Wissenschaftszentrums Berlin für Sozialforschung
FS m 94-202
Cultural Conditions of the Transition to Liberal Democracy
in Central and Eastern Europe
Dieter Fuchs Edeltraud Roller
Berlin, November 1994
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH (WZB) Reichpietschufer 50, D 10785 Berlin,
Telefon (030) 25 49 1-0
Following the introduction of democratic institutions in the countries of central and eastern Europe, the question of the consolidation of these newly implemented democracies arises.
One of the most important conditions for consolidation is support for democracy from the community of citizens in the respective countries. In the theoretical frame of reference of this analysis, it is postulated that, although high initial support is to be expected, only enduring positive experience with the reality of democracy makes this a stable attitude.
Only where this is the case can one speak of a consolidated democracy. The empirical analysis on the basis of representative surveys in 11 central and eastern European countries (conducted between 1990 and 1991, in East Germany 1992) indicates that there is indeed initial approval of democracy as a specific form of political order. But it also shows that there was no positive feedback from experience with the reality of democracy to sustain this initial support. The reality of democracy was judged to be bad in all countries. A cau- sal analysis makes it clear that the respondents' negative assessment of the reality of de- mocracy in their own countries depends primarily on the perceived performance of the respective governments. In view of the problems all governments in central and eastern European countries were and are facing, the positive feedback necessary to consolidate democracy in these countries is unlikely to manifest itself. The question of the consolida- tion of democracy in central and eastern Europe is accordingly still an open one.
Zusammenfassung
Nach der Einführung demokratischer Institutionen in den Ländern Mittel- und Osteuropas stellt sich die Frage nach der Konsolidierung dieser neu-implementierten Demokratien.
Eine der wichtigsten Bedingungen für diese Konsolidierung ist die Unterstützung der De- mokratie durch die Gemeinschaft der Bürger in den einzelnen Ländern. Im theoretischen Bezugsrahmen der Analyse wird postuliert, daß anfänglich zwar eine hohe Unterstützung erwartbar ist, daß diese sich aber erst durch andauernde positive Erfahrungen mit der Wirklichkeit der Demokratie zu einer stabilen Einstellung verfestigt. Nur wenn letzteres der Fall ist, kann von einer konsolidierten Demokratie gesprochen werden. Die empirische Analyse auf der Grundlage von repräsentativen Umfragen in 11 Ländern Mittel- und Ost- europas (Erhebungszeitpunkt: 1990-1991, in Ostdeutschland 1992) zeigt, daß die anfäng- liche Zustimmung zur Demokratie als einer spezifischen Form der politischen Ordnung tatsächlich existierte. Sie zeigt aber auch, daß ein positiver Feedback von den Erfahrungen mit der Wirklichkeit der Demokratie auf diese anfängliche Unterstützung nicht stattfinden
Demokratie im eigenen Land vor allem von der perzipierten Performanz der jeweiligen Regierungen abhängt. Angesichts des Problemdrucks, dem sich alle Regierungen in den Ländern Mittel- und Osteuropas gegenübersahen und noch gegenübersehen, ist der für die Konsolidierung der Demokratie in diesen Ländern notwendige positive Feedback wenig wahrscheinlich. Die Frage der Konsolidierung der Demokratie in den Ländern Mittel- und Osteuropas ist demnach noch nicht entschieden.
1. Outline of the Problem, 1 2. Theoretical Framework 3
2.1 The Concept o f Political Culture i n the Present Discussion 3 2.2 A General Model of the Legitimation of Democracy and a Concept
of Political Culture 5 2.3 Specifications of the General Model 11
3. Empirical Analysis 14 3.1 Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Indicators 14
3.2 Empirical Dimensions 19 3.3 Support for Democracy 22
3.3.1 Support for the Culture of Democracy 22 3.3.2 Support for the Structure of Democracy 26 3.3.3 Support for the Performance of Democracy 29
3.4 A Model of the Performance of Democracy 35
4. Summary and Conclusions 41
1. Outline of the Problem
The processes of social change in central and eastern European countries still present a challenge to social scientific analysis. They permit the application, testing, and modification of the most diverse theories and concepts. In other words, they offer an opportunity to further our knowledge. Of the issues inviting examination, Ekiert (1991, 285) believes the problem of the transition to liberal democracy to be the most interesting one from a theoretical point of view and the most relevant from a political perspective.
This transition becomes a problem primarily when attainment of the final phase in the process, seen by D i Palma (1990) as the consolidation of the newly established institutional structure of liberal democracy, is subject to uncertainty. Such uncertainty is reduced i f a modernization theory frame of reference is applied. In so far as social change in central and eastern Europe is attributed to modernization processes, consolidation w i l l be a likely outcome. In a recent study, Inglehart (1992) for example postulates the gradual convergence of all developed industrial societies towards three central elements:
democratic political institutions, a free market economy, and liberal religious, social, and sexual norms. Gibson, Duch and Tedin (1992) take a similar, though somewhat less affirmative view, basing their argument on, among others, Hauslohner (1989) and Lapidus (1989). They see modernization processes in industrial societies as contributing to the acceptance of democratic values and thus to the consolidation of the democratic order.
They believe that the surprisingly strong support for democratic values they recorded in Moscow as early as 1990 can be explained in terms of such modernization processes.
Ekiert (1991) develops a far more sceptical perspective. He regards the functioning and consolidation of a democratic order as only one of several possible developments in the transition process, and not even as the most likely one. He sees two other variants as being at least as likely. The first is the "formation of new non-democratic political regimes"
(Ekiert 1991, 288). He refers to them as new because he excludes a return to the recently abandoned state-socialist regimes. As far as non-democratic regimes are concerned, Ekiert
* This article stems from the project "Political Culture, Political and Economic Orientations in Central and Eastern Europe during Transition to Democracy 1990 -1992". It will be published in a volume edited by Samuel H. Barnes, Laszk) Bruzst and Janos Simon, the initiators and coordinators of the project.
is thinking primarily of authoritarian types. The second variant is a sort of "anarchization"
(Ekiert 1991, 287) of society, which can also come about within the framework of democratic and market economy institutions. These institutions would then have little binding effect on the actions of members of these societies. Ekiert (1991, 310f.) states the main reason for his scepticism to be the enormous pressure exerted by problems concomitant to the transition process in central and eastern European countries. This is due primarily to the need simultaneously to "democratize the polity" and "marketize the economy", and to both the economic and the social crises that have to be mastered at the same time.
We adopt Ekiert's view for three reasons. First, we consider that Ekiert has convincingly demonstrated the barriers to consolidation. Second, there are sufficient instances of a breakdown in democratic regimes under similar conditions, also in relatively highly developed societies. In Europe we need mention only Italy and Germany prior to the Second World War, and Greece in the post-war period. Third, modernization theory allows for the possibility of partial modernization. This can, for example, mean that the economic system modernizes to become a market economy, but that modernization towards liberal democracy and liberal values fails to occur. Such developments are indicated in a number of Asian countries. The Western model of complete modernization on all three dimensions mentioned by Inglehart (1992) is thus not the only one possible nor the only one existing.
Differing views on liberal values and norms, in particular, constitute one of the sources of the "clash of civilizations", which Huntington (1993) regards as one of the most important cleavages world society w i l l be facing for the near future.
Especially i f the outcome of the transition processes in central and eastern European countries is considered to be open, social scientific analysis faces at least three issues: first, determining the factors that play a role in attaining the goal —• that is to say the consolidation of liberal democracy; second, understanding the mode of operation of these factors; and third, evaluating further developments on the basis of the empirical analysis of these factors. The following study will focus on analysing the salience of cultural factors in the process of transition. The subject of our investigation w i l l thus be the cultural conditions of the transition to liberal democracy in central and eastern Europe. By cultural conditions we mean not the entire cultural spectrum but only political culture.
With regard to political culture, however, two basic aspects are controversial. On the one hand the more general aspect of the analytical and explanatory usefulness of the concept, and on the other the more specific aspect of the salience of the concept for explanatory ventures within the framework of the transition process. D i Palma (1990) and Przeworski (1986) assess the importance of political culture for the transition process as rather low, whereas Gibson, Duch and Tedin (1992), Kaase (1993) and Toka (1994) regard it as a
relevant factor in the transition process. The most unequivocal evaluation is given by Gibson, Duch and Tedin (1992,330): "This article is grounded in the basic assumption that processes of change are dependent on the political culture of the polity. (...) Though cultural theory does not provide a complete explanation of political change, culture un- doubtedly influences the process mightily." We assume that a possible reason for the controversial status of political culture as a factor in explaining the transition process is the more general aspect mentioned above, namely conceptual vagueness. In the following section we therefore intend to develop a number of theoretical ideas on the ways in which the concept of political culture can be made fruitful for analysing the transition process. A series of empirical studies based on case analyses and macro data have already shown that certain cultural factors play a role in the stabilization and persistence of democracies (see inter alios Grew 1978; Linz 1978; Lichbach 1981; Lipset 1981).
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 The Concept of Political Culture in the Present Discussion
Within the framework of empirical social research, the concept of political culture was introduced by Almond and Verba (1963). Despite numerous critical comments on their concept, their understanding of political culture still prevails in most studies undertaken within the empirical research paradigm. On the most general level, political culture is defined as "the subjective orientation to politics" (Verba 1965, 315) or as the
"psychological or subjective dimension of politics" (Almond 1980, 26). A certain particularization of this subjective element of politics is provided by the following definition: "Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings about politics current in a nation at a given time" (Almond and Powell 1978, 25).
It is especially this definition that makes Almond and Verba's concept of political culture so attractive for empirical analysis. Survey data can be used for analysis without further ado, and more or less every political attitude recorded can be subsumed under the concept of political culture, thus investing it with a certain theoretical sanctity. But it is also this definition that draws criticism. Dittmer (1977) refers to the concept of political culture as a "catch-all term" or a "blurred conception". In a critical review, Kaase (1983) used a graphic metaphor to characterize the situation, describing it as "trying to nail a pudding to the wall".
In investigating the transformation of central and eastern European countries, Gibson, Duch and Tedin (1992) place themselves quite explicitly in the tradition of Almond and
Verba's political culture concept. But as a consequence, we believe their otherwise very elaborated analysis has also inherited the problems posed by the extremely comprehensive and thus analytically vague meaning of the concept. The authors themselves recognize the difficulty when they state: "there is little agreement on a list of specific cultural attributes that is conducive to democratic development" (Gibson, Duch and Tedin 1992, 331f.). They attempt to solve the problem by referring back to Dahl. In the two works by Dahl that they cite (1971; 1989), the author does, indeed, offer a list of the various factors promoting the development of democracies, or polyarchies as Dahl terms them. However, we feel it is not a matter only of listing plausible factors, even though this ddes restrict the spectrum of possible variables. In order to make the concept of political culture analytically and explanatorily fruitful, the issue must be specified, the factors relevant to it must be selected, and an idea both about the relations between these factors and about their mode of operation must be developed. However, this was unnecessary for Dahl's analysis because his principal interest was not to explain the development of polyarchies. A well- founded list of factors was therefore sufficient for his purpose. But such a list is not yet a theory, but rather a preliminary stage in the formation of a theory. We thus feel that by taking recourse to Dahl's list, Gibson, Duch and Tedin do not offer an adequate solution to the problem. We will later be taking up certain of Dahl's theoretical considerations in another fashion.
Almond himself indicates a direction in which the general concept of political culture can be converted for concrete analytical purposes. To begin with he states: "Political culture is not a theory; it refers to a set of variables which may be used in the construction of theories" (Almond 1980, 26). Which theory is to be constructed depends on the issue in hand. Almond turns again to the central question of 'civic culture', that of the stability or persistence of democracies. In this regard, he and Powell differentiate political culture into system culture, process culture, and policy culture (Almond and Powell 1978). On the question of persistence, system culture is the especially relevant factor, and the most important category of system culture is the legitimacy of the system. Since the consolidation of democracies in central and eastern European countries is to a large extent identical with their persistence, we remain true to the direction indicated by Almond and Powell in proposing, in the next section, a model of the legitimation of democracy. I t is in this context that we also advance the definition of political cultural underlying our empirical analysis.
2.2 A General Model of the Legitimation of Democracy and a Concept of Political Culture
In elaborating a model of the legitimation of a democracy and a concept of political culture, we have to a large extent relied on theory developed by Parsons (1969; 1971).1 Parsons postulates his categories within the context of a comprehensive theory of society.
This has the advantage that they relate to one another systematically, thus mutually delimiting and specifying one another. Another advantage is the relative ease with which the approaches espoused by Almond, Verba, and Powell can be integrated. Despite the ab- stract nature of Parsons' theory, it is thus possible to establish a link to empirical research.
Easton's (1965b; 1975) concept of political support, which provides the frame of reference for most empirical studies on political support also points to the potential for empirical application displayed by elements of Parsons' theory. Easton adopts fundamental theoretical elements from Parsons.
Parsons himself does not use the term political culture. But he analyses the relationship between structure and culture in social systems. And since the political system is a social system, or to be more exact, a primary subsystem of society, specification for the political system is a relatively 'easy matter. This is all the more true since Parsons himself formulated the key aspects in his legitimation concept.
The point of reference of our study is the consolidation of the democracies in central and eastern Europe. When a democracy is consolidated it is also stable or persistent. The concept of persistence was proposed by Easton (1965a, 84) in order to avoid the connotation of static continuance associated with the term stability. Persistence is perfectly compatible with change, i f the latter does not affect the constitutive elements in a social system. In many cases persistence is possible only through limited change, implying ad- justment to the changing environmental conditions of a system. Eckstein and Gurr (1975,
465) refer to the same state of affairs as durability. The function of political culture in the persistence of a political system is stated in general terms by Almond and Verba. A political system is persistent when the culture and the structure of the system are congruent (Almond and Verba 1963, 21, 36). With the aid of Parsons' theory we will explain more exactly what is meant by congruence in this context.
The structure of a democratic system consists of certain patterns of roles and rules (procedures) relating in differing ways to the production of collectively binding decisions.
Executive, legislative, and judicial roles can be distinguished. Parsons (1969, 126) describes roles that are strategically important for a social system as institutions. He
1 In applying Parsons' theoretical considerations, we waive derivation from the A G I L schema, because in our opinion this would to some extent produce very artificial analytical constructs.
regards institutional patterns as the 'backbones' of a social system. The institutional patterns defining liberal democracy are the institutions of representation and of party competition. We will be looking at this in greater detail at a later point. In modern democracies, the function of roles and the definition of rules are laid down in the constitution (Parsons 1969, 207; 1971, 18). Besides these legally formalized roles and rules, however, every democracy also operates in accordance with informal rules holding between actors (Easton 1990, 66f., 87; Fuchs 1993a, 87ff.). Among other things, these informal rules can effect a distinction between the constitutionally based claim of democracy and reality. We w i l l also be returning to this question.
' Easton has developed a comparable concept of political structure, which he refers to as regime. Easton's (1965b, 191ff.) regime is composed of role patterns, but, in contrast to Parsons' concept, of values as well. Parsons' approach is more appropriate for our analysis, since he distinguishes analytically between the structural level and the value level (cultural level). It is only on this basis that a meaningful account of congruence between structure and culture can be given. Moreover, this distinction permits a plausible legitimation concept to be derived.
Legitimation justifies a given structure. Such justification provides reasons for the rights and duties, as well as the obligations and prohibitions defined in the role norms (Parsons 1969,12). These reasons and thus the justification relate to the values of the social system.
Values are the constitutive elements of culture, and to this extent legitimation has a cultural basis (Parsons 1969, 43). The values forming the basis for legitimizing the struc- ture of a social system are the conceptions of the desirable type of this social system (Parsons 1971, 9). In our case we are dealing with the political system in the shape of a liberal democracy. Legitimation is thus defined as the justification of the structure of (liberal) democracy by the values of (liberal) democracy. This is expressed in Figure 1 by the arrow linking values of democracy and structure of democracy.
But legitimation is not a state but a process, and one that is performed by actors. There have to be actors through whom legitimation occurs and for whom legitimation occurs. A more precise account of this requires introduction of the concept of institutionalization.
A social system is a system of action, deriving its reality in the final resort only from the actions of its members. The values (culture) and the roles (structure) of the social system should accordingly be binding on these actions. This being so, the structure and the values of a social system can also be described as its normative order. As with the legitimation process, the two dimensions are located on different levels, structure being relatively closer to behaviour than are values.
Structure and values are rendered binding by institutionalization, and it is only as institutionalized elements that they become constitutive to the social system (Parsons 1971,
6). The first level in the institutionalization of a democracy in modern societies is its implementation by the constitution (Parsons 1971, 18). The values of a society are generally set forth in the form of basic rights, the structural elements being specified on this basis as legal rules governing action. The analytical difference between the structure and the values of a democracy are thus also expressed by the constitution. The values and structure implemented by the constitution and the performance pursuant to them constitute the polity (see Figure 1). We w i l l discuss the concept of performance later.
Constitutionally regulating the actions of members of a democratic system entails sanctioning non-compliance. This means the enforcement of legal norms, without which no political system can be stabilized. This level of institutionalization is, however, insufficient for stability in either a democracy or any other form of political system, as the collapse of the socialist systems in central and eastern Europe have shown.
Figure 1: A general model of the legitimation of democracy
Community Polity
Hi
Political culture Commitment
to
L values j
Legitimacy of democracy
Political structure
Values of democracy
Structure of democracy
Political performance Evaluation
of performance
BO
J3
Performance of democracy
Normative order
of democracy
The second level of institutionalization is the consensus of members of the social system on its structure and values (Parsons 1969, 126; 1971, 9f.). The set of members of a social
system is referred to as a community,2 and the members of the community o f a democracy as citizens. Relative to structure, the consensus of the citizens can be called legitimacy, and in relation to values commitment (see Figure 1). Both are variable factors, and a democracy is institutionalized in proportion to the depth of commitment to values and the degree of legitimacy of its structure. Strong commitment to values is a precondition for the legitimacy of the structure, because legitimation occurs in reference to values. On the individual level, legitimacy is a certain type of attitude (specifically political support), the source of which is a subjective conviction that the structure of democracy corresponds to the values one personally considers to be right (Fuchs 1989, 25f£; 1993b, 235ff.). I t becomes characteristic of the community through distribution of the citizens' legitimacy convictions. Democracy enjoys a high degree of legitimacy where a clear majority of citizens have a positive conviction of legitimacy.
On the basis of the discussion so far, the political culture of a democracy can be determined on two levels. The first is that of structurally relevant values which are legally codified by the constitution. The second level is that of community commitment to the implemented values. Where there is a high degree of commitment, political culture is institutionalized. Common to both of these levels is a concern for values. And it is these values that are central to our conception of culture. The political culture of a democracy thus consists of implemented and institutionalized values. These values representing conceptions of the desirable type of democracy. However, the two dimensions of political culture are not located on the same level as Figure 1 might suggest. A relationship of precondition and stabilization exists between the two. The values of a democracy are first selected and implemented before the question of commitment arises.3 I f a value pattern as a conception of the desirable type of democracy is implemented, it is essential for the consolidation of democracy that the members of the community also feel bound by it. The more pronounced the bond, the stronger the institutionalization of values. The extent of such commitments can also be interpreted as congruence, to take up a concept introduced at a earlier stage. Only institutionalized political culture stabilizes implemented values and contributes as a whole to the consolidation of democracy.
What has been said about political culture also applies to political structure. The first level of political structure is roles as defined with binding effect by the constitution. This level represents implemented political structure. To the extent that this structure is
2 This simple definition of a community suffices for the purposes of our study. It requires only a definition of a membership rule stating who belongs and who does not.
3 With regard to selection and implementation, the interesting issue of the relationship with the general culture of a society can be addressed, referred to by Parsons (1971, 9f) as 'cultural system'. The embedding of a democracy's values in general culture is also important in stabilizing a democracy.
However, this perspective would inflate our study to too great an extent; moreover, we do not dispose of data on the subject.
legitimized by the community, political structure is institutionalized. The political structure of a democracy accordingly consists of implemented and institutionalized roles.
These roles representing normative expectations concerning the action of political actors.
The culture and structure of a democracy together constitute its normative order. Within this normative order, two levels of institutionalization exist: the first level is that of implementation of both the values and the structure of democracy by the constitution.4 And the second level is the consensus of the community on values (commitment) and structure (legitimacy). Only when the central elements of the culture and structure of a democracy are implemented by law and have won consensus among the citizens can these central elements be regarded as the institutions of a democracy. And when such institutions exist in a country, we can speak of a stable democracy. We w i l l now shift our analytical perspective, directing our attention no longer towards the two institutionalization levels of the normative order of democracy but towards the relationship between this normative order and the actual actions performed by the actors within this context. This level w i l l be referred to as the performance of democracy. In our model, the performance concept relates not in a general or indifferent sense to the actions of polity actors, but contains a question.5 This question arises from the relationship of the normative order of democracy to real political action: to what extent do the actions of actors satisfy the normative expectations laid down in the constitution? To the extent that this is the case, the normative order transforms into actual action, and constitutional norms approach constitutional reality.
Since the holders of decision-making positions in a democracy are selected by legal procedures, this selection also effects the legalization of their decision making. The arrow
in Figure 1 accordingly leads from the structure of democracy to the performance of democracy. Legalization also involves the demand that the members of the community accept the decisions actually made, even i f they do not agree with their substance. This type of acceptance of binding decisions even where the substance is disapproved is the real proof of a functioning democracy. However, the citizens' willingness to accept decisions is determined not only by the legality of the decisions but also by the concrete way in which decision makers act. Conformity with the rules on the part of polity actors is not yet ensured by the constitutionally defined rules of the game and the sanctions relating to this definition in the event of the rules being violated. Numerous examples can be cited. A
4 Or by functional equivalents to the constitution, which does not exist in codified form in every modern democracy (e.g. the United Kingdom). A written constitution can find a functional equivalent in, for example, rules passed down through history that, as a consequence of this tradition, exert a binding influence of the political actors. Another functional equivalent can be written documents other that a constitution.
5 A comprehensive discussion of the concept of performance in the analysis of political systems is to be found in Almond and Powell (1978, Chapter 11).
recent instance is that of Italy, where corruption had developed into informal rules governing interactions among the political elite, which is, of course, not constitutional.
The perceived difference between constitutional norms and constitutional reality forms one of the bases on which citizens evaluate the performance of democracy. This applies all the more where the normative order is regarded by citizens as legitimate. In the case of Italy, the permanent violations of the rules by the political elite, violations which have taken, on the character of established informal rules, did not remain hidden from the community. In comparison to other western European countries, this led in Italy to a con- siderably more negative evaluation by the citizens of the performance of democracy (Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson 1994). This negative evaluation by citizens is likely to be one of the reasons for the recent structural reforms of the Italian political system. They affected not the fundamental institutions of democracy but were limited to structural arrangements relating essentially to the mode of selection of decision makers.
Let us summarize our discussion of political performance. The decisive criterion for the performance of democracy is, as the model in Figure 1 shows, the extent of agreement between constitutional norms and constitutional reality. This criterion becomes one of the standards by which the community assesses the performance of democracy. Depending on the outcome of the evaluation, there is either positive or negative feedback to the community's legitimacy convictions and value commitments. This feedback stabilizes or erodes the community consensus on its democracy, and for this reason has important consequences for the consolidation of a democracy. There is, however, a factor that complicates citizen evaluation of democratic performance. Rule conformity by polity actors is in fact only one of the relevant evaluation criteria. We w i l l be returning to this aspect in the course of the study.
We will conclude our theoretical analysis at this stage with reference to three implications for the current discussion on political culture. First, political culture can be localized not only on the level of citizens' attitudes towards values, but relates also to the values implemented in the constitution, which have nothing to do with attitudes. Second, the congruence relevant for the persistence of a system is less that between structure and culture than that between polity and community. The essential point in this regard is the extent to which the normative order of the polity implemented by the constitution generates consensus among citizens, this being the only way it can achieve stable institutionalization. Third, the legitimacy of the system is no longer attributed to political culture, and can thus not constitute the central category of political culture. It is rather a category of the political structure, and within this dimension relates to a certain type of support of the community for the structure of the political system.
2.3 Specifications of the General Model
Before we come to the empirical analysis, the general model shown in Figure 1 must be specified in two respects. This specification will then be transformed into two hypotheses providing the background for the empirical analysis.
The first specification concerns the constitution of community consensus with .the values and structure of democracy. Parsons (1969, 15, 36; 1971, 6) believes that commitment to values occurs through internalization of values by individuals. Internalization takes place through socialization in the context of family and school. This is also the case for the internalization of legitimacy convictions (Easton and Dennis 1969). The addressees of socialization are future citizens, and the agents performing socialization are parents and teachers. The socialization process is based not only on affective mechanisms but also on reasons given for why the values and structure of democracy are the right choice. The socialization agents derive this justification from memories of their own socialization and from their current intake of information. One of the most important sources of this information intake is the constant legitimation effort undertaken by the political elite vis-a- vis the community. The legitimation of the political elite vis-a-vis the citizens as members of the community is thus assumed by the socialization agents in the course of their socialization activities. It constitutes something in the way of second-order legitimation.
This brief sketch of the internalization of values commitment and legitimation convictions naturally applies only under the conditions of an already consolidated democracy. It is based on Parsons and Easton, who in this regard both think very much in psychoanalytical categories. However, from a learning theory point of view, internalization occurring through socialization processes is to be regarded rather as a predisposition for individual experience in adulthood. Even where socialization takes place under the favourable conditions of an established democracy, a positive assessment of the values and structure of democracy is not secured for all time but is either weakened or strengthened by feedback from experience with the reality of democracy. We will assume this to be the case, thus inferring that citizen commitment to the values and legitimacy of structure is constituted and sustained by both socialization and experience.
Socialization can be more or less successful, and experience can be positive or negative.
For this reason, consensus among citizens must also be regarded as a variable factor. The criterion of variability is determined by the extent to which consensus on the values and structure of democracy has become anchored in the belief system of the individual.
Newcomb, Turner and Converse (1965) term this centrality. In order conceptually to identify and also to simplify the different degrees of anchoring, we w i l l resort to the differentiation proposed by Wright (1976, 268f.), who distinguishes between consent,
assent, and dissent. We take political support as the superordinate. Easton (1975, 436) un- derstands political support to mean an evaluating attitude of an individual towards a political object. Consent is a type of positive support, which in the sense of Newcomb, Turner and Converse is anchored in the individual belief system and is highly central to it.
Dissent means the same, except that it is a matter of negative support. The type that we are interested in within our context is assent, which, although expressing a positive assessment, is indicative of a low degree of anchoring or centrality for the individual.
Figure 2 shows the two objects of the normative order of democracy, which constitute the objects of citizen support. Citizen consent to values is, in accordance with the general model (see Figure 1), described as commitment and citizen consent to structure as legitimacy. As explained above, commitment to values and legitimacy of structure are attitudes that are also anchored in citizens' belief systems. As attitudes, both types of political support relate primarily to the individual level. However, the decisive factor for the consolidation of democracy is how these attitudes are distributed within the community. The crucial question for the consolidation of democracy in central and eastern Europe is thus whether a majority of the community in each country develops a commitment to the values of democracy and whether the structure of democracy gains legitimacy.
Figure 2: Types of support for democracy
Support
Objects
Consent Assent Dissent
Democratic
values Commitment
Democatic
structure Legitimacy
The formulation of this question shows that we assume this had not yet occurred at the point in time when the data we are analysing were recorded. The surveys took place in all 11 countries covered by the comparative study between 1990 and 1991 (1992 in East Germany), thus relatively soon after the implementation of at least some fundamental structural elements of (liberal) democracy. In all eleven countries, at least one competitive
election had taken place by the survey date. A t this time, both preconditions for the anchoring of the values and structure of democracy among the members of the community could not have been fulfilled. In the first place, their socialization had taken place under the conditions of a socialist regime. In the second place, the experience citizens had had with the reality of democracy had not been so extensive that the anchoring of democratic values and structure can plausibly be assumed. The necessity of positive experience with the performance of democracy for its stabilization is also stressed by Weil (1993, 197f.), who accordingly argues that "democratic values should not be strong at the point of transition because they have not yet had time to grow". He introduces an additional aspect, namely comparison by the citizens with their former situation and with the situation in other countries. This seems to us to be a crucial point of view, which we w i l l be taking up and somewhat modifying in specifying our general model for analysing the processes of transition in central and eastern Europe.
The introduction of new democratic institutions in the countries of central and eastern Europe occurred on the one hand as a result of the breakdown of the old system, which at the same time was an expression of failure. But on the other hand, the breakdown also happened with reference to the more successful alternative system represented by Western countries. Consequently, the form of the two important subsystems of Western societies, liberal democracy and market economy, were and are the points of reference for the transition processes. Applying this to the citizens of central and eastern European countries, we can thus assume initial support for liberal democracy and market economy.
This initial support can be assumed on the basis of citizens drawing comparison between the former socialist societies and current Western societies. Weil (1993, 198) has labeled this process of comparison which is clearly favourable to the latter "demonstration effect".
This effect is based rather on information about the new type of society than on experience, let alone socialization. Although positive attitudes exist, it therefore cannot be assumed that democracy has been institutionalized through citizen commitment to democratic values and the legitimacy of structure. We can make this apparently contradictory state of affairs clearer with the help of the types of support distinguished in Figure 2, formulating a first hypothesis for this purpose: Shortly after implementation of democratic institutions, there is a high degree of assent to democratic values and the democratic structure in central and eastern European countries. Although this type of support is expressive of a positive assessment, it is nonetheless superficial, thus being relatively volatile in the face of concrete experience. This leads us directly to a second hypothesis: The assent of citizens in central and eastern European countries to the values and structure of democracy transforms into consent to the extent that positive experience with the performance of democracy is obtained. I f this is the case, then, in the conceptual
terminology we have chosen, the normative order o f democracy would be institutionalized and democracy consolidated. The second hypothesis and corresponding model are shown in Figure 3. The second hypothesis also represents the second specification of the general model.
Figure 3: A model of the consolidation of democracy in central and eastern Europe
Assent Consent Democratic
values
Democratic structure
High
High
Strong
Strong
Institutionalized normative order
Time t l t l + n
i
Democratic performance
a Immediately after the implementation of basic democratic institutions.
3. Empirical Analysis
3.1 Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Indicators
In the outline of the problem given in the first section, the cultural conditions of the transition to liberal democracy in central and eastern Europe were stated to be the subject of our study. We have used the term political culture in the usual survey-research sense.
However, our theoretical analysis provides greater precision. We analyse support for liberal democracy by the communities of these countries on all three theoretically defined levels: the culture, structure, and performance of liberal democracy. The subject of the study is thus the attitudinal conditions of the transition process. The cultural conditions are only one dimension of attitudinal conditions.
We will attempt empirically to clarify the two hypotheses formulated in the previous section as far as is possible on the basis of the data available. Because of the data situation, this is possible only to a limited extent. This qualification applies more particularly with regard to the second hypothesis than to the first. We will be dealing with these qualifications in greater detail in the course of our analysis. In this section the available
indicators will be introduced and assigned to the theoretical constructs. This presupposes that we have a more precise definition of what is to be understood by democracy. It is no longer enough to speak in general terms of culture, structure, and performance, and then simply to refer to Western democracies. What are in fact the constitutive elements of Western democracies that are also the points of reference for the processes of transition in countries of the East?
Western democracies are often referred to as liberal democracies, and we adopt this term in our study as well. An alternative designation is representative democracy. But the two terms merely stress different aspects of the same thing. Bollen (1993,1208) provides a brief but precise definition covering both aspects: " I define liberal democracy as the extent to which a political system allows political liberties and democratic rule". Powell (1992) sees liberal democracy in a very similar light. In our theoretical frame of reference, political liberties are to be assigned to the cultural level and democratic rule to the structural level. To understand what is meant by these terms, we turn to Dahl. On the basis of an historical and systematic analysis, Dahl (1971, 3; 1989, 233) develops seven requirements for a democracy among a large number of people. These relate on the one hand to political liberties (freedom of expression, associational autonomy, and alternative information), and on the other to party competition and the principle of representation (inclusive suffrage, free and fair elections, elected officials, and the right to run for office).
Dahl describes these as institutions; where they are implemented in a country with binding effect, he speaks of a polyarchy. According to Dahl, all Western democracies are polyarchies, or liberal democracies as we prefer to call them.
When introducing the institutions of polyarchy, Dahl does not explicitly distinguish between the levels of culture and structure. We have, however, explained in our theoretical frame of reference that this distinction is a useful one for our analysis. Even i f political liberties are implemented with binding effect by a constitution, they are still in the nature of general principles or values, and thus belong to political culture. But a democracy is realized in the final resort in the collectively binding decision-making processes, and for this reason institutions are necessary that relate to the procedural level. These are what Dahl calls the institutions of party competition and representation, and in our definition they are the structural components of a democracy. Dahl's polyarchical institutions, partly on the cultural level and partly on the structural level, together constitute the normative order of liberal democracy.
This normative order of liberal democracy must be distinguished from the reality existing in a given country. We call this level the performance of democracy (see Figure 1). The distinction is necessary for a number of reasons. First, there is room for interpretation in judging the extent to which the activities of political actors meet
normative expectations. It is only in borderline cases of obvious rule violation that this is negligible. Second, such violation cannot be ruled out despite the threat of legal penalties.
And third, normative expectations do not fully define the activities of political actors for every situation. There are very often degrees of leeway. I f the attitudinal conditions of the transition to liberal democracy in central and eastern Europe are to be analysed, the attitudes of citizens to the central objects of liberal democracy must be determined on all three theoretical dimensions, namely the culture, structure, and performance of liberal democracy.
Table 1 brings together the indicators contained in the survey we have analysed that can be assumed to measure, at least approximately, the attitudinal constructs we are interested in. The attitude objects addressed in the questions provide the basis for this assumption.
They permit most indicators to be assigned relatively clearly to the attitudinal constructs and theoretical dimensions. This face validity of the indicators is complemented by a dimensional analysis in the following section.
The two indicators of the cultural level relate to political liberties in Dahl's sense of the term. For all indicators, the response categories are given in brackets following the question. As is clear from the two cultural level indicators, respondents had to decide how strongly they associate the basic rights mentioned with democracy. Of central interest here is the cognitive understanding of democracy or the cognitive association of values with de- mocracy ( C I ) . It is not so much a matter of support for these values on the part of respondents, and not at all a matter of recording commitment to these values (C2). The survey contains no indicators for the latter. Nevertheless the question of adequate cognition of democracy is not a trivial one, since it is a precondition for commitment to the pertinent values. I f citizens were not to regard political liberties as essential elements of democracy, the question of commitment to such rights would not arise, and the ground would more or less cut from under the feet of democratic structural legitimacy, and thus indirectly of performance.
At the structural level we follow Dahl in distinguishing two constructs relating firstly to the institutions of representation and secondly to the institution of party competition. The central institutions of representation (SI) are elections and parliament. Elections select representatives who make collectively binding decisions on behalf of the citizens in parliament. In Table 1 an additional indicator is assigned to this attitudinal construct, referring in general terms to the type of democracy in Western countries (Q49a). Re- spondents may well relate this to the institutions of representation, but also to political liberties, to the institution of party competition, or to something quite different. The indicator in question has been assigned to this construct on the basis of the dimensional analysis yet to be discussed, and is thus ex post facto and not a priori.
Table 1: Support for liberal democracy - theoretical dimensions, attitudinal constructs, and empirical indicators
Theoretical
dimensions Attitudinal constructs Culture C I : Association of values
C2: Commitment to values Structure S I : Institutions of representation
S2: Institution of party competition
[S3: Implementation of institutions]
Performance P1: Functioning of democracy
P2: Effectiveness of democracy
P3: Performance of government
P4: Economic performance
Empirical indicators
Q l l a Political liberties e.g. freedom of speach, freedom of association (have a lot/
something/not much/nothing to do with democracy)
Q l l f The judges provide equal justice before the law (have a to/something/not much/nothing to do with democracy)
Q39 Elections are the best way to choose a govern- ment and the authorities of the country (yes/no) Q40 Necessity of a parliament (yes/no)
Q49a Our country needs a kind of development typical of the Western countries (agree/
disagree)
Q66 One-party vs multi-party system
Q54a We need political parties if we want democratic development (agree/disagree)
Q54c Parties provide opportunity to participate in political activities (agree/disagree)
Q49c We have got the same kind of democracy here as in Western European countries (agree/
disagree)
Q49e You can't say that democracy has already been accomplished in (country) (agree/disagree) Q12 Satisfaction with the way democracy is working
in our country today (1-4 = dissatisfied, 5-6 = neutral, 7-10 = satisfied)
Q53 Contented with the present state of democracy in our country (totally/certain/lMe/not at all) Q50 Problems of our country in democracy (will be
solved/will remain the same/will be getting more and more serious)
Q23 Satisfaction with the present government (1-4 = dissatisfied, 5-6 = neutral, 7-10 = satisfied) Q38 Trust in the government in our country (just
about always/most of the time/only some of the time/almost never)
Q13 The economic situation of the country during the period that the present government has been in power (improved'/get worse/the same) Q14 The economic situation of the country in the
next year (will improve/get worse/the same)
In a liberal democracy, selection of the citizens' representatives takes place within the context of competition between parties (S2). This implies two things. First, the political parties have to be understood as actors carrying and shaping political processes, and second, there has to be a two or multi-party system i f there is to be such a thing as party competition in the first place. The assigned indicators concern these two implications.
A t the structural level, a further attitudinal construct is specified, relating not to a central structural component of liberal democracy but to the extent of implementation of the institutions of liberal democracy in the country concerned (S3). Complete implementation of the institutions of liberal democracy is itself a component of the transition process. They are not introduced in one fell swoop. Citizens' evaluation of the reality of democracy in their country at any given time can therefore depend on perception of the degree to which democratic institutions have been implemented at the given point in time. The construct 'implementation of institutions' has been included to take this possibility into account.
The performance of democracy is covered by two constructs. The first of these represents a generalized evaluation of the functioning of democracy in the respondent's own country (PI). Since this is a generalized evaluation, the underlying reasons and sources are left open. For the consolidation and maintenance of a democracy, it would be best if citizens were to make use of the normative expectations embodied in the values and structure of democracy as standards for assessing performance. Real democracy would then be measured against criteria by means of which it can legitimate itself. But as empirical democracy research has shown, this is not always the case, and the degree of evaluation of an existing democracy on the basis of the values and norms of democracy as such is in its turn a contributing factor to the persistence of an existing democracy.
Increased demands are made on democracy in proportion to the saliency of other evaluation standards, rendering a positive evaluation of performance more difficult. Lipset has diagnosed the 'effectiveness of democracy' as one of the most important of these other factors, and the second construct on the performance dimension in Table 1 is named ac- cordingly (P2). Although Lipset (1981, 64) relates effectiveness to the outcomes of democratic processes, he refers not to the day-by-day actions of the governments concerned but to "the extent to which the system satisfies the basic functions of government". Linz (1978,20) develops a similar conception when he defines effectiveness as "the capacity of a regime to find solutions to the basic problems facing any political system". Dahl (1971, 144), too, stresses the importance of the "effectiveness of different regimes in dealing with the critical problems". Since basic problems have to be resolved in almost all central and eastern European countries, ranging from the integration of ethnic minorities to providing internal order and meeting basic economic needs, this factor is likely to play an important role in the evaluation of the performance of democracy by the
citizens. In a later analytical step, we will attempt to investigate this empirically with the aid of the indicator that appears to record this construct appropriately.
Within the framework of the performance dimension, a further two constructs are given, which do not relate to democracy but to the current government (P3) and economic situation in the respondent's country (P4). Both are constructs recording what Easton refers to as 'specific support'. One of the characteristics of a consolidated democracy, according to Easton, is the large independence of generalized support for this democracy from the diverse variants of specific support. Replacing the government through elections is the way in which dissatisfaction with the results imputable to politicians is worked off in conformity with the system. This mechanism is above all to prevent such dissatisfaction from shifting to the system level. But this characterization of a consolidated democracy does not permit the conclusion that what exists is what should exist. The effect of specific support on generalized support for democracy must therefore be regarded as an empirical question, to which we will be returning at a later stage.
In the following section, a dimensional analysis will examine the indicators to test the empirical tenability of the theoretically postulated attitudinal constructs. This will then provide the basis on which the extent of support for liberal democracy can be empirically analysed.
3.2 Empirical Dimensions
The empirical dimensions are determined by exploratory factor analysis. This analysis aims to provide information on the extent to which the differentiation postulated by the attitudinal constructs is indeed made in the communities of central and eastern European countries. The data for all eleven countries is pooled in the factor analysis. The reason for doing so is that we are interested primarily in general propositions on all countries rather than on the peculiarities of individual countries. The two hypotheses formulated in the previous section are accordingly general in nature, applying to the countries at issue in the aggregate. In the sections to come, we will be dealing repeatedly with differences between countries, but on the descriptive level only. Such description shows the extent to which the general hypotheses are tenable. The difference in size between national samples poses a problem for the pooled factor analysis. However, it is our assumption that the results are not distorted to a significant extent since the average sample size is about 1,000 respondents per country, some samples being a little below this figure and others a little above it. Deviations are unlikely to give rise to any systematic effects.
Table 2 shows the results of the exploratory factor analysis on the basis of these pooled data. Only the factor loadings of .25 or more are recorded. Nine attitudinal constructs were differentiated theoretically (see Table 1), and we have data on eight of these. Factor analysis extracted six factors correlating to a large extent with the postulated attitudinal constructs. Unexpectedly, "functioning of democracy1 (PI) and "performance of government" (P3) form a common factor. In principle, this can mean two things: either the citizens actually do not distinguish between these two objects or, i f they do draw a distinction, their evaluation of the one object has a considerable influence on their evaluation of the other. Since the stimuli for the two attitudinal constructs — democracy
Table 2: Exploratory factor analysis (pooled analysis)3
F l F2 F3 F4 F5 F 6 Culture
CI Association of values
Political liberties .77 Equality before the law .81 Structure
51 Institutions of representation
Elections .71 Parliament .54 Western model .34 .63
52 Institution of party competition
Multi-party system -.66 Political parties .79 Participation by parties .69 53 Implementation of institutions
Western European democracy
already implemented .33 -.66
Accomplishment of democracy .76 Performance
PI Functioning of democracy
Working of democracy -.68 Present state of democracy .71 P2 Effectiveness of democracy
Problem-solving capacity
of democracy .25 .31 .27 P3 Performance of government
Satisfaction with present government -.77
Trust in present government .74 P4 Economic performance
Economic situation (present) .77 Economic situation (future) .36 .68
Explained variance (in %) 18.1 12.4 7.1 6.2 6.0 6.0 Explained variance: Total 55.8
a Principal component analysis, orthogonal rotation, pairwise deletion. Only factor loadings & .25 shown.
and present government — are quite distinct, the second possibility seems to us to be the more plausible one. Also contrary to theoretical expectations, 'effectiveness of democracy' (P2) does not form a factor by itself, the corresponding indicator having loadings on several factors. This result presumably has to do with method, since, unlike the others, this
attitudinal construct has only one indicator available, making it relatively unlikely that an independent factor would be extracted.
Table 3: Exploratory factor analysis with three pre-defined factors (pooled analysis)3
F l F2 F3 Culture
CI Association of values Political liberties Equality before the law Structure
SI Institutions of representation Elections
Parliament Western model
S 2 Institution of party com petition Multi-party system
Political parties Participation by parties S3 Implementation of institutions
Western European democracy already implemented
Accomplishment of democracy Performance
PI Functioning of democracy
Working of democracy -.68 Present state of democracy .67 P2 Effectiveness of democracy
Problem-solving capacity
of democracy .33 .29 .31 P3 Performance of government
Satisfaction with present government -.76
Trust in present government .69 P4 Economic performance
Economic situation (present) .52 Economic situation (future) .61
Explained variance (in %) 18.3 12.4 7.1 Explained variance: Total 37.8
a Principal component analysis, orthogonal rotation, pairwise deletion. Only factor loadings & .25 shown.
Within our theoretical frame of reference, the various attitudinal constructs are subsumed under the dimensions of the culture, structure^ and performance of democracy. A further
.75 .81
.36
.41 .51 .31 -.60 .74 .58
factor analysis determines whether these more general theoretical dimensions are also reflected on the citizen attitudinal level. The empirical test assume that the culture, structure, and performance of democracy are second-order factors, hierarchically superior
to the attitudinal constructs (first-order factors). Adequate testing of such a model would require confirmatory factor analysis, explicitly specifying the two hierarchical levels. By introducing a restriction in the exploratory factor analysis, namely a three factor requirement, our procedure is quasi-confirmatory, achieving at least an approximation to adequate testing. The outcome expected of this factor analysis is that the three factors w i l l correspond to the theoretical dimensions (culture, structure, performance). As can be seen from the result of Table 3, this is indeed the case. Apparently, respondents distinguish in terms of the culture, structure, and performance of democracy. Once again, this solution offers no clear localization of the indicator for 'effectiveness of democracy' (P2).
Overall, the results of the two factor analyses invite the conclusion that the theoretically identified objects of the democratic system are also citizens' attitude objects in central and eastern European communities. There is noteworthy deviation from theoretical expectations in only one aspect: the two attitudinal constructs 'functioning of democracy' (PI) and 'performance of government' (P2) form one factor. We interpret this empirical result not to mean the existence of only one attitude but as the consequence of a strong causal effect of the evaluation of 'performance of government' on the evaluation of 'functioning of democracy'. The corresponding specification is undertaken in the model tested in section 3.4.
3.3 Support for Democracy
3.3.1 Support for the Culture o f Democracy
In the following three sections, the extent of support for democracy is analysed. The corresponding distributions are shown both for the aggregate of central and eastern European countries and separately for each individual countries. The analysis begins with the cultural level, which forms the topmost level of the democratic system in the control and legitimation hierarchy. As we have already noted, there are no indicators available for directly determining support for the central values of the culture of democracy. However, the survey does contain an indicator permitting the degree of correct cognitive association of values with democracy to be assessed. On the basis of this indicator, it is possible first to analyse a crucial precondition for support for democratic values, and second to construct something in the way of a substitute for support for the culture of democracy.
The survey presented respondents with a list of eleven quite different characteristics. For each of these characteristics, respondents were requested to state i f and how strongly they feel that they are features of a democracy. A t least two of these characteristics relate unequivocally to elements of polyarchy as defined by Dahl: political liberties (e.g.
freedom of speech, freedom of association) and equality before the law. These two elements are described as democratic values. The association of these values, which essen- tially define the culture of democracy, is a necessary condition for support for the culture of democracy. As the distributions in Table 4 indicate, such association is made by somewhat more than two thirds of citizens in central and eastern European countries. The necessary condition is thus to a large extent met, even i f some thirty per cent of citizens do not associate the two democratic values with democracy or do so to only a limited extent.
There are considerable differences among the countries concerned in the extent to which the two values are associated with democracy. In Romania and Slovenia, an average of only about fifty per cent of citizens make this attribution, whereas in the majority of countries the average is over seventy per cent. Romania and Slovenia can thus be regarded as deviant cases.
One of the marks of a liberal democracy in modern societies is the distinction drawn between the political and economic systems. In order for the boundary between these two systems to be actually drawn, it is necessary to define it by legal rules as well as in the perception of the citizens. The fundamental values that are associated with the two systems and which have a formative influence on expectancies regarding the reality of the two systems, ought to be confused as little as possible. Among other things, this means that values and performances proper to the economic system ought not to be considered essential elements of democracy. In the list of eleven characteristics submitted to respondents, there are two relating precisely to such economic performance: improvement of economic conditions, and: more jobs, less unemployment. As Table 4 shows, some fifty per cent of all respondents associate these two economic values with democracy. In order to evaluate this result adequately, a comparison with western European countries would be useful, but the data situation precludes this. However, the differences among central and eastern European countries also show that such an understanding of democracy need not necessarily prevail. In Czechoslovakia, only about thirty per cent of citizens associate the two economic values with democracy. A contrast is presented by Bulgaria and Romania, where a average of seventy per cent of respondents make such an association. These figures indicate that legitimation conditions for liberal democracy differ widely from country to country. Where the citizens of a country associate democracy also, or even primarily, with economic effectiveness, legitimation of the structure and performance of democracy on the basis of originally democratic values is likely to have an only limited chance of success. It is dependent on the performance of a quite different system.
