When the Mind Forges Its Own Plans:
The Phenomenon of the Implicit Emergence of Implementation Intentions
Dissertation
zur
Erlangung des akademischen Grades
doctor rerum naturalium
(Dr. rer. nat.)vorgelegt von
Michael K. Marquardt
an der
Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftliche Sektion Fachbereich Psychologie
Konstanz, 2011
Universität Konstanz
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 20.12.2011 1. Gutachter: Peter M. Gollwitzer 2. Gutachter: Marco Steinhauser
Konstanzer Online-Publikations-System (KOPS) URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-175616
I
Selbstständigkeitserklärung
Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit ohne unzulässige Hilfsmittel und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt habe. Die aus anderen Quellen direkt oder indirekt übernommenen Daten und Konzepte sind unter Angabe der Quelle gekennzeichnet. Weitere Personen, insbesondere Promotionsberater, waren an der inhaltlichen und materiellen Erstellung dieser Arbeit nicht beteiligt. Die Arbeit wurde bisher weder im In- noch im Ausland in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form einer anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt.
Konstanz, den 30.06.2011
Unterschrift
II
Foreword
The present research reflects far more than simply the author’s thoughts and work. It is also the result of the contributions of many others. I feel very grateful to these contribu- tors, as they have helped make possible what the reader will discover on the following pages.
Thank you to Peter M. Gollwitzer
for your guidance from the early days of my studies to the finalizing of this dissertation, as well as for introducing me into the fascinating field of motivational research, and for your invaluable support in realizing my ideas in this field.
Thank you to Gabriele Oettingen
for fostering my understanding of how words can be arranged to form a complete text that is not cryptic for people other than myself.
Thank you to my family
for providing me with everything I needed to finish my studies and the present work.
Thank you to Nathalie Brenneisen
for always offering your help and for being there even when my work made me rabid.
Thank you to Alexander Jaudas, Frank Wieber, Ute C. Bayer, Torsten Martiny- Hünger, and to my colleagues from the Motivation Lab in Konstanz,
for your clever suggestions that allowed my ideas to grow into the present work.
Thank you to Claire Bacher, Elizabeth J. Parks-Stamm, and James Tan
for your professional help in adding structure to my thoughts and in catching those that were almost lost in translation.
Thank you to Jeanette Fröhn, Mirko Briemle, and Yasmin Zottmann
for your efforts as research assistants that allowed me the time I needed to accomplish the present work.
Thank you to Alexander Woll, Marco Steinhauser, and not least of all to you, the reader,
for offering your thoughts and valuable time to the present findings and ideas. You are who this dissertation was written for.
Keeping these important contributors in mind, I turn now to the present research, which leads to the insight that our brains forge their own plans without our conscious intent or even awareness.
III It is a general principle in Psychology that consciousness
deserts all processes where it can no longer be of use.
William James (1890), The Principles of Psychology
We must give up the insane illusion that a conscious self, however virtuous and however intelligent, can do its work singlehanded and without assistance.
Aldous Huxley (1956), The Education of an Amphibian
The more of the details of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless custody of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be set free for their own proper work.
William James (1890), The Principles of Psychology
IV
Abstract
The present research investigates the implicit emergence of implementation intentions (i.e., plans specifying when, where, and how goal pursuit is to be enacted; Gollwitzer, 1999). The thinking processes leading to implementation intentions were recently found to nonconsciously occur in the service of goal pursuit (Dijksterhuis, 2004). Research on skill acquisition and language processing indicates that merely processing an implementa- tion intention in an if-then conditional format is sufficient to make it available for such thinking processes (see Anderson, 1983; Scholnick & Wing, 1992). Thus, it is hypothe- sized that when an implementation intention specifying in an if-then conditional format how to attain an actively pursued goal is processed, it implicitly emerges without con- scious intent or awareness. Five experiments empirically support this assumption by replicating with implicitly emerged implementation intentions the behavioral outcomes found in previous research in which implementation intentions were explicitly formed (for review, see Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2011). Experiments 1 and 2 replicate improved goal attainment. Experiments 3 and 4 replicate the finding that improved goal attainment is due to behavioral automation. Experiment 4 also indicates that the implicit emergence of implementation intentions does not occur when a plan specifies the same information as an implementation intention but without the if-then conditional format. Experiments 4 and 5 indicate that the implicit emergence of implementation intentions can be genera- lized to the pursuit of different goals and that it can be instigated by everyday influences.
Experiment 5 was a field experiment indicating that the implicit emergence of implemen- tation intentions is a means of goal pursuit controlled by nonconscious behavioral self- regulation as it occurs in everyday life. Theoretical implications of the present findings concern the understanding of flexibility in nonconscious behavioral self-regulation and of the conscious and nonconscious processes resulting in implementation intentions. Prac- tical implications of the findings include interventions to support goal attainment in cases in which conscious planning is unlikely. Conditions that might hinder the implicit emer- gence of implementation intentions are discussed, and avenues for future investigation concerning methods to induce the implicit emergence of implementation intentions are elucidated.
V
Contents
When the Mind Forges Its Own Plans: The Phenomenon of the
Implicit Emergence of Implementation Intentions
1Nonconscious Behavioral Self-Regulation ... 2
Nonconscious Behavioral Self-Regulation Based on Perceptions ... 2
Nonconscious Behavioral Self-Regulation Based on Evaluations ... 3
Nonconscious Behavioral Self-Regulation Based on Emotions ... 3
Nonconscious Behavioral Self-Regulation Based on Motivations ... 4
Origins of the Nonconscious Behavioral Self-Regulation of Goal Pursuit... 5
Implementation Intentions Delegate Control Over Goal Pursuit to Nonconscious Behavioral Self-Regulation ... 5
The Implicit Emergence of Implementation Intentions ... 7
Active Goal Pursuit ... 7
If-Then Conditional Format ... 8
Overview of Experiments ... 10
Experiment 1 ... 11
Method ... 11
Results ... 14
Discussion ... 16
Experiment 2 ... 17
Method ... 18
Results ... 20
Discussion ... 22
Experiment 3 ... 24
Method ... 25
Results ... 28
Discussion ... 30
Experiment 4 ... 32
Method ... 33
Results ... 37
Discussion ... 40
VI
Experiment 5 ... 43
Method ... 43
Results ... 45
Discussion ... 47
General Discussion ... 48
Contribution to Self-Regulation Theory ... 49
Contributions to and Integration in Implementation Intention Theory ... 51
Restrictions to the Implicit Emergence of Implementation Intentions ... 52
Practical Use of the Induction of the Implicit Emergence of Implementation Intentions ... 53
Future Avenues... 54
References ... 56
List of Figures ... 69
List of Tables ... 73
Appendices
Appendix A: Materials Experiment 1 ... 74Appendix B: Materials Experiment 2 ... 86
Appendix C: Materials Experiment 3 ... 96
Appendix D: Words and Sentences Used in Manipulations in Experiments 1 Through 3 ... 106
Appendix E: Materials Experiment 4 ... 108
Appendix F: Materials Experiment 5 ... 119
Appendix G: Deutsche Zusammenfassung ... 129
Einleitung ... 129
Aktuelle Forschung ... 130
Diskussion ... 132
1
When the Mind Forges Its Own Plans: The Phenomenon of the Implicit Emergence of Implementation Intentions
Like planes or ships that are regulated by an autopilot, most living organisms are nonconsciously self-regulated, that is, their behavior is automatically triggered in re- sponse to the appearance of environmental cues without conscious intent or awareness (Gray, 2004). Think back a short time: How did you come to where you are right now?
Did you consciously plan and direct each footstep, or did you leave that to your personal autopilot?1 The idea that most of human behavior is controlled by nonconscious beha- vioral self-regulation (for reviews, see Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh & Morsella, 2010; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001) is not surprising for a simple logical reason – its efficiency makes effective interaction with and functioning within our complex environ- ment possible (e.g., Bateson, 1972; Gilbert, 1989; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960).
Nonconscious behavioral self-regulation frees up the limited conscious cognitive processing resources needed for situations requiring conscious regulation (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Kahneman, 1973; Miller, 1956; Posner
& Snyder, 1975). These are, for instance, new situations that require new behavioral strategies to be handled (Arievitch & van der Veer, 2004) as nonconscious behavioral self-regulation is bound to already existing behavioral strategies (e.g., Aarts &
Dijksterhuis, 2000; Hassin, Aarts, Eitam, Custers, & Kleiman, 2009).
If such new situations are anticipated, new behavioral strategies can be intentionally delegated to the control of nonconscious behavioral self-regulation beforehand by the formation of implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999). By forming an imple- mentation intention, an individual decides in advance when, where, and how to act to- wards a certain goal by specifying a critical environmental cue and a goal-directed beha- vior to be enacted when it appears. As soon as the specified environmental cue is encoun- tered, the specified goal-directed behavior is automatically triggered and controlled by nonconscious behavioral self-regulation. In this way, the explicit formation of implemen- tation intentions allows for preparation of efficient nonconscious behavioral self- regulation in anticipation of new future situations (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999).
Recent research suggests that implementation intentions also might emerge implicitly as a means of nonconscious behavioral self-regulation. Dijksterhuis and colleagues (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006) have recently discovered that our
1 Humans are generally unaware of the operations of their motor system (Blakemore, Wolpert,
& Frith, 2002; Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Rosenbaum, 2002).
2 nonconscious self-regulation systems assist us in more sophisticated ways than by simply triggering goal-directed behaviors in response to the appearance of critical environmental cues. Even the complex thinking processes that the formation of implementation inten- tions is based upon, such as evaluation and decision processes (see Gollwitzer, 1990, 1993, 1999), have been found to nonconsciously occur (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004;
Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006). Thus, it seems possible that implementation intentions implicitly emerge without our conscious intent and awareness as a means of noncons- cious behavioral self-regulation. This raises the question: Does the phenomenon of the implicit emergence of implementation intentions exist? The present research investigates this question.
The text that follows first lays the theoretical foundation necessary to understand how and why the phenomenon of the implicit emergence of implementation intentions is expected to occur as a means of nonconscious behavioral self-regulation. Research from different fields will be brought into connection to develop a theoretical argument in support of the hypothesized implicit emergence of implementation intentions. The present research will then be introduced in detail. The text will conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of the present findings.
Nonconscious Behavioral Self-Regulation
To understand how nonconscious behavioral self-regulation functions, typically four systems that nonconscious behavioral self-regulation builds upon are differentiated.
Perceptual, evaluative, emotional, and motivational systems automatically become acti- vated by critical environmental cues and can separately, as well as through interaction, nonconsciously regulate behavior (e.g., Bargh & Morsella, 2010). Implementation inten- tions are expected to emerge implicitly as a function of nonconscious behavioral self- regulation controlled by the motivational system.
Nonconscious Behavioral Self-Regulation Based on Perceptions
Individuals constantly analyze and process their environment on a preconscious level (Neisser, 1967). Through this processing, a variety of different concepts (i.e., mental representations that consist of knowledge, assumptions, and expectations associated with the objects perceived) automatically become activated (Bargh, 2007; Higgins, 1996).
Social behaviors, for instance, are spontaneously categorized in terms of trait concepts (e.g., cooperative or competitive; Gilbert, 1989; Higgins, 1989; Uleman, Newman, &
Moskowitz, 1996; Winter & Uleman, 1984), and people become categorized in terms of stereotypes (i.e., “integrated collections of trait concepts purportedly descriptive of the
3 groups a perceived individual is associated with”; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001, p. 15).
Concepts, in turn, nonconsciously activate behavioral dispositions that are in line with the concepts’ content. For instance, behavioral consequences of concept activation have been observed when activating the stereotype “old” that made people walk more slowly (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996) and decreased their memory performance (Dijksterhuis, Aarts, Bargh, & van Knippenberg, 2000; Levy, 1996), and by activating the concept of
“library” that made people speak more quietly (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2003).2 Nonconscious Behavioral Self-Regulation Based on Evaluations
Evaluations automatically become activated with perceptions of familiar objects (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Fiske, 1982; Zajonc, 1980) and even of novel stimuli (Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002). As originally posited by Lewin (1935), these automatic and nonconscious evaluations are directly linked to and thus automatically trigger behavioral approach and avoidance dispositions (for current models, see Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Many recent studies have found the expected activation of behavioral dispositions in line with the valence of perceived stimuli (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999; Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000; Krieglmeyer, Deutsch, De Houwer, & De Raedt, 2010;
Neumann, Förster, & Strack, 2003). For instance, Chen and Bargh (1999) observed that when a word naming a positive attitude object (e.g., puppy) was presented, participants pulled a lever faster towards themselves than they pushed it away, thus indicating an approach tendency. This result was reversed when negative attitude words were pre- sented, indicating an avoidance tendency.
Nonconscious Behavioral Self-Regulation Based on Emotions
Emotions are assumed to serve a signaling function, as they anticipate behavioral consequences without actual experience of the real consequences (e.g., Mowrer, 1960).
For instance, fear, which warns of potentially dangerous situations, is a state that an individual seeks to internally dissipate by avoiding the real physical situation, thereby preventing potential physical damage. In line with this assumption, emotions have been found to be automatically triggered by environmental stimuli (e.g., Damasio, 1994;
Frijda, 1986; Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Olsson & Phelps, 2007). Emotions, in turn, auto- matically trigger motivational states (e.g., Lang, 1995; Weiner, 1980), which trigger and
2 Related research in cognitive neuroscience has found that merely hearing action verbs acti- vates the same brain region as does witnessing a meaningful action (Jeannerod, 1999), and that both activate the implicit motor representations needed to carry out the action (Decety &
Grèzes, 1999; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995; Perani et al., 1999).
4 regulate behavior (see “Nonconscious Behavioral Self-regulation Based on Motivations”, below). For instance, anger induces approach motivation, fear and disgust induce avoid- ance motivation, and sadness induces the motivation to change the current state (Haidt, 2001; Lerner & Keltner, 2000).
Nonconscious Behavioral Self-Regulation Based on Motivations
Nonconscious behavioral self-regulation driven by motivations is goal-directed. Mo- tivations are chronic (i.e., enduring over time) and associated with their related goals (Gollwitzer, 1993; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; Kruglanski, 1996; Kruglanski et al., 2002; Locke & Latham, 1990; Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci, 1996). The motivation to be successful might be associated with the goal to win a race for an athlete or the goal to get good grades for a student. Goals are mentally represented as desired end-states that, like other mental representations, automatically become activated by associated environ- mental stimuli (Bargh, 1990; Shah, Kruglanski, & Friedman, 2003). For instance, back- packs activate cooperation goals, whereas briefcases activate competition goals (Kay, Wheeler, Bargh, & Ross, 2004), candy bars activate hedonic goals (Fishbach, Friedman,
& Kruglanski, 2003), and dollar bills activate greed goals (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006);
in addition words related to performance found in a crossword puzzle can activate the goal to perform well (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001), and other people can either activate the goals usually pursued in their presence (Fitzsimons &
Bargh, 2003; Shah, 2003) or the goals these people themselves pursue (Aarts, Gollwitzer,
& Hassin, 2004). Goal activation is not restricted to the visual modality. For instance, recent experiments revealed that even olfactory perceptions can activate goals, in that the scents of cleaning fluids activate cleanliness goals (Holland, Hendriks, & Aarts, 2005).
Once a goal is activated, it nonconsciously regulates goal pursuit by automatically ac- tivating its associated means (i.e., behavioral plans and strategies that specify goal- directed behaviors; Bargh, 1990; Kruglanski, 1996; Kruglanski et al., 2002; Shallice &
Burgess, 1998). For instance, the activation of performance goals leads to improved performance, the activation of cooperation goals leads to cooperative behavior, the activa- tion of competition goals to competitive behavior (Bargh et al., 2001, Study 3; Parks- Stamm, Oettingen, & Gollwitzer, 2010, Study 1), the activation of helping goals leads to helping behavior (Custers, Maas, Wildenbeest, & Aarts, 2008; Macrae & Johnston, 1998), and the activation of cleanliness goals leads to cleaning behavior (Holland et al., 2005). Goal pursuit controlled by nonconscious behavioral self-regulation exhibits the same motivational qualities as consciously regulated goal pursuit as posited by Lewin (1935; for recent theories, see Bandura, 1977; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996;
Heckhausen, 1991), including increased goal strength over time, persistence in the face of
5 obstacles, resumption of goal-directed behaviors following interruption (Bargh et al., 2001, Study 2; Chartrand & Bargh, 2002; Custers et al., 2008), changes in mood and goal strength in response to success or failure (Bongers, Dijksterhuis, & Spears, 2009;
Chartrand & Bargh, 2002), and flexibility and adaptation to new environmental condi- tions (Hassin et al., 2009).
Origins of the Nonconscious Behavioral Self-Regulation of Goal Pursuit
Nonconscious behavioral self-regulation develops through associative learning (e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Anderson, 1992; Bargh, 1990; Dijksterhuis et al., 2000;
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Formerly conscious regulatory processes and consciously controlled behaviors become controlled by nonconscious behavioral self-regulation through their frequent use in the presence of these cues. This consistent pairing establish- es an association between respective cues and regulatory processes as well as goal- directed behaviors. As a consequence, regulatory processes and behaviors are automati- cally triggered without conscious intent as soon as the critical environmental cues are encountered. As James stated:
If an act require for its execution a chain, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, etc. (. . .) habit soon brings it about that each event calls up its own appropriate successor without any al- ternative offering itself, and without any references to the conscious will, until at last the whole chain, A, B, C, D, E, F, G rattles itself off as soon as A occurs. (1890, p.
114)
Goal pursuit in particular becomes controlled by nonconscious behavioral self- regulation when mental representations of goals become associated with critical cues of the environments in which they are frequently pursued. Goals, in turn, become associated with the goal-directed behaviors that typically serve them. Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000) found that goal-directed behaviors can even become directly associated with critical environmental cues. As a consequence, the critical environmental cues automatically trigger associated goals and goal-directed behaviors (Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Kruglanski et al., 2002; Shah & Kruglanski, 2003).
Implementation Intentions Delegate Control Over Goal Pursuit to Nonconscious Behavioral Self-Regulation
Goal pursuit can be intentionally delegated to nonconscious behavioral self- regulation by forming implementation intentions that directly associate a specified cue
6 with a specified goal-directed behavior (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999). Forming an implemen- tation intention means that an individual decides in advance when, where, and how to act towards a goal. As control over goal pursuit is delegated to nonconscious behavioral self- regulation, the formation implementation intentions helps to manage typical obstacles encountered in goal pursuit, such as initiating goal-directed behavioral responses (e.g., by not forgetting to perform a specified goal-directed behavior; McDaniel, Howard, &
Butler, 2008), maintaining ongoing goal pursuit (e.g., by shielding goal pursuit from distracting stimuli; Achtziger, Gollwitzer, & Sheeran, 2008), disengaging from ineffec- tive goal pursuit (e.g., by changing to more effective means; Henderson, Gollwitzer, &
Oettingen, 2007), and undertaking further goal pursuit (e.g., by conserving self-regulatory capacity; Webb & Sheeran, 2003). Numerous field and laboratory studies in, for instance, academic, environmental, health-related, and interpersonal domains attest to the benefits of forming implementation intentions in promoting goal achievement (for reviews, see Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2011; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). A recent meta-analysis revealed a medium-to-large effect size (d = 0.65) of implementation intentions on goal attainment over and above the effect of the mere intention to attain the goal (Gollwitzer &
Sheeran, 2006). However, implementation intentions have been found to be most effec- tive when formulated in an if-then conditional format, whereby the if-part first specifies a critical environmental cue and the then-part specifies a goal-directed behavior to be performed when the critical cue is encountered (e.g., “If situation X arises, then I will initiate goal-directed behavior Y”; Chapman, Armitage, & Norman, 2009; also see Oettingen, Hönig, & Gollwitzer, 2000, Study 3).3
How do implementation intentions delegate control over goal pursuit to nonconscious behavioral self-regulation? Two processes are responsible that relate both to the antic- ipated critical environmental cue and to the goal-directed behavior to be enacted. First, forming an implementation intention increases the activation of the mental representation of the critical environmental cue and thus increases its accessibility (Gollwitzer, 1999).
As a consequence, the critical environmental cue is more easily detected, readily attended to, and successfully remembered (Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & Midden, 1999; Bayer, Gollwitzer, & Achtziger, 2010; Parks-Stamm, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2007; Webb &
Sheeran, 2007; Wieber & Sassenberg, 2006). Second, forming an implementation inten- tion forges a strong association between the critical environmental cue and the specified goal-directed behavior (Webb & Sheeran, 2007) similar to the association forged through
3 Chapman and colleagues (2009) found that implementation intentions formulated in an if-then conditional format were more effective in attaining the goal to increase fruit and vegetable in- take than implementation intentions formulated in other formats. Implementation intentions in general were more effective than when no implementation intentions were formed.
7 the frequent pairing of a behavior with a critical environmental cue (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000). Consequently, initiation of the goal-directed behavior is automatically triggered as soon as the critical environmental cue is encountered.
The resulting goal-directed behaviors exhibit the key features of automaticity (Bargh, 1994, 1997; Logan, 1992; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977): absence of conscious intent (Bayer, Achtziger, Gollwitzer, & Moskowitz, 2009), immediacy (Brandstätter, Lengfelder, & Gollwitzer, 2001; Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997; Webb & Sheeran, 2007), and efficiency (i.e., few processing resources are required; Brandstätter et al., 2001; Cohen, Bayer, Jaudas, & Gollwitzer, 2008; Holland, Aarts, & Langendam, 2006;
Lengfelder & Gollwitzer, 2001; Miles & Proctor, 2008; Webb & Sheeran, 2003). Beha- vioral immediacy and efficiency, for instance, were evidenced in a dual-task paradigm by Brandstätter, Lengfelder, and Gollwitzer (2001, Study 4). In this study, to maintain a constant draw on conscious processing resources, participants tracked a freely moving circle. Simultaneously, they reacted to numbers (but not letters) appearing in the circle.
When a certain number and the respective behavioral response were specified in an implementation intention, participants reacted more quickly to that number as compared to other numbers, and more quickly than the control group who merely familiarized with the critical number. These results indicate not only behavioral immediacy but also effi- ciency, as the behavioral immediacy did not require much cognitive processing resources.
The Implicit Emergence of Implementation Intentions
Can implementation intentions also implicitly emerge without conscious intent or awareness? When brought into connection, related lines of research from a variety of fields suggest that the implicit emergence of implementation intentions is indeed likely to occur when an individual who actively pursues a certain goal processes an implementa- tion intention specifying how to achieve that goal in an if-then conditional format.
Active Goal Pursuit
When a goal is activated, cognitive processing is automatically tuned towards poten- tially relevant information in order to evaluate it in terms of its relevance for how, when, and where to enact goal pursuit (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Gollwitzer, 1990;
Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987; Shah &
Kruglanski, 2002, Shah et al., 2003). If certain information (i.e., goal-directed behaviors or situations in which to enact goal pursuit) is evaluated to be potentially beneficial for goal attainment, it is likely that this information will become instantly associated with the goal in a goal-means manner (Shah & Kruglanski, 2003).
8 Such evaluation and decision processes were recently found to be triggered and non- consciously occur in the service of goal pursuit (Bos, Dijksterhuis, & van Baaren, 2008;
Dijksterhuis, 2004). In their studies, Dijksterhuis and colleagues provided participants with information, for instance, about alternative apartments (Bos et al., 2008, Study 1& 3;
Dijksterhuis, 2004, Study 1 & 2), art (Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006), cars (Bos et al., 2008, Study 2; Bos, Dijksterhuis, & van Baaren, 2011; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, &
van Baaren, 2006), or prospective roommates (Dijksterhuis, 2004, Study 3) of varying desirability and asked participants to choose an alternative (for review, see Dijksterhuis &
Nordgren, 2006). Participants who pursued the goal to decide on one of the alternatives and were then distracted made better decisions than those who immediately made their decision and even than those who had time to consciously think about their decisions, indicating that goal-directed evaluation and decision processes nonconsciously occurred.
Even when the goal to just evaluate the information was activated, participants automati- cally decided for an alternative (Bos et al., 2011). However, when participants did not pursue such a goal, no nonconscious evaluation and decision processes occurred (Bos et al., 2008).
Thus, an individual actively pursuing a goal is likely to automatically associate in- formation that potentially facilitates goal attainment with the corresponding goal as its means as soon as the information becomes available for nonconscious thought processes (i.e., evaluation and decision processes).
If-Then Conditional Format
Implementation intentions directly answer the questions of how, when, and where to enact goal pursuit by specifying a goal-directed behavior and linking it to the situation in which to enact it (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999). As a consequence, when an implementation intention relevant to a certain active goal becomes available for nonconscious thought processes, it should become automatically associated to that goal as its means – that is, the implementation intention should implicitly emerge.
The question arises as to how an implementation intention becomes available for nonconscious thinking processes without previously triggering conscious thinking and planning. When brought into connection, research from the fields of language and skill acquisition suggest that the mere processing of an implementation intention formulated in an if-then conditional format directly results in its mental representation and thus makes it available for nonconscious thinking processes, without triggering conscious thinking processes. In general, some conscious processing is initially required to decode complex information like implementation intentions (see Pratkanis & Greenwald, 1988). However, if this complex information is processed in the form of if-then conditionals, no deep
9 conscious thinking is required for further refinement and transformation to decode and mentally represent the information, as if-then conditionals are “an elementary component of human thinking” (Gollwitzer, Wieber, Myers, & McCrea, 2010, p. 145). Most informa- tion processing frameworks that are designed to model higher-order cognition are based on if-then conditionals (e.g., mathematics, language, reasoning, memory, and problem solving); this includes scientific speech theories (e.g., König & van der Auwera, 1988), philosophical approaches (e.g., Stalnaker, 1968), and symbolic programming languages (e.g., Java, Perl, PHP; Gollwitzer et al., 2010).
Specifically, research by Scholnick and Wing (1992; also see Scholnick & Wing, 1991) on speech acquisition has indicated that only a minimal amount of conscious processing is required to decode an implementation intention in if-then conditional for- mat; they found that even before speaking their first if-statements, two-year-olds were able to link contingencies and understand the different components of if-then condition- als. Research by Anderson on skill acquisition (ACT; 1982, 1983) indicates that imple- mentation intentions formulated in an if-then conditional format do not require further refinement and transformation (i.e., conscious thinking) for their mental representation.
Anderson concludes that information on behavioral sequences and strategies is trans- formed, integrated, and stored in if-then conditional structured productions that consist of
“a condition that specifies the circumstances under which the production can apply and an action that specifies what should be done when the production applies” (1983, p. 370).
Falmagne (1990) and Nelson (1985) stated that mental representations of contingencies are generally stored as if-then conditionals. Through this mechanism, behavioral se- quences and strategies may become triggered automatically and controlled by noncons- cious behavioral self-regulation (Anderson, 1992). In line with Anderson’s model, im- plementation intentions formulated in an if-then conditional format provide verbalized and direct “short cuts” to the end product of the respective production (see Aarts &
Dijksterhuis, 2000). Not surprisingly, explicitly formed implementation intentions are most effective when formulated in an if-then conditional format (Chapman et al., 2009;
Oettingen et al., 2000, Study 3).
In accordance with these findings, it is expected that an implementation intention will implicitly emerge when an individual actively pursuing a certain goal merely processes an implementation intention formulated in an if-then conditional format that specifies how to attain that goal. Specifically, it is hypothesized that if an implementation intention implicitly emerges, the same effects on goal attainment based on the same processes (i.e., automating goal-directed behavior) will be observed as when the implementation inten- tion was explicitly formed. However, when no corresponding goal is actively pursued, no
10 implementation intention should implicitly emerge when an implementation intention in if-then format is processed.
Overview of Experiments
To test whether implementation intentions implicitly emerge as a means of goal pur- suit controlled by nonconscious behavioral self-regulation, five experiments were con- ducted. The experiments were designed to provide empirical support for the phenomenon of the implicit emergence of implementation intentions by replicating behavioral out- comes found in previous research in which implementation intentions were explicitly formed using implicitly emerged implementation intentions.
All experiments followed the same course of events: First, participants were assigned to a task that nonconsciously activated a certain goal for some participants but did not activate that goal for others. Goals were nonconsciously activated to ensure that partici- pants would not engage in conscious goal pursuit and explicitly form implementation intentions. Next, participants were assigned to a second task that provided them with either an implementation intention formulated in an if-then conditional format specifying how to attain the goal in order to instigate the implicit emergence of this implementation intention, or with a goal-irrelevant control plan (in Experiments 1 to 3) or a goal-relevant control plan (in Experiment 4; Experiment 5 did not include the a control plan group).
Participants then engaged in a third task to test for the implicit emergence of the imple- mentation intention (i.e., the dependent measure). All experiments concluded with a thorough funneled debriefing to ensure that participants were not aware of the goal acti- vation or of the emergence of the implementation intention (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996).
Experiments 1 and 2 tested the implicit emergence of implementation intentions by replicating the improved goal attainment found when implementation intentions were explicitly formed. Experiments 3 and 4 tested the implicit emergence of implementation intentions by replicating the process responsible for improved goal attainment (i.e., auto- mation of goal-directed behavior) found when implementation intentions were explicitly formed (for reviews, see Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2011; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006).
Experiment 4 also tested whether the implicit emergence of implementation intentions would occur when a goal-relevant plan specified the same information as a respective implementation intention but not in an if-then conditional format. Experiments 4 and 5 tested whether the implicit emergence of implementation intentions can be generalized to the pursuit of different goals controlled by nonconscious behavioral self-regulation and whether it can be instigated through everyday influences. Experiment 5 was conducted in
11 an everyday setting to test whether the implicit emergence of implementation intentions is a means of goal pursuit controlled by nonconscious behavioral self-regulation as it occurs in everyday life, and thereby to support the relevance of the present research for the understanding of the mechanisms of nonconscious behavioral self-regulation.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed to test the implicit emergence of implementation inten- tions by replicating the improved goal attainment found in previous research in which implementation intentions were explicitly formed (for reviews, see Gollwitzer &
Oettingen, 2011; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). A crossword puzzle manipulation (Bargh et al., 2001) was combined with a pictorial manipulation (Shantz & Latham, 2009) to activate the goal to perform well. Manipulations were combined to increase the effective- ness of goal activation. A sentences-construction puzzle was used to induce the implicit emergence of an implementation intention specifying how to attain the goal to perform well. A matchbox-uses generation task was used to measure performance and thus goal attainment (see Shantz & Latham, 2009). In line with previous research on explicitly formed implementation intentions, it was expected that if the implementation intention implicitly emerged, improved performance and thus improved goal attainment would be found. A goal commitment questionnaire was used to measure the strength of the goal to perform well (i.e., goal commitment). In line with the findings of the meta-analysis by Webb and Sheeran (2008, Study 1) on how explicitly forming implementation intentions improves goal attainment, it was expected that the implicit emergence of implementation intentions would occur without an increase in the strength of the goal to perform well.
Method
Participants and design. Ninety-seven students (51 female) with a mean age of 17.10 years (SD = 0.97) of the Gymnasium Spaichingen (Germany) participated as a course requirement. Experiment 1 applied a 2 (goal activation, between: goal vs. no-goal) x 2 (implicit implementation intention, between: II vs. no-II) factorial design, with goal attainment as indicated by performance in the matchbox-uses generation task as the dependent variable. Participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions.
Materials and setup. Manipulations and measures were included in a single paper- and-pencil test (see Appendix A).
Goal activation. To establish the goal and no-goal control conditions, an adapted ver- sion of the verbal crossword puzzle manipulation of Bargh and colleagues (2001) was combined with an adapted version of the pictorial manipulation of Shantz and Latham
12 (2009; see Appendix A). To activate the goal to perform well in the goal condition, the crossword puzzle required participants to enter 15 words related to strong performance (e.g., success or compete; see Appendix D) and 15 words neutral with respect to perfor- mance (e.g., chimney or giraffe; see Appendix D). For each word, a hint and its letters in scrambled order were provided (e.g., for the word Erfolg [engl. success], the hint “When someone achieves a goal, he has had…” and the letters R, E, F, O, L, and G were pro- vided). In addition, a picture of an anonymous runner winning a race was shown in the background of the semi-transparent crossword puzzle. In the no-goal control condition, the words that related to strong performance were replaced with words neutral with respect to performance with comparable phonetic features and length (i.e., 30 words unrelated to performance were entered). A picture of a hayfield was shown in the back- ground of the semi-transparent crossword puzzle. To ensure that all words were processed, the crossword puzzles were easy to solve and the instructions asked partici- pants to solve them completely. No differences in the time required or success in solving the crossword puzzles between experimental conditions were found.
Implicit implementation intention. To establish the II (Implementation Intention) and no-II control conditions, a sentences-construction puzzle was used (see Appendix A). To induce the implicit emergence of an implementation intention in the II condition, the sentences-construction puzzle required participants to process an implementation inten- tion specifying how to attain the goal to perform well in the subsequent matchbox-uses generation task. The puzzle consisted of 34 bubbles in concentric arrangement, each bubble including a phrase from one of six different sentences formulated in a conditional format. The bubbles that enclosed the phrases from one of these six sentences were connected with lines. Sentences were constructed by following the lines with a pen and jotting down the sentences on the same page, below the bubbles. One sentence was the implementation intention, which read: “If I have found a use, I will instantly search for the next use.” The other five sentences were neutral with respect to the goal to perform well in the subsequent matchbox-uses generation task (e.g., “The window is always opened wide to let fresh air into the room”; see Appendix D). To ensure that the imple- mentation intention was processed, it was jotted down a second time. In the no-II control condition, the implementation intention was replaced with a goal-irrelevant plan of the same length, formulated in if-then conditional format and read: “If I have vacuumed the room, then the floor will be very clean again.”
Performance. To measure performance and thus goal attainment, participants com- pleted a matchbox-uses generation task, with the instruction to generate as many uses for a matchbox as possible (see coat-hook-uses generation task; Shantz & Latham, 2009,
13 Study 1; see Appendix A). Matchbox-uses were written down in a table below a picture of a matchbox. The number of matchbox-uses found served as the dependent variable.
Goal strength. To measure the strength of the goal to perform well, a three-item goal commitment questionnaire asked participants to indicate agreement with each of three comments (“I want to find many uses”, “It would be a shame if I could not find many uses”, and “I feel committed to the goal of finding many uses”; see Appendix A) on 7- point Likert scales ranging from 1 (not at all true) to 7 (true). The internal consistency of the questionnaire was adequate (α = .80).
Funneled debriefing and demographics. To probe for suspicions about manipula- tions, hypotheses, and the general purpose of the experiment, a funneled debriefing asked increasingly specific questions relating to the purpose of the experiment, the manipula- tions, the dependent measures, and the relationships between the manipulations and dependent measures. Moreover, it asked whether participants remembered certain pecu- liar words from the goal activation manipulation or a certain peculiar sentence from the implicit implementation intention manipulation, and if so, why these were remembered (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; see Appendix A). Demo- graphic questions relating to age, gender, grades in major courses (German and Math), and GPA followed (see Appendix A). Eight participants indicated suspicions about the hypothesis or the general purpose of the experiment and were excluded from further analyses.
Procedure. All participants were run at individual desks at the same time. After greeting participants, the experimenter informed them that their associative thinking skills would be tested using several puzzles and handed out the paper-and-pencil test, which included both the manipulations and the dependent measures. Instructions for the manipu- lations and the dependent measures were embedded in a fictional story. The first page introduced the story of a person named Günther who ostensibly required the participant’s help to solve the puzzles throughout the paper-and-pencil test and read: “Günther has found a crossword puzzle in the sports magazine [nature magazine, in the no-goal control condition]. The first person who solves the puzzle awaits a special prize. Can you solve the puzzle for Günther?” Participants then worked on the crossword puzzle to establish the goal and no-goal control conditions. Thereafter, participants read that Günther has several thoughts to be unscrambled by solving the sentences-construction puzzle used to establish the II and no-II control conditions. Participants answered the commitment questionnaire and were then informed that Günther had won a matchbox by solving the previous crossword puzzle as an introduction to the matchbox-uses generation task used to measure participants’ performance and thus goal attainment. When participants had
14 completed the funneled debriefing and had answered the demographic questions, they worked on an open-ended essay task on the last page of the paper-and-pencil test until the experimenter ended the session, in order to ensure that other participants still working on the matchbox-uses task would not hurry as a result of recognizing that others were al- ready done (see Appendix A). Lastly, the experimenter again verbally tested for suspi- cions about the hypothesis, thoroughly debriefed, and thanked the participants.
Results
Overview. Participants indicated strength of the goal to perform well of M = 4.37 (SD = 1.50) and generated M = 8.21 (SD = 5.01) matchbox-uses. To test for main and interaction effects of Goal Activation and Implicit Implementation Intention on the num- ber of matchbox-uses generated, a Poisson regression analysis was conducted.4 First, Goal Activation and Implicit Implementation Intention were entered into the regression model, followed by the two-way interaction of these variables. The Poisson regression model is presented in Table 1.
Performance. The model revealed no main effect of Goal Activation, Wald χ2(1, N = 89) < 1, ns, or Implicit Implementation Intention, Wald χ2(1, N = 89) = 2.33, ns, but the predicted interaction effect, Wald χ2(1, N = 89) = 5.67, p = .02, see Figure 1.
Table 1. Experiment 1: Poisson regression model predicting the number of matchbox- uses generated from goal activation and implicit implementation intention.
Variable b SDb eb Wald χ2 p Pseudo R2
Goal Activation 0 .08 0 .12 1 .08 0 .46 .50 0 .07
Implicit Implementation Intention 0 .19 0 .12 1 .21 2 .32 .13 <0 .01 Goal Activation x
Implicit Implementation Intention 0 .38 0 .16 1 .46 5 .67 .02 0 .02 Wald χ2 (1, N = 89) = 5.67, p = .02, Pseudo R2 = 0.09
Note. eb is the estimated multiplicative increase in the number of matchbox-uses generat- ed resulting from an one unit increase in the predictor variable when other predictor variables are controlled for. Pseudo R2 was computed following the procedure of Mittlböck and Waldhör (2000).
4 A Poisson regression is to be applied when testing for effects on count data (i.e., the discrete number of occurrences of a certain behavior; Coxe, West, & Aiken, 2009). All Poisson regres- sion models were conducted using the GLM procedures of SPSS 19 and SAS 3.1.
15 As expected, planned comparisons revealed that participants in the goal & II group (M = 9.97, SD = 6.40) generated more matchbox-uses than those in the goal & no-II group (M = 8.26, SD = 5.12), Wald χ2(1, N = 89) = 3.66, p = .05, d = 0.30,5 the no-goal &
II group (M = 6.29, SD = 2.94), Wald χ2(1, N = 89) = 21.48, p < .001, d = 0.79, and the no-goal & no-II group (M = 7.60, SD = 2.87), Wald χ2(1, N = 89) = 6.13, p = .01, d = 0.51. In contrast, participants in the no-goal & II group did not generate more matchbox- uses than those in the no-goal & no-II group, Wald χ2(1, N = 89) = 2.32, ns. Participants in the goal & no-II group generated more matchbox-uses than those in the no-goal & II group, Wald χ2(1, N = 89) = 5.72, p = .02, d = 0.49, however, they did not generate more matchbox-uses than those in the no-goal & no-II group, Wald χ2(1, N = 89) < 1, ns.
Goal strength. To test for main and interaction effects of Goal Activation and Impli- cit Implementation Intention on the strength of the goal to perform well, a Goal Activa- tion x Implicit Implementation Intention ANOVA was conducted. As expected, neither a main nor an interaction effect was found, all Fs(1, 85) < 1.64, ns.
Figure 1. Experiment 1: Number of matchbox-uses generated as a function of goal acti- vation and implicit implementation intention.
5 To estimate Cohen’s ds, differences of group means were divided by the pooled standard deviation of the respective groups.
16 Discussion
Performance. As expected, when participants’ goal to perform well was activated before they processed the implementation intention specifying how to attain that goal, they performed better than those in the other groups, that is, participants whose goal to perform well was activated but did not process the implementation intention, those whose goal to perform well was not activated before they processed the implementation inten- tion, and those whose goal to perform well was not activated and did not process the implementation intention. This result replicates previous research on explicitly formed implementation intentions showing that implementation intentions improve goal attain- ment, indicating the implicit emergence of the implementation intention. As expected, when participants’ goal to perform well was not activated before participants processed the implementation intention they did not perform better and thus showed no improved goal attainment in comparison to those whose goal to perform well was not activated and did not process the implementation intention, indicating the goal contingency of the implicit emergence of implementation intentions. Participants whose goal to perform well was activated but did not process the implementation intention did not perform better than those whose goal to perform well was not activated and did not process the implementa- tion intention. This result was unexpected in the light of Bargh and colleagues’ (2001) and Shantz and Latham’s (2009) findings that the activation of the goal to perform well using goal activation manipulations similar to the present experiment improves perfor- mance and thus goal attainment even without a related implementation intention. Two explanations seem likely: First, participants might have already enacted their goal to perform well to some degree on the sentences-construction puzzle used to induce the implicit emergence of the implementation intention. This argument is in line with Bargh and colleagues’ (2001, Study 1) findings that puzzles can be used to enact the goal to perform well. Second, participants who did not process the implementation intention and thus lacked an emerged implementation intention simply might not have known how to enact their goal to perform well in the matchbox-uses generation task.
Goal strength. As expected, participants whose goal to perform well was activated before they processed the implementation intention did not indicate greater strength of this goal than those in other groups. This pattern of results replicates the findings of Webb and Sheeran (2008, Study 1) for explicitly formed implementation intentions and further supports the conclusion that the implementation intention implicitly emerged.
Conclusion. Experiment 1 provides support for the hypothesized implicit emergence of implementation intentions by replicating the improved goal attainment found when implementation intentions were explicitly formed. Moreover, it replicates previous re-
17 search finding that implementation intentions do not function by increasing the strength of the goal served by the implementation intention (Webb & Sheeran, 2008, Study 1).
However, Experiment 1 does not provide sufficient support for the activation of the goal to perform well, as it was not reflected in subsequent goal attainment among participants who did not process the implementation intention specifying how to attain that goal.
Experiment 2 was designed to address this issue.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to corroborate the findings of Experiment 1 and thus to test the implicit emergence of implementation intentions by replicating the improved goal attainment found in previous research in which implementation intentions were explicitly formed (for reviews, see Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2011; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). In response to the undetected goal activation in Experiment 1, alternative manipulations and an alternative dependent measure were used. A first adapted version of the scrambled- sentences task of Srull and Wyer (1979; also see Bargh et al., 2001, Studies 2 & 3;
Chartrand & Bargh, 1996, Study 1) was used to activate the goal to perform well. A second adapted version of this task was used to induce the implicit emergence of an implementation intention specifying how to attain the goal to perform well. Scrambled- sentences tasks were chosen as they should not be perceived as an opportunity to enact the goal to perform well, as outcomes cannot be influenced by a strong performance. In contrast to Experiment 1, manipulations (the scrambled sentence tasks) were introduced as two parts of one task rather than as separate tasks to further support this perception. In line with the findings of Atkinson and Birch (1970) that the strength of a goal increases over time until it is enacted, a delay between the first and the second scrambled-sentences task was included in order to increase the strength of the goal to perform well and thus to make the detection of its activation more likely. In contrast to Experiment 1, a word- construction task was used to measure performance and thus goal attainment, as this task was previously found to be effective to detect the activation of the goal to perform well (Bargh et al., 2001, Study 3). In light of previous research on explicitly formed imple- mentation intentions and the findings of Experiment 1, it was expected that if the imple- mentation intention implicitly emerged, improved performance and thus improved goal attainment should be found. A goal commitment questionnaire similar to that in Experi- ment 1 was used to measure the strength of the goal to perform well (i.e., goal commit- ment). In line with previous research on explicitly formed implementation intentions (Webb & Sheeran, 2008, Study 1) and the findings of Experiment 1, it was expected that
18 the implicit emergence of implementation intentions would occur without an increase in the strength of the goal to perform well.
Method
Participants and design. Fifty-four students (31 female) with a mean age of 22.80 (SD = 2.65) from different majors at the University of Konstanz (Germany) participated in exchange for 8 €. Experiment 2 applied a 2 (goal activation, between: goal vs. no-goal) x 2 (implicit implementation intention, between: II vs. no-II) factorial design, with goal attainment as indicated by performance in the word-construction task as the dependent variable. Participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions.
Materials and setup. To establish experimental conditions, two computerized adapted versions of the scrambled-sentences task of Srull and Wyer (1979; also see Bargh et al., 2001, Studies 2 & 3; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996, Study 1) were used, of which the first task was used to establish the goal and no-goal control conditions and the second task was used to establish the II and no-II control conditions (for instruction-slides used, see Appendix B). Each scrambled-sentences task required participants to reconstruct 15 grammatically correct sentences out of sets of words in scrambled order. Each sentence had a six-word part followed by a seven-word part that were presented in sequence on two separate slides on the computer screen. For instance, a sentence in its restructured form read, “The window is always opened wide (slide 1) to let fresh air in the room”
(slide 2; see Appendix D). In addition to the words in scrambled order, each slide in- cluded a distracter word, that is, a word that semantically could not be integrated into its sentence part and that was to be ignored. Of the 15 sentences in the first scrambled- sentences task (the goal activation manipulation), five different sentences appeared with varying frequencies (i.e., one sentence appeared four times, another sentence appeared two times). In the second scrambled-sentences task (the implicit implementation intention manipulation), the 15 sentences to be reconstructed consisted of six unique sentences.
Five of these six sentences also appeared in the first scrambled-sentences task. All six different sentences appeared a total of five times across the two scrambled-sentences tasks (e.g., a sentence that appeared three times in the first scrambled-sentences task, appeared twice in the second scrambled-sentences task). This served two aims: First, to support the cover story that both scrambled-sentences tasks represented two blocks of a single task. Second, to keep participants from becoming suspicious about the sixth sen- tence, which appeared five times in the second scrambled-sentences task only. Sentence parts were reconstructed and subsequently written down on forms with five tables on separate pages, each table providing space for three sentences; there were separate forms for the two tasks (see Appendix B). To ensure that sentences had to be reconstructed and
19 could not be copied, each sentence was not entered more than once in the same table. The scrambled-sentences tasks were performed on a standard personal computer with a 35.2 x 26.3 cm CRT display with a resolution of 1024 x 768 and 32 bit. Viewing distance was about 70 cm.
Goal activation. To activate the goal to perform well in the goal condition, 15 of the 30 distracter words in the first scrambled-sentences task were related to strong perfor- mance (e.g., success or compete; see Appendix D). In the no-goal control condition, only neutral distracter words appeared (e.g., chimney or giraffe; see Appendix D). To increase the strength of the goal to perform well, a 5-minute delay followed the first scrambled- sentences task, during which a time-filler task asked participants to draw a family-tree on a sheet of paper (see Appendix B). This task has been found effective in increasing the strength of the goal to perform well (Bargh et al., 2001, Study 3).
Implicit implementation intention. To induce the implicit emergence of an imple- mentation intention in the II condition, the second scrambled-sentences task required processing an implementation intention specifying how to attain the goal to perform well in the subsequent word-construction task (i.e., the dependent performance measure).
Therefore, the sixth sentence, which only appeared in the second scrambled-sentences task, was the implementation intention and read: “If I have found a word, then I will instantly search for the next word.” In the no-II control condition, the implementation intention was replaced with the same goal-irrelevant plan as in Experiment 1: “If I have vacuumed the room, then the floor will be very clean again.”
Performance. To measure performance and thus goal attainment, a word- construction task included in a paper-and-pencil test required participants to construct as many words as possible by combining depicted letter tiles from the board game Scrabble (Hasbro®; the following letter tiles were presented: A, E, D, I, R, N, S, E, L; see Bargh et al., 2001, Study 3; see Appendix B). Words were entered in a table below the letter tiles.
The number of words constructed served as the dependent variable.
Goal strength. To measure the strength of the goal to perform well, a three-item pa- per-and-pencil goal commitment questionnaire asked participants to indicate agreement with each of three comments (“I want to find many words”; “It would be a shame if I could not find many words”, and “I feel committed to the goal of finding many words”;
see Appendix B) on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (not at all true) to 7 (true). The internal consistency of the questionnaire was adequate (α = .60).
Funneled debriefing and demographics. To probe for suspicions about the hypo- theses, a final paper-and-pencil questionnaire included a funneled debriefing similar to that used in Experiment 1 (see Appendix B). Demographic questions relating to age,
20 gender, major courses, current semester, the course of studies, native and foreign lan- guages, and GPA were included in an introductory paper-and-pencil questionnaire (see Appendix B). One participant indicated suspicions about the hypotheses and was there- fore excluded from further analyses.
Procedure. After greeting participants, the experimenter guided them to private cu- bicles with a computer screen on a desk. As a cover story participants were told that the study would consist of two unrelated linguistic tasks to investigate the relationship be- tween different majors and language skills. The experimenter handed out the introductory questionnaire including the demographic questions, which asked in detail about partici- pants’ studies and majors to back up the cover story. Afterwards, participants turned to the computer and were asked to turn over the form with the tables for the first scrambled- sentences task, which was lying upside-down on the desk beside the computer screen;
then worked on the first scrambled-sentences task (introduced as the first block of the first linguistics test according to the cover story) to establish the goal and no-goal control conditions. When the first scrambled-sentences task was done, the experimenter collected the forms and handed out a sheet of paper for the family-tree task used as time-filler.
After five minutes, the experimenter interrupted the participants, handed out the second form with tables, and asked them to turn back to the computer to continue with the second scrambled-sentences task (introduced as the second block of the first linguistics task) to establish the II and no-II control conditions. When participants were done, the experimen- ter handed out a paper-and-pencil test with the commitment questionnaire, followed by the word-construction task to measure participants’ performance and thus goal attain- ment. Lastly, the experimenter handed out the final questionnaire, again tested verbally for suspicions about the hypothesis, thoroughly debriefed and thanked the participants.
Results
Overview. Participants indicated strength of the goal to perform well of M = 5.56 (SD = 0.93) and constructed M = 57.40 (SD = 21.90) words. To test for main and interac- tion effects of Goal Activation and Implicit Implementation Intention on the number of words constructed, a Poisson regression analysis was conducted. First, Goal Activation and Implicit Implementation Intention were entered into the regression model, followed by the two-way interaction of these variables. The Poisson regression model is presented in Table 2.
Performance. The model revealed main effects of Goal Activation, Wald χ2(1, N = 53) = 27.51, p < .001, and Implicit Implementation Intention, Wald χ2(1, N = 53) = 10.89, p = .001, that were qualified by the predicted interaction effect, Wald χ2(1, N = 53) = 4.25, p = .04, see Figure 2.
21 As expected, planned comparisons revealed that participants in the goal & II group (M = 69.07, SD = 21.41) constructed more words than those in the goal & no-II group (M
= 56.75, SD = 30.76), Wald χ2(1, N = 53) = 15.43, p < .001, d = 0.47, the no-goal & II group (M = 52.85, SD = 15.26), Wald χ2(1, N = 53) = 28.80, p < .001, d = 0.88, and the no-goal & no-II group (M = 50.50, SD = 15.03), Wald χ2(1, N = 53) = 40.05, p < .001, d = 1.01. In contrast, participants in the no-goal & II group did not construct more words than those in the no-goal & no-II group, Wald χ2(1, N = 53) < 1, ns. As expected and in con- trast to Experiment 1, participants in the goal & no-II group constructed more words than those in the no-goal & no-II group, Wald χ2(1, N = 53) = 4.72, p = .03, d = 0.27. Partici- pants in the goal & no-II group did not differ from those in the no-goal & II group, Wald χ2(1, N = 53) = 1.74, ns.
Goal strength. To test for main and interaction effects of Goal Activation and Impli- cit Implementation Intention on the strength of the goal to perform well, a Goal Activa- tion x Implicit Implementation Intention ANOVA was conducted. As expected, neither a main nor an interaction effect was found, all Fs(1, 49) < 1, ns.
Table 2. Experiment 2: Poisson regression model predicting the number of words con- structed from goal activation and implicit implementation intention.
Variable b SDb eb Wald χ2 p Pseudo R2
Goal Activation 0 .27 0 .05 1 .30 28 .80 < .001 0 .07 Implicit Implementation Intention 0 .20 0 .05 1 .22 15 .43 < .001 0 .03 Goal Activation x
Implicit Implementation Intention 0 .15 0 .07 1 .16 4 .25 .04 0 .01 Wald χ2 (1, N = 53) = 4.25, p = .04, Pseudo R2 = 0.11
Note. eb is the estimated multiplicative increase in the number of words constructed resulting from an one unit increase in the predictor variable when other predictor va- riables are controlled for. Pseudo R2 was computed following the procedure of Mittlböck and Waldhör (2000).
