Communicating Agents in Social Networks
Roland Mühlenbernd, University of Tübingen
In this talk I’ll present a game-theoretical model for communication among agents, also known as asignaling game(Lewis, 1969). In a couple of research projects I applied signaling games in combination with learning dynamics to multi-agent systems to simulate and analyze various issues, for example
· the population-wide communicative behavior of agents embedded in social network structures
· the strategic communication of agents with different social statuses against invading agents
· the dynamics for mutual consent in a population of innovative agents
· the robustness of signaling equilibria (Nash equilibria in signaling games) in structured populations
The talk will conclude with prospective research directions for possible com- binations of these topics and those of the Prague research groups.
References.
Lewis (1969), Convention. A philosophical study. Havard University Press.
1