• Keine Ergebnisse gefunden

Syllabus: Managerial Economics

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2022

Aktie "Syllabus: Managerial Economics "

Copied!
2
0
0

Wird geladen.... (Jetzt Volltext ansehen)

Volltext

(1)

Prof. Dr. Martin Kocher

Department of Economics University of Munich D-80539 Munich; Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1

Tel: +49 89 2180 9726 e-mail: martin.kocher@lrz.uni-muenchen.de Office hours: Mo 14:00-15:00 (and anytime upon appointment) My office: Giselastr. 10, 1st floor, room-no. 107 http://www.experimentalforschung.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/index.html

Syllabus: Managerial Economics

Autumn/Winter 2009/10

Time and place: Tuesday (Lecture), 14:30-16:00, HGB, room A 120, and Friday (Tutorial), 16:00-20:00 (bi-weekly), HGB, room A 014

Contents:

The course focuses on microeconomic contributions to managerial decision making and includes areas such as profit maximization, pricing, strategic decision making, information asymmetries and behavioral economics.

Course language: English

Literature: The course is mainly based on selected chapters of the following books:

- David M. Kreps, Microeconomics for Managers, Norton

- Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, Pearson Education (Prentice Hall)

- Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach, Norton

Aims: This course aims to provide an exemplary overview of interesting areas in microeconomics, to give a flavor of their importance for business decisions as well as and, probably most importantly, to create a basis and interest for the use of the applied methods in one’s own work/research.

Methods: We will not strictly distinguish between lectures and meetings that are organized in a tutorial style (where we will solve exercises together and discuss examples). Usually, lectures will be on Tuesdays and tutorials on Fridays (bi-weekly).

Grading:

& Presence and active participation in classes

& Final exam (written): Friday, 05.02.2010, 4:00 - 6:00 p.m., Room: HGB A014 Prerequisites: Basic economic thinking, i.e. an introductory course in microeconomics.

(2)

2 Preliminary lecture plan

Date Topic

20.10., 14:00! (0) Introduction, Organizational issues, Plan for the semester 27.10., 14:30 (1) Maximization

03.11., 14:30 (2) Maximization, Consumer Behavior 06.11., 16:00 (3) Maximization, Consumer Behavior 10.11., 14:30 (4) Price Discrimination

17.11., 14:30 (5) Price Discrimination, Perfect Competition 20.11., 16:00 (6) Price Discrimination, Perfect Competition 24.11., 14:30 (7) Market Failure

27.11., 16:00 (8) Market Failure 01.12., 14:30 (9) Strategic Behavior 08.12., 14:30 (10) Strategic Behavior 15.12., 14:30 (11) Implicit Collusion

18.12., 16:00 (12) Strategic Behavior, Implicit Collusion 22.12., 14:30 (13) Expected Utility

12.01., 14:30 (14) Risk Sharing

15.01., 16:00 (15) Expected Utility, Risk Sharing 19.01., 14:30 (16) Incentives and Moral Hazard

26.01., 14:30 (17) Incentives and Moral Hazard (Experiment) 29.01., 16:00 (18) Incentives and Moral Hazard

02.02., 14:30 (19) Behavioral Managerial Economics 05.02., 16:00 (20) Exam

09.02., 14:30 (21) Feedback and closing

Dates in shaded boxes indicate tutorials (the exam).

Referenzen

ÄHNLICHE DOKUMENTE

Study one revealed that distinct cognitive decision-making mechanisms in a gambling task share neural mechanisms: Brain activity patterns extending from temporo-parietal to

Besonders hilfreich erweist sich hierbei der Umstand, dass die Bewertung f¨ur die “meisten” Bedingungen gerade Null ist und diese daher – basierend auf dem

It takes a closer look onto the interaction between the characteristics of complex situations (Schroda, 2000), the computational architecture of psycho- logical processes (PSI

The decision preponderate over information in a new central function of management defined as information- decision; we believe that the option for a compromise of the type:

[r]

Working Papers are interim reports on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and have received only limited review. Views or opinions expressed herein

Goals of a decision making process and constraints create more uncertainties and cases when good intentions may lead to bad results and public

We have seen a principle allowing us to model imprecision within a Bayesian con- text: if the Bayesian foundations require that comparative judgements follow a weak