Comparative Anatomy of Fertility Trends: The Aging of the Baby Boom

W O R K I N G P A P E R

Comparative Anatomy

ot

Fertility Trends:

The Aging of the Baby B o o m

WoZPgahg L u t z A n a t o t i Y a s h i n

January

1987 WP-87-12

l n t e r n a t ~ o n a l l n s t ~ t u t e for Appl~ed Systems Analysis

NOT

FOR

QUOTATION

WITHOUT THE PERMLSSION

OF

THE AUTHORS

Comparative Anatomy of Fertility

Wndn:

The

Aging

of the Baby Boon

Wo&ang Lutz

A h a t o L i Yashin

January 1987 WP-87-12

Working Papers are interim reports an work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and have received only Umited review. Views or opinions expressed b e n i n do not necessarily represent &are of the Institute or of its National Member Organizations.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE ?VR

APPLIED

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS A-2361 Laxenburg, A m t r i a

Foreword

The focus of IIASA's Population Program i s population aging, p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h e IIASA member nations. Changes in mortality, b u t t o a much g r e a t e r e x t e n t changes in f e r t i l i t y , account f o r t h e p r e s e n t aging of t h e IIASA countries. This p a p e r discusses t h e anatomy of t h e most pronounced fertility change in r e c e n t times, the post-war baby boom. The presentation makes much use of newly- available g r a p h i c a l techniques, which allow t h e r e a d e r t o visualize t h e demo- g r a p h i c t r e n d s in g r e a t detail. The g r a p h i c a l tools also f a c i l i t a t e comparative analyses, such as t h a t p r e s e n t e d by t h e authors.

Douglas Wolf Deputy L e a d e r Populatfon P r o g r a m

Comparative Anatamy of Fertility Trends:

The

Aging

of the Baby Boom

W o v g a n g L u t z and A n a t o t i Yashin

1.

introduction

Modern f e r t i l i t y t r e n d s in industrialized c o u n t r i e s s e e m to follow strange and almost unpredictable p a t t e r n s . Y e t t h e comparative analysis of f e r t i l i t y t r e n d s in d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s shows a s u r p r i s i n g similarity in t h e changing p a t t e r n s of reproduction. Countries geographically as f a r a p a r t as t h e United States of Amer- i c a a n d t h e F e d e r a l Republic of Germany show almost p a r a l l e l f e r t i l i t y t r e n d s a f t e r 1950 (with t h e German rates consistently lower t h a n t h e American).

W e may assume t h a t in c o u n t r i e s where t h e decision to have children is deli- b e r a t e a n d more or less conscious, fluctuations in f e r t i l i t y r e f l e c t fluctuations in t h e d e s i r e s f o r children. On t h e a g g r e g a t e level, s u c h d e s i r e s may b e influenced by economic conditions and, probably more important, by socio-cultural develop- ments and c h a n g e s in attitudes. After World W a r 11, s u c h conditions changed almost simultaneously. in North America a n d most European c o u n t r i e s , f i r s t producing t h e baby boom a n d then t h e baby bust.

T h e r e are o t h e r examples where c o u n t r i e s as closely r e l a t e d as t h e German Democratic Republic a n d t h e F e d e r a l Republic of Germany e x h i b i t quite d i v e r g e n t t r e n d s . In t h i s c a s e we c a n assume t h a t t h e diffusion of attitudinal and socio- economic changes r e l e v a n t f o r childbearing was r a t h e r weak between t h e two Ger- man states. In addition to this, t h e GDR had a n explicitly p r o n a t a l i s t i c policy which seemed to have had some e f f e c t whereas t h e FRG abstained from population policy. With a total f e r t i l i t y rate of 1.26, t h e FRG today h a s t h e lowest f e r t i l i t y level in t h e world, whereas t h e GDR holds around 1.7.

In o r d e r to understand t h e baby boom and t h e baby b u s t and t h e i r conse- quences f o r t h e aging of t h e population, one must f i r s t t a k e a closer look at fertili- t y rates o v e r time and age. What w e need i s a comparative analysis of many coun- tries examining age-specific p e r i o d fluctuations as compared to changes in c o h o r t fertility. In t h e light of t h e s e empirical findings w e c a n t h e n consider t h e plausi-

bility of s e v e r a l models of explanation. In t h i s p a p e r w e had to b e selective in r e s p e c t t o t h e number of c o u n t r i e s considered and especially in r e s p e c t to expla- n a t o r y models. This study i s mainly a n attempt t o s u r v e y t h e extremely r i c h empir- i c a l material i n a visual manner t h a t makes you see t h e most important f e a t u r e s at f i r s t sight. The g r a p h s in t h i s p a p e r summarize more t h a n 15,000 age- a n d period- specific f e r t i l i t y rates.

2. Looking at Demographic Surfaces

The traditional way of presenting d a t a in demography i s based on using t a b l e s and two-dimensional (x-y) g r a p h s . Both a p p r o a c h e s are a p p r o p r i a t e f o r many problems in d a t a analysis. However, t h e y sometimes a r e not informative enough, especially when one needs to r e p r e s e n t functional dependences among t h r e e or more v a r i a b l e s . Rapid p r o l i f e r a t i o n of computers and g r a p h i c s software have made i t possible to easily plot three-dimensional g r a p h s . Such a n opportunity seems especially useful f o r presenting many demographic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which a r e t h e functions of a g e and time. Providing a nice image of demographic linkages and giving information on major t r e n d s i n any direction on t h e s u r f a c e of t h e three-dimensional plot alone i s sometimes s t i l l n o t v e r y convenient when we want to analyze t h e details and make a quantitative analysis of major dependences and ten- dencies. A supplementary a p p r o a c h i s based on using t h e shaded c o n t o u r maps of demographic s u r f a c e s . Shaded c o n t o u r maps allow one to c a p t u r e t h e m o s t impor- t a n t qualitative changes of t h e s u r f a c e . By using d i f f e r e n t shades, t h e methods provide t h e quantitative values of demographic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s f o r any point on t h e map. ¹

Unlike traditional methods of g r a p h i c a l analysis, i n t e r p r e t i n g c o n t o u r maps r e q u i r e s some p r a c t i c e even f o r t h e most skilled scientists. After some training, however, reading t h e c o n t o u r map should not b e a problem. The method allows one t o visualize t h e d a t a a n d o f f e r s a panoramic view which is impossible to obtain from t h e usual g r a p h s of levels or rates at s e l e c t e d a g e s o v e r time or at s e l e c t e d times o v e r age. I t allows illustration of d a t a in both a g e and time directions, simultane- ously displaying t h e e n t i r e h i s t o r y of demographic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (mortality, f e r - tility, morbidity, e t c . ) in approximately one minute on a n inexpensive personal computer.

%he respective computer program for an l B M PC or compatible was developed a t IIPSA (see Cam- bill, Vaupel, and Yashfn 1986).

The c o n t o u r map p r o v i d e s a clear a n d r i c h r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e e n t i r e demo- g r a p h i c s u r f a c e . While m a j o r p e a k s a n d valleys are r e a d i l y a p p a r e n t f r o m viewing three-dimensional plots, t r e n d s are o f t e n o b s c u r e d . Contour maps are p a r t i c u l a r - ly e f f e c t i v e at highlighting p a t t e r n s i n t h e i n t e r a c t i o n of a g e , p e r i o d , a n d c o h o r t e f f e c t s . They c a n b e used as a n initial s t e p f o r d a t a analysis by helping to s e l e c t t h e f r a i l c o h o r t s , r e v e a l t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h e most i m p o r t a n t s o c i a l economic e v e n t s , o r t h e most s e n s i t i v e a g e g r o u p s . After s u c h a s e l e c t i o n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l g r a p h i c a n a l y s i s of d e m o g r a p h i c d e p e n d e n c e s might b e r e l e v a n t .

In o u r p a p e r we p r e s e n t five f e r t i l i t y maps f o r e a c h of t h e e i g h t IIASA coun- t r i e s a 2 A t t h e t o p r i g h t , a three-dimensional p l o t of age-specific f e r t i l i t y o v e r time, t o t h e l e f t a c o n t o u r map; b e s i d e i t a two-dimensional p l o t of t r e n d s in t h e to- t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e s ; a n d , finally at t h e bottom, a g e a n d time c u t s f o r t h e h i g h e s t rate o b s e r v e d s i n c e 1 9 4 7 a n d o t h e r s e l e c t e d a g e s a n d y e a r s . ³

3. Pre-World War

II

Fertility Trends

F e r t i l i t y t r e n d s a f t e r World W a r I1 c a n only b e understood if we s e e them within t h e f e r t i l i t y h i s t o r y of t h e l a s t c e n t u r y . The findings from h i s t o r i c a l f e r t i l - i t y s t u d i e s in E u r o p e ( f o r s u r v e y s of t h e l i t e r a t u r e , see e.g. Knodel a n d van d e Walle (1979) o r Coale a n d Watkins (1986)) i n d i c a t e t h a t until t h e l a t e nineteenth c e n t u r y , a l l E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s e x c e p t F r a n c e h a d a r a t h e r c o n s t a n t high l e v e l of f e r t i l i t y which was only d i s t o r t e d by s t r o n g s h o r t - t e r m f l u c t u a t i o n d u e t o w a r s , famines, o r o t h e r exogenous e v e n t s . F o r c e n t u r i e s most segments of t h e population e x h i b i t what H e n r y (1961) c a l l e d n a t u r a l f e r t i l i t y , i.e. a f e r t i l i t y regime where, within m a r r i a g e , t h e b i r t h of a n additional child did n o t depend on t h e number of c h i l d r e n a l r e a d y b o r n b u t only on t h e m o t h e r ' s a g e a n d physical c a p a c i t y . A few d e c a d e s b e f o r e o r a f t e r 1 9 0 0 a l l E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s e n t e r e d t h e s e c u l a r f e r t i l i t y decline: a seemingly i r r e v e r s i b l e t r a n s i t i o n from high uncontrolled f e r t i l i t y t o lower c o n t r o l l e d f e r t i l i t y . This t r a n s i t i o n was accompanied by c h a n g e s i n socio- economic environments a n d mentality. A t t h i s point w e d o n o t intend a c l o s e r exami- nation of t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s of t h i s s e c u l a r change.

%IASA member c o u n t r l e s are: Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakla, Flnland, France, t h e Cer- man Democretlc Republlc, t h e Federal Republlc o f Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, t h e Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, t h e Union of S o v i e t S o c l a l l s t Republics, and t h e United S t a t e s of Amerlca.

' ~ a t a on a g e s p e c i f i c f e r t l l l t y r a t e s originate from IIASA's denlog!-aphic data bank.

Graph 1. Fertility trends for Austria.

AUSTRIA - F E R T l L l M 1 9 5 1 - 1 9 8 3

0.20 Auntria Fertility rot.

I I I I I I I

-

h

.= 2 ^0.0'

-

0.06

0.04

0.02

0.00

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975

wan 1980 1985

3.00

2.-

2 . 0

2.40

2.20

2.W

1 .a0

1 . 0

1.40 19% 1955 1900 1065 1970 1975 1WO 1-

wan

OtOtOl op. proup. mt.

-

0.20

,

h o t r i a Fertility rat.

I I I I I I I

hiqh.at fertility rot. 24 Aaq. of 16 Oaq. of 35 high001 f h l i t y rot. 1961 A y w r 1070 O y 4 r 1080

Table 1. Dates of a 10% decline in marital fertility from t h e pre-industrial level in s e l e c t e d I I A S A c o u n t r i e s (1900 boundaries).

Franoe

lam

Hungary 1910

Germany 1888 Finland 1912

Netherlands 1897 Bulgaria 1912

Sweden 1902 Italy 1913

Austria 1908 European Russia 1922 S o u r c e : Coale and Treadway (1966).

Table 1 shows t h e y e a r s in which European IIASA c o u n t r i e s f i r s t experienced a 10% decline in marital fertility. As previously mentioned, F r a n c e w a s t h e f i r s t country t o r e d u c e marital f e r t i l i t y , followed about 60 y e a r s l a t e r by Germany in 1888. Over t h e n e x t 30 y e a r s most European c o u n t r i e s followed those o u t r i d e r s . In 1922 European Russia a l s o experienced a 109. decline. Finland had s e e n a decline in t o t a l f e r t i l i t y a l r e a d y at t h e end of t h e eighteenth c e n t u r y b u t Lutz and Pitkanen (1986) shows t h a t this w a s not due t o marital fertility b u t t o changes in t h e marriage p a t t e r n . More will b e said on t h e decomposition into nuptiality and mari- t a l f e r t i l i t y t r e n d s l a t e r on.

For Finland, Canada, t h e US, and Italy we have time s e r i e s of age-specific f e r - tility rates t h a t start b e f o r e World W a r 11. A l l f o u r c o u n t r i e s exhibit declining f e r - tility until t h e 1930s. The t o t a l f e r t i l i t y rate declined from 3.35 in 1915 in t h e US t o less t h a n 2.20 in 1936; in Finland i t e v e n declined from more t h a n 4.50 in 1910 to l e s s t h a n 2.30 in 1933. Canadian f e r t i l i t y also displays a minimum in 1937. For Italy t h e p a t t e r n is somewhat d i f f e r e n t with a local minimum of 2.95 in 1936 b u t a much

C lower level of 2.45 in 1944-45. In all cases t h i s decline i s c l e a r l y p a r t of t h e g r e a t s e c u l a r f e r t i l i t y transition.

In many countries, t h e late 1930s a n d e a r l y 1940s s a w a r e c o v e r y of f e r t i l i t y rates b u t t h e last y e a r s of t h e w a r in 1944-45 again caused a depression of fertili- t y in all c o u n t r i e s participating in t h e w a r . Finland w a s exceptional in t h e way t h a t t h e post-war baby boom s t a r t e d a l r e a d y in 1945 and peaked in 1947. After t h a t f e r - tility e n t e r e d a new decline. A similar phenomenon of a n e a r l y boom i s visible in Canada and t h e US where total fertility a l s o r e a c h e d a local maximum in 1947 b u t peaked again, t o g e t h e r with most o t h e r western countries, in t h e l a t e 1950s and e a r l y 1960s. In North America t h i s real baby boom with total f e r t i l i t y rates above

G r a p h 2 . F e r t i l i t y t r e n d s f o r C a n a d a .

1 9 2 6 1 9 3 0 1 9 9 0 1 9 5 0 1 9 6 0 1 9 7 0 1 9 8 0

years

45-1983

Canada - Fertility 1921 - 1 983

3.7 w a s much h i g h e r and more pronounced than in any European c o u n t r y .

In t h e following section we will have a c l o s e r look at t h i s unique phenomenon of t h e post-World War I1 baby boom.

4. C o m p a r a t i v e A n a t o m y of the B a b y Boom

What i s usually called t h e post-war baby boom is a phenomenon t h a t a p p e a r e d in quite d i f f e r e n t forms in v a r i o u s countries. What makes t h e baby boom a distinct phenomenon is t h a t i t w a s a n unexpected significant i n c r e a s e in f e r t i l i t y t h a t , i r - r e s p e c t i v e of d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s , religions, and socio-economic standing, took place in m o s t industrialized c o u n t r i e s at about t h e s a m e time.

This i n c r e a s e w a s completely unexpected even to t h e s c h o l a r s of demography who e x p e c t e d continuation of pre-World W a r I1 f e r t i l i t y levels or even a f u r t h e r decline. I t w a s significant in a way t h a t i t b r o u g h t t h e t o t a l f e r t i l i t y rate up t o an a l m o s t pre-modern level. In t h e US, f o r example, t h e t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e i n c r e a s e d by more than 70% from 1935 to 1957; t h e f e r t i l i t y r a t e of women in t h e i r e a r l y twenties even more t h a n doubled o v e r t h a t period. This unexpected i n c r e a s e of f e r t i l i t y did not seem t o b e specific f o r any c u l t u r e or economic system. I t could b e o b s e r v e d in P r o t e s t a n t Scandinavia as well as in Catholic Italy, i n e a s t e r n Europe as well as in t h e United States and Canada. And in all c o u n t r i e s t h e i n c r e a s e oc- c u r r e d within t h e 25 y e a r s following World W a r 11, even in c o u n t r i e s t h a t did not p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e w a r s u c h as Sweden and Switzerland.

Table 2. Highest age-specific f e r t i l i t y r a t e s observed a f t e r 1947.

P e a k of post-

w a r f e r t i l i t y Age Year Level

Finland 25 1948 0.18

US 22 1957 0.26

Austria 24 1961 0.19

Canada 23 1961 0.25

F r a n c e 24 1963 0.22

FRG 25 1963 0.18

Italy 26 1964 0.19

GDR 20 1967 0.20

Graph 3. F e r t i l i t y t r e n d s f o r F i n l a n d .

Fin- Fartllity rat.

1::: 1

7 - .--.

FINNISH FERTlLlM 1776- 1984

5.00

4.50

4.00

3.50

7

^3.00

8 I _2.50

2.00

1.50

1.00 1010 1920 1630 1940 1050 low 1070

)m

Ototd

*

^{group m(.}

Finland fertility rota 0.20

14 19 24 29 34 39 W 49

ap.

hiqhast fertility rate 1948 A ywr 1070 0 ywr 1080

Graph 4. F e r t i l i t y t r e n d s f o r t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f Germanv.

a5 -1982

West - Germany Fertility 1951 - 1982

2.60

2.40

2.20

2.00

t

I

q

^{1 . 8 0}

-

1.00

1.40

1.20

0.25 0 ~ 2 3 0 . 2 ~ 0 ~ 1 9 0 . 1 7 0 ~ 1 5 0 . 1 3 0 ~ 1 1 0 - 0 9 0.05 0.02 0.001 1

0.07 0.03 0.01 Ototal og. groups l a m mt.

Graph 5. Fertility trends for France.

FRANCE

Fertility - ^Trend

45--1981

France - Fertility 1 9 4 8 - 1 9 8 1

Ot& og. group w m(*

Franc. F.rtilmty rot.

0 24

14 19 24 29 og. 3U 39 44 49

0 hiphest fertility rat. 1963 A m r 1970 O m r l9M)

In all c o u n t r i e s fertility t r e n d s show a local maximum r i g h t a f t e r t h e end of t h e war in t h e Late 1940s. For some countries this w a s a l r e a d y t h e highest level of f e r t i l i t y experienced a f h r World W a r 11, f o r o t h e r c o u n t r i e s t h i s was only a s h o r t r e c o v e r y followed by t h e real baby boom in t h e e a r l y 19609. Among t h e e i g h t IIASA countries studied in t h i s p a p e r , only Finland belongs to t h e f i r s t group with t h e peak of t h e baby boom in 1948. From t h e plots of a g e distributions (see Appendix), we c a n see t h a t in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, t h e GDR, Japan, and Sweden, similar peaks in t h e number of b i r t h s a p p e a r a r o u n d 1 9 4 8 4 3 . In all IIASA coun- t r i e s e x c e p t Finland t h i s was followed by a n o t h e r local maximum in t h e e a r l y 1980s.

In Finland f e r t i l i t y declined a l m o s t monotonically between 1948 and 1974. After 1975 a slight r e c o v e r y i s visible, especially f o r women above a g e 25.

Among t h e c o u n t r i e s studied, F r a n c e and Italy d o not show a distinct peak of t h e baby boom. In F r a n c e t o t a l fertility w a s above t h e level of 2.6 from 1945 until 1966. Nevertheless, two p e a k s c a n b e identified: one in 1947 and a n o t h e r in 1963.

An analysis of t h e a g e p a t t e r n s of fertility r e v e a l s t h a t t h e 1947 peak included a higher percentage of b i r t h s by women above a g e 30, whereas in t h e peak of 1963 women in t h e i r e a r l y twenties played a major role. Hence, t h e a g e p a t t e r n of this second baby boom i s similar to t h a t of t h e U S and o t h e r w e s t e r n European coun- tries. In Italy t h e p a t t e r n i s somewhat similar to France. Only t h e level of fertility between t h e p e a k s of 1946 a n d 1964 w a s significantly lower than in France. Again, women in t h e i r twenties played a more significant r o l e in t h e second peak. Since 1965 both c o u n t r i e s have experienced s t e e p f e r t i l i t y declines, especially f o r w o m e n a b o v e a g e 3 0 .

Fertility t r e n d s in t h e German Democratic Republic have a unique f e a t u r e . Total fertility shows one peak in 1951, a n o t h e r peak in 1967, and a local maximum in 1980. Between t h e two f i r s t p e a k s t h a t r e a c h e d a level of about 2.5 children p e r woman, f e r t i l i t y had declined to a total fertility rate of less t h a n 2.2. As in most o t h e r c o u n t r i e s t h e peak in 1965 w a s mainly due to younger women, and hence can b e called t h e "real" baby boom. Between 1970 and 1974 f e r t i l i t y declined dramati- cally at all ages. In 1974 t h e t o t a l f e r t i l i t y rate w a s about 30% lower than just four y e a r s e a r l i e r . This precipitous decline c a n b e s e e n in connection with t h e intro- duction of new legislation in social politics t h a t , among o t h e r s , abolished r e s t r i c - tions on abortion. In t h e following y e a r s new social legislation was introduced to make childbearing more a t t r a c t i v e and t h e total fertility r a t e i n c r e a s e d again to o v e r 1.8 in 1980. Since then, a slow decline c a n b e observed.

Graph 6. Fertility trends for the German Democratic

Republic.

43 1985

East - Germany Fertility 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 8 5

Ea.1 Gumany - Futlllhl r o t .

East Cormany Fertility rat.

0.22

1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981

m-

hiqhe.1 f.Nlity rat. 20 A ap* of 18 O a q * af 35

13 18 23 2'bg. 33 38 U3

13 hiqh-ml fertility rate 1967 A)mr 1070 O m r 1 0 8 0

Graph 7 . ~ e r t i l i t y t r e n d s f o r I t a l y .

ltoly Fertrlity mt.

0.20

0 . 0 0

1929 1939 1959 1969 1979

lgq9 y.ar.

highest farlility rot. 26 A ape of 18 0 op. Of 35

49

-

¹⁹⁷⁹

Italy - Fertility 1930- 1979

Italy Fertility rat.

13 18 23 28 33 38 44 U8

'-3-

high..( krtility rot. 1964 A y.ar 1 0 7 0 0 y.ar 1080

Graph 8. ~ertility trends for the United States of America.

1917 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980

years

USA Fertility r a t . 0.26

I I I I I I 1

0.00 -1 ^{I I I I I}

1916 1926 1936 1946 19% 1966 1976

y a n

0 hiqh-mt fertility mt. 22 A aq. of 1 6 0 ago of 35

US - Fertility 1917-1980

3.00

3.00

3.40 3.20

3.00 2.00

2.00

2.40 2.20

2.00

! .00

1 .00

1915 1925 1 1945 19% 1 1975

IM total aga group. rot.

USA Fertility rot.

13 18 23 28 33 38 49

aq* ⁴⁸

Oh-ph*at fertility rat. 1957 A y m r 1070 O y - 1900

Fertility t r e n d s in t h e Federal Republic of Germany w e r e quite different.

F i r s t , t h e r e was no peak i n t h e e a r l y 1950s as compared t o t h e GDR. Instead, t h e r e was a s t e a d y i n c r e a s e of f e r t i l i t y r a t e s , especially of women in t h e i r twenties. A peak w a s r e a c h e d in 1963 with a t o t a l f e r t i l i t y rate of more than 2.5 c h i l d r e n p e r woman. In t h e eleven y e a r s between 1966 and 1977, fertility- fell extremely rapidly at all ages; t h e t o t a l f e r t i l i t y rate w a s almost c u t in half. This w a s simultaneous t o t h e s t e e p decline in the GDR, but i t was not followed by a r e c o v e r y . By now f e r t i l i t y in the FRG i s t h e lowest in t h e world at a level of l e s s than 1 . 3 children p e r woman.

Fertility t r e n d s in Austria w e r e v e r y similar t o t h o s e in t h e FRG, only t h e lev- el of f e r t i l i t y h a s always b e e n slightly h i g h e r and t h e mean a g e of childbearing slightly lower. A s in t h e FRG, t h e baby boom in Austria w a s c l e a r l y c o n c e n t r a t e d within a few c a l e n d a r y e a r s and a few y e a r s of age. Since 1970 t h e modal a g e of childbearing h a s b e e n shifting upwards.

By f a r , t h e highest concentration of t h e baby boom could b e o b s e r v e d in t h e US a n d Canada. In t h e US between 1956 and 1961, o n t h e a v e r a g e , e v e r y f o u r t h woman aged 20 to 24 had o n e child in a y e a r . In Canada f e r t i l i t y levels w e r e slightly lower b u t s t i l l h i g h e r t h a n in t h e baby boom of any o t h e r industrialized c o u n t r y . A t its peak t h e total f e r t i l i t y rate was above 3.7 c h i l d r e n p e r women in t h o s e coun- t r i e s , which w a s c l e a r l y h i g h e r t h a n t h e f e r t i l i t y levels s h o r t l y b e f o r e World War I.

The contour maps also indicate t h a t t h e high f e r t i l i t y levels of t h e baby boom y e a r s w e r e to a l a r g e e x t e n t due t o p e r i o d fluctuations. N o c o h o r t of women b o r n in t h i s c e n t u r y in t h e US had actually 3.7 children on t h e a v e r a g e . On t h e contour map w e c a n follow t h e diagonals t o analyze t h e r e p r o d u c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e of c o h o r t s of women. By looking at t h e maps in t h i s r e s p e c t , we c a n find t h a t f o r e v e r y coun- t r y considered t h e c o h o r t of women t h a t p a r t i c i p a t e d in t h e baby boom in t h e i r e a r l y twenties e x h i b i t lower f e r t i l i t y in t h e i r t h i r t i e s t h a n e a r l i e r c o h o r t s . From this we c a n visually understand t h e f a c t s t r e s s e d by numerous a u t h o r s (see e.g.

R y d e r 1955) t h a t with r e s p e c t t o c o h o r t f e r t i l i t y , t h e baby boom was much less pronounced than with r e s p e c t to period fertility.

5- The Role of Marriage in the Baby Boom

So f a r t h e f e r t i l i t y rates given r e f e r r e d to a l l women, r e g a r d l e s s if t h e y were m a r r i e d or not. But i t i s a universally o b s e r v e d phenomenon t h a t f e r t i l i t y within m a r r i a g e is h i g h e r t h a n outside marriage. For this r e a s o n t r e n d s in marriage strongly influence t r e n d s in o v e r a l l fertility. In t h e following we t r y t o decompose

Graph 9. Changes in the relationship between I

,

I

,

and I in Hungary

9 m f

(H)

,

Austria (A)

,

and Finland (SF), 1910-1960.

Index of total fertilitv

I f *

0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60

Index of marital fertilitv

overall f e r t i l i t y into t h e marital f e r t i l i t y and nuptiality components. W e d o this by using t h e indices developed by Ansley Coale in t h e c o u r s e of t h e P r i n c e t o n Europe- a n Fertility P r o j e c t .

Coale (1969) developed a set of i n t e r r e l a t e d demographic indices to d e s c r i b e t r e n d s in o v e r a l l f e r t i l i t y a n d i t s nuptiality and marital f e r t i l i t y components. The indices r e l a t e t h e a c t u a l population considered to t h e population with t h e highest schedule of age-specific f e r t i l i t y on a r e l i a b l e r e c o r d : t h e f e r t i l i t y of married H u t t e r i t e women in 1921-1930. Hence, t h e index of o v e r a l l f e r t i l i t y (If) i s defined by

where B i s t h e annual number of b i r t h s to a l l women in a given period, w i is t h e number of women in e a c h 5-year age i n t e r v a l from 15-49, a n d Fi i s t h e f e r t i l i t y of m a r r i e d H u t t e r i t e women in e a c h age i n t e r v a l (see Knodel 1974). The index of mar- i t a l f e r t i l i t y (Ig) i s defined by

where mi i s t h e number of m a r r i e d women in e a c h a g e g r o u p a n d

B'

is t h e annual number of legitimate b i r t h s . Finally, t h e marriage index (I, ) summarizes t h e p r o - portion m a r r i e d among women which i s weighted at e a c h a g e by t h e H u t t e r i t e f e r - tility schedule.

In t h e a b s e n c e of illegitimacy, t h e following equation holds:

And even in r e a l populations with c e r t a i n p r o p o r t i o n s of children b o r n out of wedlock, t h e p r o d u c t of I, a n d Ig gives a r a t h e r good approximation of If (Coale and Treadway 1986).

In t h e c o n t e x t of t h e European Fertility P r o j e c t t h e s e indices (plus a n addi- tional index I,, f o r illegitimate f e r t i l i t y ) w e r e calculated f o r t h e p e r i o d 1870-1960 f o r a l l provinces of Europe. The following t w o g r a p h s show how, o v e r t h e period 1910 to 1960, changes in o v e r a l l f e r t i l i t y If w e r e induced by changes in marital f e r t i l i t y and n ~ p t i a l i t ~ . ~ The horizontal a x i s gives t h e value of t h e marital f e r t i l i t y 4 ~ a t a for all IIASA countries are given In Appendix 1. Data and the setup of the graphs were e x -

tracted from Coale and Treadway (1986).

Graph 10. Changes in the relationship between I

,

Im, and If in q

~zechoslovakia.(CS), the Netherlands (NL), and the Federal Republic of Germany (D)

,

1910-1960.

Index of total fertility

I f *

0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60

Index of marital fertility

index

Ig

and t h e v e r t i c a l a x i s t h a t of proportions married I,. Together, both pro- duce a level of o v e r a l l f e r t i l i t y

If.

In all t h r e e c o u n t r i e s in Graph 9 , namely Hungary, Finland, and Austria, t h e s t e e p decline in o v e r a l l f e r t i l i t y between 1910 and 1930 w a s mainly due to declining marital f e r t i l i t y ; p r o p o r t i o n s married declined only slightly. In Germany (GDR and FRG combined) and t h e Netherlands (Graph y), t h e proportions married even in- c r e a s e d o v e r t h a t period, though not strongly enough to offset t h e s t e e p decline in marital fertility.

Between 1930 and 1960 t h e situation w a s almost r e v e r s e d . In Austria and Ger- many both I, and

Ig

i n c r e a s e d , producing a s h a r p i n c r e a s e in overall f e r t i l i t y , i.e.

t h e peak of t h e baby boom around 1980. In Germany p r o p o r t i o n s married in- c r e a s e d significantly m o r e t h a n marital f e r t i l i t y , indicating t h a t changing mar- r i a g e p a t t e r n s played a m o r e important role in t h e peak of t h e baby boom t h a n c h a n g e s in t h e number of c h i l d r e n p e r family. In Finland, t h e Netherlands, and Czechoslovakia, overall f e r t i l i t y i n c r e a s e d between 1930 and 1960, d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t marital f e r t i l i t y declined. Hence, t h e o b s e r v e d i n c r e a s e in o v e r a l l fertility was exclusively due to increasing p r o p o r t i o n s of marrying women. In Hungary, Po- land, and Italy, t h e o b s e r v e d f e r t i l i t y decline would have been much s t r o n g e r if t h e proportions married had not i n c r e a s e d o v e r t h e s a m e period.

From t h e eleven IIASA c o u n t r i e s considered i n t h e European Fertility P r o j e c t , only Austria and F r a n c e c l e a r l y showed increasing levels of marital f e r t i l i t y between 1930 and 1960. In Germany a marginal i n c r e a s e could b e observed. Over t h e same period t h e p r o p o r t i o n s married increased in all c o u n t r i e s e x c e p t Europe- a n Russia.

h?arriage had been legally or socially and economically r e s t r i c t e d in many European countries. I t was not until t h e end of World W a r I1 t h a t t h e s e r e s t r i c t i o n s w e r e completely abolished. During t h e economic boom of t h e 1950s, almost every- one who wanted to m a r r y could a f f o r d to. And c o n t r a r y to today's situation, t h e wish to marry s e e m s to have been universal a t t h a t time. Hence, w e c a n conclude t h a t t h e baby boom was, t o a l a r g e e x t e n t , induced by a marriage boom.

-

20 -

Graph 11. P r o j e c t e d a g e s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s , 1950-2025.

World Total, 1950-2025

Graph 1 2 . P r o j e c t e d a g e s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s , 1950-2025.

IlASA Countries, 1950-2025

6 . The Aging of the Baby &om

Men a n d women b o r n at t h e p e a k of t h e post-war baby boom will soon find themselves in t h e s i t u a t i o n t h a t not only a t t h e time of t h e i r b i r t h did t h e y belong t o t h e l a r g e s t a g e g r o u p of t h e population, b u t t h a t at t h e a g e of r e t i r e m e n t n o o t h e r a g e g r o u p will b e more e x t e n s i v e t h a n t h e i r own. This h a s f a r - r e a c h i n g consequences f o r t h e i r individual o p p o r t u n i t i e s , where t h e y f a c e h i g h e r competi- tion f r o m d a y c a r e c e n t e r s to t h e l a b o r m a r k e t up t o old-age homes, b u t i t a l s o h a s d r a m a t i c consequences f o r t h e s o c i e t y as a whole.

Population aging i s t h e most important demographic problem f o r industrial- ized c o u n t r i e s . Aging may b e defined as a n i n c r e a s e In t h e p r o p o r t i o n of o l d e r peo- ple in t h e t o t a l population which i s accompanied by a n i n c r e a s e i n t h e mean a g e of t h e population. In t e r m s of t h e a g e s t r u c t u r e of t h e population, I t c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e s h i f t f r o m a population pyramid w h e r e t h e a g e g r o u p s d e c l i n e with a g e t o a r e c t a n g l e w h e r e t h e a g e g r o u p s are of c o m p a r a b l e s i z e until a c e r t a i n a g e (60 or s o ) o r , in some c a s e s , e v e n t o a situation where o l d e r a g e g r o u p s are l a r g e r t h a n y o u n g e r a g e g r o u p s .

The p r o c e s s of aging i s a l r e a d y at a n advanced s t a g e in a number of E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s b u t e v e r y t h i n g points toward much h i g h e r p r o p o r t i o n s of t h e a g e d in t h e f u t u r e . The major r e a s o n f o r t h i s i s t h e continued v e r y low level of f e r t i l i t y in most industrialized c o u n t r i e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , f e r t i l i t y , mortality, a n d migration d e t e r - mine t h e s t r u c t u r e and t h e s i z e of t h e population. Inmigration of g u e s t w o r k e r s In r e c e n t d e c a d e s t e n d e d to dampen t h e p r o c e s s of aging in s e v e r a l industrialized c o u n t r i e s b e c a u s e migrants w e r e usually below t h e mean a g e of t h e population and t h e i r f e r t i l i t y i s usually much h i g h e r t h a n t h a t of t h e citizens of t h e i r h o s t coun- t r y . But i n most E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s t h e e f f e c t of inmigration was not s t r o n g enough t o s t o p o r e v e n r e v e r s e t h e p r o c e s s of aging.

Improvements in mortality, on t h e o t h e r hand, played a significant r o l e in making t h e a g e distribution r e c t a n g u l a r by allowing h i g h e r and h i g h e r p r o p o r t i o n s of a b i r t h c o h o r t to s u r v i v e t o old a g e . R e c e n t improvements in o l d a g e mortality a l s o led to a significant i n c r e a s e in t h e p r o p o r t i o n of t h e population a b o v e a g e 70.

S i n c e v e r y old people h a v e a much h i g h e r r i s k of being s u b j e c t t o c h r o n i c d i s e a s e s , aging i s not only a problem of t h e p r o p o r t i o n of t h e population engaged in economic activity b u t i t a l s o carries d r a m a t i c implications f o r t h e health care system. The care f o r c h r o n i c a l l y ill p e r s o n s above a g e 70 will soon become a major . problem f o r aging s o c i e t i e s .

- 22 -

Graph 13. Projected age structural changes, 1950-2025.

GFR, 1950-2025

Graph 14. Projected age structural changes, 1950-2025.

United States, 1950-2025

By comparing t h e e f f e c t of mortality a n d f e r t i l i t y on t h e p r o c e s s of aging o v e r t h e l a s t d e c a d e s and in t h e n e a r f u t u r e , i t becomes c l e a r t h a t f e r t i l i t y c h a n g e s played t h e major r o l e in bringing a b o u t t o d a y ' s d i s t o r t e d a g e distributions. When looking at t h e population distributions of t h e United S t a t e s (Graph 1 3 ) a n d t h e F e d e r a l Republic of Germany (Graph 4), we c a n s e e t h e s t r o n g impact of changing f e r t i l i t y . The b a b y boom g e n e r a t i o n of a r o u n d 1960 will r e t i r e in 2025 (under a n assumed r e t i r e m e n t a g e of 65). In most IIASA c o u n t r i e s , t h e i r a g e g r o u p will not b e smaller t h a n t h a t of c h i l d r e n b o r n at t h e beginning of t h e n e x t c e n t u r y b e c a u s e of t h e low f e r t i l i t y l e v e l s t h a t c a n b e e x p e c t e d t o continue. A t l e a s t t h e r e i s no evi- d e n t r e a s o n why f e r t i l i t y should i n c r e a s e again-most information available points towards f u r t h e r d e c r e a s e s in f e r t i l i t y . 5 Hence t h e p r o j e c t i o n s shown, which are based on UN estimations with r e l a t i v e l y high f e r t i l i t y assumptions, are s t i l l v e r y c o n s e r v a t i v e .

In t h e g r a p h s i t i s only t h e r e m a r k a b l e i n c r e a s e s of people a g e d o v e r 05 i s p a r t l y t h e r e s u l t of improving mortality conditions, but a l s o in p a r t c a u s e d by g r e a t e r b i r t h c o h o r t s e n t e r i n g t h o s e a g e s . I t i s a l s o in p a r t improved s u r v i v o r - s h i p t h a t makes t h e r i d g e of t h e baby boom s t i l l s o s t r o n g at h i g h e r a g e s . When t r y i n g to assess t h e r e l a t i v e e f f e c t s of f e r t i l i t y and mortality on t h e p r o c e s s of aging, w e find t h a t f o r t h e c h a n g e s u p t o t h e late 20th c e n t u r y i t i s predominantly improving mortality and l a t e r on primarily f e r t i l i t y (Lutz 1987). The quantitative f i g u r e , however, d e p e n d s g r e a t l y o n t h e aging i n d i c a t o r s e l e c t e d .

F o r t h e FRG, t h e p i c t u r e i s much more pronounced t h a n f o r t h e US. Most unevenness in t h e p a t t e r n c a n be t r a c e d b a c k t o u p s a n d downs in t h e number of b i r t h s . On t o p of t h i s t h e w a r s s e l e c t i v e l y r e d u c e d some c o h o r t s of men. This r e s u l t s in v e r y d i s t o r t e d sex r a t i o s at c e r t a i n a g e s . Because of a n e x t e n d e d p e r i o d of s u b r e p l a c e m e n t f e r t i l i t y a f t e r t h e e n d of t h e baby boom, younger c o h o r t s a r e

much s m a l l e r t h a n o l d e r ones.

T h e r e i s no doubt t h a t f e r t i l i t y i s t h e most important d e t e r m i n a n t of differen- t i a l s in t h e a g e s t r u c t u r e a n d t h e p r o c e s s of aging. Mortality t r e n d s a n d l e v e l s in t h e US a n d t h e FRG w e r e , e x c e p t f o r t h e two world wars, r a t h e r similar a n d c a n b e e x p e c t e d t o b e e v e n more s i m i l a r in t h e f u t u r e , but as G r a p h s 13 a n d 1 4 r e v e a l t h e a g e s t r u c t u r e s a r e v e r y d i f f e r e n t . A s we showed e a r l i e r , t h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s l i e s in d i f f e r e n t f e r t i l i t y h i s t o r i e s .

% e v e r t h e l e s s t h e possIbIlIty o f unexpected t r e n d s a l w a y s remains. We ntentloned b e f o r e t h a t t h e baby boom came c o m p l e t e l y unexpect.ed. We now ut~derstattd t o a great exterlt why I t came. But s t l l l some unexpected changes in n ~ e n t e l i t I e s might o c c u r . ,

7. Discussion

The b a b y boom and t h e subsequent decline in f e r t i l i t y w e r e t h e main f a c t o r s t h a t p r o d u c e d t h e d i s t o r t e d a g e p a t t e r n s of today's population u n d e r a g e 3 0 a n d t h a t will l e a d t o v e r y d r a m a t i c developments in t h e p r o p o r t i o n of r e t i r e d t o a c t i v e people i n t h e n e x t 30-40 y e a r s . But e v e n b e f o r e t h a t t h e d e c r e a s i n g p r o p o r t i o n of young people t o g e t h e r with a h i g h e r p r o p o r t i o n of v e r y old p e r s o n s , d u e t o mortal- ity r e d u c t i o n s at old a g e s , will bring d r a s t i c c h a n g e s f o r s o c i e t y .

What a r e t h e f a c t o r s behind t h e s e f e r t i l i t y t r e n d s t h a t f i r s t p r o d u c e d e x c e e d - ingly l a r g e c o h o r t s and t h e n e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y small o n e s ? A t t h i s point w e will n o t review t h e v e r y e x t e n s i v e l i t e r a t u r e on f e r t i l i t y determinants. UTe will only s e l e c - tively mention some of t h e most common p a t t e r n s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .

The p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t c h a n g e s in t h e m a r r i a g e p a t t e r n played a n i m p o r t a n t r o l e in t h e post-war f e r t i l i t y i n c r e a s e . The d e c r e a s i n g inclina- tion t o m a r r y a n d a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y f a s t r i s e in d i v o r c e r a t e s h a v e a l s o a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e downward t r e n d in f e r t i l i t y rates s i n c e t h e 1960s. Hence, nuptiality did n o t only c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e b a b y boom, i t a l s o plays i t s r o l e in t h e c u r r e n t bust. But by no means i s m a r r i a g e b e h a v i o r t h e only f a c t o r explaining f e r t i l i t y fluctuations, especially i n a s i t u a t i o n w h e r e t h e p e r c e n t a g e of c h i l d r e n b o r n o u t of wedlock i s becoming more a n d m o r e significant.

R i c h a r d E a s t e r l i n (1980) s t r e s s e d what is usually r e f e r r e d t o as t h e r e l a t i v e income h y p o t h e s i s ( o r simply Easterlin-Hypothesis). R e f e r r i n g t o t h e empirical evidence f o r t h e United S t a t e s , h e a r g u e d t h a t a young family's e x p e c t e d income, r e l a t i v e to t h e a s p i r a t i o n s t h e s p o u s e s b r i n g from t h e i r p a r e n t s ' families, plays a c r u c i a l r o l e in t h e c o u p l e ' s decision on family size. The small c o h o r t s b o r n during t h e d e p r e s s i o n of t h e 1930s had r a t h e r low m a t e r i a l a s p i r a t i o n s d u e t o t h e difficult living c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e i r time, b u t b e c a u s e t h e r e w a s l e s s competition f o r jobs a n d t h e economy w a s booming during t h e l a t e 1950s a n d e a r l y 1960s, t h e available income by f a r e x c e e d e d t h e a s p i r a t i o n s f o r t h o s e young families and they decided t o h a v e many c h i l d r e n . F o r t h o s e c h i l d r e n b o r n as p a r t of t h e baby boom, t h e situation i s r e v e r s e d a n d t h e y will h a v e only a few c h i l d r e n . The p u r e l y demo- g r a p h i c s i d e of t h i s a r g u m e n t s s a y s t h a t small c o h o r t s tend t o h a v e high f e r t i l i t y a n d l a r g e c o h o r t s low f e r t i l i t y holding economic conditions constant. Our empirical analysis c a n c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e evaluation of t h i s argument in d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s .

The demographic s i d e of t h e E a s t e r l i n argument c a n b e e v a l u a t e d i n r e s p e c t t o two a s p e c t s : d o e s t h e p e r i o d between low a n d high f e r t i l i t y r e a l l y c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e mean length of a g e n e r a t i o n , a n d i s t h e fluctuation r e a l l y a c o h o r t

phenomenon? The second a s p e c t was a l r e a d y discussed e a r l i e r a n d we came to t h e conclusion t h a t in a l l c o u n t r i e s young families t h a t h a d many c h i l d r e n at t h e time of t h e baby boom did not continue c h i l d b e a r i n g in t h e l a t e 1 9 6 0 s when t h e y became 30. Hence, t h e main a r g u m e n t should not b e t h a t members of small b i r t h c o h o r t s h a v e h i g h e r completed f e r t i l i t y but t h a t t h e y start o u t f a s t e r a n d h a v e t h e i r chil- d r e n at y o u n g e r a g e s . The remaining c y c l i c a l fluctuation of c o h o r t f e r t i l i t y i s much l e s s impressive t h a n t h e p e r i o d p e r s p e c t i v e .

But was t h e r e r e a l l y a n y c y c l i c a l p a t t e r n ? In t h e U S t h e p e r i o d between t h e lowest f e r t i l i t y in 1 9 3 3 and t h e h i g h e s t f e r t i l i t y i n 1957 i s indeed a b o u t t h e mean length of a g e n e r a t i o n . But t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p no l o n g e r holds when w e move up a n d down t h e time s c a l e : t h e l a r g e c o h o r t s b o r n a r o u n d 1920-25 should h a v e t h e i r lower number of c h i l d r e n a r o u n d 1945-50 which w a s i n f a c t a p e r i o d of f a s t f e r t i l - i t y i n c r e a s e . Similarly, t h e s t i l l v e r y small c o h o r t s b o r n a r o u n d 1940 h a d much lower f e r t i l i t y t h a n t h e c o h o r t s b o r n in t h e e a r l y 1930s. F o r o t h e r c o u n t r i e s with time s e r i e s on a g e s p e c i f i c f e r t i l i t y s t a r t i n g e a r l i e r i n t h i s c e n t u r y , t h e a r g u m e n t i s even much w e a k e r t h a n i n t h e U.S. In Finland, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e t i m e between t h e low f e r t i l i t y of t h e 1930s a n d t h e peak of t h e baby boom w a s only a b o u t 1 2 y e a r s . Between 1 9 5 5 a n d 1 9 6 5 when t h e small c o h o r t s w e r e in t h e i r prime c h i l d b e a r i n g a g e s , f e r t i l i t y was declining s t e e p l y . In Italy e v e n t h e unusually l a r g e c o h o r t s b o r n in 1938-40 p r o d u c e d t h e p e a k of t h e baby boom in 1964. F o r many o t h e r c o u n t r i e s t h e time s e r i e s a r e t o o s h o r t t o s a y much a b o u t cyclical p a t t e r n s . W e c a n only s e e t h a t t h e e x t r e m e l y low level of p e r i o d f e r t i l i t y o b s e r v e d i n most coun- t r i e s a r o u n d 1 9 7 8 w a s at a time when t h e women in t h e prime c h i l d b e a r i n g a g e s came from r a t h e r small pre-baby boom c o h o r t s . Much more could b e s a i d a b o u t c y c l i c a l p a t t e r n s and more s o p h i s t i c a t e d methods could b e a p p l i e d , b u t t h e prima facie impression i s t h a t t h e demographic e v i d e n c e f o r E a s t e r l i n c y c l e s i s e x t r e m e l y weak in most of t h e c o u n t r i e s w e c o n s i d e r e d .

The s t e e p decline of f e r t i l i t y a f t e r t h e p e a k of t h e baby boom h a s o f t e n been a s s o c i a t e d uiith t h e introduction of new e f f e c t i v e c o n t r a c e p t i v e methods, e s p e - cially t h e pill which a p p e a r e d in t h e 1 9 6 0 s and quickly became v e r y p o p u l a r . The pill h a s f a c i l i t a t e d a l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of s e x u a l a t t i t u d e s by g r e a t l y diminishing t h e r i s k of conception a n d i t a l s o c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e postponement of m a r r i a g e . Despite t h e medical c o n c e r n s o v e r t h e y e a r s , t h e pill continues t o be t h e most com- monly used e f f e c t i v e method of c o n t r a c e p t i o n f o r women, especially t h o s e u n d e r a g e 30. S u r g i c a l s t e r i l i z a t i o n f o r c o n t r a c e p t i v e p u r p o s e s i s a l s o widely used in t h e US at o l d e r a g e s . Induced a b o r t i o n s w e r e legalized i n t h e US in 1 9 7 3 and in many o t h e r industrialized c o u n t r i e s a r o u n d t h a t time. In most c o u n t r i e s t h e number of

a b o r t i o n s s t e a d i l y i n c r e a s e d until i t seemed to l e v e l off in t h e 1980s. F o r t h e U S it i s estimated t h a t in 1 9 8 4 , 259, of a l l p r e g n a n c i e s w e r e t e r m i n a t e d by induced a b o r - tions (Westoff 1986).

However, t h e s e p r o x i m a t e d e t e r m i n a n t s of f e r t i l i t y only- e x p l a i n t h e how b u t n o t t h e why- of f e r t i l i t y t r e n d s . In modern s o c i e t i e s t h e number of c h i l d r e n b o r n i s mainly d e t e r m i n e d by t h e c o u p l e ' s a t t i t u d e s and intentions. Of c o u r s e a c e r t a i n p e r c e n t a g e of c o u p l e s e n d s up with more o r l e s s c h i l d r e n t h a n t h e y originally intended (e.g. G i s s e r e t a l . 1985). Despite t h i s inconsistency between d e s i r e s and r e a l i t y , f e r t i l i t y intentions a n d t h e i r c h a n g e s o v e r t h e life c y c l e remain t h e c r u - c i a l f a c t o r in explaining f e r t i l i t y p a t t e r n s . These intentions o r d e s i r e s a r e t h e r e s u l t of a v e r y complex p r o c e s s t h a t h a s i t s r o o t s in childhood e x p e r i e n c e s a n d t h e normative system of t h e p a r e n t s , own inclinations, e d u c a t i o n , job o p p o r t u n i - t i e s , t h e economic: situation, a n d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o o n e ' s p a r t n e r . F o r t h e link between d e s i r e s a n d r e a l i t y , not only c o n t r a c e p t i o n b u t a l s o physical a s p e c t s of fecundability p l a y a c e r t a i n r o l e . Summarizing t h e findings f r o m a number of r e c e n t f e r t i l i t y s t u d i e s (Lutz 1985), i t c a n b e s a i d t h a t t h e r e a r e c u r r e n t l y n o indi- c a t i o n s of d r a m a t i c c h a n g e s i n t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s of d e s i r e d family s i z e in t h e n e a r f u t u r e t h a t would b r i n g a b o u t significantly h i g h e r f e r t i l i t y l e v e l s . On t h e con- t r a r y , many f a c t o r s point t o w a r d s s t i l l lower f e r t i l i t y .

The understanding of f e r t i l i t y intentions on a n individual l e v e l i s e x t r e m e l y complex, b u t t h e i r c o n s e q u e n c e s a r e v e r y r e l e v a n t on a n a g g r e g a t e level. The f u t u r e p r o c e s s of population aging will, to a l a r g e e x t e n t , d e p e n d on t h e family s i z e d e s i r e s of young couples. The population p r o j e c t i o n s p r e s e n t e d in t h i s p a p e r are b a s e d on v e r y optimistic f e r t i l i t y assumptions of t h e IJN, t h a t assume i n c r e a s i n g l e v e l s f o r some c o u n t r i e s in t h e n e a r f u t u r e . S c e n a r i o s of f u r t h e r d e c r e a s i n g f e r - tility r e s u l t in a n e v e n f a s t e r a n d more pronounced p r o c e s s of aging t h a n shown in t h e g r a p h s .

Even though f e r t i l i t y rates c a n n o t b e p r o j e c t e d , we already- know t h e number of women t h a t will be in t h e i r prime c h i l d b e a r i n g a g e s i n t h e n e x t 2 5 y e a r s . L a r g e c o h o r t s of women s u c h as those b o r n d u r i n g t h e baby boom will p r o d u c e a l a r g e r number of c h i l d r e n e v e n if a v e r a g e f e r t i l i t y r e m a i n e d c o n s t a n t simply b e c a u s e potential m o t h e r s a r e l a r g e r in numbers. This phenomenon c a n b e c l e a r l y s e e n in most g r a p h s giving t h e p r o j e c t e d population to t h e y e a r 2025 (see G r a p h s 11 to 1 4 ) . I t i s c a l l e d t h e e c h o of t h e baby boom. Especially in c o u n t r i e s with a v e r y pronounced a n d c o n c e n t r a t e d b a b y boom, t h i s e c h o i s visible as a s e c o n d wave of b i r t h s following t h e b a b y boom by a b o u t 25 y e a r s (see, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e g r a p h s f o r

Poland, Czechoslovakia, FRG, a n d o t h e r s ) . These e c h o s h a v e l e d to a n i n c r e a s e in t h e a b s o l u t e number of b i r t h s in s e v e r a l c o u n t r i e s at p r e s e n t . J o u r n a l i s t s a n d pol- iticians h a v e to b e c a u t i o u s so as n o t to i n t e r p r e t t h i s as a n i n c r e a s e in f e r t i l i t y b u t as t h e a g e s t r u c t u r a l e f f e c t i t r e a l l y is.

The b a b y boom g e n e r a t i o n in most c o u n t r i e s i s c u r r e n t l y i n t h e i r mid-twenties.

T h e i r members f a c e d more difficult conditions when t r y i n g t o e n t e r t h e l a b o r m a r k e t t h a n many g e n e r a t i o n s b e f o r e them. This i s p a r t of t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e high youth uncmployment we c u r r e n t l y o b s e r v e a n d of crowded u n i v e r s i t i e s a n d o t h e r phenomena r e l a t e d to c o h o r t s i z e . This h a r d e r competition will g o on o v e r t h e i r whole life a n d e v e n a f t e r r e t i r e m e n t , s i n c e in many c o u n t r i e s t h e c o h o r t b o r n at t h e p e a k of t h e baby boom will b e t h e l a r g e s t a g e g r o u p i n t h e population until a g e 70 o r e v e n beyond. F o r t h e c o h o r t s following them i t will b e e a s i e r a g a i n b u t s t i l l t h e y may s u f f e r f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t many positions will be filled with r e l a t i v e l y young p e o p l e a n d , in positions w h e r e t h e e x a c t a g e i s n o t s o i m p o r t a n t , t h e y will h a v e t o c o m p e t e with t h e baby boomers.

REFERENCES

Coale, A. (1969) The Decline of F e r t i l i t y in E u r o p e from t h e F r e n c h Revolution t o World War 11. In F e r t i l i t y a n d F a m i l y P l a n n i n g : A ?t70rLd b%m, e d i t e d by Behrman e t a l . Ann A r b o r .

Coale, A. and R. Treadway (1986) A Summary of t h e Changing Distribution of Overall F e r t i l i t y , Marital F e r t i l i t y , a n d t h e P r o p o r t i o n M a r r i e d in t h e P r o - vinces of E u r o p e . P a g e s 131-178 in The Decline of F e r t i l i t y in E u r o p e , e d i t e d by A. Coale a n d S . Watkins.

Coale, A. a n d S. Watkins, e d s . (1986) The Decline of F e r t i l i t y in E u r o p e . P r i n c e - ton University P r e s s .

E a s t e r l i n , R. (1980) B i r t h a n d F o r t u n e : The Impact of N u m b e r s o n P e r s o n a l Mrel- f a r e . New York.

Gambill, B.A., J.W. Vaupel, a n d A.I. Yashin (1986) The L e z i s C o m p u t e r P r o g r a m f o r C r e a t i n g S h a d e d C o n t o u r Maps of D e m o g r a p h i c S u r f a c e s . WP-86-37. Laxen- b u r g , Austria: I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r Applied Systems Analysis.

G i s s e r , R . , W. Lutz, a n d R . Miinz (1985) Desired Family Size a n d Number of Children.

P a g e s 33-94 in Leben m i t Kindern-?trunsch u n d W i r k l i c h k e i t , e d i t e d by R.

Miinz (in German). Vienna.

Knodel, J . (1974) The Decline o f F e r t i l i t y in G e r m a n y , LR71-DSG. P r i n c e t o n . Knodel, J . a n d E. van d e Walle (1979) Lessons from t h e Fast: Policy Implications of

H i s t o r i c a l F e r t i l i t y S t u d i e s . P o p u l a t i o n a n d Development R e v i e w 5(2):217- 246.

Lutz, TV. (1985) On t h e P r e d i c t i v e Value of F e r t i l i t y Studies. P a g e s 287-303 in Z e i t s c h r i . f i i r BevolkerungsurissenschaJ?: 3/85 (in German).

Lutz, W. (1987) E f f e c t s of F e r t i l i t y T r e n d s o n Population Aging in Finland. In:

Yearbook of P o p u l a t i o n R e s e a r c h in F i n l a n d , forthcoming.

Lutz, W. a n d K . F i t k a n e n (1986) The Fwo D e m o g r a p h i c T r a n s i t i o n s of F i n l a n d . WF-86-9. L a x e n b u r g , Austria: I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r Applied Systems Analysis.

R y d e r , N. (1955) The Influence of Declining Mortality on Swedish R e p r o d u c t i v i t y . P a g e s 65-81 in C u r r e n t R e s e a r c h in H u m a n F e r t i l i t y . New York.

Westoff, Ch. (1986) F e r t i l i t y i n t h e United S t a t e s . S c i e n c e 234:554-558.