Dependent Origination (pratityasamutpäda)
By Shinkan Murakami, Sendai (Japan)
I. The doetrine of dependent origination (pratitya-samutpäda) is very
unique and essential to Buddhism from the beginning, but its meaning is
difficult to grasp, and it has been interpreted variously during the long his¬
tory of Buddhism as well as by the modern scholars. The very authentic text
of the Vedänta-school, i.e. Brahma-sütra (=BS) 2.2.18-32 critically refers to
some fundamental Buddhist views, but so briefly that the exact meaning
of the BS is to be understood only through its commentaries. The commen¬
tators and philosophers of the Vedänta-school elucidate variously. Among
them Sankara's commentary: Brahma-sütra-Bhäsya (BSBh) is the oldest
one written with full explanations (in the eighth century). Väcaspatimisra
(near the end of the 10''' century) writes a voluminous sub-commentary
Bhämati (BM) on Sankara's Bhäsya (BSBh), in which he explains, interprets
and criticizes the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination in full length.
Sankara's later followers, who are generally called Advaitins, i.e. followers of
the Advaita (Non-dual) philosophy, expound and develop the Advaita phi¬
losophy, writing sub-commentaries and compendiums of philosophy. The
Advaitin Sadänanda Käsmiraka's Advaita-Brahma-Siddhi (ABS), a compen¬
dium of the theories of the Vedänta-schools, was written at the beginning of
the IS'*" century,' i.e. five centuries after the time when the Buddhist temples
and monasteries were destroyed by the Moslem forces and Buddhism was
lost in India proper. This is perhaps the last book that refers to Buddhism
and criticizes it in full detail. Other schools and authors of the Vedänta,
such as Bhäskara (8-9''' century), Rämänuja (11-12''' century), Madhva (13'''
century), Nimbärka (13-14''' century), Srikantha (13-14''' century), Sripati
(14''' century), all of whom wrote commentaries on the BS, have also en¬
gaged differently, but rather briefly, in the criticism of Buddhist doctrines.
According to Sankara's Bhäsya (BSBh), etc., the Buddhists (Vaibhäsika,
' It was written in the year of [Wikrama]-sarnvat 1761=1704 ce according to the colo¬
phon of the presumed original manuscript 'Ka' quoted by Vämana Sästri Sarmä at the p. 9*
of the Bhümikä of the ABS.
Sarvästitva-vädin = Sarvästi-vädin) maintain that hving (human) beings con¬
sist of a combination (samudaya, coUection) of both causes, i.e. aggregates
and elements, but this is not possible because there is no eternal spiritual
entity (viz. ätman) in Buddhist doctrine. Buddhists defend their position
that the combination is possible because of mutual dependence (paraspara-
pratyayatvdt), i.e. dependent origination (pratitya-samutpäda). Here we
have a Vedäntic understanding of the Buddhist view of dependent origina¬
tion, but this understanding does not seem so properly fitting to the Bud¬
dhist views. The teaching of dependent origination in the Buddhist Canon
seems originally to aim at the destruction of the sufferings of old age (de¬
crepitude) and death, etc. by means of the destruction of fervent desire
(trsnd) and nescience (avidyä), but it does not seem to seek the possibility of
subsistence of living beings, because Buddhism teaches to seek the deliver¬
ance from the existence of transmigration.^ The contemplation of dependent
origination consists of two phases, i.e. origination (samudaya) and cessation
(nirodha) of all the sufferings of decrepitude and death, etc., together with
life itself. Sankara's and his followers' Advaita (as well as the other Vedäntic)
interpretation of the Buddhist dependent origination takes notice of the
phase of the origination only rather than of the cessation. Then whether and
why their Advaita (or Vedäntic) interpretation of the dependent origination
is wrong or not is a problem to be examined. It is necessary to compare the
Vedäntic interpretation of the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination
with the Buddhist interpretations of this doctrine (thought) found in the
Buddhist Canonical texts and Abhidharma-literature in more detail. A com¬
parative study of this kind should and can have the advantage of considering
and elucidating the real meanings of both interpretations of the world and
living (human) beings more deeply and more precisely.
II. The first Sütra of this Buddhist (bauddha) section of the BS runs as follows:
"Although the combination (collection) [of body and mind is assumed to be] of
a twofold cause [of minutest particles (atoms) and five aggregates], yet this is
impossible." (samudaya ubhaya-hetuke 'pi tad-apraptih. BS. 2.2.18: This inter¬
pretation follows Sankara's BSBh.)
2 The doctrine of the twelve chains of dependent origination aims at the annihilation of decrepitude, death, sorrow, suffering, etc. by means of the destruction of nescience (S. II. pp. 1-11, etc.). Whereas five chains of dependent origination aim at the annihila¬
tion of decrepitude, death, sorrow, suffering, etc. by means of the destruction of fervent desire (S. II. pp. 86-89, 93). The four Noble Truths, which are a kind of two-fold chain of dependent origination, aim at the destruction of suffering by means of the destruction of fervent desire (Vin. 1. p. 10).
This means that Buddhism assumes the twofold combination (collection)
of external and internal elements, which explains our human existence.
Sahkara explains as follows:
"Those who hold that all things are really existent (sarvästitva-vädinah) admit the external and internal real facts (vastu), i.e. the element (bhüta), the elemen¬
tal (bhautika, that which comes from the element, special element), the mind
(citta) and the mental (psychical) functions (caitta).^ We refute them in the first
place. In that case, the element is element of earth, etc. and the elemental is
colour (form), etc. and eyes, etc. The minutest particles (paramanu, atom) of
earth, etc. in the four-fold [element] (= earth, water, fire, and wind), which
have the own [particular] qualities of the solidity, wetness, heat, and motion
[respectively], combine themselves as earth, etc.; so they think. Similarly the
five aggregates (panca-skandhäh), which are called colour (rüpa, also form),
consciousness (vijnäna), feeling (vedana), conception (sarnjnä) and the [men¬
tal and physical] latent forces (sarnskärä),^ combine themselves internally as
being the basis of all the daily behaviours; so they think." (ye sarvastitva-
vädino bähyam antararn ca vastv abhyupagacchanti bhütam bhautikarn ca
cittarn caittarri ca, tärns tävatpratibrümah. tatra bhütarnprthivi-dhätv-ädayah- bhautikarn rüpädayas caksur-ädayas ca. catustaye caprthivy-ädi-paramänavah
khara-sneha-usna-irana-svabhäväs te prtbivy-ädi-bhävena samhanyanta iti
manyante. tathä rüpa-vijnäna-vedanä-sarnjnä-sarnskära-sarnjnakäh paüca-
skandhäh. te py ädhyätmarn sarva-vyavahäräspada-bhävena sarnhanyanta
iti manyante. BSBh. p.5242-'')
Generally speaking, this assertion seems to coincide with the doctrine of the
Sarvästi-vädin-school, as expounded by Vasubandhu (in the 4-5''' century)
in his Abhidharma-Kosa-Bhäsya (AKBh). But the above order of the five
aggregates, which is very usual in the Vedänta-school, is different from the
' The group of caitta (or caitasika) consists of elements, functions, and faculties of
mind (consciousness). And 46 such mental elements are reckoned [according to the Chi¬
nese and Japanese traditional interpretation of the AKBh]: such as feeling (vedanä), con¬
cept (sarnjüä), volition or mental force (cetanä), sensation (sparsa, contact), etc. Regarding
this, Th. Stcherbatsky's The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the
word "dharma" (London 1923) is yet useful.
Sarnskärä (Päli sarnkhära) is mainly mental latent force (cetanä, vohtion) and it is sometimes translated as 'impression', but according to the Buddhist Canon (S. IV. p. 293, T. 2, No. 99 [568], p. 150a) exhalation and inhalation (assäsa-passäsa) ire included in käya- sarnkhära (physical force) and life force (jivita-samkhära, D. II. p. 99, S. V. p. 152), which is never excluded from sarnskärä in any school of Buddhism, is one of non-mental forces (citta-viprayukta-sarnskära) according to the philosophical system of the Sarvästivädin- school (AKBh. pp. 62, 73). See my article "A Study of Sarnskärä - view of body and mind in Early Buddhism" (Ittr % — *Ö1A Ä CO # -d^M—)(I)(II)(III)(IV), Buddhist Studies
(ftW^) Vol. XVI 1987 pp. 51-94, Vol. XVII 1988 pp. 47-87, Vol. XVlll 1989 pp. 43-70,
Vol. XVI 1990 pp. 67-119.
original Buddhist use (= rüpa, vedanä, sarnjnä, sarnskärä, vijnäna). Sahkara
explains this twofold combination as consisting of the combination of the
elements and elementals, of which the atoms are the cause, and of the five¬
fold aggregates. But in Buddhism, the atoms are included in the aggregate
of colour (rüpa) among the five aggregates, so Sankara's understanding is a
little misleading. Bhäskara (BS-Bhäsya) seems to interpret correctly the five
aggregates as an internal combination of the mind and mental functions and
an external combination of the elements and elementals (cittan caittikas can-
taro bähyo bhüta-bhautikah sahghätah, p. 117'''"'^). Rämänuja (SrI-Bhäsya)
mentions the combination consisting of the elements of earth, etc., of which
atoms are the cause (anu-hetukah prthivy-ädi-bhütdtmakah samudäyah),
and the combination composed of body, sense-organs and objects, of which
earth, etc. are the cause (prthivy-ädi-hetukah sartrendriya-visaya-rüpah
samudäyah, II. p. 296^'^), without mentioning the five aggregates. Later
commentators mention the internal combination of mind and mental func¬
tions, of which the five aggregates are the cause, and the external combina¬
tion of atoms (Srikantha: BS-Bhäsya II. p.8I^", Sadänanda Käsmiraka: ABS.
p. 56^"), which seems a more reasonable understanding, though some follow
Sahkara also (Vallabha, Vijnänabhiksu). Sahkara and others criticize this
theory of twofold combination. Sahkara points out its impossibility and ar¬
gues as follows:
"(1) Because the combined [elements] are non-sentient (acetanatvät), (2) be¬
cause the mind's cognition (cittabhijvalana)^ depends on the establishment of
the combination, (3) because neither some other spiritual enjoying [soul], nor
a ruling [god], who should be an ever-lasting combining agent [of these ele¬
ments], is admitted, (4) because there could be no cessation of activity in case
of admitting an independent activity [of these elements], (5) because even the
mental stream of disposition (äsaya)^ is not to be described as being either dif¬
ferent or being not different [from the combining agent], and (6) because uni¬
versal momentariness [of these elements] is admitted, there could be no func¬
tion [of our existence], and therefore activity becomes impossible. Therefore,
the combination [of these elements] is impossible. And because the combi¬
nation is impossible, the course of mundane existence which is dependent on this [combination of these elements] would get lost." (samudäyinäm acetanatvät,
cittäbbijvalanasya ca samudäya-siddhy-adhinatvät, anyasya ca kasyacic ceta-
nasya bhoktuh prasäsitur vä stbirasya samhantur anabbyupagamät, nirapeksa-
^ Cittahbijvalana (mind's flashing forth, i.e. mind's cognition) takes place when there is contact of sense and sense-object. See BM. p. 525""".
' Aiaya (mental stream of disposition, which is said to be the receptacle of the latent force of karman) means the fundamental all-covering latent consciousness {älaya-vijüäna, store-consciousness). See BM. p. 525""^^.
pravrtty-abhyupagame ca pravrtty-anuparama-prasahgät, äsayasyäpy
anyatvänanyatväbhyäm anirüpyatvät, ksanikatväbbyupagamäc ca
nirvyäpäratvät, pravnty-anupapatteh, tasmät samudäyänupapattih,
samudäyänupapattau ca tad-äsrayä loka-yäträ lupyeta. BSBh. p. 525'"')
The point of this criticism of Buddhism consists in the impossibility of the
very combination of human physical and mental elements, without a com¬
bining and controlling agent of these elements, because the Buddhists deny
the existence of an eternal spiritual self (dtman, soul), and because the Bud¬
dhists assert the universal momentariness of these elements. In replying to
this criticism, the Buddhists bring forward an argument according to which
the combination of these elements is possible because of dependent origina¬
tion (pratitya-samutpäda). According to Sahkara the next Sütra runs as fol¬
lows:
"If it is said that [the combination of these elements is possible] because of mu¬
tual dependence (causality) [of nescience (avidyä) and the rest, we say:] no, be¬
cause [each preceding member of dependent origination is] an efficient cause of
origination [of each of its subsequent members] only." (itaretara-pratyayatväd iti cen na, utpatti-mätra-nimittatvät. BS. 2.2.19)
According to Rämänuja this Sütra differs a little as in the following:
"If it is said that [the combination of these elements is] possible because of mu¬
tual dependence (causality) [of nescience and the rest, we say:] no, because [nes¬
cience and the rest of dependent origination are] no efficient cause for a com¬
posite being [of these elements]." (itaretara-pratyayatväd upapannam iti cen
na, samgbäta-bhävänimittatvät. BS. 2.2.19)
The same text is found in the commentaries of Nimbärka, Srikantha, Sripati
and Vallabha, and also the text of Bhäskara (i.e. itaretara-pratyayamanyatväd
upapannam iti cen na, sarnghäta-bhävdnimittatvät) seems to have been cor¬
rected as just the above. However, the Sütra-text of the commentaries of
Madhva and Vijüänabhiksu (16-17''' century) follows Sankara's text.
Sahkara introduces the Buddhist argument as follows:
"Even though no ever-lasting combining spiritual agent [of these elements],
such as an enjoying [soul], or a ruling [god], is admitted, still the course of
mundane existence is possible, because nescience and the rest [of the twelve
chains of dependent origination] become mutually the cause for each other.
And since that [course of mundane existence] is taking place, nothing else,
which is required, exists. Namely, nescience (avidyä) and the rest, that is to
say: nescience, the [mental and physical] latent force, consciousness, name-and- form, the six spheres of cognition, contact, feeling, thirst (fervent desire), acqui¬
sition (attachment), becoming [force of existence], birth, decrepitude, death.
grief, lamentation, suffering, sorrow, and the like, mutually become the cause for each other. So it is indicated in some places briefly, and in some places ex¬
pounded in full length in the Buddhist system. This chain of nescience and the
rest is not denied by any of them. In this way, as the chain of nescience and
the rest is constantly turning round, like a mechanism of a water-wheel, as be¬
ing efficient cause and effect for each other, the composite [of physical and men¬
tal elements] is implied to be possible in context." (yady api bhoktä prasäsitä
vä kascic cetanah samhantä sthiro nabhyupagamyate, tatbäpy avidyädinäm
itaretara-käranatväd upapadyate loka-yäträ. tasyärn cöpapadyamänäyärn na
kimcid aparam apeksitavyam asti. te cävidyädayo 'vidyä sarnskäro vijnänarn
näma-rüparn sad-äyatanarn sparso vedanä trsnä upädänarn bbavo jätir jarä
maranarn s'okah paridevanä duhkharn durmanastety evarn-jätiyakä itaretara-
betukäh Saugate samaye kvacit sarnksiptä nirdistäh kvacit prapancitäh.
sarvesäm apy ayam avidyädi-kaläpo 'pratyäkhyeyah. tad evam avidyädi-kaläpe
paraspara-nimitta-naimittika-bbävena gbati-yantravad anis'am ävartamäne
'rtbäksipta upapannah sarngbäta iti. BSBh. pp. 525''-528')
In short, because of the chain of dependent origination, the composite (com¬
bination) of physical and mental elements is possible, and thus our human
existence can be explained, no eternal self {dtman, soul) is needed accord¬
ing to Buddhism. Sahkara correctly explains this chain of dependent origi¬
nation. Bhäskara (pp. 11 7-118)'' explains as follows. From nescience comes
7 "This aggregate of consciousness (vijnäna), on which the I-conception is super¬
imposed, continues in the form of stream. Its causes are nescience (avidyä) and so on, which are involved in the beginningless time. And it (consciousness) is [the cause] of them (nescience and so on) too. Thus nescience is indeed a contrary view, i.e. a permanent-view to what is impermanent, a right-way-view to what is not a right way. From that [nesci¬
ence] comes forth the effused [mental] latent force (sarnskärä'^) which is characterised as desire, hatred, delusion, jealousy, etc. as mentioned before. From that [comes forth] activ¬
ity (pravrtti). The good or evil work (karman) is called by the word of activity. Because of Buddha's word: "There is work, there is its retribution" (T. 2, No. 99 (335), p. 92c'*
Paramärtha-s'ünyatä-sütra, AKBh. pp. 129', 468^°), work is admitted by Buddhists. De¬
pending on that [work] there comes forth birth and acquisition of body, then the six-fold sphere of cognition (äyatana). The six-fold sphere of cognition is called as five senses and mind, and the six kinds of consciousness (vijüäna). The objects of five senses are five, i.e.
colour and so on, on which five consciousnesses come forth, but these qualities are the object of mind. In this way the daily activities of a cognising agent, his means of cogni¬
tion and objects of cognition become possible." (yo 'yarn vijüäna-skandho 'ham-pratyaya-
samärüdhah santati-rüpena vartate, tasyävidyädayo 'nädi-käla-pravrttä hetavah sa ca
tesäm iti avidyä näma viparlta-drstir anitye nitya-drstir amärge märga-drstir iti I tatah sarnskärah"' skannah prädurbhavati räga-dvesa-mohersädi-laksanah pürvöktah I tatah pravrttih / punyäpunyätmakarn karma pravrtti-s'abdendcyate / "asti karma asti vipäka"
iti sugata-vacanät karmähhyupagamyate bauddhaih / tan-nibandhanarn janma s'arira-
grahanam / ^ad-äyatanarn ca, panca buddhindriyäni manas ca sad-äyatanam ucyate
sad-vijUänäni / pancänäm indriyänärn panca-rüpädayo visayäs tesu panca-vijüänäny
forth the [mental] latent force (sarnskärä) which is characterised as desire,
hatred, delusion, jealousy, etc. From that [comes forth] activity (pravrtti),
i.e. the good or evil work (karman).^ Depending on that [work] there comes
forth birth and acquisition of body, then the six-fold sphere of cognition
(äyatana), and the six kinds of consciousness (vijüäna), in this way the daily
activities of a cognising agent, his means of cognition and objects of cog¬
nition become possible. Rämänuja (II. p. 297)' expounds thus. From nesci¬
ence come forth the latent forces (sarnskärä), i.e. desire, hatred, etc. From
them comes forth consciousness. From that comes forth the so-called name
(ndma) which consists of mind and mental functions. From that comes forth
the form-substance (rüpi-dravya) that is earth, etc. From that come forth
the six spheres of cognition i.e. six senses. From them comes forth the so-
called contact (spars'a), i.e. the body. From that comes forth feeling (vedanä)
and the rest, and from them again nescience and so forth, as mentioned be¬
fore. Nimbärka (p. 32^°"^')'° enumerates nescience, the [mental and physical]
latent forces, consciousness, name-and-form (näma-rüpa), the six spheres of
utpadyante / manasas tu tad-dharmä visayas tad evam pramätr-pramäna-prameya-
vyavahära-siddheh sarvam upapannam. Bhäskara p. \V^^-\\P). '^sarnskambhah of the
printed text is corrected to sarnskärah. Bhäskara's understanding of sarnskärä is as fohows:
sarnskära-skandho näma räga-dvesa-moha-mätsarya-bhaya-soka-visädädayas caitasikä
dharmäs (The aggregate of latent forces by name is mental elements, i.e. desire, hatred, delusion, envy, fear, sorrow, despondence, etc. Bhäskara p. IIZ''-^, ad BS. 2.2.18).
* Karman means our good or evil work, action, or deed which causes future retribu¬
tion and results in either good or evil transmigration.
' "Even though all the entkies are momentary, yet all this is accounted for by nescience.
For nescience by name is the contrary conception, which conceives permanency, and so
on, in what is momentary, and so on. From that [nescience] come forth the so-called latent forces (sarnskärä), i.e. desire, hatred, etc. From them, comes forth consciousness that con¬
sists in the form of the flashing forth of mind. From that comes forth the so-called name
(näma) which consists of mind and mental functions. From that comes forth the form-
substance (rüpi-dravya) that is earth, etc. From that come forth the so-called six spheres of cognition, i.e. six-fold sense. From them comes forth the so-called contact (spars'a), i.e.
the body. From that come forth feeling (vedanä) and the rest, and from them comes forth again nescience and so forth, as mentioned before. Thus there is a beginningless revolving of the cycle of nescience, and so on, mutually dependent." (yady api ksanikäh sarve bhäväh, tathä'py avidyayäitat sarvam upapadyate / avidyä hi näma viparita-buddhih,
ksanikädisu sthiratvädi-gocarä / tayä sarnskäräkhyäh räga-dvesädayo jäyante, tatas
cittäbhijvalana-rüparn vijriänam, tatas ca nämäkhyäs citta-caittäh, tatas ca prthivy-
ädikarn ca rüpi-dravyam, tatah sad-äyatanäkhyam indriya-satkam, tatah sparsäkhyah
käyah, tato vedanädayah, tatas ca punar apy avidyädayo yathöktä ity anädir iyam
avidyädikä'nyonya-mülä cakra-pravrttih. Rämänuja II. p. 297'"'. Cf. Sripati II.
pp. iV-ll' in the following note 11)
'° avidyä-sarnskära-vijnäna-näma-rüpa-sad-äyatanädinäm itaretara-hetutvena
sahghätädikam upapannam (Nimbärka p. 32^°"") .
cognition, etc. Sripati (II. pp. 21-22)" also repeats the explanation that is
nearly the same as Rämänuja's. Other commentators mention very briefly
the import of dependent origination.
III. From the above mentioned explanation of Saiikara, etc., the exact mean¬
ing of each member of the chain of dependent origination is not yet clear
enough. On Sankara's BSBh, there are many sub-commentaries, which ex¬
plain dependent origination in more detail, such as:
Vacaspatimisra's Bhämati (BM, written about at the end of the 10* cen¬
tury),
Anubhütisvarüpa's Prakatärtha-vivarana (written about in 1200),
Änandagiri's Nyäya-nirnaya (written about in the 13* century),
Citsukha's Bhäsya-bhäva-prakäsikä (written about in the 13* century),
Govindananda's Ratnaprabhä (written about in the 17* century),
Näräyana-Sarasvatl's Värttika (written about at the beginning of the
18* century).
Appaya Diksita's Sivärkamani-dTpikä (written in the 17*' century, on Srl-
kantha's BS-Bhäsya), Sudarsana-süri's Sruta-prakäs'ikä (written in the
13-14* century, on Rämänuja's Sri-Bhäsya), and Sadänanda's ABS also ex¬
plain dependent origination in detail. Among them, the most detailed and
influential explanation of dependent origination is seen in Vacaspatimisra's
BM. He explains in his BM (pp. 526^-528'') dependent origination in de¬
tail, often quoting many passages of the Sälistamba-Sütra (Sis) in full length,
very skilfully, though without mentioning its title. The Sis is a Mahäyäna¬
sütra, the oldest version of which was translated into Chinese by Chih-
ch'ien, in the first half of the third century, and which is based on the
old (Ägama) tradition. At first Väcaspatimisra observes that 'the definition
of dependent origination is declared by the Buddha (pratitya-samutpdda-
laksanam uktam buddhena),' and quotes the following passage.
"This result of conditional relation (pratyaya-pbala) is [as follows]. Whether or not Tathägatas (Buddhas) arise, this essential nature of essential elements
" [See the above translation of Rämänuja II. p. 297'"* (note 9)]. yady api ksanikäs
sarve bhäväh, tathä'py avidyayäitat sarvam upapadyate I avidyä hi näma viparita-
buddhih, ksariikädisu sthiratvädi-gocarä / tayä sarnskäräkhyäh räga-dvesädayo jäyante I tatas cittäbhijvalana-vijüänam, tatas ca nämäkhyäs citta-caittäh''', prthivy-ädikarn ca
rüpi-dravyam, tatah sad-äyatanäkhyam indriya-satkam, tatah sparsäkhyah käyah, tato
vedanädayah, tatas ca punar apy avidyädayo yathöktä ity anädir iyam avidyädikä'nyonya- mülä cakra-pravrttih / (Sripati II. pp. 21"-22') citta-caityäh of the printed text is cor¬
rected, see the above-quoted Rämänuja II. p. 297'.
(dharmatä dharmänäm) is ever constant; that is to say, there is the constancy
of the essential elements (dharma-sthititä), the restriction of the essential
elements (dharma-niyämakatä), [or] the conformity to dependent origina¬
tion." (idam pratyaya-phalam iti, utpädäd vä tathägatänäm anutpädäd vä
sthitäiväisärn dharmänäm dharmatä, dharma-sthititä dharma-niyämakatä
pratitya-samutpädänulomatä iti. BM. p. 526^"')
This passage corresponds to the Sis (R. 9, BST. p. 101^"'') and its Chinese
equivalent translations (T. 16, No. 709, p. 8I7a2°-, No. 710, p. 8I9bS No. 711,
p. 82^2'-, No. 712, p. 824ai, T 85, No. 2782, p. 550a'''. It is quoted in
Sthiramati's Abhidharma-kosa-vyäkhyä = Av. 1, p. 293^^"* with few vari¬
ants). This passage of the Sis seems to come from an old tradition. For in¬
stance, we can trace a similar passage in the Päli Canon (S. II. p. 25'*"'^°'''"":
uppddd vd tathägatänäm anuppädä vä tathägatänärn / thitä va sä dhätu
dhammatthitatä dhamma-niyämatä idappaccayatä). A Sanskrit parallel
is seen in Ch. Tripäthi's Fünfundzwanzig Sütras des Nidänasarnyukta (Ber¬
lin 1962, p. 148: utpädäd vä tathägatänäm anutpädäd vä sthitä eveyarn
dharmatä. dharma-sthitaye dhätuh) which also corresponds to the Chinese
Version (T. 2, No. 99 [296], p. 84b''-2°). The famous Mädhava (14* century,
SDS. II. //. 302-304) also quotes the same sentence and gives a short com¬
ment. In any way, dependent origination is here in the Vedänta-School un¬
derstood as the very essential doctrine of Buddhism.
The following explanation of dependent origination in the BM (pp. 526'-528'^)
depends on the Sis. (R. I0~I4, 21-25, 27; BST. pp. I0IM02'-'7--103'2. '7-29,
MSIs. pp. 108'M09i°, I10'-2\ IlP°-22; cf. T. 16, pp. 8I5b-816a, 8I7a-818a,
819b-820a, 822a-c, 824a-825a, T. 85, pp. 550b-553b). It consists of external
and internal dependent originations, each of which is born from a causal rela¬
tion (hetu-upanihandha) and a conditional relation (pratyaya-upanihandha).
Causal relation means that each cause produces an effect, and conditional re¬
lation means that the conditions, which are combinations of causes, produce
an effect. An external causal relation is as follows. As in the case of a rice
plant, from a seed [of rice] comes a sprout, and so on until, from the flower
a fruit (grain). Here it does not occur to the seed, "I produce the sprout." In this way, it does not occur to the fruit too, "I am produced by the flower."'^
Then the BM reads as follows:
'2 "This dependent origination arises from two causes, i.e. a causal relation (hetu-upani¬
handha) and a conditional relation (pratyaya-upanibandha). And it (dependent origina¬
tion) is of two kinds, i.e. external and internal. In that case, the causal relation of external dependent origination is as follows. From a seed [of rice] a sprout comes up, from the sprout a leaf, from the leaf a shoot, from the shoot a stalk, from the stalk an ear, from the ear a sheath of a bud, from the sheath of a bud a flower, and from the flower a fruit (grain).
"Therefore, even when there is neither sentience (caitanya) of the seed, etc. nor
any other controlhng agent (adhisthätr), a settled rule of relationship of the
cause and effect is to be seen." (tasmäd asaty api caitanye bijädinäm asaty apy canyasminn adhisthätari kärya-kärana-bhäva-niyamo drsyate. BM. p. 527'"'°).
It is not certain whether this passage belongs to the original Sis., because
this is not found in the Madhyamaka-Sälistamba-sütra (MSIs) as well as in
the Tibetan version (R.II) and most of the Chinese versions. We find this
sentence in the ABS. p. 59^"'', which seems to refer to the BM. Anyway this
passage fairly expresses a basic idea of the Buddhist point of view.
An external conditional relation is observed, as for example, when a
sprout is born from a seed, which is a cause, on account of the combination
of the six elements (dhätu = bhüta, i.e. earth, water, fire, wind, space, and
season)." Then follows a detailed explanation of each function (krtya) of
these six elements,''' and the unconsciousness of these elements.'^
When there is no seed, no sprout comes up, and so on until, when there is no flower, no fruit comes up. However, when there is a seed, a sprout comes up. In that case, such a con¬
sciousness does not occur to the seed as 'I produce the sprout.' In this way also such a con¬
sciousness does not occur to the sprout as 'I am produced by the seed.' In this way, until it does not occur to the flower, 'I produce the fruit.' It does not occur to the fruit too, 'I am produced by the flower.'" (atha punar ayarn pratityasamutpädo dväbhyärn käranäbhyärn
bhavati hetüpanibandhatas ca pratyayöpanihandhatas ca I sa punar dvi-vidhah: bähya
ädhyätmikas ca I tatra bähyasya pratityasamutpädasya hetupanibandhah: yad idarn bijäd ahkuro, 'hkurät pattrarn, patträt leändarn, kändän nälo, näläd garbho, garbhäc chükab, sükät pusparn, puspät phalam iti / asati bije 'nkuro na bhavati, yävad asati puspe phalarn na bhavati/ sati tu bije 'nkuro bhavati, yävat puspe sati phalam iti / tatra bijasya
naivarn bhavati jnänam: aham ahkurarn nirvartayämiti / ahkurasyäpi näivarn bhavati
jnänam: aharn bijena nirvartita iti / evarn yävat puspasya näivarn bhavaty: aharn phalarn
nirvartayämiti I evarn phalasyäpi näivarn bhavaty: aharn puspena nirvartitam iti. BM.
p. 526'-'). This passage corresponds to R. 10-11 (pp. 34-35); BST. p. 101'-'^; MSIs.
p. 108"-^' (cf. T. 16, pp. 815b'°-'5, 817a"-b', 819b'-^°, 822a2-", 824a5-i5, T 85, 550b2-c").
The ABS. pp. 58"-59^ seems to quote this passage from the BM. The SDS. 11. //. 313-317 and Näräyana-Sarasvatl's Värttika (BSj, p. 591*-'^) seem to be a brief paraphrase of the same passage.
" "An [external] conditional relation of dependent origination is said [as follows]: Condi¬
tion (pratyaya) is a combination of causes. Other causes depend on [such a] cause and [such a]
cause. Thus, a relation of the [causes] which are coming forth is a condition, so to say a combi¬
nation. As for example, a sprout is born from a seed, which is a cause, on account of the com¬
bination of the six elements" (pratyaydpanibandhah pratityasamutpädasyöcyate I pratyayo hetünärn samaväyah I heturn heturri pratyayante hetv-antaräniti, tesäm ayamänänärn bhävah pratyayah / samaväya iti yävat / yathä sannärn dhätünärn samaväyäd bija-hetur ahkuro jäyate. BM. p. 526'°"'^). This passage seems to be a brief paraphrase of the Sis (R. 12).
'■• "Therein, the element of earth does the function of supporting the seed, so the sprout
becomes hard. The element of water moistens the seed. The element of fire matures the
seed. The element of wind excites (lets grow up) the seed, so the sprout comes up from the seed. The element of space does the function of not-obstructing the seed. Season also
The internal dependent origination also arises from two causes, i.e. a
causal relation (hetu-upanibandha) and a conditional relation (pratyaya-u.)}^
The causal relation of the internal dependent origination is the twelve-fold
chain of dependent origination,''' and the internal conditional relation is
makes a change of the seed. In this way when there is a combination of all these elements, the seed grows, [then] the sprout is born, but not otherwise." {tatra ca prthivi-dhatur bijasya sarngraha-krtyarn karoti, yato 'hkurah kathino bhavati, ab-dhätur bijam snehay- ati, tejo-dhätur bijam paripäcayati, väyu-dhätur bijam abhinirharati, yato 'hkuro bijdn nirgacchati, äkäsa-dhätur bijasyänävarana-krtyam karoti, rtur api bijasya parindmam karoti, tad etesäm avikalänärri dhätünärn samaväye bije rohaty ahkuro jäyate, nänyathä.
BM. p. 526'2-"'). This passage corresponds to R. 13 (p. 37); BST. p. 101"-27. mSIs. p. 109'"«
(cf. T. 16, pp. SlSb"--'«, 817b*-^ 819b"-28, 822a"-i^ 824a"-2^ T 85, pp. SSOc^^-SSla*). The ABS. p. 59'-'* and Näräyana-Sarasvatl's Värttika (BSj, p. 591''-'^) seem to be a quotation
of this passage of the BM.
'* "In that case, it does not occur to the element of earth, T do the function of sup¬
porting the seed.' And in this way, until it does not occur to season, T make a change of the seed.' It does not occur to the sprout too, T am produced by these conditions.'"
{tatra prthivi-dhätor naivarn bhavaty: aham bijasya sarngraha-krtyant karomiti, yävad rtor naivarn bhavaty: aharn bijasya parinämarn karomiti/ ahkurasyäpi näivarn bhavaty:
aham ebhih pratyayair nirvartita iti. BM. p. 527^"'). This passage corresponds to R. 14 (p. 38); BST. pp. 1012M02'; MSIs. p. 1098-'° (cf. T. 16, pp. 815b'8-", %\7h'^-^\ mh^*-c\
822a'7-22, 824a"-bi, T 85, p. 551a«-"'). The ABS. p. 59'5-'8 seems to be a quotation of this passage of the BM.
tathädhyätmikah pratityasamutpädo dväbhyärn käranäbhyärn bhavati hetüpani-
bandhatah pratyayöpanihandhatas ca. BM. p. 527'-''. This passage corresponds to R. 21
(p. 43); BST. pp. 102'^-« (cf. T. 16, pp. 815b", 817b2^ 819c"-'8, 822b*-5, 824b'«-", T 85, p.551c"-2°).
''' "In this case, the causal relation of this [internal depending origination] is as follows:
Depending on nescience there come forth the [mental and non-mental] latent forces, and so on, until depending on birth there come forth decrepitude and death, etc. If there shall be no nescience, the latent forces shall not be born, and so on until birth. If there shall be no birth, decrepitude and death, etc. shall not arise. In that case, it does not occur to nescience, T produce the latent forces.' It does not occur to the latent forces too, 'We are produced by nescience.' In this way until it does not occur to birth too, '1 produce decrepi¬
tude and death, etc' It does not occur to decrepitude and death, etc. too, 'We are produced by birth, etc' Now though nescience, etc. are non-sentient by themselves and not control¬
led by any other sentient one, [depending on them] the latent forces come forth, just as if the non-sentient seed, etc. though not controlled by any other sentient one, [depend¬
ing on them] the sprout, etc. come forth. Depending on, i.e. reaching that, this originates, because only such a kind is seen, but any sentient control is not perceived. Thus this is the causal relation of the internal dependent origination." {tatrasya hetüpanibandhah -
yad idam avidyä-pratyayäh sarnskärä yävaj jäti-pratyayam jarä-maranäditi / avidyä
cen näbhavisyan näiva sarnskärä ajanisyanta I evarri yävaj jätih / jätis cen näbhavisyan näiva jarä-marariädaya udapatsyanta I taträvidyäyä näivarn bhavaty: aharn sarnskärän
abhinirvartayämiti I sarnskäränäm api näivarn bhavaty: vayam avidyayä nirvartitä
iti / evarn yävaj jätyä api näivarn bhavaty: aharn jarä-maranädi abhinirvartayämiti I
jarä-marariädinäm api näivarn bhavati: vayarn jäty-ädibhir nirvartitä iti / atha ca
satsv avidyädisu svayam acetanesu cetanäntaränadhisthitesv api samskärädinäm utpattih
seen as our body is born due to the combination of the six elements, i.e. the
five elements (earth, etc.) and consciousness {vijnäna, instead of season).'*
This interpretation of the internal dependent origination is an explanation
of human existence in the process of transmigration. This interpretation im¬
plies that there is no necessity of a soul (ätman) for explaining our human
existence." On this point, the BM reads as follows:
"Just as a sprout is born from the non-sentient elements such as earth and the rest, [which] are not under any other sentient being's control, so a human body is born." {prthivy-ädi-dhätubhyo 'cetanebhyas cetanantaranadbistbitebbyo
'nkurasyeva käyasyötpattih. BM. p. 527'^"'')
This passage seems Vacaspatimisra's comment or paraphrase, because other
versions of the Sis do not contain this passage (See R. 25). Nonetheless, this
bijadifv iva satsv acetanesu cetandntaranadbisthitesv apy ankurädinäm / idam pratitya
präpyedam utpadyata ity etävan-mätrasya drstatväc cetanädhisthänasyänupalabdheh I
so 'yam ädhyätmikasya pratityasamutpädasya hetüpanibandhah. BM. p. 527''-'°). This
passage corresponds to R. 22 (pp. 43-44); BST. pp. 102'«-2'; MSIs. p. 110' '° (cf. T. 16, pp. 815c'-'^ 817b«-'2, 819c'*-2\ 822b5-", 824h^°-^\ T 85, p. 552a2-). The ABS. pp. 59'''-60«
seems to be a quotation of this passage of the BM.
'* "Then the conditional relation [of the internal dependent origination] is as follows:
Because there is a combination of [these] elements (factors), i.e. earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness, there is [our] body. Therein the element (factor) of earth pro¬
duces solidity of the body. The element of water moistens the body. The element of fire digests what is eaten and drunk in the body. The element of wind does [the function of]
breath, etc. of the body. The element of space causes hollowness inside the body.
But that which produces a sprout of name-and-form and defiled mind's consciousness that is associated with the effects of five kinds of consciousness is called the element of consciousness. When the internal elements of earth, etc. are not deficient, then, be¬
cause of the combination of all [these elements] there comes forth the body." {atha
pratyaydpanibandhah -prthivy-ap-tejo-väyv-äkäs'a-vijfiäna-dhätünärn samaväyäd bha¬
vati käyah / tatra käyasya prthivi- dhätuh käthinyarn nirvartayati I ab-dhätuh snehay-
ati käyam I tejo-dhätuh käyasyäsita-pite paripäcayati I väyu-dhätuh käyasya sväsädi
karoti I äkäsa-dhätuh käyasyäntah susira-bhävam karoti / yas tu näma-rüpähkuram
abhinirvartayatipahca-vijriäna-kärya-sarnyuktarn säsravarn ca mano-vijnänarn, so 'yam
ucyate vijnäna-dhätuh / yadä hy ädhyätmikäh prthvy-ädi-dhätavo bhavanty avikaläs
tadä sarvesärn samaväyäd bhavati käyasyötpattih. BM. p. 527'°-'*). This passage cor¬
responds to R. 23-24 (pp. 45-46); BST. pp. 102"-103''; MSIs. p. 110"-" (cf. T. 16, pp. 815c"--816a', 817c2->^, 819c2''-820a\ 822b"-'«, 824b"-c", T 85, p. 552a"-). The ABS.
p. 60'"'^ seems to refer to this passage of the BM.
" "In that case, it does not occur to the elements of earth, etc., 'We produce solidity,
etc. of the body.' And such a consciousness does not occur to the body too as 'We are
produced by these conditions.'" (tatra prthivy-ädi-dhätünärn näivarn bhavati: vayarn
käyasya käthinyädi nirvartayäma iti / käyasyäpi näivarn bhavati jnänam: aham ebhih
pratyayairabhinirvartita iti BM. p. 527'*-'^). This passage corresponds to R. 25 (p. 47-49);
BST. p. 103'-'2; mSIs. pp. 110"-lll''(cf. T. 16, pp. 817c'^-'S 820a^-'°, 822b'8-", 824c"-'^
T. 85, p. 552c^-). The ABS. p. 60"-" seems to refer to this passage of the BM.
sentence expresses the important characteristic of the Buddhist point of
view too.
Then follows a detailed exposition of the twelve chains of dependent origi¬
nation, just as if quoting and condensing the Sis (R.27; BST. p. 103''"^', MSIs.
p. Illi°-22; cf. T.I6, pp. 8I5c-816a, 8I7c-818a, 820a, 822b-c, 824c-825a,
T.85, p. 553a-b).
"Whatever [conception there is] wuh regard to these same six elements,
i.e., one[-ness]-conception (eka-samjnd), individual-conception, eternity-con¬
ception, pleasure-conception, living-being-conception, person-conception,
man-conception, mother-and-daughter-conception, [or] I-and-my-conception
(ahamkära-mamakära-samjnä), it is this very nescience (avidyä) that is the
fundamental cause of the multitude of transmigrations and misfortunes. When
this nescience exists, the latent forces (sarnskärä), i.e. greed, hatred, and delu¬
sion become active with regard to the [sense-]objects. The cognition with a real object (vastu-visayä vijnaptir) is consciousness (vijnäna). The four form-less
(arüpin, non-material) grasping-aggregates (upädäna-skandha) which come
from consciousness are name (näma). Grasping these [four aggregates] the
form (rüpa, colour) appears. When these [name and form] are put together into
one, this is etymologically called name-and-form (näma-rüpa). These are the
first and second stages of the embryo, etc. (kalala-budbudädy-avasthä) of the
[child's] body. Sense organs mixed together with the name-and-form are the
six spheres of cognition (sad- äyatana). The conjunction of these three, i.e. of
the name-and-form and sense organs, is contact (sparsa). From contact come
forth feeling (vedanä) of pleasure and the rest. When there is feeling, there
comes forth thirst (trsnä, fervent desire), i.e. a decision that T will effect this
pleasure again.' From this [thirst] comes forth the acquisition (upädäna), i.e.
motion of speech and body. From this [acquisition] comes forth the becoming
[force of existence] (bbava). The becoming [force of existence], from which
comes forth birth, is merit (dbarma) and demerh (adbarma). Caused by this
[becoming force of existence], the appearance of aggregates is birth (jäti).
Caused by birth, later come forth decrepitude, death, etc. The maturing of the
born aggregates is decrepitude (jarä, decay). The perishing of the worn out
aggregates is death (marana). The inner distress of a dying infatuated patient
having attachment with regard to his sons and wife, etc. is grief (s'oka). The
lament which is caused by this [grief], such as, 'Oh mama!' 'Oh daddy!' 'Oh
my son! Darling!' or so, is lamentation (paridevanä). The unpleasant expe¬
rience, which is concerned with the effect of the five kinds of cognitions,
is suffering (dubkba). Painful mental emotion is sorrow (daurmanasya)."
(tatraitesv eva satsu dbätusu yäika-sarnjnä, pirida-sarnjnä, nitya- sarnjnä,
sukha-sarnjnä, sattva-sarnjnä, pudgala-sarnjüä, manusya-sarnjnä, mätr-
duhitr-sarnjnä, aharnkära-mamakära-samjnä, seyam avidyä, sarnsäränartba-
sarnbbärasya müla-käranarn. tasyäm avidyäyärn satyärn sarnskärä räga-dvesa-
mohä visayesu pravartante. vastu-visayä vijnaptir vijnänarn. vijnänäc catväro
'rüpina'' upädäna-skandhäs tan näma, täny upädäya rüpam abhinirvartate,
tad aikadbyam abhisamksipya näma-rüparn nirucyate sarirasyäiva kalala-
budbudädy-avastbäh. näma-rüpa-sarnmis'ritäni-indriyäni sad-äyatanarn. näma-
rüpendriyänärn trayänärn sarnnipätah sparsah. spars'äd vedanä sukhädikä.
vedanäyärn satyärn kartavyam etat sukharn punar may ety adhyavasänarn trsnä
bhavati. tata upädänarn väk-käya-cestä bhavati. tato bhavo bhavaty asmäj jan-
meti bhavo dharmädharmau, tad-dhetukah skandba-prädur-bhävo jätih janma.
janma-hetukä uttare jarä-maranädayah- jätänärn skandhänärn paripäko jarä.
skandbänärn näso maranam. mriyamänasya müdhasya säbbisahgasya putra-
kalaträdäv antar-dähah s'okah. tad-uttharn pralapanarn bä mätah, hä täta,
hä ca me putra-kalaträditi paridevanä. panca-vijnäna-kärya-sarnyuktam
asädbv-anubhavanarn duhkharn.. mänasarn ca duhkharn daurmanasyam. BM.
pp. 527'''-528'2; ''"not rüpina as in the printed texts.)
This exposition of dependent origination is, in the whole, repeated in the
ABS (pp. 58'*-61i'), and in Näräyana-Sarasvatl's Värttika (BSj, pp. 591-593).
Moreover Mädhava (SDS. II. //. 290-317) also refers to the causal relation
(hetu-upanibandha) and the conditional relation (pratyaya-u.), but he omits
a detailed comment on the internal dependent origination. Most of the com¬
mentaries (Prakatartha-vivararia, Nyäya-nirnaya, Bhäsya-bhäva-prakäsikä,
Ratnaprabhä, Sivärkamarii-dipikä) explain the twelve chains of dependent
origination only, and these explanations are, on the whole, very akin to the
above passage of the BM. The gist of the twelve chains of dependent origina¬
tion as explained above points out the human existence in the process of
transmigration. In addition, in the external as well as in the internal depend¬
ent origination, i.e. in a wider sense of relationship, the combination of sev¬
eral elements becomes possible, and then our human existence as well as ex¬
ternal thing, which we experience, becomes possible.
IV. Such is the Buddhist theory. In replying such an assertion, Sahkara criti¬
cizes as follows.
"If any efficient cause of the composite [of physical and mental elements] is
noticed, the composite would be possible. But this (efficient cause) is not no¬
ticed. Because [no efficient cause is possible for the origination of the compos¬
ite itself], even if nescience and the rest mutually become a condition for
each other, each preceding member [of the chains of dependent origination]
would become an efficient cause for the production of each subsequent member
only. But no efficient cause is possible for the origination of the composite."
(bhaved upapannah sarnghäto yadi sarnghätasya kirncin nimittam avagamyate,
na tv avagamyate. yata itaretara-pratyayatve py avidyädinärn pürva-pürvam
uttaröttarasyötpatti-mätra-nimittarn bhavad bbaven na tu sarngbätötpatteh
kirncin nimittarn sarnbbavati. BSBh. pp. 528^-529')
Even though it is admitted that nescience becomes the cause of the latent
forces (sarnskärä), and the latent forces become the cause of consciousness,
and so on, there is no efficient cause for the composite of the [elements of]
mind and body. Without the composite of mind and body, nescience itself is
not possible. There must be an agent (viz. dtman, or a man) to whom nesci¬
ence belongs. So thinks Sahkara. He continues as follows.
"If it is, in the first place, meant to say, that as nescience, etc. cannot come into
existence without a [physical and mental] composite, and hence they require
a composite, then some efficient cause for such a composite has to be stated.
Moreover, even if permanent atoms (anu) are accepted and experiencing sub¬
jects (bhoktr, = self) as the abode of the abider (äsrayäsrayi-bhüta = adrsta, un¬
seen force that restricts living beings' existence in the process of transmigra¬
tion) do exist, no [cause for a composite] is possible. Thus k has already been
stated in the examination of the Vaisesika [doctrine]. How much less then is
[the efficient cause for the composite] possible, in case [of Buddhism] without
experiencing subjects, or being devoid of the abode of the abider, only mo¬
mentary atoms are assumed? Or if it is assumed that only nescience and the
rest are the efficient cause of the composite, then how can the same [nescience
and the rest], which come into existence only depending upon the composite,
ever be themselves the efficient cause of such a composite?" (yadi tävad ayam
abbipräyo 'vidyadayah samghätam antarenätmänam alabbamänä apeksante
sarnghätam iti. tatas tasya sarnghätasya nimittarn vaktavyam. tac ca nityesv
apy anusv abbyupagamyamänesv äsrayäsrayi-bhütesu ca bhoktrsu satsu na
sarnbhavatity uktarn Vaisesika-pariksäyärn. kim anga punah ksanikesv apy
anusu bhoktr-rahitesv äsrayäsrayi-sünyesu vä 'bhyupagamyamänesu sarnbbavet.
atbäyam abbipräyo 'vidyädaya eva sarrighätasya nimittam iti, katharn tam
eväsrityätmänarn labhamänäs tasyäiva nimittarn syuh. BSBh. pp. 530'"^)
The assertion that the efficient cause is necessary for the formation of the
physical and mental composite (mind and body) implies that there must be an
eternal self. Sahkara has developed an argument that any efficient cause is im¬
possible for the composite of atoms in the Vaisesika doctrine (ad BS.2.2.12).
He asserts that no efficient cause is possible, if not only the atoms but also
the physical and mental elements are momentary and without any eternal self
(soul) in Buddhism (in the Sarvästi-vädin-school). Notwithstanding this, I
think, the Buddhists (AKBh, etc.) assume the formation of living beings and
the universe (world) by their work (karman, latent force of work that decides
the future existence), that is to say, the work must be the efficient cause for
the physical and mental composite. The latent forces (samskara) and the be¬
coming [force of existence] (bhava) of the twelve chains of dependent origi¬
nation means the force of work (karman). Is Sahkara then wrong? I do not
think so, because it seems to be undeniable that the physical and mental
composite must come Into existence before nescience, that, in return. Is as¬
sumed to be the cause for the composite. This seems to be contradictory.
V. Sahkara continues his argument as In the fohowing.
"Now perhaps you (Buddhist) think that the composites themselves recur
through a series of moments (santati) in the beginningless transmigration, and
nescience and the rest abide in the [composites]. Even then, [you will have to as¬
sume either that] a composite comes forth from another composite of the same
kind as a settled rule, or that, without any settled rule, a like one (composite) may come forth, or an unlike one may come forth. If a settled rule is admitted, a human soul will never pass over into a god, an animal or a being of the hell [in
the transmigration]. Even though no such settled rule is admitted, it would fol¬
low that a human soul might in a certain instant be turned into an elephant or
a god, or again become a man. Both these [consequences] would be contradic¬
tory to your doctrine. Moreover, your doctrine is that there is no such ever¬
lasting experiencing self (jiva, soul) for whose experience this composite will
come into existence. Hence, such an experience will be for the sake of the same experience (for its own sake) only, and it is not to be aimed at by anyone else.
Similarly, final release (moksa) will be for the sake of the same final release (for its own sake) alone, thus no one else can be an aspirant for such release. If both
[experience and release] are to be desired by someone else [other than both],
that one will have to be permanently in existence up to the time of experience and release. If that is permanently in existence, then it is contradictory to your
doctrine of universal momentariness. Therefore, if there is a causal relation be¬
tween the members of the series consisting of nescience, etc., let it be
so, but the composite can not be established, because a [permanent] experienc¬
ing one (self, soul) does not exist. Thus is [our] opinion." (atha manyase
samghätä evänädau samsäre samtatyänuvartante tad-äsrayäs cävidyädaya iti.
tadäpi sarnghätät samghätäntaram utpadyamänarn niyamena vä sadr sam evöt-
padyeta, aniyamena vä sadrsarn visadrsam vötpadyeta. niyamäbhyupagame
manusya-pudgalasyadeva-tiryag-yoni-näraka-präpty-abhävahpräpnuyät. an-
iyamäbbyupagame pi manusya-pudgalah kadäcit ksanena hasti bhütvä
devo vä punar manusyo vä bhaved iti präpnuyät. ubhayam apy abhy-
upagama-viruddham. api ca yad-bbogärthah sarnghätah syät sa jivo nästi
sthiro bbokteti taväbhyupagamah. tatas' ca hhogo bhogärtha eva sa nänyena
prärtbaniyah. tathä mokso moksärtba eveti mumuksunä nänyena bhavitavyam.
anyena cetprärtbyetöbhayam, bboga-moksa-kälävasthäyinä tena bhavitavyam.
avasthäyitve ksanikatväbbyupagama-virodhah. tasmäd itaretarötpatti-mätra-
nimittatvam avidyädinärn yadi bhaved, bhavatu näma. na tu sarnghätah sid-
hyet. bhoktr-abhäväd ity abhipräyah. BSBh. pp. 530^-531^)
While a man lives, experiences, does religious practices, and obtains final
release, there must be one and the same permanent subject (self, soul) In him.
But if the momentary physical and mental elements become a composite
through combining with each other by dint of causes and conditions, there
should be no such permanent self in Buddhism. Sahkara does not fail to miss
this point.
The next Sütra also refers to the dependent origination as in the following:
"[No causal relation between nescience, etc. is possible], because when the sub¬
sequent [member] originates, the preceding one ceases to be." (uttara- utpäde ca pürva-nirodhät. BS. 2.2.20)
Sahkara explains as follows.
"It has been said that as nescience and the rest are an efficient cause of the origina¬
tion [of the subsequent members of the chains of dependent origination] only,
so there is no establishment of the composite. But now it is to be propounded that also their being an efficient cause of the origination only is impossible.
Those who assert the momentary destruction [of every existing thing] (ksana-
bhariga-vädin) have this doctrine that when the subsequent moment comes
forth, the preceding moment perishes. But he who holds this cannot prove the
relationship of cause and effect between two preceding and subsequent mo¬
ments, because a perishing or perished preceding moment is taken by non-exist¬
ence, it is impossible to be a cause of the subsequent moment. Or if it is meant
that the preceding moment, which has come into existence and has attained the
condition of its full development, is a cause of the subsequent moment, even
thus it is not possible too. Because if it is supposed that [the preceding moment]
which has come into existence has any activity again, then there would follow
an unfavourable conclusion that [this preceding moment] has connection with
another moment, [this contradicts the doctrine of universal momentariness]. If
it is meant that existence itself is activity of this [cause], even thus it is not pos¬
sible, because it is not possible that an effect which is not dyed by the nature of its cause can ever come into existence. In addition, if it is admitted that an effect is dyed by the nature [of its cause], and the nature of [its] cause lasts until the
time of [its] effect, then there would follow an unfavourable conclusion of giv¬
ing up the doctrine of universal momentariness. Or if it is admitted that though [an effect is] not dyed by the nature [of its cause], there is [still] a relationship
of cause and effect, then in this [relationship of cause and effect] would be
available everywhere. So an unwarrantable consequence would follow." (uk¬
tam etad avidyädinäm utpatti-mätra-nimittatvän na sarnghäta-siddhir astiti.
tad api tütpatti-mätra-nimittatvarn na sarnbhavatitidänim upapädyate. ksana-
bhahga-vädino 'yam abbyupagama uttarasmin ksana utpadyamäne pürvah
ksano nirudbyata iti. na cäivam abbyupagacchatä pürvöttarayoh ksanayor
hetu-phala-bbävah sakyate sampädayitum. nirudhyamänasya niruddhasya
vä pürva-ksanasyäbhäva-grastatväd uttara-ksana-hetutvänupapatteh- t-tba
bhäva-bbütah parinispannävasthah pürva-ksana uttara-ksanasya hetur ity
abbipräyas tathä'pi nopapadyate. bhäva-bhütasya punar vyäpära-kalpanäyäm
ksanäntara-sarnbandha-prasangät. atha bhäva eväsya vyäpära ity abbipräyas tathäpinäivdpapadyate. betu-svabbävänuparaktasyapbalasydtpatty-asanibhavät.
svabhävöparägäbbyupagame ca hetu-svabhävasya pbala-kälävastbäyitve sati
ksana-bhahgäbbyupagama-tyäga-prasahgah. vinaiva vä svabhävöparägena
hetu-phala-bhävam abhyupagaccbatah sarvatra tat-präpter atiprasahgah- BSBh.
pp. 531'°-532')
Sarikara argues that a relationship of cause and effect is not possible, if
the doctrine of universal momentariness is admitted. The doctrine of uni¬
versal momentariness, which goes back to the Buddha's teaching that every¬
thing (any physical and mental element) is impermanent (anitya), was estab¬
lished by Vasubandhu, and later elaborated by Dharmakirti (7* century)
and his followers, Ratnäkarasänti, Jüänasrimitra (both 10-11* century), etc.
Vasubandhu asserts that every conditioned element (sarnskrta dharma) is
momentary (ksanika), and that the destruction (vinäs'a, extinction) of exist¬
ing things (bhäva) is without cause, because destruction is non-existence
and non-existence has no cause (AKBh. p. 193). Dharmakirti accepts this
doctrine (PVSV. p. 98) and universalises it further as in the following.
"Anything existing is only momentary, if it is not momentary, it is contradic¬
tory to the efficient function (artha-kriyä, efficient operation), 2° hence the
reality (vastutva) which is of the characteristic of that [efficient function]
is to be lost." (yat sat tat ksanikam eva, aksanikatve 'rthakriyä-virodhät
tal-laksanarn vastutvarn hiyate. Hetubindu p. 4*^. This text has been recon¬
structed from the Tibetan by Ernst Steinkellner)
"In case of no momentariness, there [would be] no existence." (ksanikatväbhäve sattväbhävah. Hetubindu p. 5"'^°) -
The very basic concept of his argument (inference) is expressed as in the fol¬
lowing assertion:
"Since the definition (characteristic) of existence is a function (sakti),'^^ the defi¬
nition (characteristic) of non-existence is devoid of all functions, and a non-
momentary (aksanika, eternal) thing does not have any function anywhere.
2° Artha-kriyä (efficient function, efficient operation, or causal efficiency) is a very im¬
portant term in Dharmakirti's philosophy (epistemology and ontology). Epistemologically speaking, only the extreme particular characteristic (sva-laksana) of the object of direct perception (pratyaksa) has its potency (PV. Pratyaksa 1). Ontologically speaking, it is a characteristic of a real existence (bhäva, vastu) which is momentary, only a momentary thing has it (Hetubindu p. 4*'). His definition of direct perception: 'direct perception is free from conceptional construction and non-illusive' (pratyaksam kalpanäpodham abhräntam, Nyäyabindu 1.4) implies indeterminate cognition which lasts only for a moment.
2' Sakti (function, ability, or potency) means here the potency of efficient function (see PV. Pratyaksa 1).
because it is devoid of efficient function (artha-kriyä, efficient operation)
successively as well as simultaneously (saktir hi bhäva-laksanam, sarva-
s'akti-viraho 'bhäva-laksanam. na cdksanikasya kvacit käcic chaktih, krama-
yaugapadyäbhyäm artha-kriyä-virabät, Hetubindu p. 19*'°-'^).
The theory of universal momentariness later becomes a target of criticism
in other schools of Indian philosophy. Sahkara next examines the origina¬
tion and cessation (destruction) of things in order to criticize the theory of
universal momentariness as follows.
"Moreover, the so-called origination (utpada) and cessation (nirodha) must be
either the very own nature (svarüpa) of a real thing (vastu, fact), or another
state [of itself], or an altogether different thing. But none of these alternatives is possible. (1) If, in the first place, the origination and cessation are the own
nature of a thing itself, then the term 'thing' and the terms 'origination' and
'cessation' would become synonymous. (2) If a certain difference is to be con¬
ceived, then the two states of the so-called beginning and end of the thing that is situated in the middle are to be denoted by the terms 'origination' and 'cessa¬
tion'. In the same way also, as the thing is connected with the three moments
of the beginning, end and middle, so the doctrine of universal momentariness is abandoned. (3) If the origination and cessation are to be entirely different from the thing, just as a horse and a buffalo for instance, then the thing is nei¬
ther connected with origination nor with cessation. In this way, it follows
that the thing is eternal. Moreover (4) if its perception and non-perception
are the origination and cessation of the thing, in this way also these two (per¬
ception and non-perception) are the properties of the person who perceives,
but not the properties of the thing. Hence it follows that the thing would
be eternal." (api cötpäda-nirodhau näma vastunah svarüpam eva vä syätäm
avastbäntaram vä vastv-antaram eva vä. sarvathä'pi nopadyate. yadi tävad
vastunah svarüpam evötpäda-nirodhau syätärn, tato vastu-sabda utpäda-
nirodha-s'abdau ca paryäyäh präpnuyuh. athästi kascid visesa iti manyetötpäda-
nirodha-sabdäbhyäm madbya-vartino vastuna ädy-antäkhye avasthe
abbilapyete iti, evam apy ädy-anta-madhya-ksana-traya-sambandbitväd
vastunah ksanikatväbhyupagama-hänih. athätyanta-vyatiriktäv evötpäda-
nirodhau vastunah syätäm as'va-mahisavat, tato vastu utpäda-nirodhäbbyäm
asarnsrstam iti vastunah säsvatatva-prasangah. yadi ca darsanädarsane vas¬
tuna utpäda-nirodhau syätäm. evam api drastr-dharmau tau na vastu-
dharmäv iti vastunah säs'vatatva-prasanga eva. BSBh. p. 532'"")
In this way Sahkara refutes the Buddhist theory of universal momentariness
and concludes that this theory is not established. Almost the same argument
is repeated in the ABS. p. 65'*"^^. This criticism of the universal momentari¬
ness reveals the essential points of this doctrine. Especially the last criticism
(4) seems to be the most important. That is to say, the Buddhist theory of
universal momentariness has nothing to do with the real thing {vastu, fact)
itself, but it is largely concerned with the perception or intuitive knowledge
of the perceiving and thinking person only. In other words, as a whole,
the Buddhists who hold the theory of impermanence and universal momen¬
tariness have little concern with the objective physical, chemical, or biologi¬
cal fact itself. As for instance, the five aggregates (skandha) and the twelve
spheres of cognitions (äyatana), which, as the Canonical Text often repeats,
cover all our human existence and phenomena (sarvam, sahharn), depend
mainly on the subjective faculties of sense which are all impermanent, but
hardly concern the realities (living individual beings, composite material
substances, or permanent elements) themselves. Bhäskara and Rämänuja
also criticize the doctrine of universal momentariness on commenting this
Sütra. The next Sütra also refers to the Buddhist theory of dependent origi¬
nation as follows.
"If [it is supposed that] in the absence [of a cause, an effect takes place, there results] a contradiction of the proposition, or otherwise, simultaneity [of cause and effect]." {asatipratijna-uparodho yaugapadyam anyathä. BS. 2.2.21)
Sahkara comments on this sütra as in the following.
"It has already been stated that in the doctrine of momentary destruction
[of every existing thing] (ksana-bhahga-väda), as the preceding moment is
grasped by cessation, it cannot become the cause of the subsequent moment. If
[the Buddhist] would say that in the absence of a cause, an effect takes place,
there would result the contradiction of the proposition. Namely, the proposi¬
tion that depending on four kinds of causes, the consciousness {citta, mind)
and mental functions (caitta) come forth is to be abandoned. And if [they]
" Twelve dyatanas are originally called six dyatanas that mean six spheres of cognition (i.e. spheres of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind), and then divided into six inner spheres of cognition (i.e. eye, etc.) and six outer spheres of cognition [i.e. colour, sound, odour, taste, the tangible, and the object of mind (dharma, dhamma)]. Colour, etc. are im¬
permanent, because these are not objective qualities of things themselves, but subjectively perceptible ephemeral phenomena, i.e. sensations or perceptions. Eyes, etc. are imperma¬
nent, because these belong to our living body, which according to our new knowledge consists of cells that are always changing without cease, i.e. impermanent. These six or twelve are said in the Buddhist Canon to cover all (sarvarn, sabbarn) [of our existence, or our experiencing world], and to be impermanent, full of sufferings, and not-self (anätman, anattan). Colour (rüpa) of five skandhas, which comprises colour, etc. (but except mind) and eye, etc. (except dharma) of twelve dyatanas, is impermanent too. Other constitu¬
ents of skandha, which are all mental elements or functions (though some non-mental ele¬
ments or forces are included in sarnskärä), are impermanent and changing, because these come forth from our living body that is always changing and then impermanent. I am writ¬
ing a paper to prove such tendencies of Buddhist theory of impermanence and universal
momentariness in the Commemoration Volume of Prof. Esho Mikogami.
come forth without cause, as there is no restriction, everything would come
forth everywhere. Or if until the subsequent moment comes forth, the preced¬
ing moment lasts, then there would be simultaneity of cause and effect. In this
way also, there would be a contradiction of [your] very proposition. That
is to say, this proposhion that all the conditioned products (sarnskrta)
are momentary would be contradicted." (ksana-hhanga-vade pürva-ksano
nirodha- grastatvän nöttarasya ksanasya hetur bhavatity uktam. athasaty
eva hetau pbalotpattirn brüyät, tatah pratijnoparodbah syät. catur-vidbän
hetün pratitya citta-caittä utpadyanta ittyarn pratijnä hiyeta. nirhetukäyärn cötpattäv apratibandbät sarvarn sarvatrötpadyeta. atböttara-ksanötpattir
yävat tävat avatisthate pürva-ksana iti brüyät, tato yaugapadyarn hetu-
phalayoh syät. tathäpi pratijnöparodba eva syät. ksanikäh sarve sarnskärä
itiyarn pratijnöparudhyeta. BSBh. pp. 532''-533'')
Bhäskara and Rämänuja explain this sütra similarly. This argument points
out the impossibility of causal relation in the Buddhist doctrine of uni¬
versal momentariness. The Buddhist should, I think, have proved its pos¬
sibility in universal momentariness, which has never been introduced by
Sahkara, etc. The above 'four kinds of causes' (hetu) are, according to the
BM (pp. 532^'-533''), the objective condhion (dlambana-pratyaya), interme¬
diate condition (samanantara-pr.), up-heaving condition (adhipati-pr.), and
co-operating condition (sahakari-pr.), which are known to Bhäskara and
Rämänuja also. The four kinds of conditions (pratyaya) are enumerated in
the AKBh (p. 98^), but the co-operating condition is omitted and the causal
condition (hetu-pratyaya) is added instead there. In short, the AKBh ex¬
plains the causal relationship between the essential elements (dharma) by
four kinds of conditions (pratyaya), six kinds of causes (hetu) and five kinds
of effects (phala). And thus it explains the origination and series of mo¬
ments of these elements and thereby interprets our human existence and the
world. But the AKBh does not seem to explain our human existence and the
world only by dependent origination. It is the Sis that explains our existence
mainly by dependent origination.
VI. According to Sahkara, the next context of the BS runs as follows.
"The cessation [of each element of mental defilement (klesa)] attained by an in¬
tellectual power, and the cessation not attained by an intellectual power (but
Dharma means essential element of our existence that is said to have each own par¬
ticular characteristic (own definition) (sva-laksaria-dhäranäd dharmah, AKBH. p. 2').
And the system of dharmas consists of visual (physical) elements (rüpa), mind {citta, con¬
sciousness), mental elements {caitta, caitasika, mental concomitants and functions), non- mental forces (citta-viprayukta sarnskärä), and the unconditioned (asarnskrta) according to the philosophical system of Sarvästivädin-school (AKBh. pp. 52^H.).
caused by the absence of productive causes) cannot be established, because there is no interruption [of the series of moments of elements]." (pratisamkhyd-
'pratisamkhyä-nirodha-apräptir, avicchedät. BS. 2.2.22)
"But [this view is wrong], because in either case (if the cessation of nescience, etc. is attained by right knowledge or by itself), there is a defect. [That is to
say, the first alternative contradicts the doctrine that the destruction takes
place without any cause, the second alternative makes the teaching of the reli¬
gious way meaningless]." (ubhayathä ca dosät. BS. 2.2.23. Bhäskara omits this sütra)
Here Sankara-^'' seems to refer to Vasubandhu's (and Dharmakirti's) doc¬
trine of universal momentariness that the cessation (destruction) of existing
things takes place without any cause. Then the BS runs as follows.
"And with regard to the empty space also, as there is no difference [from the ces¬
sation attained by an intellectual power, and the cessation not so attained, so
it is wrong to call this 'not explainable as the fact'" (nirupäkhya = asarnskrta, that which is not produced by causes, non-product, unconditioned)]." {äkäse caavisesät. BS. 2.2.24)
"And on account of remembrance, [it is not possible that those who cognise are raomtriti^ry]" {anusmnes ca. BS. 2.2.25)
"[Ahhough the Buddhists assert that being comes forth from non-being], noth¬
ing comes forth from non-being, because [that non-being is] not observed."
{na asato 'drstatvät. BS. 2.2.26)
"Moreover, in this way, [if being comes forth from non-being], even those who are indifferent (idle) would thus accomplish [their purpose]." {udäsmänäm api ca evarn siddhih. BS. 2.2.27)
Here ends the section of 'Combination (samudaya)' (according to Sahkara,
Rämänuja, Sripati, and Vijnänabhiksu).
The BS and its commentators explain and criticize the Buddhist doc¬
trines of combination of physical and mental elements, dependent origina-
2'' "If this cessation of nescience, etc. is assumed to be included in the cessation attained by an intellectual power, would it be attained by right knowledge together with the aux¬
iliaries or only by itself [spontaneously]? The former alternative would result in the aban¬
donment of the admitted [doctrine] that the destruction takes place without a cause.
However, the latter [alternative] would result in the meaninglessness of the teaching
of the religious way. Thus from any of both [alternatives], as the predicament of a
fault would result, this [Buddhist] view is incongruous." {l.co 'yam avidyadi-nirodhah
pratisarnkhyä-nirodhäntahpäti parikalpitah, sa samyag-jnänäd vä saparikarät syät
svayam eva vä / pürvasmin vikalpe nirhetuka-vinäsäbhyupagama-häni-prasahgah I
uttarasmirns tu märgüpadesänarthakya-prasahgah / evam ubhayathä'pi dosa-prasahgäd asamanjasam idarn dars'anam. BSBh. p. 534''"').
