or the control on its maintenance it can win over the guilds to
co-operate.*' The government can favour retail dealers by controlhng
the prices of the middlemen and the market distributors (bunakdär).
The retail dealers have to support the government in exchange. The
role of the middlemen is a very powerful one, because it is rarely that
sales between manufacturer and retailer occiu-. The government has
tried to reduce the great number of middlemen in domestic trade ; to no
avail, however. They often block sale of goods, because they buy bulk
of goods in advance and when the retailers want to buy they sell only at
high prices.** In 1971, for example, the poultry farmers and egg pro¬
ducers guild was completely under the control of a few middlemen, who
controlled the supply and delivery of chicken feed and also the distri¬
bution of eggs and chickens.*' Another method used by the government
to influence guilds is to import cheap foreign goods to force prices to go
Ibid., August 7, 1971, p. 6.
" Ibid., May 1, 1971, p. 7.
" Ibid., May 8, 1971, p. 5.
" Ibid., August 7, 1971, p. 2; see on this subject in general Jacobs, pp. 82—96.
'8 Kayhan intern., June 5, 1971, p. 2.
" Echo of Iran, July 24, 1971; see also Kayhan intem., August 7, 1971, p. 6.
The Guilds in Iran — an Overview from the Earliest Beginnings 115
down, allowing other groups than guilds to import certain items.'* The
government can also take the initiative to open a modern factory, hereby
breaking the monopoly of a guild. Normally guilds are vehemently
opposed against such measures, but it seems that the bakers guild did
not protest against government plans to introduce machine-made bread,
in 1971. This was probably due to the fact that those bakers who would
be replaced by this factory would become the joint owners, while the
government would advance the capital needed. Part of the 4—5000
workers employed by the bakers of barbari bread would be used to staff
the bread factory and the bread distribution system.'^
Thus the government by pulling financial, economic and pohtical
strings has a fair control over the guilds. Although the latter have to see
to it that certain standards of workmanship are maintained, in practice
the government often does this. Guilds just don't have the kind of
organisation to do so. Bakers, for instance, stiU have no standardization
of units, and often sell short ; neither can they limit effectively the num¬
ber of bakery shops opened. For anyone who can get a work permit can
open a shop.
The hair dressers guild complained that this was an inadequate policy.
It is their opinion that the Ministry of Labour should have newcomers
pass an examination. Moreover they have demanded that a distance
of 250 to 500 meters should be kept between their shops.'*
Notwithstanding their legal status guilds are loosely organised. They
are run by some wealthy members. Since the strength of a guUd is cen¬
tered around some strong influential person, rather than being based on a
strong organisation backed by a responsible and effective membership,
guilds are greatly hampered in becoming effective channels for their
members' interests. Also the fact that many a guild leader is only rep¬
resenting his own (sometimes political) interest and Iiis followers'
interests, impairs the guilds' effectivity. Moreover the government does
not always treat the guilds as economic and legal units with defined
legal rights and privileges, but often as amorphous intermediaries
hagghng over taxes and price policies.**
To the question : were and are the guilds voluntary democratic asso¬
ciations?, I say no. The initiative in organizing professional organizations
lay vnth the government. The guild's acquired functions were stronger
or weaker according to circumstances. These differed per period and per
guild. That the acquired functions are stronger than evidence induces us
•» Ittilä'ät, June 12, 1970, p. 4.
•1 Kayhan intern., August 7, 1971, p. 2.
•2 Ibid.; Ittilä'ät, June 12, 1970, p. 4.
•3 Jacobs, pp. 87, 88; see also Binder, pp. 186, 187.
s»
to believe, is indicated by the fact that guilds still exist, though the
government has other and more modern means to fix prices and taxes.
It is a common misconception that futuvvat orders and guilds had
close connections. However no evidence is found to warrant such a
belief. The futüwatnämas are concerned with mystical lore and ritual of
certain caUings only. It is, of course, tempting to assume that the two,
guilds and fuiuvvat orders, were associated. However, as far as Iran is
concerned one can prove only that individual craftsmen joined futuvvat
associations, where they were initiated in the mystical knowledge of a
craft. No evidence is found that guild membership was concomittant
with membership of a futuvvat order.'*
Another platitude is that the trade unions grew out of the 'ancient'
guilds. This is not the case in Iran, where trade unions were foreign
import. Guilds are and were organisations of masters, which protected
the interests of the employers, not of the employees. In Iran polari¬
zation between master and worker did not occur, at least information
about this is not available. This is probably due to four factors. Firstly, many a craft or trade was a family affair, which given the authoritarian
structure of the extended family, precluded the possibility of labour
disputes. Secondly, the apprentices and assistants were not part of an
apprenticeship system with a rigid structure and with rigid distinctions
between apprentices and assistants. Thus unhke the European confr6ries,
they lacked the structure to give vent to their feehngs, which they no
doubt had. Thirdly, it was relatively easy to become a master, many of
whom were not so much better off than their employees. Fourthly, the
division of Iranian towns in quarters and other parochial divisions, which
were often mutuaUy hostile, handicapped their common action. The
same goes for the guilds as a whole too. The existing frustration about
low pay, and about the socio-economic situation in general, which often
led to attacks on bakers', butchers', and grocers' shops, probably found
an outlet in such district associations as the lütis.'*
See note 9, chapter five.
Floob: The Lüfls.
Dehkhodä's Place in the Iranian
Constitutional Movement
By Gholam Hoseyn Yousofi, Mashhad
"It would be a pity for 'Ali's
Scimitar to rust in sheath and
Mr. Dehkhodä's tongue to rest
in mouth."
Mohammad Qazvini
It is an interesting co-incidence that two notable critics and wits in
Persian language and literature, that is 'Obeyd Zäkäni and 'Ali-Akbar
Dehkhodä should both hail from Qazvin. Both of them have assailed the
inequities of their times with profound accuracy and perception. They
are possessed of powerful and precise intellect and sharply satirical pen
which they wield with maximum effectiveness. They have both glowed
as social critics in their own time and have relegated their names to
perpetuity. This article, however, deals with Dehkhodä, the more recent
of the two writers.
In the annals of Iranian constitutional history (1905—1909) the
Süre Esräfil, the most significant of Iranian political journals, is inse¬
parably linked with the name of Dehkhodä and his political comic
satire which was pubhshed regularly in that paper. The connection is so
much more poignant as Mirzä Jahängir Khän Süre Esräfil, one of the
two editors of the journal, lost his hfe in the cause of freedom^ and was so
memorably elegized by Dehkhodä, himself then in exile, in the famous
ode, "Remember the Extinct Taper, Remember." (Yäd 'är ze sham'e
mordeh yäd 'är.)*
'Ah Akbar Dehkhodä, was not only endowed with brilhant native
intelligence, he was also highly learned and accomplished, having bene¬
fited from the teachings of many outstanding contemporary scholars,
and accumulated a wealth of experience in the course of life. The
conditions prevaihng at the time of the Constitutional Revolution
1 "On 22nd Jomädä I, 1326. H. (June 22, 1908), Mirzä Jahängir Khän
Shiräzi was arrested by Mohammad 'Ali Mirzä's Cossaeks. On the 24th he
was Strangled in Bäghe Shäh." — 'Ali Akbar Dehldiodä.
2 This poem was published in Yverdon edition of the Süre Esräfil by
Dehkhodä and others.
