The development of the Buddhist ideas will be evaluated in the context of Indian thought in general

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A.N. Balslev

A Philosophical Appraisal of l-Conscioumss in the Context ofthe No-Self Doctrine of Buddhism

The issue of I-consciousness as one of the most challenging tasks for any systematic enquiry of man had drawn the attention of the ancient Indian thinkers already at an early date. The philosophical treatment of this many-faceted issue gave rise to distinct conceptual models in the history of Indian thought.

This paper focuses on the diversity of views regarding this question in the different phases of Indian Buddhism. To begin with, reference will be made to the scholarly disputes centering

around the question of anätma-väda as the ultimate import of the Buddha's teachings.

Different interpretations of Anatta-lakkhana sutta and Brahma-jäla sutta will be alluded to.

The question of I-consciousness will be shown to acquire a novel dimension as the Buddhist thinkers deal with the subject, beginning with the Nikäya literature. The different versions

of the accounts of I-consciousness will be noted in the analysis of the ideas of citta and

vijnäna, the doctrine of paüca-skandha, the pudgala-väda of the Vätsiputriyas, the mano-

vijüäna of the Vijfiäna-vädins etc. The development of the Buddhist ideas will be evaluated

in the context of Indian thought in general. An attempt will also be made to situate the

conceptual models in an inter-cultural framework.

Robert Robbins

The Concept of Anattä in Early Buddhism

Since earliest times, the mainstream of Indian philosophico-religious thought has been directed toward separating the essential from the non-essential, the self from the not-self. As set forth

in the Pali Nikäyas, early Buddhism provided its own interpretation of this imperative

launching a revolution in our thinking about ourselves and our place in the universe.

One of the most unique features of early Buddhism is the no-self (anattä) doctrine. Despite its eentrality, however, a comprehensive and consistent analysis has yet to be forthcoming.

Scholars have tended to take sides — generalizing upon particular applications. Despite the rather straightforward style of these texts, closer inspection reveals stratification in a number of ways, i.e. (1) as a chronicle, they span almost half a century of Gotama Buddha's life; (2)

by variations in style, syntax and formulation of doctrine; and (3) anattä is itself a

multifaceted concept operative on more than one level of discourse carrying epistemological, ontological, psycho-ethical and soteriological import.

In early Buddhism, the concepts of self, not-self, self-reference and personality are

intertwined. In the Nikäyas, these two concepts interrelate in various ways. At times, they are identical, contradictory and asymmetrical. While attä has currency in both conventional and philosophical discourse, anattä has currency only in the latter. There are two aspects to the

attä concept: (1) the conventional self — which Buddhism does not deny; and (2) the

metaphysical self — to which the meaningful ascription of a referent is not possible — at

times, either because unverifiable or else unintelligible.

A. Wezlcr/E. Hammerschmidt (Hrsg.): Proceedings of the XXXII Intemational Congress for Asian and Nonh African Studies, Hamburg, 25th-30th August 1986 (ZDMG-Suppl. 9).

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632 Panel 6

The body of the paper is divided into 4 parts:

(1) "Historical Backdrop": Anattä emerges against the backdrop of attä. The concept of anattä seems to have been more a reaction to prevailing tendencies than to any specific

view of attä. It is just as true to say that Buddha never categorically denies the

existence of attä, as it is to say that the existence of an animating principle is always

regarded as plausible. Buddhism holds anattä up against the speculative excesses of

earlier Brahmanical thought, not to replace one with the other, but to show both as

transparent.

(2) "The Concept of Personality as a Function of Dependent Origination" : An analysis of the cognitive relation vis-ä-vis the models of the citta-vithi, dvädasangabhavacakka and paficakhandhas.

(3) "The Linguistic Turn": T as an indexical term, the use of nitattha and neyyattha forms of discourse, indeterminability, and the reification of sufifiatä.

(4) "Meditation and the Soteriological Imperative": anattä is both the awareness of the emptiness (sufifiatä) of being and the presence of emptiness.

Anattä can be viewed in various ways depending upon the context. It can be: (1) a fiction,

metaphysical abstraction, or null class — a name to which nothing corresponds; (2) a name

denoting the absence of being in things; (3) following the middle path — that which is neither existent nor non-existent; (4) an object of meditation, negatively considered, that which is empty (sufiüata); positively considered, anattä is the lawful flow of events and processes

(paticcasamupäda); (5) a necessary moral postulate; and (6) a heuristic device with a

therapeutic orientation exorcised to dispel certain ideas.

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Panel 7 633

Yoshitomo Takahashi

Symbolism ami Locality in Japanese Suicide: Mt. Fuji's Black Forest

There are a number of places throughout the world where many people commit suicide, such

as the Golden Gate Bridge, Niagara Falls and the Eiffel Tower (Fuse, 1985). Mt. Fuji has

been a symbol of faith for centuries in Japan and is associated with many myths, folktales and religious ascetic practices. Aokigahara-jukai (Jukai), a dense forest at the foot of Mt. Fuji, is known to be the leading suicide location in Japan, about 30 people committing suicide there every year (Takahashi, 1986). It is believed that, if a person once entered Jukai, it would be impossible to fmd a way out.

A short history of Jukai as the suicide site, cases of suicide and attempted suicide in Jukai and several cases of psychogenic amnesia after failing to commit suicide there were reported in the presentation.

The meanings of death in Jukai are interpreted as follows: 1) Mt. Fuji still has certain

symbolic value to Japanese people these days. 2) Since suicidal ideation and sympathy

towards other suicides subconsciously exist among people who are at high risk of suicide,

reports of suicide in Jukai may trigger others. 3) People tried to purify and beautify their

death by committing suicide in Jukai. 4) They felt as if Jukai were a sanctuary where they

were accepted, their suicide was allowed, and they could easily kill themselves. 5) They

travelled from far-away places to Jukai and they repeatedly reconfirmed their will to take their own lives on the long way to Jukai. 6) Although suicide itself is a purely individual act, they wished to share the same place with others and to belong to the same group by choosing Jukai as their suicide site. 7) They wished to disappear without being noticed or disturbed in Mt.

Fuji's dense forest.

Jukai represents a "closed" and wide space where a suicide's body might never be discovered and where one could literally disappear, as opposed to other well-known spots that are "open"

and limited in their extent, where one's body would be relatively easily discovered and which would allow one to show hatred or aggression toward others through death. Suicide in Jukai, in general, is a form of death in which people express less hatred toward others, but rather wish to die quietly without being noticed or disturbed.

Bibliography

Fuse, T.: Suicide and Culture Sincho-sha, Tokyo, 1985.

Takahashi, Y.: "Attempted Suicide in Aokigahara-jukai" Yamanashi Medical Joumal 1, 23- 28, 1986.

Takahashi, Y.: "Two Cases of Prolonged Generalized Amnesia: Factors Relating to its

Prolongation and Suicidal Risk" Japanese Joumal of Clinical Psychiatry 15, 1535- 1541, 1986.

A, Wezler/E. Hammerschmidt (Hrsg.): Proceedings of the XXXII International Congress for Asian and North African Studies, Hamburg, 25th-30th August 1986 (ZDMG-SuppI. 9).