Ongoing UN Operations and New Challenges in Peacekeeping
Major General Patrick C. CAMMAERT, Netherlands General Officer Commanding Eastern Division of
MONUC, Democratic Republic of Congo
It’s a great pleasure and honor to address such a distinguished audience from a country with a long history in UN operations and many of you having served in UN Peacekeeping Operations. In the next half hour I will give you a quick overview of the ongoing UN Operations and I will share a few ideas that we have developed recently at UNHQ to respond to new challenges in peacekeeping. After my two years in New York, I now hope to see these ideas come to life during my current assignment in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
These new ideas and responses are particular essential in times where the UN has been deliberately targeted and during UN peacekeeping operations where the borderline between war and a peacekeeping operation is not always obvious. Before moving to these topics, let’s first have a quick glance at the challenges we face today but we can only do that in relation of UN operations some 10-15 years ago. At that time DPKO was formed and faced with immense problems in the world. Also a time when Military Observers were looking through binos in areas with a well defined peace accord or cease fire agreement.
Ongoin g UN Opera tio
ns and New Chall
eng es
in Peacek eeping
Major Gener al Pa tric k C. CAMMAERT, Ne therlands
General Offic er Comman
ding Easte
rn Division of MONUC, Democratic Republic of Cong o
It’s a gr eat pleasur e and honor to addr
ess such a
distinguished audience fr om a countr
y with a long history
in UN operations and man y of
you havin g s
erve d in UN
Peacekeepin g Oper ations. In
the next half hou
r I will N Op g U e ongoin w of th quick overvie you a give
erations
and I will sha re
a fe w ide as th at we ha ve d
eve loped
recently at UNHQ to respond to new challeng
es in I now in New York, wo years my t After ng. peacekeepi
hope to see thes e ideas
come to life durin g my
current
assig nme nt in the D
emocr atic Republic of Congo.
These new id eas and r
esponses ar e particular
essential in
times whe re the UN has be
en de libera
tel y t arg eted a nd
during UN pea cekeepin
g operations where the borderline cekeepin and a pea between war g op
eration is not alwa ys
obvious. Befo re moving to thes
e topics, let’s first have a
quick g lanc e at the chal lenges we fa
ce toda y but
we can of UN operations som elation only do that in r
e 10-15
year s ag o. At that time
DP KO was f
orm ed a nd face d with
immense proble ms in the world. Also a
time whe
n through binos in areas re looking Observers we Military
with a well defi
ned peac e accord o r c
ease fi re agre ement .
Unprecedented Surge in Peacekeeping: 18 UN Missions with more than 65,000 uniformed peacekeepers
Our times are referred to today as times of an
‘unprecedented surge in peacekeeping’. A UN mission map shows the current deployment of these missions in the world: 18 as of today, 9 of which are concentrated on the African continent. This is how the UN continues to facilitate complex and fragile peace processes and to maintain significant progress in the face of incredible challenges. As one can see, UN troops are fully deployed in Africa, between India and Pakistan, the Middle-East, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo and Haiti. The missions in Sierra-Leone, Timor-Leste and Ethiopia-Eritrea are being downsized as planned.
Last year, while still deploying the 15.000 troops for Liberia, we had to start-up three new complex operations in Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi and in Haiti, almost simultaneously between April and June.
Meanwhile, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, dramatic events have led the Security Council to enforce the MONUC’s mandate and to authorize a significant increase in the military and police components. With an overall strength of some 17.000, MONUC is now the largest UN peacekeeping operation ever in terms of strength, deployment, budget, challenges. For the first time in the UN peacekeeping history, MONUC has established a full fledge Military Division with its Divisional HQ, three powerful brigades in Ituri and North
& South Kivu plus a large helicopter fleet, an impressive Unp
receden ted S urg e i n Peacek eep
in
g: 18 than 65,000 uniform ore UN Missions with m
ed
peacek eeper
s
Our time s are
ref err ed to today
as time s of a
n
‘unprecedented sur ge in peacek
eeping’
. A UN mission of these missions in yment ent deplo map shows the curr the world: 18 as of today,
9 of which are conc entrated on
the Af ric an contine nt. T
his is how the UN continue
s to
fac ilitate comple x a
nd fra gile peac e pr oce sses a
nd to ncredi he face of i n t ess i progr ficant gni in si nta mai
ble
challenges. As one can s ee, UN troops are fully d
eplo yed
in Africa, betw een India
and Pakistan, the Midd
le-East, missions in nd Haiti. The , Kosovo a gia us, Geor Cypr
Sierra-L eone, Timor- Les
te and Ethiopia-Eritr ea are bein
g
downsized as planned.
Last year, while still deployin
g the 15.000 troops for
Libe ria, we had to start-up three new complex
operations
in Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi
and in Haiti, almost April and June. en simultaneously betwe
Mean while, in the
Democra tic Re public of
Cong
o, enforce e Security Council to led th dramatic events have
the MONUC’s mandate and to authorize a significant
increase in the militar y and police components.
With an NUC is now the of some 17.000, MO overall strength
largest UN peac
ekeeping operat
ion eve r i
n t erm s of
strength, deployment, b
udget, challenges.
For the first
time in the UN peacekeepin g histor
y, MO NU
C has with its ry Division ge Milita led ull f blished a f esta
Divisional HQ, three po werful brigades in
Itu ri a nd North
& South Kivu plus a l arg
e helic opter fleet,
an impressive
engineer capacity and special forces in order to conduct military operations under Chap VII in the most troublesome Eastern part of Congo. This is a major change in the peacekeeping by which the Organization is provided with the adequate military means to implement a sort of enforcement mandate with strong RoE which results with a more aggressive posture by the UN troops and a high tempo of sometimes deadly operations.
A new mission is deploying in Sudan as we speak, a country slightly larger than Congo that is the size of Western Europe. Though the mandate so far will cover the North-South agreement, we will have to find solutions how to merge the operations with Darfur where the African Union led mission is facing major hurdles.
Finally we are keeping a close eye on Iraq where we have deployed a UN Guard Unit to protect a UN civilian team that is there to assist the Iraqi interim government. These 18 operations represent over 65,000 uniformed peacekeepers and over 10.000 international and local civilian staff.
Complexity of current mandates
The complexity of the current mandates of our missions highlights the need for integration of the different components of the missions. Planning, integrating, directing, advising and managing the safety and security of all the personnel and assets involved are stretching the UN capacity to the limits. Key is to generate sufficient troops, prepared, trained, equipped and adequately supported, to do an extreme difficult task in challenging
engin eer capa cit y and sp ecial forces in ord
er to conduct
military oper ations under Chap V
II in th
e most o. This is a major troublesome Eastern part of Cong
change in the pea
cekeeping by whi
ch the Or ganization is
provide d with the ade
qua te milita ry mea
ns to im plem
ent RoE which with strong ndate ent ma em orc enf t of a sor
results with a more aggressive posture b y the U
N troops
and a high tempo of sometime
s dead ly ope rations.
A new mission is deplo yin
g in Sudan as we
speak, a
country slightl y lar ger than Cong
o that is the siz e of
Western Europe. Thou gh the ma
ndate so far will c
over to find will have nt, we eeme South agr th- the Nor
solutions how to merg e t he ope rations with Dar
fur where
the African Union led mission is facing
major hurdles. raq e on I ose ey ng a cl keepi ly we are Final
where we hav
e
deplo yed a UN Guard
Unit to pr otect
a UN c ivilia n team
that is the re to
assist the Ira
qi inte rim gover nme nt. The
se 18 operations represent over 65,000 uniformed
peacekeep ers and over 10.000 international and local
civilia n staff
.
Com ple xity of curren
t m an dates
The c omple xit y of the cur rent mandates of our missions
highlig hts the need
for integration of the d ifferent
components of the m issions. Planning
, integr
ating, and securit ety ng the saf managi g and directing, advisin
y
of all the personnel and assets
involved are str etc hing the
UN cap acit y to the limits. Key is to g
ener ate suf fic ien t
troops, prepared, train ed,
equipped and adequatel
y llengin treme difficult task in cha supported, to do an ex
g
circumstances. Nevertheless, this surge in demand for Peacekeeping operations can be seen somehow as a welcome sign, a sign that opportunities are emerging to help put an end to ongoing conflicts. But the concentration of demands will undoubtedly stretch the capacities of the entire system, not only in addressing adequately all threats to peace, but also in guaranteeing a consistent engagement of the international community.
Solidify the Foundations for Peace
But let’s not forget that peacekeeping operations are called to assist always when peace is fragile. The operations must include longer-terms strategies to solidify the foundations for peace. If this is not integrated to the post-conflict exit strategies, it sets high risks for failure, and the UN might unfortunately have to return again, as it has done in Congo, Liberia or in Haiti.
Before we define what is needed to mount a successful UN mission, let’s have a sense of under what circumstances we deploy our troops today. A fragment from the New York Times some time ago on Liberia is illustrative:
‘At times today it was difficult to distinguish the fighters on this side of the bridge from those on the other side.
They wore the same clothes, the same wigs. They carried the same weapons. (Fighters on this side have a penchant for spray-painting their guns.) Neither side seemed to have any purpose beyond defeating the enemy. All sides said they were tired of fighting. One soldier, wearing cir
cumsta nce
s. Neve rth ele ss, this surge
in dema nd for
Peacek eeping
operat ions can be se en someho
w as a
welcome sign, a si gn th
at opportunities are emer gin
g to But the g conflicts. help put an end to ongoin
concentration of deman ds
will undoubtedly str etch the
cap acitie s of the
entir e s yste m, not onl y in a
ddr
essing teei uaran so in g e, but al s to peac hreat l t y al adequatel
ng a
consistent engage ment of th
e inte rna tional c
ommu nity.
Solidify t he F oundat ions for
Peace
But l et’
s not for get that peaceke
epi ng op
erations are s fr when peace i ways st al d to assi calle
agi le. The
opera tions must inclu
de long er-t
erms str ateg
ies to
solidify th e foundations for peace.
If this is not in tegrate
d or isks f h r , it sets hig ies strateg xit lict e conf to the post-
failure, and the UN might unfortuna tely have to retur
n
again, as it has done in Cong o, L ibe ria or in Haiti.
Befo re we de
fine what is needed to mount a successful
UN mission, let’s have a sense of und
er what
circumstances we deploy
our troops toda y. A
fra
gment Liber ago on s some time w York Time m the Ne fro
ia is
illustrative :
‘A t times toda
y it was dif fic ult to disting uish
the f igh ters
on this side of the bridge from those on the other side.
They wo re the sam
e cl othes, t he sam e wi gs. The y carri
ed
the same weapons. (F igh
ters on
this side have a penchant ir guns.) Ne inting the -pa spray for ither side
see med to
have any purpose bey
ond defeating
the en emy.
All sides
said they wer
e tir ed of f igh
ting.
One soldie r,
wear ing
dirty soccer cleats, described how he came to this side of the bridge. Last February, he was captured by government forces and sent to fight. Then he was captured by rebels and sent to a training camp for three weeks and then sent to fight again. He said he found his former commander and had him executed’.
Essential Field Intelligence
What can be expected in a complicated operational environment, where consent is only partial or limited to one or two of the parties to the conflict? Political developments may have improved the security situation, but a country remains very unstable as armed groups, militia and criminal elements may be present throughout.
More likely than not, exact figures regarding the strength of the various armed groups, which may include large number of child soldiers and paramilitary personnel, are not available.
It is exactly here that field intelligence assets are needed, to find out where the spoilers are and what there intent is.
‘Intelligence’ long time has been a word hard to accept in the peaceful UN world. Still it is a sensitive issue, as openness is the name of the game. In fact, information gathering never has been the problem in UN Peacekeeping: our UNMOs are top-class HUMINT people.
It is the analysis, evaluation and distribution phase where we continue to experience difficulties. Poor intelligence means you will not have the right forces with the right
dirt y soc cer cl
eats, d escri bed how he
came to this side of
the bridge . L ast Feb ruar
y, h e w as c aptur
ed by he was sent to fight. Then rnment forces and gove
captured by rebels and s
ent to a trainin g camp f
or three
weeks and then sent to f
ight a gain. He said
he fo
und his ecuted’. and had him ex former commander
Essent ial Fie
ld Intellige nce
What can be ex
pected in a com pli
cated operat
ional
envir onment, wher
e c ons ent is onl y p
artia l or limite
d to Political t? onflic s to the c partie two of the one or
developments ma y hav e impr oved the secu
rity situation,
but a country remains very unstable
as arm
ed groups, esent throug militia and criminal elements may be pr hout.
More lik ely t han not , exact
figu res re gardi ng t he s tren gth
of the various armed groups , which may in
clude large rson ry pe ramilita and pa ild soldiers ch number of
nel, a re
not available.
It is exa ctl y h ere that f ield inte lligen
ce a sse ts are ne ede d,
to fi nd out wh
ere th e spoil
ers ar e and wh at th
ere i nte nt is .
‘Inte lligenc
e’ lon g time has be
en a wor d har d to a cce
pt in issue sensitive Still it is a rld. ful UN wo ace the pe
, a s
openness is the name of the ga me. In fa
ct, information
gath ering nev er h
as been the problem in UN
Peacek eeping
: our UNMOs ar
e top- class H
UMINT people.
It i s t he an alys is, ev aluat ion and distribution phase wher
e ence s. Poor intellig cultie diffi nce rie expe ontinue to we c
mean s you will not h ave
the r igh t fo rce s with the
rig ht
equipment at the right time and the right place. This has too often resulted in casualties - peacekeepers lives - as we have seen in Rwanda and Somalia, or the lives of innocent civilians – the genocide in Rwanda and massacres at Srebrenica serve to illustrate this.
An intelligence capability is a priority for all UN missions and efforts in this regard can only be achieved if they are seen in the overall context of effectiveness. This can only be achieved if the senior leadership within a mission is able to make fully informed decisions. For this to occur mechanisms for information management and analysis and the production of accurate intelligence assessments must be in place.
Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC)
The cornerstone in improving this capability is the establishment of what we now call the Joint Mission Analysis Cell. It is an integrated civilian and military structure, incorporating representatives, military and civilian, from key elements of the mission. The task of the JMAC is “to provide the expertise to handle information, conduct and present analysis and provide advice at a level that will ensure that decisions are made with awareness of all available and relevant factors.” It should be capable of providing in-depth current and longer term analysis of all issues affecting the mission.
The JMAC will be responsible for collection, co- ordination and analysis of information and distribution of the intelligence with a priority to support the decision equipm
ent at the ri ght tim e and t he ri
ght place.
This has
too ofte n resulte d in casu
altie s - pea cek eep ers li ves - as
we have seen in R
wanda a nd Somalia
, or the live
s of and anda de in Rw noci ge ns – the t civilia innocen
massa cre s a t Sreb renic a s erv e to illustr ate
this.
An intellig ence capa
bility is a prior
ity f or all UN
missions and efforts in th is rega
rd can onl y be
achieved if
they a re see n in the ove rall c
ontext of eff ective ness. This
can only be ac hieved i
f t he seni or leadershi
p wi thi
n a s. For cision ed de orm y inf full to make ble mission is a
this to occu r me cha nisms f or inf
orm ation ma nage
ment
and analys is and t he pro
duction of accu rate i
nte lli genc
e ace. be in pl ust s m assessment
Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC)
The c orn erstone in impr oving this
cap abilit y is the
esta blishment of
what we now call the
Joint
Mission nd milita ivilian a ted c gra n inte ll. It is a sis Ce Analy
ry
struc tur e, inc orp ora ting r epr ese nta tives, milita ry
and
civilian, from key elements of the mission. The
task of e to handl pertis he ex de t o provi s “t C i MA the J
e
information, conduct an d present anal
ysis and provide
advic e a t a leve l that will e nsur
e tha t de cisions a re ma
de ors.” It nt fact eva ble and rel aila l av awareness of al with
should be capable of providing
in-depth cu rrent and
longer t erm an alys
is of all issues affectin g the mis
sion.
The JM AC will be respons
ible for collection, co-
ordination and analys is of information and distrib
ution of
the intelligen ce with a priority to
support the decision
making process of the SRSG, the Senior Management Group and the Force Commander. It will also provide advice to the mission headquarters staff more generally.
As such, the JMAC is at the heart of any operation, be it humanitarian, DDR, police, civilian or military and it requires highly trained intelligence professionals to provide the intelligence processes and analysis capabilities.
The UN has become a Target of Political Violence After the disaster in Baghdad - the attack that killed 22 staff, the recent ambush in MONUC on Bangladeshi peacekeepers that killed nine, and other tragic incidents, we are forced to acknowledge that the UN has become a target of political violence, challenging the long-held perception that we were protected by our flag and by our status as an impartial actor.
This new security reality provided a compelling rationale for security reform. The current UN system is terribly fragmented, with disparate security entities and offices both at headquarters and in the field. The Secretary- General has therefore proposed to create a single, integrated security management system. It will unify the existing offices of UNSECOORD, the Security and Safety Services and the security component of DPKO. It is designed to ensure that we are organized to provide reliable threat and risk analysis, fundamental to security, especially in volatile, constantly changing circumstances.
making pro cess of the
SRSG, the Senior Management
Group and the Forc e Commander.
It will also provide advice to the mission headquarters staff mor e g
enerall y.
As such, the J MAC is at the heart o
f an y ope ration, be it
humanita ria n, DDR, polic
e, c ivilia n or milita
ry a
nd it ls to ofessiona ce pr lligen ned inte trai hly es hig requir
provide the inte
lligence pr oce
sses and ana lysis
cap abilitie s.
Th e UN has b
ecome a Target of Pol
iti cal Viol ence
Afte r the disaste
r in Bag hdad - the a ttack that killed 22
staff, the recent ambus h in MONUC on Bang
ladeshi
peac eke epe rs tha t kille d nine, a
nd other tr agic inci
dents, come a ledge that the UN has be ced to acknow we are for
targ et of political
violenc e, c halle ngin g the long
-he ld
perception that we were
protected by our fla g and by
our actor. ial part us as an im stat
This new s ecurity
real ity provided a compelling rationale
for securi ty r eform . The curr
ent UN syst em i s t erri
bly fic s and of entitie ity cur te se d, with dispara ente gm fra
es
both at headquarte rs an
d in the field. The Secreta
ry-
General has th erefore
proposed to create a
sing
le, the m. It will unify yste ent s nagem ity ma cur d se ate integr
exis tin g offi ces of UNS
EC OORD, t he S ecurity
and
Safety Se rvices and the s
ecurity component of DP
KO. It ganized to provide re or ensure that we a is designed to
reliable threat and risk a
nal ysis, fundamental to s
ecurity,
espe cia lly in volatile
, con stantl y c han gin g c irc umsta nce s.
UN Strategic Reserve (SR) and Complementarities of this Initiative with the EU “battle-group” Initiative Currently the only way to react to an emerging crisis in a mission area is through an ad-hoc decision on a new mandate with an expanded force, or to request external assistance from the international community. The political and force generation process required to deploy additional units can take too much time to allow a reaction in the critical early stages of a crisis. As a result of this delayed reaction crises often deteriorate, risking mission collapse and requiring an even larger or more capable force to deal with them.
The lack of a reliable reserve or reaction capability for responding to crises remains a major obstacle to the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations. In order to fill this gap, the Department for Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) has developed the concept of a Strategic Reserve (SR), a mission-specific, pre-planned and rapidly deployable “over the horizon force”.
The Strategic Reserve would be held in a troop contributing country (TCC) with prior agreement of this country to deploy to certain, specific UN missions. It would be deployed on the recommendation of the Secretary-General and under Security Council authority for a specific task or duration. The Strategic Reserve must be equipped, trained and prepared to deploy into Chapter VII environments. Once deployed, the reserve would be placed under UN command and control and rules of engagement.
UN Strat egi c Reserv e (S
R) and Compl
emen tar iti
es of “battle-group” Initiative he EU h t wit ive is Initiat th
Curre ntly th e onl y wa y to reac t to an
eme rgin g crisis in a
mission area is through an ad-hoc d ecision on a new
mandate with an expanded forc
e, or to request external tional c rna nte om the i fr nce assista ommunit
y.
The
political and f orc e ge nera tion proc
ess require d to de
ploy
additiona l units can
take too muc h time to
allow a
reaction i n t he c rit ical earl y st ages of a c ris
is. As a resul
t risking s often deteriorate, tion crise eac layed r of this de
mission collapse and requiring an even la
rger or more
capable force t o deal with
them .
The la ck of a relia
ble re serv e o r re action ca pabilit
y f or
responding to crises r emains a major
obstacle to the rations. In g ope keepin N peace iveness of U effect
order to
fill this g ap, the
Departme nt for
Peac e Keep ing
Operations (DPKO) h as de
veloped the concep t of a
Strat egi c R eserv e (SR
), a m ission-specific,
pre-planned on force”. “over the horiz yable and rapidly deplo
The Strategi c Reserve
would be held in a troop CC) with prior agre y (T contributing countr ement of this
country to deplo y to ce
rtain, specific UN missions.
It
would be deployed o n the recommend
ation of the Security Council a l and under era -Gen Secretary
uthority
for a specifi c task or d
uration. The Strategi
c Reserve
must be equipped, trained and prepa red to deplo y into
Chapter VII environments. Once deplo
yed, the reserv
e rol and and cont under UN command would be placed
rules of enga gement.
DPKO explores the modalities of such an initiative with member states, and has formed a working group which will address a broad spectrum of concerns and will be utilized to further work out the details of such an initiative in the nearest possible future. The working group will also take steps to build on the complementarities of this initiative with the EU “battle- group” initiative and the African Standby Force initiative. Essentially, however, the SR proposal’s key advantage is that TCCs would seek political agreement in advance to deploy to specific UN missions; thereby diminishing the response time after a crisis erupts.
MONUC - High Tempo Operations, the use of Military Aircraft, Night operations, the use of Special Forces, and Attack Helicopters
Let me say a few words in my capacity as GOC E-Div MONUC. A few challenges from a Marine with his boots in the mud and his nice New York suit back home. I will not list all the day to day challenges. But what are the most important challenges that we face in MONUC that has a wider effect for the future of PK. I would like to mention three: First, how to carry out operations under Chapter VII with UN rules and regulations that are designed for Chapter VI. Secondly, the importance of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and thirdly, the issues of peace building and peace keeping.
High tempo operations, the use of military aircraft, night operations, the use of Special Forces, and attack helicopters, operations with multinational composite
DPKO explor es the modalitie
s of suc h a n initia tive
with
member states, and has formed a workin g g
roup
which will be ns and oncer m of c tru d spec broa ess a will addr
utilized to f urt
her work out the deta
ils of s uch an
initiative in the
near est possible futur
e. The wor
kin
g on the group will also take steps to build
comple menta
ritie s of thi
s initia tive with the
EU “ba ttle-
group
” initia tive a
nd the Afr
ican Standb
y
Force the SR proposal’s ke owever, initiative. Essentially, h
y
adva ntage is tha
t TCCs would seek political
agre eme nt in
advance to deplo y to
specific UN missions; thereby
diminishing the response time after a crisis erupts.
MONUC - High T em po Op erations, th
e u se o f
Milit ary Air cra ft, Night opera
tions, t he use
of Special ters icop Hel Attack ces, and For
Let me sa y a few words
in m y cap acity
as GOC E-Div
MONUC. A few ch allenges
from a Marine with his boots
in the mud a nd his nice
New Yor k suit back hom
e. I will
not list a ll the day
to day cha lleng es. B ut wha t a
re the we face in MONUC hat nges t challe portant im most
that
has a wide r effe ct for t he fut ure o f P K. I woul d l
ike t o
mention three: F irst, ho w to carr
y out op
erations under gula nd re les a ru with UN II r V Chapte
tions tha t a re
designed for Chapter V
I. Se condly,
the importance o f
Securi ty S ect or Reform (S SR ) and thi
rdl y, t he i
ssues of ng. e keepi eac ng and p ldi peace bui
High te mpo oper
ations, t he use
of milita ry
air cra ft, night
operations, the use of Special F orc
es, and attack with multinationa ations opters, oper helic
l composite
units at battalion level with a Chapter VII mandate require flexible logistic procedures and flight safety rules and regulations. As of today, the UN administration is not capable of allowing the use of national flight safety rules of the TCC. Administrative procedures are very inflexible and most of the time virtually impossible to change. DPKO has been made aware over the last few months that not only in MONUC but also in Haiti and other missions, operations are hampered and hindered by these factors. Changes should be brought into operation in order to fulfill the mandate effectively.
If a failed state on its knees, want to get back on its feet and talk coherent, armed forces, police, customs and the judicial system should be properly organized. It is part of the exit strategy of the UN. In most missions this task is done by a lead nation. However, the UN can not sit idle and watch where things are going wrong. Lead nation and the UN should work closely together in order to set up and implement the programs for the SSR.
Last challenge is the combination of Peace building and Peace keeping. In my view it should go hand in hand, concurrent and not sequential. Quick Impact projects, hearts and minds campaigns, using spare military engineer capacity to the maximum effect to assist in encouraging the local economy, rebuilding school infra structure, road reconstruction etc. in combination with keeping the peace is what is happening today in our missions. In this concurrent approach, peacekeepers must be versatile, combining a strong military posture to deter and defeat spoilers/ armed groups to a smoother attitude to build confidence among a frightened population.
units at ba ttalion le
vel with a Chapte
r V II manda te
require flex ible logistic p
rocedur es and fli
ght sa fety rules
and r egu lations. As of today
, the UN administra
tion is t safet e of national fligh the us not capable of allowing
y
rule s of the
TCC. Administr ative
proc edure s ar e v ery
infle xible and most of the
time vir tua lly impossible
to few last he are over t ade aw n m as bee . DPKO h change
months that not only in MONUC but also in H
aiti and
other missions, operations are hamper ed and hindered by
these factors. Change s should be broug
ht into operation ly. ctive ffe te e nda ill the ma ulf r to f in orde
If a failed state on its kn
ees, want to get ba ck on its feet ces, police, cust and talk coherent, armed for oms and t
he
judicial system should be properl
y or ganiz ed.
It is part of
the e xit str ate gy of the UN.
In most missions th
is task is not sit idle the UN can owever, lead nation. H done by a
and watch wh ere thing
s are go ing w ron g.
Lead nation
and the UN should work
closely to gethe r in ord er to set
up and implement the prog rams for the SSR.
Last chal len ge i s t he com bin
ation of P eace buildi
ng and
Peace k eeping.
In my v iew it should g o h
and in hand, pact projects, l. Quick Im concurrent and not sequentia
hear ts and minds c ampa
igns, using spare milita
ry
eng inee r c apac ity to the ma
ximum e ffe
ct to a
ssist in ool infra sch ebuilding y, r cal econom g the lo encouragin
struct ure, road reconst
ruc tion et c. in com
bin ation wi th
keeping the p eace is
what is happenin g toda
y in our
missi ons. In t
his concurrent
approach, peacek eepers m
ust o de e t ry postur ong milita a str ombining tile, c rsa be ve
ter
and defeat spoilers/ arm ed
groups to a smoother attitude
to build confidence among a frigh tened population.
Once security conditions are good enough and vigilance mechanisms are in place, all other peace keeping operations components, the UN family, NGO, partners and donors can assist the political process including the reform of the Security Sector, the Army integration and the preparation of free and transparent elections with post electoral stability. At the same time the humanitarian assistance can be delivered, the Human rights abuses be investigated, internal displaced persons be settled, refugees be back home, former fighters be demobilized, disarm and reinserted (DDR), local development be encouraged. The multi-dimensionality and complexity of any modern peacekeeping culminates when regional factors and cross borders issues influence significantly the local and national situation. In the Congo, illegal exploitation of resources and weapons smuggling are challenged by the UN arms embargoes and the presence of foreign combatants like the FDLR affect deeply the whole peace process. PKO must then address both issues and coordinate with other international or local partners.
In addition, our peacekeepers are confronted with new tasks including the training/ mentoring of the new local army or police to implement sensitive tasks of the mandate like for example the support of the new national forces poorly sustained in their combat operations in a challenging environment.
We have touched upon issues related to the tactical and operational level and moved to more strategic issues. It is certain that all these levels have seen changes and will
see more changes in the near future. Peacekeeping over e gilanc keeping ace gh and vi her pe l ot good enou ace, al n pl re i y conditions are s a sm Once securit mechani
operations components, the UN family, NGO, partners
and donors can assist the political process including the
reform of the Security S
ector, the Arm y inte gration and
the prep aration of
free and t ranspar ent el
ect ions w ith post
ele ctor al sta bilit y. At the same
time the human
itari
an uses be ghts ab red, the Human ri assistance can be delive
investigated, internal displaced persons be
settled,
ref uge es be bac k home
, f orme r f igh ters be d emobilize d,
disarm and reinserted (DDR), local develop
ment be ompl nd c y a nsionalit dime d. The multi- ourage enc
exi ty o f
any modern pe
acek eeping culmina
tes whe n re
gion al
factors and cross borders i
ssues infl uence sign
ifi
cantly o, illeg In the Cong the local and national situation.
al
exploitation of resource s and weapons smu
ggl ing a re
challe nged b y t he U N arm
s em bargoes and t
he p resenc
e the ply ct dee affe LR he FD ike t ants l bat of foreign com
whole peace process. PK
O must then address bot h issues
and coordinate with other international or loc
al pa rtners.
In addition, our pea cekeepers
are confronted w ith new
tasks including th e training / mentoring of the
new local
arm y or polic e to impleme
nt sensitive tasks of
the new national support of the ample the mandate like for ex
forces poorl y sust ained in t hei r combat
operatio ns in a
challengin g environment.
We have touch ed upon i
ssues related to the t actical and
opera tional le vel a nd move
d to more stra tegic
issue s.
It
is cer tain tha t a ll these levels ha ve se
en cha nge
s and will eeping eacek future. P he near n t changes i see more
over
the last few years has also seen many changes and has shown many faces, from the friendly food distributing blue-beret, to the less friendly UN attack helicopter. All these faces have brought a sense of peace and stability to parts of the world where it is needed mostly, a peace that is certainly worth fighting for.
the last few ye ars has a lso seen man
y chan ges and has
shown many f aces, fro
m the friendly food distributing
blue-b ere t, to the less
fri endl y UN atta ck h elic opte
r. All nd stability to e a peac nse of a se ght brou s have face these
parts of the wo rld wh
ere i t i s needed most
ly, a peace that
is cer tainl y wor th f igh ting f or.
