Adolescents’ Family Models: A Cross-Cultural Study
Dissertation
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doktor der Naturwissenschaften (Dr. rer. nat.)
an der Universität Konstanz
Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftliche Sektion Fachbereich Psychologie
vorgelegt von
Boris Mayer
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 21. Juli 2009 Referentin: Prof. Dr. Gisela Trommsdorff
Referent: Prof Dr. Thomas Götz
Konstanzer Online-Publikations-System (KOPS) URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-86612
URL: http://kops.ub.uni-konstanz.de/volltexte/2009/8661/
Meiner Familie
I am indebted to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Gisela Trommsdorff who gave me the opportunity to prepare this dissertation in the framework of the cross-cultural „Value of Children and Intergenerational Relations Project“. For your mentorship, your continuous support and for the confidence shown in me - especially during difficult stages of the project - I would like to thank you sincerely.
I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Thomas Götz who accepted to provide expertise for this dissertation as a second advisor. Many thanks also go to Prof. Dr. Brigitte Rockstroh for accepting the role of chairperson in the defense of this thesis. Dr. Willi Nagl has provided very helpful advice regarding the data analysis in this study – thank you! Thank you Prof. Dr. Rachel Seginer and Prof. Dr. Fred Rothbaum for your encouragement and enthusiasm.
During the years of my work at the Chair of Developmental Psychology and Cross-Cultural Psychology at the University of Konstanz I have met a number of people to whom I feel indebted both personally and professionally. Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Friedlmeier gave invaluable conceptual comments in earlier stages of this project. Working together with PD Dr. Beate Schwarz and Dr. Pradeep Chakkarath was both pleasant and instructive. I would like to especially thank my (former) colleagues Dr. Isabelle Albert, Dipl.-Psych. Tobias Heikamp, Dr. Antje von Suchodoletz, Dr. Mihaela Friedlmeier, and Dipl.-Soz. Alexandru Agache for the great exchange and continuous support.
I am indebted to the national as well as the international collaborators in the „Value of Children and Intergenerational Relations“-Project who provided the data for this study on the basis of the project agreements. Without this data base a cross-cultural study like this would of course be impossible. I would also like to thank all participating adolescents for providing their time as well as sharing their personal thoughts.
While studying the “reasons for having children“ I became a father myself. I would like to thank my wife Flávia C. N. dos Santos for her great patience, love and support, and my daughters Felicia and Mariana for being there. Thanks for everything go to my parents Bernd Mayer and Jutta Mayer-Elbertzhagen, and to my sisters Jessica Mayer and Vanessa Mayer.
Special thanks go to my sister-colleague Dipl.-Psych. Jennifer Mayer for invaluable moral and proof-reading support during the final stages of this work. Klaus Edenhofer and Joachim Brehm, thank you for your friendship.
using a typological and multilevel approach. Thereby, it aims to empirically contribute to Kagitcibasi’s (2007) theory of family change. This theory postulates the existence of three ideal-typical family models across cultures: a family model of independence prevailing in Western societies, a family model of (total) interdependence prevailing in non-industrialized agrarian cultures, and as a synthesis of the latter two a family model of emotional interdependence. This family model should develop when collectivistic cultures are modernizing/industrializing. Thus, traditional cultures characterized by a family model of (total) interdependence should not go all the way to the family model of independence when undergoing modernization processes but instead develop an emotionally interdependent model that allows combining autonomy and close interpersonal relatedness. This assumption contradicts classical modernization-theoretical approaches and has not been tested yet sufficiently in empirical studies. In a first step, adolescents’ general and family-related values are explored in a typological multilevel approach to obtain value profiles that can be related to the three ideal-typical family models. In a further step, these value profiles are validated by relating them to family model indicators representing concrete behavioral intentions. The data for this study come from the cross-cultural and interdisciplinary project „Value of Children and Intergenerational Relations“ (Trommsdorff, 2001) (funded by the German Research Foundation) and contain a sample of 2566 male and female adolescents from the People’s Republic of China, Germany, France, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, South Africa, Switzerland, and Turkey.
To identify the assumed family model value profiles at the cultural as well as the individual level, cluster analyses were employed. At both levels of analysis three value profiles corresponding to the expected pattern of the three ideal-typical family models emerged. Of these value profiles, the one corresponding to the family model of emotional interdependence took a middle position between the two more extreme value profiles. It was similar to the profile corresponding to the family model of (total) interdependence with respect to value orientations representing emotional relatedness, and similar to the profile corresponding to the family model of independence with respect to value orientations representing autonomy and material interdependencies among family members. Furthermore, culture-level and individual-level analyses corresponded with respect to cluster-membership:
cultures displaying a specific family model value profile in the culture-level analysis were
To validate the identified family model value profiles these were related to family model indicators representing concrete behavioral intentions. The prediction was carried out separately for the value profiles identified at the cultural as well as the individual level.
Employing multinomial logistic regression models, first the effect of family model value profiles on adolescents’ readiness to help their parents with household work was analyzed.
Results showed a strong effect of family model value profiles on both levels of analysis:
nearly all adolescents with a family model of (total) interdependence would help their parents instead of meeting their friends as they originally planned. Two thirds of adolescents with a family model of emotional interdependence would help their parents, whereas only one third adolescents with a family model of independence would do the same. For the relation of family model value profiles to adolescents’ plans to start an own family in the future overall weaker effects were found: adolescents with a family model of (total) interdependence reported the strongest intention to get married and have children in the future, those with a family model of emotional interdependence were most insecure in this regard, and those with a family model of independence were most likely not to plan to get married and have children.
Nevertheless, family future orientation was strong in all family models and cultural groups.
There were no effects of family models and culture on adolescents’ sex preference regarding a future child: the participants either did not report any preference or preferred their own sex.
Overall, the results strengthen the controversial validity of the family model of emotional interdependence at the cultural and individual level with regard to value profiles and their relation to more behaviorally relevant family model indicators. Whether this family model represents a synthetical convergence model as suggested by Kagitcibasi’s theory, or rather represents a transitional model has to be studied in future research.
Jugendlicher in zehn Kulturen auf Basis eines typologischen Ansatzes und eines Mehrebenenansatzes. Sie leistet damit einen empirischen Beitrag zur Theorie der Familienmodelle im kulturellen Wandel nach Kagitcibasi (2007). Diese Theorie postuliert die Existenz dreier idealtypischer Familienmodelle: ein Familienmodell der Independenz, das in industrialisierten westlichen Gesellschaften vorherrscht, ein Familienmodell der (vollständigen) Interdependenz, das in nicht-industrialisierten agrarischen Kulturen zu finden ist, und als Synthese der beiden genannten ein Familienmodell der emotionalen Interdependenz. Letzteres entwickelt sich der Theorie zufolge, wenn nicht-industrialisierte kollektivistische Kulturen Modernisierungsprozessen ausgesetzt sind. Traditionelle Kulturen mit einem Familienmodell der (vollständigen) Interdependenz sollen sich also im Zuge gesellschaftlicher Modernisierungsprozesse nicht notwendigerweise hin zum Familienmodell der Independenz entwickeln, sondern zu einem emotional-interdependenten Modell, das erlaubt, Autonomie mit enger interpersoneller Verbundenheit zu vereinen. Diese Annahme steht im Widerspruch zu klassischen modernisierungstheoretischen Annahmen und wurde in bisherigen kulturvergleichenden Studien nur unzureichend geprüft. In einem typologischen Mehrebenen-Ansatz sollen Profile allgemeiner und familienbezogener Werthaltungen Jugendlicher identifiziert werden, die mit den drei idealtypischen Familienmodellen theoretisch verbunden werden können. In einem zweiten Schritt sollen diese Wertemuster durch verhaltensnähere Familienmodellindikatoren validiert werden. Die Daten für diese Arbeit stammen aus der von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft geförderten kulturvergleichenden und interdisziplinären „Value of Children and Intergenerational Relations“-Studie (Trommsdorff, 2001) und umfassen eine Stichprobe von 2566 männlichen und weiblichen Jugendlichen aus der Volksrepublik China, Deutschland, Frankreich, Indien, Indonesien, Israel, Japan, Südafrika, der Schweiz und der Türkei.
Zur Identifikation der angenommen Familienmodell-Werteprofile wurden Cluster- Analysen auf der Kultur- und auf der Individualebene durchgeführt. Auf beiden Analyseebenen zeigten sich drei Werteprofile, die dem erwarteten Muster der drei idealtypischen Familienmodelle entsprachen. Das Familienmodell der emotionalen Interdependenz nahm dabei eine Zwischenposition zwischen den zwei extremeren Werteprofilen ein. Bezüglich der Werthaltungen, die emotionale Interdependenzen zwischen den Familienmitgliedern widerspiegeln zeigte es ähnlich hohe Werte wie das Familienmodell der (vollständigen) Interdependenz, dagegen zeigte es ähnlich hohe bzw. niedrige Werte wie
Familienmodell-Werteprofil aufwiesen befanden sich zudem überwiegend Jugendliche, die das jeweils korrespondierende Werteprofil auf der individuellen Analyseebene aufzeigten.
Zur Validierung der erhaltenen Familienmodell-Werteprofile wurden diese zu verhaltensnäheren Merkmalen von Familienmodellen in Beziehung gesetzt. Die Vorhersage erfolgte auch hier jeweils getrennt für die auf der Kultur- bzw. Individualebene identifizierten Werteprofile. Mit Hilfe multinomialer logistischer Modelle wurde zunächst der Effekt der Familienmodell-Werteprofile auf die Bereitschaft der Jugendlichen überprüft, ihren Eltern auf deren Bitte hin bei der Hausarbeit zu helfen. Die Ergebnisse zeigten einen starken Effekt der Familienmodell-Werteprofile auf beiden Analyseebenen: fast alle Jugendlichen mit einem Familienmodell der (vollständigen) Interdependenz würden ihren Eltern helfen statt sich wie geplant mit ihren Freunden zu treffen, zwei Drittel der Jugendlichen mit einem Familienmodell der emotionalen Interdependenz würden ihren Eltern helfen, und nur ein Drittel der Jugendlichen mit einem Familienmodell der Independenz würde der Bitte der Eltern folgen. Für die Zusammenhänge zwischen den Familienmodellen und den familienbezogenen Zukunftsorientierungen Jugendlicher zeigte sich in Bezug auf die Pläne für eine zukünftige Heirat/Beziehung, dass Jugendliche mit einem Familienmodell der (vollständigen) Interdependenz den stärksten Heiratswunsch hatten. Jugendliche mit einem Familienmodell der emotionalen Interdependenz waren bezüglich dieser Frage am unsichersten, und Jugendliche mit einem Familienmodell der Independenz äußerten die stärkste Ablehnung in dieser Frage. In Bezug auf Pläne, später eigene Kinder zu haben zeigten sich ähnliche Effekte, die aber insgesamt schwächer ausfielen. Insgesamt zeigte sich trotz der Unterschiede eine hohe familienbezogene Zukunftsorientierung in allen Familienmodell-Werteprofilen sowie in allen Kulturen. Bezüglich der Sohn- bzw.
Tochterpräferenz zeigten sich keine Effekte der Familienmodell- und Kulturzugehörigkeit:
Jugendliche präferierten entweder kein Geschlecht oder das jeweils eigene Geschlecht.
Insgesamt stärken die Ergebnisse der Studie die umstrittene Validität insbesondere des Familienmodells der emotionalen Interdependenz auf der Individual- und Kulturebene sowohl in Bezug auf Werteprofile, als auch bezüglich der Zusammenhänge mit verhaltensnäheren Familienmodell-Indikatoren. Ob es sich hierbei im Sinne der Theorie von Kagitcibasi um ein synthetisches Konvergenzmodell oder doch eher um ein Übergangsmodell handelt, muss zukünftige Forschung zeigen.
1. Introduction ... 1
2. Theoretical Outline ... 7
2.1 Culture and Modernization ... 7
2.1.1 The Concept of Culture ... 7
2.1.2 An Outline of Modernization Theory ... 8
2.1.3 Modernization and Family Change ... 11
2.1.4 Summary ... 14
2.2 Family Models and Selves ... 15
2.2.1 Kagitcibasi’s Theory of Family Change ... 15
2.2.1.1 General Family Change Model ... 15
2.2.1.2 Family Model of (Total) Interdependence ... 18
2.2.1.3 Family Model of Independence ... 18
2.2.1.4 Family Model of Emotional Interdependence ... 19
2.2.2 Empirical Studies Based on the Theory of Family Change ... 22
2.2.2.1 Georgas, Berry, van de Vijver, Kagitcibasi, and Poortinga (2006) ... 22
2.2.2.2 Keller et al. (2006) ... 31
2.2.2.3 Van den Heuvel and Poortinga (1999) ... 32
2.2.2.4 Kagitcibasi and Ataca (2005) ... 34
2.2.3 Autonomy and Relatedness in Cross-Cultural Perspective ... 38
2.2.4 Empirical Studies Regarding the Compatibility of Autonomy and Relatedness .... 41
2.2.5 Summary ... 45
2.3 Adolescents’ Family Models: An Overview of Concepts in the Study ... 46
2.3.1 Values and Self-Construal ... 47
2.3.1.1 Individualism/Collectivism ... 50
2.3.1.2 Family Values ... 51
2.3.1.3 Independence/Interdependence ... 52
2.3.1.4 Value of Children ... 53
2.3.2.2 Adolescents’ Family Future Orientation ... 61
2.3.3 Summary ... 64
2.4 Hypotheses and Research Questions ... 66
2.4.1 Cross-Cultural Differences of Values and Self-Construal ... 67
2.4.2 Family Model Value Profiles: Culture-Level and Individual-Level Clusters ... 68
2.4.3 Validation of Family Model Value Profiles ... 69
3. Method ... 73
3.1 Selection of Cultures ... 73
3.2 Participants ... 74
3.3 Procedure ... 76
3.4 Instruments, Cross-Cultural Equivalence, and Reliabilities ... 77
3.4.1 Individualism/Collectivism ... 79
3.4.2 Family Values ... 81
3.4.3 Independence/Interdependence ... 83
3.4.1 Value of Children ... 85
3.4.5 Readiness to Support Parents ... 88
3.4.6 Family Future Orientation ... 88
3.5 Data Analysis ... 89
3.5.1 Within-Subject Standardization of Likert-Type Variables ... 89
3.5.2 Cross-Cultural and Gender Comparisons of Values and Self-Construal ... 90
3.5.3 Cluster Analyses ... 90
3.5.4 Multinomial Logistic Regression Models ... 92
3.5.5 Multilevel Modeling ... 93
4.1.1 Individualism/Collectivism ... 95
4.1.1.1 Individualism ... 95
4.1.1.2 Collectivism ... 97
4.1.2 Family Values ... 99
4.1.3 Interdependence ... 101
4.1.4 Value of Children (VOC) ... 102
4.1.4.1 Utilitarian/Normative VOC ... 102
4.1.4.2 Emotional VOC ... 104
4.2 Cluster Analyses of Family Model Value Profiles ... 106
4.2.1 Culture-Level Cluster Analysis ... 106
4.2.2 Individual-Level Cluster Analysis ... 108
4.2.3 Correspondence between Culture-Level and Individual-Level Clusters ... 111
4.3 Relating Family Model Value Profiles to Behavioral Intentions ... 115
4.3.1 Family Model Value Profiles and the Readiness to Help Parents... 116
4.3.1.1 Effect of Culture-Level Clusters on the Readiness to Help Parents ... 116
4.3.1.2 Effect of Individual-Level Clusters on the Readiness to Help Parents ... 118
4.3.2 Family Model Value Profiles and Marriage Plans ... 121
4.3.2.1 Effect of Culture-Level Clusters on Marriage Plans ... 122
4.3.2.2 Effect of Individual-Level Clusters on Marriage Plans ... 128
4.3.3 Family Model Value Profiles and the Intention to Have Children ... 134
4.3.3.1 Effect of Culture-Level Clusters on the Intention to Have Children ... 134
4.3.3.2 Effect of Individual-Level Clusters on the Intention to Have Children ... 139
4.3.4 Family Model Value Profiles and the Preference for a Single Child’s Sex ... 143
4.3.4.1 Effect of Culture-Level Clusters on the Preference for a Single Child’s Sex ... 143
4.3.4.2 Effect of Individual-Level Clusters on the Preference for a Single Child’s Sex ... 147
6. References ... 191
Appendix ... 213
Appendix A. Cross-cultural and Gender Comparisons of Values and Self-Construal Using Original Scores ... 214
1. Individualism and Collectivism ... 214
1.1 Individualism ... 214
1.2 Collectivism ... 215
2. Family Values ... 216
3. Self Construal: Interdependent Self ... 217
4. Value of children ... 218
4.1 Utilitarian/Normative VOC ... 218
4.2 Emotional VOC ... 219
Appendix B. Cluster Differences at the Cultural Level and Individual Level ... 220
Appendix C. Multilevel Analysis to Estimate the Between-Culture Variance Explained by Culture-Level Cluster Membership ... 221
Appendix D. Extract from the Value-of-Children Questionnaire by Gisela Trommsdorff/Bernhard Nauck/Beate Schwarz/Pradeep Chakkarath/ Otto G. Schwenk (February 2002) ... 222
Figure 2. Overview of the hypothesized relationships among the constructs in the study. ... 72
Figure 3. Culture and Gender differences in Individualism. ... 96
Figure 4. Culture and Gender differences in Collectivism. ... 98
Figure 5. Culture and Gender differences in Family Values. ... 100
Figure 6. Culture and Gender differences in Interdependence. ... 102
Figure 7. Culture and Gender differences in Utilitarian/Normative VOC. ... 104
Figure 8. Culture and Gender differences in Emotional VOC. ... 105
Figure 9. Dendrogram of the culture-level hierarchical cluster analysis. ... 106
Figure 10. Cluster profiles resulting from the culture-level hierarchical cluster analysis. .... 107
Figure 11. Cluster profiles resulting from the individual-level K-means cluster analysis. ... 110
Figure 12. Individual-level cluster membership across Cultures and Culture-Level Clusters. ... 114
Figure 13. Individual-level cluster membership: Gender differences. ... 114
Figure 14. Readiness to Help Parents across Cultures and Culture-Level Clusters. ... 118
Figure 15. Readiness to Help Parents across Individual-Level Clusters. ... 121
Figure 16. Male adolescents’ Marriage Plans across Cultures and Culture-Level Clusters. . 126
Figure 17. Female adolescents’ Marriage Plans across Cultures and Culture-Level Clusters. ... 126
Figure 18. Marriage Plans across Individual-Level Clusters in ten cultures. ... 131
Figure 19. Intention to Have Children across Cultures and Culture-Level Clusters. ... 138
Figure 20. Intention to Have Children across Culture-Level Clusters and Gender. ... 138
Figure 21. Intention to Have Children across Individual-Level Clusters and Gender. ... 142
Figure 22. Preference for a Single Child’s Sex across Cultures and Culture-Level Clusters. ... 145
Figure 23. Preference for a Single Child’s Sex across Culture-Level Clusters and Gender. 146 Figure 24. Preference for a Single Child’s Sex across Individual-Level Clusters and Gender. ... 150
Figure A-1. Culture and Gender differences in Individualism (original scores). ... 214
Figure A-2. Culture and Gender differences in Collectivism (original scores). ... 215
Figure A-3. Culture and Gender differences in Family Values (original scores). ... 216
Figure A-4. Culture and Gender differences in Interdependence (original scores). ... 217
Figure A-5. Culture and Gender differences in Utilitarian/Normative VOC (original scores). ... 218
Figure A-6. Culture and Gender differences in Emotional VOC (original scores). ... 219
Table 1 Cultural Indicators and Sample Sizes ... 75
Table 2 Means and Standard Deviations for Participants’ Age ... 75
Table 3 Means and Standard Deviations for Adolescents’ Socio-Economic Status ... 76
Table 4 Factor Loadings for Individualism/Collectivism ... 80
Table 5 Cross-Cultural Equivalence and Reliability of Individualism/Collectivism ... 81
Table 6 Factor Loadings for Family Values ... 82
Table 7 Cross-Cultural Equivalence and Reliability of Family Values ... 83
Table 8 Factor Loadings for Independence/Interdependence ... 84
Table 10 Factor Loadings for the Value of Children Construct ... 87
Table 11 Cross-Cultural Equivalence and Reliability of the Value of Children Construct ... 88
Table 12 Means and Standard Deviations for Individualism ... 96
Table 13 Means and Standard Deviations for Collectivism ... 98
Table 14 Means and Standard Deviations for Family Values ... 100
Table 15 Means and Standard Deviations for Interdependence ... 101
Table 16 Means and Standard Deviations for Utilitarian/Normative VOC ... 103
Table 17 Means and Standard Deviations for Emotional VOC ... 105
Table 18 Hierarchical Cluster Analysis: Cluster Centroids and Standard Deviations ... 107
Table 19 Two-Step Cluster Analysis: Determination of Number of Clusters ... 109
Table 20 Starting Values for the K-Means Cluster Analysis ... 109
Table 22 Multinomial Logistic Regression for Individual-Level Cluster Membership ... 111
Table 23 Individual-Level Cluster Membership: Contrasts for Culture-Level Cluster ... 112
Table 24 Individual-Level Cluster Membership: Culture, Culture-Level Cluster, and Gender Differences ... 113
Table 25 Multinomial Logistic Regression for the Readiness to Help Parents ... 116
Table 26 Readiness to Help Parents: Culture, Culture-Level Cluster, and Gender Differences ... 117
Table 27 Multinomial Logistic Regression for the Readiness to Help Parents ... 119
Table 28 Readiness to Help Parents: Culture and Individual-Level Cluster Differences ... 120
Table 29 Multinomial Logistic Regression for Marriage Plans ... 123
Table 30 Marriage Plans: Contrasts for Culture- Level Cluster ... 123
Table 31 Marriage Plans: Culture, Culture-Level Cluster and Gender Differences ... 124
Table 32 Multinomial Logistic Regression for Marriage Plans ... 128
Table 33 Marriage Plans: Contrasts for Individual-Level Cluster ... 129
Table 36 Intention to Have Children: Contrasts for Culture-Level Cluster ... 136
Table 37 Intention to Have Children: Culture, Culture-Level Cluster, and Gender Differences ... 137
Table 38 Multinomial Logistic Regression for the Intention to Have Children ... 140
Table 39 Intention to Have Children: Contrasts for Individual-Level Cluster ... 140
Table 40 Intention to Have Children: Culture and Individual-Level Cluster Differences .... 142
Table 41 Multinomial Logistic Regression for the Preference for a Single Child’s Sex ... 143
Table 42 Preference for a Single Child’s Sex: Culture, Culture-Level Cluster, and Gender Differences ... 144
Table 43 Multinomial Logistic Regression for the Preference for a Single Child’s Sex ... 147
Table 44 Preference for a Single Child’s Sex: Contrasts for Individual-Level Cluster and Gender ... 148
Table 45 Preference for a Single Child’s Sex: Culture and Individual-Level Cluster Differences ... 149
Table A-1 Means and Standard Deviations for Individualism (Original Scores) ... 214
Table A-2 Means and Standard Deviations for Collectivism (Original Scores) ... 215
Table A-3 Means and Standard Deviations for Family Values (Original Scores) ... 216
Table A-4 Means and Standard Deviations for Interdependence (Original Scores) ... 217
Table A-5 Means and Standard Deviations for Utilitarian/Normative VOC (Original Scores) ... 218
Table A-6 Means and Standard Deviations for Emotional VOC (Original Scores) ... 219
Table B-1 ANOVAs and Post-Hoc Tests of Between-Cluster Differences Regarding Values and Self-Construal ………...220
Table C-1 Random Coefficient Multilevel Models with Culture-Level Cluster Membership Predicting the Intercepts of Individual-Level Cluster Membership, Readiness to Help Parents, Marriage Plans, and the Intention to Have Children ...221
1. Introduction
In our globalizing world, adolescents are especially sensitive to the cultural changes going on around them – in traditional cultures as well as in modern industrialized cultures.
Adolescents are at the forefront of societal change and globalization because in this phase of life human beings are most open to new things like cultural beliefs differing from one’s own (Dasen, 2000, p. 395; Jensen, 2003). The recent technical and cultural developments in popular and media culture make these differences more influential and all-time available (Arnett, 2002, 2004). Along with the dissemination of mainstream American pop music and movies this has arguably lead to a kind of universal popular youth culture (Offer, Ostrov, Howard, & Atkinson, 1988; Schlegel, 2000). Especially traditional societies undergo dramatic changes in terms of modernization and globalization. In many of these cultures the phase of adolescence is no longer as “uncomplex and uniform” as Mead (1928/1961) reported it for Samoan girls about 80 years ago (see also Brown & Larson, 2002). For example, Inuit adolescents today “no longer form a cultural identity solely based on their traditional culture.
[…] From their traditional Inuit culture, adolescents still take collectivist values. […] From Canadian culture and Western culture more generally, Inuit adolescents also take new values and identity ideals centering on individual expressiveness and accomplishment.” (Jensen, 2003, p. 192).
That the world’s adolescents are becoming ever more similar, is, however, only one side of the picture (Trommsdorff, 2000). It has long been contended that globalization is not to be equaled with Westernization (e.g., Giddens, 1991; Kagitcibasi, 2005b). Cross-cultural and cross-ethnic studies show that especially with respect to issues concerning the family, large cross-cultural differences are still prevailing (e.g., Fuligni, Tseng, & Lam, 1999).
Furthermore, a kind of globalized youth culture (and concomitant value and behavioral changes) in modernizing traditional cultures like India may be restricted to adolescents coming from a relatively small Western-oriented middle class while the majority of adolescents do not experience these changes. Also, as Yang (1988, 1996) pointed out, psychological modernization and globalization may be restricted to those aspects of a culture that change necessarily along with societal modernization because of their incompatibility with a “modern” way of life. The question then is what these characteristics are – do they entail for instance a general reduction of closeness between family members and kin as proposed by classical modernization theory (Inkeles & Smith, 1974)? Or can modern values of democracy, achievement, and competition coexist with traditional values like group
solidarity, obedience to authority, and familial interdependence as Trommsdorff (1983, 1992) suggests?
Cross-cultural differences in adolescents’ family-related values, self-construal, and behavioral intentions with regard to supporting the family or with respect to future plans of having an own family can be seen as important indicators for these developments. These issues are addressed in Kagitcibasi’s influential theory of family change (Kagitcibasi, 1996b, 2007). The theory contends 1) that cultures differ with respect to the way families are structured, with regard to family relationships and the importance of family-related values, views and conceptualizations of the self, and with respect to child-rearing attitudes and outcomes; and 2) that modernization-related social changes in (formerly) traditional non- industrialized cultures affect the type of family model prevalent in a given society.
Kagitcibasi’s theory postulates the existence of three ideal-typical family models: a family model of independence prevalent in Western industrialized cultures largely characterized by an independent conceptualization of relationships both in material and emotional respects; a family model of (total) interdependence prevalent in traditional non-industrialized and agrarian cultures characterized by emotionally and materially interdependent and hierarchical relationships between family members; and – as a synthesis of the two former models – the family model of emotional interdependence characterized by continuing emotional interdependence but declining material interdependence. This model is thought to develop out of the family model of (total) interdependence when traditional societies industrialize and modernize and material interdependencies between generations are decreasing. Thus, traditional cultures of interdependence will not go all the way to the independent Western style of family relationships but emotional interdependencies can be retained while more autonomy and independence are becoming possible. This notion is in conflict with classical modernization theory (e.g., Inkeles & Smith, 1974) that assumes a necessary convergence to the Western state of (family) affairs.
At the individual psychological level, values and self-construal are important indicators of family models. In the present study, these constructs are the main focus of investigation. The study intends to identify configurations of values and self-construal representing the family models suggested by Kagitcibasi at the cultural as well as the individual level of analysis. Furthermore, the relation between family model value configurations with two kinds of criterion variables is explored: (1) adolescents’ readiness to support their parents and (2) concrete future plans with regard to having an own family in the
future. Thus, family models are investigated here at the level of adolescents’ subjective psychologies (values and self-construal), and are validated by relating them to more behaviorally relevant constructs.
Future orientations with regard to the family are important aspects of family models when adolescents are the focus of inquiry. Behavioral intentions regarding a future family are ideational elements of family models that can have substantial effects on future behaviour in addition to and independent of structural factors in a given culture (Jayakody, Thornton, &
Axinn, 2008). Furthermore, adolescence has been called “a time of preparation for adult reproductive life” (Schlegel, 1995, p. 16) with its beginning being biologically defined and its end culturally defined. It starts with the biological readiness to procreate and ends with the (culture-dependent) social permission to do so (Schlegel, 1995). Cultures differ strongly with respect to the ages that young people are awarded full adult status in their respective society (Schlegel & Barry, 1991). In most cultures, and especially in traditional non-Western cultures, the event that explicitly designates the transition from “boy to man and from girl to woman”
(Arnett, 1998, p. 295) is marriage. On the contrary, recent research in Western cultures shows that adolescence is followed by “emerging adulthood” (Arnett, 2006). This kind of prolonged adolescence due to lengthy education can delay starting a career and forming a family of one’s own. In these societies marriage often is no longer considered as a criterion for adulthood (Nelson, Badger, & Wu, 2004). Overall, the importance of having an own future family is expected to reflect adolescents’ more general family models.
Up to now there has been little empirical research to validate Kagitcibasi’s theory of family change and the existing studies leave important questions unanswered. The present study is designed to contribute empirical results to the questions and hypotheses entailed in this theory and to explore how adolescents from very different cultural contexts implement the different options existing with regard to family life at the beginning of the 21st century.
The study is based on the self-reports of a sample of about 2500 male and female adolescents from ten cultures that have been recruited in the framework of the cross-cultural and interdisciplinary research project “Value of Children and Intergenerational Relations” (PIs:
Prof. Dr. Gisela Trommsdorff, University of Konstanz, Germany, and Prof. Dr. Bernhard Nauck, Chemnitz University of Technology, Germany). In this large-scale international project, three-generation samples of adolescents (about 300 per country), their mothers (about 300 per country), and their maternal grandmothers (about 100 per country), as well as additional samples of mothers of children aged 2-5 years (about 300 per country) were
surveyed in fifteen countries up to now.1 For the present study, only the adolescent samples from ten countries were included. The countries selected represent the main geographical and cultural regions of the world with the exception of the Americas and Australia. The study includes Western European adolescents from France, Germany, and Switzerland; adolescents from the Eastern Mediterranean region from Israel and Turkey; African adolescents form South Africa; East Asian adolescents from the People’s Republic of China and Japan; and South-Asian and South-East Asian adolescents from India and Indonesia.
Chapter Overview
The central theoretical background for the present study is Kagitcibasi’s theory of family change. Therefore, this theory receives special attention in the theoretical outline. The theory section starts with a chapter on Culture and Modernization, two important concepts for Kagitcibasi’s theory of family change (Chapter 2.1). It starts with a definition of culture (Chapter 2.1.1), and is followed by an outline of classical modernization theory (Chapter 2.1.2). The latter contends that large-scale economic changes in traditional societies’
economies by way of industrialization and technological development inevitably lead to concomitant changes in political systems and in basic value orientations. The last part of this section focuses on the implications of modernization for the family (Chapter 2.1.3). Various theorists have linked societal changes in the domains of economy and administration to changes in the structure and function of the family. The main point here is that the classical approaches of modernization theory assume a declining importance of familial bonds in the course of modernization because many traditional functions of the family are taken over by the larger society.
The second part of the theoretical outline introduces Kagitcibasi’s theory of family change as well as the relevant empirical studies (Family Models and Selves – Chapter 2.2).
The first part gives an outline of the components and structure of Kagitcibasi’s theory of family change as well as a description of the three ideal-typical family models formulated (Chapter 2.2.1). These are the family model of (total) interdependence, the family model independence, and the family model of emotional interdependence. It is outlined that the latter model is conceptualized as a synthesis of the two former models and that it is supposed to
1 Originally, the project included six ‘core countries’ for which the survey was financed by the German Research Foundation: People’s Republic of China, Germany, Indonesia, Israel and The Palestinian Authority, Republic of Korea, and Turkey (Trommsdorff, 2001). Additional countries that have joined the project are the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Ghana, India, Japan, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, and the United States (as of April 2009). Overall, more than 15.000 participants have been interviewed.
emerge in traditional societies in times of social change. Furthermore, this synthesis entails an alternative way of family development contrary to what should be expected according to classical modernization theory. The second part of this section comprises a detailed review of the few empirical studies that have explicitly taken Kagitcibasi’s theory of family change as a theoretical starting point (Chapter 2.2.2). The third part focuses on the developing self as the
“outcome” of socialization within different family models. The focus is here on the autonomous-relational self as it is assumed to develop within the family model of emotional interdependence. Since theorizing and research with respect to the compatibility of autonomy and relatedness go beyond Kagitcibasi’s theory this aspect is dealt with in a separate chapter (Chapter 2.2.3). Finally, empirical research with respect to the compatibility of autonomy and relatedness is presented (Chapter 2.2.4).
The third part of the theoretical outline introduces the constructs employed in the present study (Adolescents’ Family Models: An Overview of Concepts in the Study – Chapter 2.3). It starts out with general and family-related values and self-construal that are hypothesized to reflect different types of adolescents’ family models in terms of different profiles of values and self-construal across cultures (Chapter 2.3.1). After defining values and their multilevel structure and after a short introduction into cross-cultural value research, the relevant constructs of individualism/collectivism, family values, independence/interdepen- dence and the value-of-children approach are described. In the following chapter, the two constructs reflecting adolescents’ family models at the level of concrete behavioral intentions are outlined: adolescents’ support for the family and family obligation, and adolescents’
family future orientation (Chapter 2.3.2). Both constructs are introduced theoretically and in terms of existing cross-cultural empirical research.
In the next section the research questions and hypotheses are delineated (Chapter 2.4).
This is followed by the empirical parts presenting the methodology (Chapter 3) and the results (Chapter 4) of the study. In the first part of the results section cross-cultural and gender differences with respect to values and self-construal will be reported (Chapter 4.1), followed by cluster analyses of values and self-construal at the cultural as well as individual level (Chapter 4.2). In the next chapter, results concerning the relation between the value profiles and adolescents’ readiness to help their parents are reported, using both culture-level cluster membership as well as individual-level cluster membership as predictors (Chapter 4.3).
Parallel analyses are carried out for the adolescents’ future orientations with regard to having an own family (Chapter 4.4).
In the last section the results of the present study are summarized and discussed (Chapter 5). Special emphasis is laid on the validity of Kagitcibasi’s theory of family change with respect to adolescents’ patterns of values and self-construal across the ten cultures included in this study. Furthermore, the predictive value of the profiles with respect to adolescents’ readiness to help their family as well as their plans for an own future family is discussed by drawing on theoretical models and empirical research regarding adolescents’
family obligation and future orientation in cultural context.
2. Theoretical Outline
2.1 Culture and Modernization
The present study investigates adolescents’ family models across cultures. The theory central to this study – Kagitcibasi’s (1996b, 2007) theory of family change – is one of societal change. Its starting point is the phenomenon of societal modernization and the cultural, familial, and psychological changes following it. In this section the concept of culture is introduced, followed by an outline of (classical) modernization theory. The final part of this section concerns the implications of societal modernization for the family.
2.1.1 The Concept of Culture
Culture can be defined in many ways (cf. Jahoda, 2007). A classical definition by Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) sees culture as existing of explicit and implicit behavioral patterns acquired and passed on through symbols. According to these authors, values can be seen as the core of culture. Others restrict the definition of culture to the shared (symbolic) meanings assigned to things and persons by cultural members. This type of definition includes Hofstede’s (1980) culture as the “collective programming of the mind.” Herskovits (1948) preferred the much broader conceptualization of culture as the “the man-made part of the environment.” A more developmental-psychological definition was proposed by Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni, and Maynard (2003). They understand culture as a social-interactive process regarding the formation of shared activity (cultural practices) and shared meaning (cultural interpretations) taking place within and between generations. This is also similar to Super and Harkness’ (1997) conceptualization of culture as a “developmental niche,” affecting socialization practices and children’s development. Matsumoto (1996) sees culture as a number of values, beliefs and behaviors shared to a considerable degree by a group, and transmitted from one generation to the next.
Smith, Peterson, Schwartz, and colleagues (2002) indicate the advantages of values as the basis for conceptualizing culture. They argue that because values can be expressed in a decontextualized way, they can be assessed without the need to specify what actions might follow from the adherence to these values in specific situations. This makes it easier to find the common core of culture for a group of people who have a lot in common but nevertheless display substantial heterogeneity with respect to specific behaviors or life circumstances.
Cross-cultural psychologist often do not differentiate between cultures and nations (Jahoda, 2007). This can be problematic since nations can be culturally heterogeneous and the extent of these cultural variations is greater in some nations than in others (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000). Nevertheless, in most nations each individual “operates within a cultural environment in which certain values, norms, attitudes, and practices are more or less dominant and serve as shared sources of socialization and social control.” (Smith et al., 2002, p. 192). The delineation of differences between national cultures can therefore be an important step in determining cultural differences with regard to a specific phenomenon – even if these differences cannot take into account all within-nation cultural variations (Smith, 2004b). In line with this reasoning the cross-cultural study presented here will not differentiate between cultures and nations but use the term “culture” for “national culture” throughout.
2.1.2 An Outline of Modernization Theory
According to Inkeles and Smith (1974) modernization is about everything that has come to replace the ways in which things (traditionally) have been (done) in the past. In later work, Inkeles (1998) identifies four forces of modernization: first, changes in technology leading to changes in production and distribution in accordance with an industrial and market economy; second, changes in living arrangements from rural residence to urban residence;
third, changes in government and political institutions like the development to more democracy and legislation in favor of gender and racial equality; and fourth, changes in norms and values like the development of greater individualism. With respect to the psychological aspects of modernization, based on empirical data Inkeles and Smith (1974) characterized modern people as follows: openness to change and to experiences, a feeling of self-efficacy and control, freedom from absolute subordination to authorities, granting more autonomy to people with less power and lower status (like minorities), and the esteem of and the striving for formal education.
In a similar vein, Inglehart (1997) contends that modernization comes along with a number of changes in economic, political, and cultural domains, and that these domains are in a permanent interplay. For example, if the economic system in a society changes in direction of industrialization and market economy then traditional cultural (value) systems have to change as well since some of the traditional values are no longer compatible with the new mode of economic subsistence. With regard to the value changes accompanying modernization, Inglehart and colleagues (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart
& Oyserman, 2004; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) presented a two-dimensional model in which
both value dimensions have a traditional pole and a modern pole. The first dimension contrasts a traditional and a secular-rational orientation. According to the authors, changes on this dimension are associated with the transition from agrarian to industrial societies.
Furthermore, the “Traditional vs. Secular-rational values dimension reflects the contrast between societies for which religion is very important and those for which it is not […].
Societies near the traditional pole emphasize the importance of parent-child ties and the deference to authority, along with absolute standards and traditional family values […].
Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all of these topics.”
(Inglehart & Oyserman, 2004, p. 78). The second dimension contrasts survival values with self-expression values. Through economic development and following greater affluence it becomes less important to care for one’s immediate physical survival, and self-expression values like personal choice, individual autonomy and self-actualization rise in importance.
This dimension bears some resemblance to the value dimension of materialist vs. post- materialist values suggested earlier by Inglehart (1990).
A common theme in modernization theories is the emphasis on positive changes for mankind brought about by modernization by freeing the individual from its traditional societal and family ties granting more autonomy and freedom to the individual, and by freeing him/her from the burden of hard work and giving room for post-materialist values and activities of individual self-expression (for an especially positive recent view on modernization see Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Furthermore, traditional versions of modernization theory share the conviction that modernization inevitably affects all societies and cultures (that come into contact with economic and institutional changes) in a similar way, namely that a cultural convergence toward the modernized Western state of affairs will take place (Inkeles & Smith, 1974). Thus, due to industrialization processes countries will reject traditional values and will finally converge to holding mainly modern individualistic, rationalistic, and self-expressive values. Together with the mainly positive appraisal of modernization reported above this means that non-modernized cultures with traditional value systems appear underdeveloped from this perspective.
More recent versions of modernization theory allow cultural variations with respect to modernization and recognize the role of longstanding cultural traditions (e.g., religions) that can canalize changes brought about by modernization. One of the starting points of this change of perspective was Huntington’s (1996) claim that after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, cultural values based on “cultural zones” are becoming
more important again and replacing former ideological distinctions. Thus, in spite of industrialization and economic development, longstanding civilizations are playing an important role in channeling the (cultural) development of nations. Similarly, Georgas (2006) argues that the thrust of modernization itself is based on religious and cultural values that developed out of Calvinist Protestantism. Inglehart and Baker (2000) also acknowledge the role of long-standing cultural traditions in the modernization process, and especially the role of religion. In their view, the development brought about by modernization is channeled through the respective cultural traditions and may therefore also lead to different outcomes by partly preserving cultural traditions while the general development should be in accordance with modernization theory (see also Inglehart & Oyserman, 2004). That religion does have a separate influence in addition to and different from economic development was also shown in a cross-cultural study by Georgas, van de Vijver, and Berry (2004) who found that religion and economic prosperity were related to psychological variables in different and partly contrasting ways.
That cultures are stable across time and not subject to convergence to the extent predicted by modernization theory is contended by Hofstede (2001, 2007): “[T]echnological modernization is an important force toward cultural change that leads to somewhat similar developments in different societies, but does not wipe out variety” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 34).
This notwithstanding that individualism – Hofstede’s culture-level indicator mostly relevant for modernization theory – is strongly related to economic development. According to the author, the overall stability of cultures is guaranteed by a process of mutual reinforcement of cultural norms and cultural structures (roles, institutions, prescribed patterns of relationship), whereby structures develop out of norms and in turn stabilize and reproduce norms and values (Hofstede, 2001). In a similar vein, Klages (2005) points out that while the general trend in modernization is towards individualistic values this does not mean that collectivistic values have to be completely abandoned. The focus in the constellation of values changes in direction of individualism, but there is also variety as to how strongly these values are endorsed. Even the most individualistic society would not be functional without a general concern for the collective. Klages and Gensicke (2006) therefore suggest a „value synthesis“
in which apparently contradictory values can be combined in one person and „can but do not have to be in conflict with each other“ (p. 332, translation by BM).
It has to be pointed out that the sociological discourse about modernization theory goes far beyond the value research that has been introduced here. For reasons of space I will
only briefly refer to this broad field in the following. One of the main critics of modernization theory in its classical formulation is Shmuel N. Eisenstadt. In short, Eisenstadt (2000, 2003, 2005, 2006) postulates that the program of modernity is based on axiality, a property of societies that have developed transcendental religions in the so-called axial age – the time span where the great philosophies and world religions (Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, and later the Islam) appeared. Axial civilizations are characterized by symbolic orientations embodying a tension between transcendental and worldly orientations.
The tension leads to the conception of the world and human beings as in need of redemption and correction/improvement (Joas & Kölbl, 2004; Koenig, 2005). In modernity this tension escalates and shows its heterodox potential in its program of change. Eisenstadt emphasizes that the axial civilizations share these features and are therefore in a sense prepared for the modern age, but they differ tremendously in their deeper societal structure. This insight led him to develop his research program of “multiple modernities” where he analyzes the special ways in which modern societies develop in very different cultures – which is of course a very different conception of modernity as proposed by the convergence hypothesis. Other exponents discussing the issue of multiplicity versus uniformity in modernization theoretical approaches include Appadurai (1996), Berger and Huntington (2002), and in Germany Giesen (1996) and most notably Zapf (1996, 2006).
2.1.3 Modernization and Family Change
The main interest here is in the effects of modernization on the family. Changes in family structure and family relationships are a long debated theme in sociology and anthropology. The origins of this debate can be traced back to the French Revolution which according to Auguste Comte had a ‘leveling effect’ on family relationships and thereby disturbed the equilibrium of the traditional extended family system and patriarchal authority (Georgas, 2006). Out of these considerations structuralism-functionalism developed with Durkheim as one of its main representatives at the end of the 19th century. This theoretical perspective explained changes in the structure and function of the family as a result of multi- faceted changes in the structure of the society. It was further developed by Talcot Parsons, the most important family theorist of the 20th century. Parsons argued that the changes brought about by the industrial revolution like the increased necessity for mobility required the formation of a nuclear family in contrast to the traditional extended family (Parsons, 1949).
Only the nuclear family would be able to satisfy the societal and the psychological needs of the family members under the new circumstances. According to Parsons the downside of this
development, however, was the alienation of the nuclear family from its extended kin network. While the traditional extended family encompassed almost all areas of life, the nuclear family primarily became a unit of consumption and a place to socialize children. All other functions were taken over by the state and the larger society. Though realizing the disintegration and psychological isolation that followed from this development, Parsons did not view the development towards the nuclear family as negative. Rather, he idealized the classical nuclear family with its role distribution of a working father and a housewife mother and with its strengthening of the psychological bond between husband and wife and between parents and children (Georgas, 2006; Kagitcibasi, 2006).
The decline and disintegration of the family in the course of modernization was also a much debated theme by other authors. Indicators of this decline in the Western world since the second half of the 20th century are manifold: an increase in nuclear families with a parallel decrease of extended families, an increase in unmarried one-parent-families, an increasing divorce rate, an increase of step-families and patchwork families as a result of more remarriages, a gradual replacement of marriage by consensual union, and most of all a declining birth rate (Georgas, 2006; Goode, 1963). Popenoe (1988) argued that in modern societies the family is declining but not disintegrating. In contrast to Parsons he believes that even the nuclear family is on the decline, resulting in the postnuclear family characterized by a decreasing family size, fewer joint activities of family members and less quality contact of parents and children, and reduced contact with collateral kin like aunts and nephews but more contact with grandparents. According to Popenoe, the family is also becoming less important both in the larger context of society and in the lives of individuals.
While there is considerable agreement that the above mentioned indicators are signalizing a decline of the family and familial bonds in the modernized Western cultural hemisphere2, the respective implications for modernizing non-Western cultures are unclear. Is there a trend toward the nuclear family and the concomitant signs of family decline in economically developing non-Western countries? While the trend to a separate residence of the nuclear conjugal family is commonly acknowledged, the question remains if there is also a functional nucleation or if the relationships to the extended kin-network stay functionally
2 There is not only agreement with respect to this argument. For instance, Hondrich (1996, 2004) sees the modern human being as “thrown back” into family bonds the more he or she tries to escape them: when relationships (with a “freely chosen” partner) are terminated people (temporarily) intensify their relationships to their parents or siblings. Thus, according to this view there is no simple decline but a dialectic relationship between modernity and the importance/closeness of familial bonds.
intact. The technological development in the modernization process also provides the means for keeping contact across large distances by providing communication tools like the telephone or more recently the internet. In India, for example, there is a trend towards the nuclear family fueled by structural changes in the modernization process. However, according to Sinha (1991) the (extended) family members are still psychologically and normatively connected to each other. Therefore, alienation from the broader kin-network is surely a misnomer in this case. The question of the functional connectedness of families was also taken up in a cross-cultural study of the family by Georgas and colleagues (Georgas et al., 2001). These authors studied the frequency of various kinds of contact (e.g. visits, telephone calls) of kin of various grades. The results showed few cross-cultural differences with respect to contact to close kin (mother, father) which was very high in all cultures studied, but substantial differences with respect to the contact with more remote kin like uncles, aunts and cousins: in modern Western countries these contacts were less pronounced than in non- Western countries. Though the authors emphasize that the pattern of the frequency of contacts was similar across cultures – high with close kin and lower with more remote kin – the results also show that a functional nucleation of the extended family is much less the case in non- Western than in Western cultures. In accordance with the recent more moderate formulations of modernization theory, Kagitcibasi (2006) contends that “research from various societies shows that despite socioeconomic development, urbanization, and industrialization, the expected shift in family culture is not taking place in the Majority World” (p. 81). As outlined above, modernization theory recently acknowledged the role and the perseverance of longstanding cultural traditions. Inkeles (1998) recognized that norms of honoring elders are so strong in some Oriental societies that they resist the breaking up of kinship ties even if societal changes make it necessary for the extended family to have separate residences.
Thus, modernization theory seems to be in a dilemma. On the one hand, it emphasizes the advantages and benefits of modernization like bringing more freedom and fulfillment for the individual. On the other hand, while some theorists like Parsons emphasize the positive features of the adaptation process in direction of the nuclear family, most researchers complain about the decline and disintegration of the family and the concomitant psychological alienation of its members. While modernization theory in its original formulation claims the inevitability and the uni-directionality of changes, these changes do not seem to be inevitable, at least not with respect to the family. Non-Western cultures seem to be able to incorporate some features of modernization like industrialization and market economies but other hypothesized changes may occur to a much lesser degree or even not at
all. Thus, the formulation of modernization theory itself may be culturally biased: a development observed in Western industrial societies may have been extrapolated to other societies without taking their different cultural heritage into account and without considering the possibility that economic, societal, and psychological changes may not be as (causally) interconnected as proposed by the advocators of modernization theory. A good point in place here is Benefo’s (1999) notion that West African societies are more picking out and choosing those features of modernization that seem beneficial to them rather than being necessarily overridden by all aspects of modern Western life. This is in line with Yang’s (1988, 1996) notion that only “specific-functional characteristics,” i.e., only to those aspects of a culture that are incompatible with a “modern” way of life, do necessarily change along with societal modernization. Many cultural characteristics, however, are not of this specific-functional kind according to the author and thus may therefore persist in modernizing cultures. While modernization theory is not able to resolve this dilemma, Kagitcibasi introduced a model of family change that views the changes from the “other side,” as the title of her 1996 book suggests (Kagitcibasi, 1996b, 2005a, 2005b, 2007). This model takes into account both:
modernization processes and the different cultural preconditions present in non-Western or
“Majority World” countries. Her theory presents an alternative view of family change that may not only be relevant to non-Western cultures but also for the Western cultural hemisphere. Since this model is the basis for the present study it will be dealt with in detail in the following section.
2.1.4 Summary
Cultures can be characterized by attitudes, values, and behaviors shared to a significant extent by a specific group and transmitted from one generation to the next.
Modernization theorists contend that societal changes coming along with technological development and industrialization inevitably lead to cultural changes in the direction of individualistic values because only these are compatible with a modern environment.
Modernization theory also assumes a necessary decline of the traditional family. The modern family is nuclear and neo-local with a declining importance of familial bonds, especially with regard to more remote kin. Other theorists question the inevitability of the decline of the family in the course of societal modernization and suggest that the benefits of modernization can be obtained without loosening family ties and without giving up traditional collectivistic and family values.
2.2 Family Models and Selves
In the following, Kagitcibasi’s theory of family change is introduced, followed by a detailed review of the relevant empirical studies. One of these studies (Georgas, Berry, van de Vijver, Kagitcibasi, & Poortinga, 2006) receives special attention since it is the first large- scale cross-cultural study explicitly designed to test the family change model. The third part of this section focuses on the developing self as the “outcome” of socialization in different family models, with a special emphasis on the compatibility of autonomy and relatedness. The section ends with an account of existing empirical research with respect to the autonomous- relational self.
2.2.1 Kagitcibasi’s Theory of Family Change
Kagitcibasi (1996b, 2006, 2007) presented a contextualist theory of family change that situates the family in ecological and cultural contexts. Family change and the development of and in families are described at multiple levels. Her conceptualization is – among others – influenced by Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological theory that places the developing individual in the middle of several layers of interdependent contextual factors arranged in circles. Another stimulating source for the theory is the eco-cultural framework developed by Berry and colleagues (Berry, 1976; Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002).
2.2.1.1 General Family Change Model
Like Bronfenbrenner’s macrosystem, the first level in Kagitcibasi’s model comprises the overall cultural orientation and living conditions. Variables at this level include a general individualist or collectivist orientation as well as the distribution of urban and rural residence and the general level of affluence in a given culture. These cultural and socio-ecological conditions are affecting the kind of family structure. The family structure is characterized by the family type (e.g., nuclear, extended), the kind of wealth flows (from older members to younger members or the other way round), the kind of family ties (e.g., patrilineal ties, nuclear family ties), the level of fertility (high or low), and by a higher or lower status of women.
While the overall ecological, cultural, and socio-economic living conditions as well as the family structural variables are operating at the cultural or group level, the other constituents of family models can be located at the level of the individual (although the normative nature of these individual-level parts always refers to the respective cultural group).
The first component operating at the individual level are socialization values. These include
the kind of loyalties deemed important (e.g., individual loyalties or group loyalties), the kind of intergenerational investments (predominating investment/support of children to parents or of parents to children), prevailing values of personal independence or interdependence, values of children (emotional vs. economic-utilitarian), and the degree of son preference. These socialization values are instantiated in the actual family interaction and socialization practices which are represented by the kind of parenting style applied by parents (authoritarian, permissive, authoritative), and the kind of childrearing orientations or childrearing goals (e.g., independence vs. obedience). To speak in Bronfenbrenner’s terms, family interaction and socialization represent the family microsystem directly interacting with the developing individual. Finally, the developing individual is located in the developing self-other relations.
These are represented by intergenerational/familial independence vs. interdependence, by interpersonal independence vs. interdependence, and by the development of an independent vs. interdependent self-construal.
The building blocks of the family model operating at different levels are conceptualized to influence each other in many ways, often bi-directionally. Thus, for example, socialization values affect the actual family interactions and socialization practices but are affected by them in turn as well. While socialization practices primarily influence the child’s development (of self-other relations), characteristics of the child may also have certain effects on the socializing adults. Furthermore, family process variables like values and interactions may affect family structural variables like living arrangements, and finally also macro-structural variables like a society’s overall distribution of urban and rural residences.
Figure 1 summarizes the hypothesized family model structure with its multiple interactions and mutual influences.
Out of this generic model Kagitcibasi formulated three ideal-typical family models.
These three models are thought to represent the kinds of family models currently existing in different cultural contexts – pre-modern non-Western contexts, modern industrialized Western contexts, and modernizing context with a collectivist background in the so called Majority World. This conceptualization in terms of different cultural areas existing at the same time is complemented by a diachronic perspective of change. That is, the family model of independence prevalent now in the West is thought to have developed out of a pre-modern family model of (total) interdependence that can still be found especially in rural areas in the
