Kulturen: Konflikt-Analyse-Dialog
Cultures: Conflict-Analysis-Dialogue
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society
Editorial Board Elisabeth Leinfellner Rudolf Haller Werner Leinfellner Klaus Puhl
Paul Weingartner
Band XIV
Volume XIV
Kulturen: Konflikt-Analyse-Dialog
Beiträge des 29. Internationalen Wittgenstein Symposiums
6. – 12. August 2006 Kirchberg am Wechsel
Band XIV
Herausgeber Georg Gasser Christian Kanzian Edmund Runggaldier
Redaktion/ Lektorat Joseph Wang Matthias Stefan
Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der Abteilung Kultur und Wissenschaft des Amtes der NÖ Landesregierung
Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2006
Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft
Cultures: Conflict-Analysis-Dialogue
Papers of the 29th International Wittgenstein Symposium
August 6 – 12, 2006 Kirchberg am Wechsel
Volume XIV
Editors Georg Gasser Christian Kanzian Edmund Runggaldier
Editorial assistance Joseph Wang Matthias Stefan
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Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2006
Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society
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Inhalt / Contents
Inhalt / Contents
Egoism, Coexistence, and the Possibility of Altruism: A Rortyan Failure
Joaquín Jareño Alarcón ... 11 A Naturalistic Method for Therapy not for Science
Marilena Andronico ... 14 About Wittgenstein’s mathematical epistemology
Olga Antonova ... 17 Der Vorrang der Logik vor der Metaphysik bei Wittgenstein
Thiago Aquino... 20 Jenseits des nichtzweifelnden Benehmens: Vertrauen als Einladung zu einem fremden Blick
auf den abendländischen Geist
José María Ariso ... 23 Intercultural Dialog and Mathematics Education: A Contribution from Ancient Chinese Algebra
Giorgio T. Bagni ... 26 Wittgenstein, Language and Chess
Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera ... 29 Wittgenstein on the Relationship Between Individual and Community
Chantal Bax ... 33 About “die letzte Zusammenfassung”
Luciano Bazzocchi ... 36 Analytical Philosophy as a Project of Emancipation from Suffering
Ondoej Beran... 39 Wittgenstein and Kripke’s Skeptic
P. R. Bhat... 42 Conflicts, Language, and Rationality
Alcino Eduardo Bonella... 45 Davidson on Intercultural Dialog
Cristina Borgoni ... 47 Ist meine eigene Weltanschuung third-personal enough?
Gerson Brea and Hilan Bensusan ... 50 An economist’s reflections on some recent trends in European culture
Y.S. Brenner ... 53 How to Make Opposite Ends Meet?
Aysegul Cakal ... 58 Intercultural Dialogue in Philosophy: Julio Enrique Blanco, Hans Lindemann,
Wittgenstein and Austrian Tradition
René J. Campis C. and Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera... 60 On Siamese Twins and Philosophical Zombies: A New Reading of Wittgenstein’s ‘Private Language Argument’
James Connelly ... 63 Wittgenstein on Frege on Connectives
Joao Vergilio Gallerani Cuter ... 66 Where to seek for the ‘Uniquely Individual’ in Human Experience: In the Twilight Zone of
Consciousness or Somewhere More Accessible?
Fulya Ozlem Dashan ... 68
Inhalt / Contents
Searles Naturalismus: Eine seiner Schwierigkeiten in Bezug auf das Geistige und das Soziale
Tárik de Athayde Prata ... 70 Concepts, Prototypes, Person. Does cognitive science solve cultural problems
or does it merely dissolve their specificity?
Sara Dellantonio and Luigi Pastore ... 73 Probleme der interkulturellen Philosophie (unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Indiens)
Kiran Desai-Breun... 76 The Rational Structure of Non-Violent Worldview
Antonino Drago ... 79 Radical Interpretation and Intercultural Communication
Eli Dresner ... 82 Indeterminismus freier Willensentscheidungen: ontisch, epistemisch oder logisch?
Helmut Fink ... 85 Is naturalism progressive? A naturalistic approach to the philosophy of science
Ulrich Frey... 88 Two Senses of Common Sense
Zacharoula Gasparatou ... 91 Against Their Own Intention: Problematic Consequences of Ontological Emergence
Georg Gasser and Joseph Wang ... 94 Recognising Beauty : On The Intercultural Dialogue In Philosophy
Mahlete-Tsige Getachew ... 98 Trendwende in der Evolution? Nicht gestellte Fragen in unserem relativistischen Zeitalter
Rainer Gottlob... 101 Postmodernismus als Argumentationstechnik
Marek Graszewicz and Dominik Lewiński... 104 Freud-Jung controversy: a failed intercultural dialogue
Ora Gruengard... 108 Grounded Action: Wittgenstein against Skepticism
Edward Guetti ... 113 Al-Ghazālī on the Incoherence of “Substance”
Boris Hennig ... 117 Wittgenstein and the Language of Religion in Secular Age
Zora Hesová ... 120 Uncertainty as a challenge for ethical reasoning
Rafaela Hillerbrand ... 123 Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt nur schlechte Interpretation. Interkultureller Dialog und Dissens
Kathrin Hönig ... 126 Wittgenstein im Iran
Malek Hosseini... 129 Wittgenstein's Paperwork. An Example from the “Big Typescript''
Herbert Hrachovec... 131 Substance and Attribute in the Controversy Between the Two Greatest Western
Philosophers (Leibniz and Spinoza): Leibniz’s Critique of Spinoza’s Argument
for Pantheism (Ethics, th. 14) in his Remarks on Benedict de Spinoza’s Ethics (part I, Of God)
Tomasz Kakol ... 134 On Freedom to Predict
Laurian Kertesz ... 141 Reflections on Ethics and Cultural Clash
Peter P. Kirschenmann ... 144 Anderssein und/oder die Macht der Differenz
Endre Kiss... 147 Nachdenken über Gewissheit – Zur Artikulierbarkeit und Verhandelbarkeit unseres
kulturellen Hintergrundkönnens und -wissens
Beatrice Kobow... 150
Inhalt / Contents
Zar'a-Jacob und Walda-Heiwat über die Rationalität religiöser Aussagen – Ein Beitrag zur äthiopischen Religionsphilosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts
Andrej Krause ... 153 Wittgenstein on consciousness in “Philosophical Investigations”
Kristijan Krkač and Josip Lukin ... 156 Geltung und Naturalismus
Tomasz Kubalica ... 159 Did you do something wrong if you couldn’t have done otherwise? – Deontic act evaluation and
some doubts concerning “ought implies can”
Michael Kühler ... 162 Wittgenstein und Pyrrhonismus
Rosario La Sala ... 165 Wittgenstein’s “notorious paragraph” about the Gödel Theorem
Timm Lampert ... 168 The Problem of Simple Objects
Eric Lemaire... 171 Designation and Ontological Commitment in Sellars and Prasangika Madhyamika
Eric J. Loomis ... 174 Language, world, and structure
Pentti Määttänen... 177 On the Impossibility of Solitary Persons
Tuomas Manninen ... 180 Wittgensteins Philosophieren für den Menschen – Denken sub specie hominis als Methode
Sandra Markewitz ... 183 Derivativeness, production and reacting to the cause
Rosja Mastop ... 186 (Non-)Compositionality and Wittgenstein’s non-ne-game
Ingolf Max ... 189
„Patamou“ oder „El poder de la palabra“?
Annelore Mayer... 192 On the Limits of Intercultural Argumentation
Guido Melchior... 195 Wittgenstein, Cavell, and the Fall of Philosophy
Thomas Meyer ... 198 Rorty, Wittgenstein, and the ‘dialogue among civilizations’
Karel Mom... 201 Reservations to Human Rights Treaties – Tribute to Religious and Cultural Diversity
or Undermining of Universality?
Andreas Th. Müller... 204 Über „Aspektsehen“ und dessen enge Verwandtschaft mit dem „Erleben der Bedeutung eines Wortes“
Marc Müller ... 207 Do We Really Need Relativism About Truth?
Julien Murzi... 210 On Language and Identity
Ohad Nachtomy ... 213 Die Relativität von Gewißheiten
Karl Nähr ... 216 Natural Language and its Speakers: Davidson’s Compositionality Requirement
Isaac Nevo ... 219 Der Beitrag einer „Logik der Philosophie“ zum Verständnis des Dialogs der Kulturen
Peter Oberhofer ... 228 Das Gehirn, das Ich und die Straßenverkehrsordnung
Hermann Oetjens... 231
Inhalt / Contents
Wittgenstein, Waismann and Non-Euclidean Geometries
Martin Ohmacht ... 234 Cultural Alterity and Unilateralism: The Dialogue of Philosophy of Language
Jerome Ikechukwu Okonkwo ... 237 Die Opazität der Oberfläche: Wittgenstein und Celan
Giorgio Palma ... 240 A Perspective of Dialogical Engagement Between Self and Culture
Ranjan K. Panda... 243 Double Meant is not Double Good: A Problem for Kane’s Response to the Chance Objection
James Petrik ... 246 The Analytic Theory of the A Priori: Ayer’s Argument
Tommaso Piazza ... 248 Experience and social norms in folk psychology – Wittgenstein meets neuroscience
Pim Klaassen ... 251 Can there be such thing as a “hopeless” language user?
Marcos Paiva Pinheiro ... 254 Regaining the Sense of the Tractatus: Wittgenstein’s Logical Mysticism
Paul Poenicke ... 257 Brandom on Holism, Communication, and Reference
Bernd Prien ... 260 Action and Morality: A Reflection on Thomas Nagel’s and Christine Korsgaard’s Moral Thinking
Marek Pyka ... 263 Peter Singer’s Utilitarianism versus Tom Regan’s Rights View. A Comparative Study
Leszek Pyra ... 266 Normativity, Experience and Concrete Case
Regina Queiroz ... 269 Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspiel – Gadamer und Wittgenstein im Vergleich
Juliane Reichel... 272
‘The riddle does not exist’: Wittgenstein’s Philosophy Revisited in the Context of the Ignorabimus-Dispute
Andrea Reichenberger... 275 Zur dringend notwendigen Revision des „standard view“ der Genese der Philosophischen Untersuchungen
Josef G. F. Rothhaupt... 278 Weltsichtkohärenz – um welchen Preis?
Eckart Ruschmann... 281 Deuten – Missverstehen – ‚Blasphemie‘: Grenze und Potential eines offenen Übersetzungsbegriffs
Britta Saal ... 284 Rule following and intercultural perspective
Michał Sala ... 287 Kulturelle Gegenstände und intentionale Erlebnisse
Alessandro Salice ... 289 Life’s Infinite Variations: Wittgenstein and Cultural Generalization
Patricia Sayre... 292 Against cultural identity: a family resemblance perspective on intercultural relations
Marina Sbisà ... 295 Kann eine Person als Urheber ihrer Handlungen verstanden werden, wenn sie keine alternativen
Möglichkeiten hat?
Benedikt Schick ... 298 Substanz, Kausalität und Freiheit
Pedro Schmechtig... 302 Fremdverstehen als dialogische Hermeneutik
Karsten Schmidt... 305 Towards an Intercultural Phenomenology? – Objectivity, Subjectivity and the Constitution of Otherness
Eva Schwarz ... 308
Inhalt / Contents
A Complicated Form of Life
Murilo Rocha Seabra and Marcos Paiva Pinheiro ... 311 Towards Cosmopolitan Philosophy
Arto Siitonen ... 313 Sprache im interkulturellen Dialog
Kirsti Siitonen ... 316 Wittgenstein and the Problem of Cultural Relativism
Rui Silva... 319 Social Criticism through Internal and Intercultural Dialogues
Vikram Singh Sirola ... 322 Interkulturelle Philosophie in Russland: Tradition und Neuorientierungen
Maja Soboleva ... 324 Wittgenstein – ein platonischer Idealist und Kulturpessimist?
Ilse Somavilla... 327 A Report on Graduate Work in Qom on the Problems of Essence/Attribute and Substance/Accident
Narjess Javandel Soumeahsaraie ... 331 Konvergenzen in grundlegenden Prinzipien zwischen dem kritischen Rationalismus und
der interkulturellen Philosophie
Harald Stelzer ... 334 Two Viewpoints On Perception: Possibility of Dialog
Anna Storozhuk ... 337 The Fraissè Theorem and Goodman’s Paradox
Tiziano Stradoni ... 340 Outline of Arguments against Naturalisms: Levels and Classifications
Thomas Sukopp... 344 Reason, red in tooth and claw: naturalising reason
Konrad Talmont-Kaminski... 348 The Significance of Interculturality for the Problem of (In)Transparency
James M. Thompson ... 351 Wittgenstein, the artistic way of seeing, and the sense of the world
Gabriele Tomasi... 353 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to Intercultural Dialogue and Cosmopolitan Democracy:
a discursive ethics of self-reflexivity
Fabrizio Trifiro ... 356 Aber der Löwe spricht eben nicht! Anmerkungen zu einer Kontroverse
Thomas Wachtendorf... 362 From Anti-Metaphysics to Non-Pyrrhonian Polyphony - remarks on the difficulty of receiving Wittgenstein
Thomas Wallgren... 365 Respective Justice through Thick and Thin: A Critique of Rawlsean Justice
Trevor Wedman ... 368 Normativity and Novelty
Tine Wilde ... 370 Towards an Intercultural Phenomenology – The problem of Interculturality from a Methodological Perspective
Harald A. Wiltsche ... 373 Das Problem des metaphysischen Subjekts im Wittgensteins „Tractatus”
Heflik Włodzimierz ... 376
Egoism, Coexistence, and the Possibility of Altruism:
A Rortyan Failure
Joaquín Jareño Alarcón, Universidad Católica San Antonio, Spain
Utopian literature has made us accustomed to imagining ideal worlds where harmony between individuals was the main characteristic in human relationships, and life was seen at its happiest. This “search for paradise” has been a usual longing in the history of humankind, and it has guided all of the reflections about the best possible model of society. Nevertheless, the harshness of facts has shown the enormous difficulties in carrying out utopian projects, and the tragic experiences of 20th century have seriously questioned the plausibility, and indeed the meaning, of such projects.
The Bible, the book of Genesis, in its chapter on the
“fall”, has probably had an influence as no other book has had to formulate our conception of human condition, stressing its weakness and, because of it, its need for redemption. From this departure from paradise there have been many nostalgic attempts to regain such a “Golden Age”. Those attempts have shown the enormous gap between human aspirations and their possibilities of fulfilment. In my opinion, the key question has been the discussion of evil, and of the relationship between evil and human freedom. This paper tries to make a brief analysis of the concepts altruism and egoism, discussing them from the perspective of Richard Rorty’s antifoundationalism, to see to what extent it cannot answer some questions concerning the human condition.
The Christian (basically the Catholic) conception of the human being presents it as a weakened being, with a sort of tendency to choose evil. Such evil is considered according to the criteria of a religion whose axis is an Absolute Being who is going to judge our deeds and intentions. The idea that we have the possibility to choose evil has been the point of departure of all political and moral reflections concerning how to give shape to models of coexistence where such possibility has been reduced to a minimum. Moral evil is something related to relationships between individuals. We will focus our attention on the idea of egoism.
As a matter of fact, we all seek to maximize our happiness in one way or another, and we consider such maximization as the permanent attainment of our goals.
But in this search we collide with the aspirations of other human beings, who – by definition – want their own happiness as well. This shock is what usually urges us to design conditions for our relationships, and makes duties and obligations arise.
This is what puts the existence of egoism – and the question about what place it has in human behaviour – at the centre of our discussion. Notwithstanding, there seems to be reasons to justify a basic deeply rooted altruism, with clear biological connotations: the relationship between a mother and her children, for instance. Nevertheless, this altruism unfortunately has many counter-examples, and it is of no special use to characterize the human condition.
Richard Rorty has pointed out on different occasions that such a concept of human condition is vacuous, whereas essentialism is in complete disagreement with his pragmatist point of view. In this paper, I will try to argue that the existence of a basic tendency to egoism is an inherent part of the human condition.
David Gauthier is the author of an already classic study on egoism titled: “The Incomplete Egoist” (Gauthier 1998). Here he shows the scope of practical rationality when we try to maximize utility. As a rule, it seems that we cooperate when we are expecting others to do the same.
When the case is just the opposite, when there is no expectation of reciprocity, we reconsider if our strategy has to bear in mind the benefits to other individuals. We bear this in mind when such considerations allow us to guarantee, one way or another, our highest benefit, be it in specific achievements or satisfactions, or to stop the actions of others that can have negative repercussions on us. To bear in mind the interests of others – contrary to what Gauthier says in his article – can be a strategic element for the egoist.
It is true that he/she looks at them taking his/her own values as a basis, but this is something fundamental to defining him/her as an egoist. The egoist is one who assumes that values can only be relative to agents, and that contacts with other individuals’ reasons are merely strategic. He/she is the one who estimates that all of his/her actions must produce his/her own benefit, and – by definition – in an exclusive mood. The inconvenience for an egoist is that many times he/she may not know the results of his/her initiatives, given that he/she can lack the appropriate orientation to make his/her choice. But if this circumstance makes the egoist have such conduct that can be considered altruist, he/she does it indeed because it is the best strategy from which he/she can keep on looking for his/her interests, by other means.
That the egoist cannot fulfill all of his/her demands is something obvious. As egoist we see he/she who only thinks of his/herself or, better, he/she who in the end tries to achieve only his/her own interests and aspirations. It is quite rare to see examples of a radical egoist, but this does not deny the tendency – we all just have to look at ourselves. So better than a strict definition (that we can be defined just as egoists) we can talk of a deeply rooted tendency towards egoism; a tendency that becomes stressed in propitious situations. To see to what extent this is so, we could imagine a man/woman whom from the very beginning of his/her life had been allowed to do his/her own will without restrictions.
The possibility of pure altruism seems, therefore, to be called in question. The justification of altruism could in principle come from the biological need to cooperate. But this would still be indirectly justifying the individual disposition to personal benefit that characterizes the egoist. In this sense, we can distinguish between strong egoism and weak egoism, which is compatible with some cases of altruism. It is true that to have a disposition for altruism we depart from concrete societies – social contexts which codify the meaning of that word – or from the knowledge of personal circumstances of those individuals who, one way or another, we know. But I agree with Th. Nagel (Nagel 2004) on the idea that we need to go from the concrete to the abstract to have a really altruistic disposition. At this point it may be good to draw a distinction between weak altruism and strong altruism. The first one would be circumscribed to the generosity with
Egoism, Coexistence, and the Possibility of Altruism: A Rortyan Failure - Joaquín Jareño Alarcón
which we treat those people close to us: our family, friends, etc.; the place where according to Rorty we make up our initial loyalties. In this personalized area of affections it is quite easy for us to cede parts of our innermost interests. So, manifestations of generosity are easier. The case of the mother who nurses her child is similar to that of the father who does not eat in order to breed his children. This altruism may have a primary interest for survival, but it can be justified by the value it has within the singular-personalized relationship, that is – so to speak – “one to one”. But to extrapolate this basic altruism is highly complicated. In a certain sense, it would be useful to employ the mimetic attitude by means of which we go from singular/particular experiences with singular/particular individuals, with their related commitments, to those – not close – individuals who we have to face personally throughout our life. This assimilation can certainly be simple, but it still requires a certain degree of abstraction or, at least, the projection of what is familiar to us to individuals who have many areas of their lives unknown to us.
There remain many other human groups with which we lack any kind of sympathy, intimacy, proximity or whatever circumstances that could justify our solidarity towards them. It is in these cases where I would use the term strong altruism. How can we act for the interest of people we do not know and we will probably never know?
What sense does generosity towards future generations make? The question is not a rhetorical one if we take into account that the world they will live is but our legacy.
In those cases where there is closeness – relative closeness – we can easily put ourselves in the place of others in order to project our affections, emotions, and passions onto them. But in those of strong altruism we need to transform such a projection into an abstract concept. This is what allows us to treat as other “us”, or Kantian “ends-in-themselves” to those individuals to whom we will never know, but will be affected by the consequences of our actions and decisions. This is what justifies values being objective. In the case of strong altruism the need for such objectivity is unavoidable, because particular benefits – or benefit for particulars – are quite diffuse. But also because we recognize as objective reasons, that is, as valid reasons for anybody those who support our personal –individual – action, in so far as we project our particular conditions in a concept: if we want to remain alive and enjoy an inhabitable world, the same will happen to those beings we can consider as humans. We would project our ideal of dignity – of our dignity – on merely conceptual human beings (to say this is just the same as talking about the concept “human individual”).
Nevertheless, nothing of this sort would be acceptable for R. Rorty. The contingency of the self can basically be seen in the fact that “self” is a hollow word.
We are beings of historic nature, and we can only deal with things historically, that is, in a contingent way. That makes us open to an ongoing reconstruction of our self- perception. Rorty calls this process redescription. With this there is nothing decisive or definitive; which makes clear the radicality of human liberty. In my opinion, this proposal would leave aside the problem of blame, given that responsibility and the meaning of human actions would remain circumscribed to contextual demands; to the context where redescription takes place. This is so at least in principle, assuming that the redescription is not conditioned beforehand. So, the process of redescription may have no limits, and our descendants could become extremely different from us (Rorty 2005, p.102). We can
imagine that we cannot imagine them, and that their criteria to choose would be extremely distinct, but still there would be certain commitments we could not avoid by the fact that we cannot imagine that which we cannot imagine.
Granted that human beings change a lot by means of their redescriptions, we will never imagine them as absolutely different from us. There will be always a basic model with which we can identify them or assimilate them to us. This is the concept we need. If, as Rorty says (Rorty 2005, p.68) our responsibility is confined to our present interlocutors, who easily can take part in the semantic context where our identity as well as its modifications are forged, it is of no use to assume it in front of those who are not – as such – our interlocutors, unless we would be talking of an ideal interlocution. In fact, given that we cannot know them, to try cooperation or to get to an intersubjective agreement with them would be nonsense.
Besides, if – as Rorty says – the concept of moral evil is reviewable (Rorty 2000a, p.38), there are no reasons to demand a commitment from us with them, due to the fact that there exists no obligation beyond the lexicon we are using in a concrete moment – or time.
There is no moral knowledge, given that there are no moral concepts as such. All we have is moral action and the circumstantial responsibility attached to it: rightness or wrongness in what we say is thus related to specific times and places (Rorty 2000b, p.84).
To a certain extent this contradicts what Hans Jonas has called “the Principle of Responsibility” (Das Prinzip Verantwortung), according to which our responsibility goes beyond the demands of respect for our fellow contemporaries, reaching those individuals from coming generations, whose value as ends-in-themselves is demanding from us the assumption of some moral obligations. But the lack of Rortyan proposals concerning strong altruism does not end here. These have to do with the consideration of the different degrees in closeness with those individuals who are contemporary to us. If taking care of others is but the projection of those conditions by means of which the links between close individuals develop, we will not be able to sufficiently transfer our version of identity. This is what makes useless those universal aspirations of moral idealism. But this is prejudging whom we are ready to help. Many will be excluded as well. If, in the last instance, as Rorty says, to talk about moral obligations we have to take into account the available resources and goods (Rorty 1998, p.106), it is impossible for the discourse on global justice or on a feeling of generosity that allows – encourages – the redistribution of wealth to end with misery in the world.
This work was possible thanks to PMAFI from the Catholic University of San Antonio (Murcia-Spain).
Egoism, Coexistence, and the Possibility of Altruism: A Rortyan Failure - Joaquín Jareño Alarcón
References
Gauthier, David 1998 Egoísmo, Moralidad y Sociedad Liberal, Barcelona: Paidós, pages 67-117.
Jonas, Hans 1995 El Principio de Responsabilidad, Barcelona:
Herder.
Nagel Thomas 2004 La Posibilidad del Altruismo, México: FCE.
Rorty, Richard 2005 Cuidar la Libertad, Madrid: Trotta.
Rorty, Richard 2002 Filosofía y Futuro, Barcelona: Gedisa.
Rorty, Richard 2001 Contingencia, Ironía y Solidaridad, Barcelona:
Paidós.
Rorty, Richard 2000a El Pragmatismo, una Versión, Barcelona:
Ariel.
Rorty, Richard 2000b Verdad y Progreso. Escritos Filosóficos 3, Barcelona: Paidós.
Rorty, Richard 1998 “¿Quiénes Somos? Universalismo Moral y Selección Económica” Revista de Occidente 210, 93-107.
Rorty, Richard 1996 Objetividad, Relativismo y Verdad, Barcelona:
Paidós.
Rorty, Richard 1993 Ensayos sobre Heidegger y Otros Pensadores Contemporáneos. Escritos Filosóficos 2, Barcelona: Paidós.
Rorty, Richard 1983 La Filosofía y el Espejo de la Naturaleza, Madrid: Cátedra.
A Naturalistic Method for Therapy not for Science Marilena Andronico, University of Ferrara, Italy
Wittgenstein’s interest in the connection of language games and forms of life as has often been rightly interpreted as "anthropologism". However, this characterization doesn’t help us understand the goal of his philosophical analysis. On the contrary, it seems to make such an understanding harder, for we expect his philosophical work to bring forth anthropological statements. But, as is well known, this is not the case.
Wittgenstein rejects all confusion of philosophy with empirical or philosophical anthropology. What then is anthropologism for? I would like to show that Wittgenstein's anthropologism can be put in the proper perspective if it is seen as an attempt to deal with the complex phenomenon of language from a naturalistic viewpoint. For Wittgenstein, our ways of classifying things or languages have become “become [second] nature to us” (BPP II 678) so that the method which makes it possible for us to represent or describe them will itself be naturalistic.
1. Beginning in the thirties, Wittgenstein's anthropological turn takes two distinct directions: on the one hand, the analysis of language is given an anthropological twist; on the other hand, Wittgenstein directly engages with anthropology in the narrow (and conventional) sense in his reflections on Frazer's Golden Bough. Here I will not be dealing with these latter thoughts, as I believe that they depend on Wittgenstein's adoption of an anthropological standpoint in philosophy. I would like to show that there is a deep connection between such a standpoint and the therapeutic purpose of Wittgenstein's philosophical activity.
According to Dale Jacquette, Wittgenstein's anthropologism consists in (1) the discovery of a plurality of different kinds of words and propositions, as opposed to the Tractatus' semantic reductionism; (2) frequent references to the organic, historical and cultural nature of language as a developing body of linguistic practices or language games; (3) the crucial role of the pragmatic concept of a language game as an activity internal to a form of life (Jacquette 1999: 168; see 1998).
Anthropologism carries out the program outlined in the first few pages of Blue Book, bringing the question „What is meaning?" back to earth. We could also say that it shapes the enterprise that is outlined in Philosophical Investigations, 107, going back "to the rough ground", regaining the "friction" that was lost in the attempted inquiry into "the crystalline purity of logic".
2. However, characterizing Wittgenstein's philosophy in anthropological terms does not make it easier to understand it: on the contrary, it seems to complicate such an understanding. The nature of philosophical inquiry is not made any clearer, for alongside the adoption of an anthropological standpoint we find the explicit rejection of all identification of philosophy with anthropology, and a definite and declared lack of interest in everything that professional anthropologists are usually interested in. If we use the ethnological approach does that mean we are saying philosophy is ethnology? No it only means we are taking up our position far outside, in order to see the things more objectively. (CV 45e)
Because of the frequent reference to the intertwining of language games and forms of life, the reader is led to the false expectation that sooner or later truths will be
stated, either empirical or philosophical, concerning the relation of language and forms of life. In this respect, however, he is bound to be disappointed: Wittgenstein clearly declares that the kind of philosophy he is up to does not set itself the task of stating truths, be they empirical or philosophical (i.e., metaphysical). Thus, there are interpreters1 who take issue with Wittgenstein for not fully understanding the value of his own references to the natural and cultural features that go together with the use of language, i.e., the features that are supposed to define the anthropological standpoint.
3. Wittgenstein's interest in the relation of language and forms of life is regarded (1) either as an attempt at a pragmatic or praxeological grounding of language. As Jacquette points out, what is outstanding in the later Wittgenstein's treatment of language and language games is his aiming at an extra-semantic – pragmatic or praxeological – foundation of language use within a form of life; or (2) as an exploration of the transcendental conditions for the possibility of language, thought and rationality (as with such transcendentalist interpreters as Williams 1974 and Lear 1986). Now, I do not wish to rule out that either reading of the anthropological standpoint may be possible or philosophically fruitful. However, neither interpretation can account for Wittgenstein's explicit claims concerning the nature of philosophy, that it does not generate discoveries or produce explanations (PI 126), be they causal, historical, or metaphysical. That philosophical truths should be stated does not agree with philosophy's therapeutic point, i.e., with the suggestion that philosophical problems should disappear thanks to the achievement of a clearer view of language (PI 133).
4. By contrast, the therapeutic point of Wittgenstein's philosophy is accounted for in John McDowell's "quietist"
interpretation of anthropologism (McDowell 1992). For McDowell, Wittgenstein does not mean to take programmatic steps toward some style of positive philosophy just because he mentions customs or forms of life. Wittgenstein's remark “What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms of life" (PI II p.226) is not to be interpreted as a “philosophical response ... to supposedly good questions about the possibility of meaning and understanding, or intentionality generally”;
instead, “his point is to remind us that the natural phenomenon that is normal human life is itself already shaped by meaning and understanding” (McDowell 1992:
50-51).
However, if Wittgenstein had wanted to say that there is a natural phenomenon, normal human life, which is imbued with meaning and understanding, one, wonders why he did not say so in so many words. Again, McDowell's "quietist" interpretation has Wittgenstein say either too little or too much. Too much, if the very general notion of "normal human life" (McDowell) is unqualifiedly assumed as the locus where therapeutic efforts converge or as an unproblematic notion on which we all agree. For if the notion's features and range of application are not specified, how could it fail to be just another metaphysical notion (some kind of foundation or transcendental limit)?
1 As a rule, this criticisim is raised by naturalistic interpreters such as Conway 1989, Pears 1995.
A Naturalistic Method for Therapy not for Science - Marilena Andronico
On the other hand, Wittgenstein is made to say too little if normal human life is assumed to be an empirical phenomenon that could be described from some standpoint; once more, we are unable to explain why Wittgenstein did not devote himself to such a description.
5. False expectations and illegitimate interpretations can both be avoided if we pay full attention to Wittgenstein's explicitly paradoxical presentation of his anthropologism. I have in mind the text in the Investigations where Wittgenstein declares, on the one hand, that he is interested in "the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature", while insisting that, on the other hand, his interest "does not fall back upon these possible causes of the formation of concepts", as "we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history" (PI II xii, p.230).2
If anthropologism is not meant to provide a scientific or philosophical foundation for language uses, nor meant to ground the identification of philosophy with anthropology, why does Wittgenstein adopt it? My view is that anthropologism is an essential ingredient of the kind of methodological naturalism that Wittgenstein conceived and endorsed in the post-Tractatus years. Dealing with philosophical problems from an anthropological standpoint amounts to adopting a naturalistic method in the investigation of the logic of language – a method that could be applied independently of any theory of language. For Wittgenstein, this is the solution to the problem of the legitimacy of philosophical inquiry, which, even after Tractatus, he is still conceiving of as an investigation of what is most fundamental, i.e., the logic of language.
‘Fundamental’ here is to be understood as not grounded upon anything else, as logic is, at any time, already active in common everyday language.
By 'naturalistic method' I mean the method of language games, from which analysis proceeds with everyday language (where logic is already effective), isolating parts of it –certain characteristic uses – and comparing them with other parts of the same everyday language, with other uses which are liable to generate conceptual misunderstandings. We know that Wittgenstein did not conceive of language games as preparatory studies to improve, refine or reform the language we have but only as terms of comparison, allowing us to highlight similarities and differences among our concepts in order to achieve a clear, perspicuous view (PI 130).
There are at least three reasons why I call this method 'naturalistic'. First of all, to start with everyday language (or with parts of it, the language games) is to remain on the "rough ground" of use; it is to look at language as “part of the human organism and ... no less complicated than it”, as Wittgenstein had already suggested we should do in Tractatus 4.002. Secondly, I call the method 'naturalistic' on account of the Preface to the Investigations where Wittgenstein points out that what looked essential to him in composing his book was that
"the thoughts should proceed from one subject to another in a natural order and without breaks" (PI, p.vii). Is Wittgenstein suggesting that nature dictated to his thinking the correct path to follow in philosophical inquiry? What could that mean? The answer can be found in Zettel 3553,
2 A closely similar remark can be read in the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology I, 46: “We are not pursuing a natural science; our aim is not to predict anything”.
3 “If we teach a human being such-and-such a technique by means of examples, - that he then proceeds like this and not like that in a particular new case, or that in this case he gets stuck, and thus that this and not that is the
‘natual’ continuation for him: this of itself is an extremely important fact of nature” (Z 355).
where a distinction is made between two different uses of 'natural': in one use it alludes to facts of nature (such as facts about the psychophysical constitution of human beings), while in another use it refers to what comes natural to us after having been trained to follow a rule. In the latter use the word is synonymous with 'usual', 'obvious', 'common'. Adopting the method of language games amounts to embracing a natural method for the description of the phenomenon of language, for language games are constituted by the rules we got used to follow, so that they have become "nature" to us:
“We’re used to a particular classification of things. With language, or languages, it has become [second] nature to us”. (RPP II 678)
“These are the fixed rails along which all our thinking runs, and so our judgement and action goes according to them too” (RPP II 679). [Z 375].
That the method of philosophy is naturalistic is not inconsistent with its employing acquired forms of linguistic behavior as tools for its comparative practice, for they have become "nature" for us. A philosopher who embraces such a method is thus not bound to be interested in re- establishing something that would be natural in the sense of belonging to physical or biological nature as distinct from the realm of the artificial, or culture. In fact, Wittgenstein has no use for this distinction. In adopting the method, the philosopher is just equipping himself with tools (the language games) and a standpoint (the anthropological standpoint) from which description is to be carried out.
Thirdly, I call the method 'naturalistic' for it is derived from a method that was conceived and applied in biology since the 18th century in the study of the forms and transformations of living beings. It is a comparative method, focussing on the forms and functions of the parts of animals and plants; it originated from the discipline called 'morphology', a necessary condition for the development of Darwinian evolutionary theory (Richards 2002: 522). As is well known, Wittgenstein was well acquainted with the works of one of the creators of the naturalistic or morphological method, J. W. Goethe. Here there is no room to go into the many significant connections between Wittgenstein's thought and Goethe's.
Wittgenstein's writings testify to his uninterrupted intellectual exchange with and reflection upon Goethe's method (Schulte 1990, Andronico 1999, McGuinness 2002).
6. Going back to anthropologism, we now understand why it did not lead to anthropological statements asserting anthropological truths. On the other hand, we may wonder whether anthropologism was merely functional to the adoption of Wittgenstein's methodological naturalism. The answer must be negative. Although Wittgenstein's focus on the anthropological dimension of language is no end in itself (so that it does not lead to the statement of anthropological truths), philosophical inquiry based upon the method of language games determines in its practitioners effects that are close to those of empirical investigations in anthropology, where the practice of intercultural comparison and contrast allow us to single out and describe the rules that others have given themselves as well as those that we have adopted and follow. An example could be Clifford Geertz's work: his style of doing anthropological research leads to the “acknowledgement of limits” (Geertz 2000: 137), i.e., to the “recognition of the fact that we are all [...] «positioned (or situated) observers»“, who renounce “the authority that comes from
A Naturalistic Method for Therapy not for Science - Marilena Andronico
«views from nowhere»“ (Geertz 2000: 137). The effect of Wittgenstein's naturalistic method is similar; in his own words, it leads us to recognize the workings of our language in spite of an urge to misunderstand them (PI 109), i.e., in spite of an urge to hypostasize them by attributing them an authority emanating from nowhere.
References
Andronico, M. 1999, “Morphology in Wittgenstein”, in: Egidi R. (ed.) In Search of a New Humanism. The Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 97-102.
Conway, G.D. 1989 Wittgenstein on Foundations, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International.
Geertz, C. 2000 Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Jacquette, D. 1998 Wittgenstein's Thought in Transition, Baltimore:
Purdue University Press.
Jacquette, D. 1999 “L’antropologismo wittgensteiniano nella logica, nella filosofia, nelle scienze sociali”, Studi Perugini 7, 1999: 159- 189.
Lear, J. 1986 “Transcendental Anthropology”, in Petit, P. &
McDowell J. (eds.) Subject, Thought and Context, Oxford:
Clarendon Press 382-403.
McDowell, J. 1992 “Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol XVII: The Wittgenstein Legacy, Notre Dame University Press, 40-52.
McGuinness, B. 2002 “In the Shadow of Goethe. Wittgenstein’s Intellectual Project”, European Review 10, 447-457.
Pears, D. 1995 “Wittgenstein's Naturalism” The Monist 78, 441- 424.
Richards, R.J. 2002 The Romantic Conception of Life, Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press.
Schulte, J. 1990 Chor und Gesetz. Zur "morphologischen Methode“
bei Goethe und Wittgenstein Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Williams, B. 1974 "Wittgenstein and Idealism“, in Vesey G.N.A.
(ed.), Understanding Wittgenstein, London: Macmillan 76-95
About Wittgenstein’s mathematical epistemology Olga Antonova, St. Petersburg State University, Russia and Sergei Soloviev, University Paul Sabatier, France
How should we understand the notion of proof in Wittgenstein’s philosophy? This is an important question because some philosophical ideas of Wittgenstein are found nowhere else in philosophy and mathematics, at least, in such an extreme form, among them the idea that proof is a purely mental construction. Many philosophical problems are related to this idea and we intend to discuss some of them.
First, let us briefly consider philosophical views of Wittgenstein on the questions of language and mind. In order to understand better Wittgenstein’s epistemological ideas, it is necessary to take into account his identification of the limits of one’s language with the limits of one’s self.
Wittgenstein identifies the limits of our thinking with the limits of our language. In particular, it follows from his doctrines that the necessity of grammatical proposition has its source in our language.
The transcendent boundaries of my thinking are those of my language.
Wittgenstein asserts that since we cannot step outside of language, the limits of my language are the limits of my world.
Since the connection between language and the world cannot depend on me, we can speak of the world because there are already certain relations between language and the world.
So Wittgenstein asserts that necessities are present in our thoughts and in our language.
To arrive at a correct interpretation of Wittgenstein’s epistemology it is necessary to compare Kant and Wittgenstein.
Kant and Wittgenstein agree in that the necessities of our thoughts about objects are the necessities which constitute the nature of these objects.
It is meant that objects have their source not in themselves, but in the nature of our thinking.
To Kant, space and time have in principle equal status. Space, the intuitive form of external sense, is the basis of pure geometry, time, the intuitive form of internal sense, must in similar way provide the foundation of arithmetic.
For Kant the limits of some metaphysical subject cannot be the same as the limits of one’s actual thoughts.
For Wittgenstein the a priori necessary limits are the general limits of possible thoughts, the limits of language.
To be more accurate, Wittgenstein says that we cannot use language to get outside language. For Wittgenstein we cannot step outside of language and consider the world and language independently.
Along these lines Wittgenstein argues that thought in language cannot depend logically on non-verbal thought. So, non-verbal thought is somewhat unnecessary, but the main point is that it never can be logically necessary.
There is profound metaphysical question: if whatever we think can be expressed in a language, so there is no way to get beyond language. The only way of drawing the limits of a metaphysical subject is to identify them with the limits of its language. To say that Wittgenstein identified the metaphysical subject with a certain totality of propositions means that he identified it also with a certain totality of thoughts. The limits of the metaphysical subject cannot be the limits of one’s actual thoughts, because there is nothing necessary about this limitation. For Wittgenstein the only necessary limits are the general limits of possible thoughts (the limits of language in general).
For many commentators it is the basis of Wittgenstein’s solipsism. Wittgenstein acknowledges the truth in solipsism. Solipsism is correct, if we consider it as the opposite to certain forms of realism. We hold to it if we cannot know how the world appears in the language and in the experience independently from human perspectives.
The reality of the world manifests itself in language and experience.
Wittgenstein identified the metaphysical subject with the totality of one’s language and the limits of language with the limits of the world. In “Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus” he says that the limits of the metaphysical subject are the limits of the world. “I am my world.”
(Wittgenstein 1922)
This aspect of his view is surely strange and far from tradition.
Some authors, e.g., (Dummet 1959), (Bernays 1959-60) considered Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics as an extreme form of constructivism.
For Wittgenstein valid mathematics is that which uses constructive proof methods. This doctrine in the philosophy of mathematics was defended by Brouwer.
Very important for Brouwer’s view is the claim that mathematics is less a language than an activity of mind.
Many of Brouwer’s comments suggest a very strong separation of thought from language. On the one hand, as one of the leaders of the significs movement (cf. Significs 1989); he was engaged in a project whose aim was to reform natural languages. The project relied on distinguishing various levels of natural language, each level presupposing another sort of extra-linguistic reality.
Words that could be used for demagogical purposes were to be removed from the language and replaced by other words capable of expressing humanist values. On the other hand, he tried to consider the nature of linguistic phenomena in rather naive terms. The separation of thought from language leads to the charge that Brouwer’s notion of intuition and the concept of meaning is solipsistic.
We agree with this view. As Brouwer’s view is solipsistic, we think it clearly deviates from the Kantian view of intuition.
About Wittgenstein’s mathematical epistemology - Olga Antonova / Sergei Soloviev
Our thesis is that the dichotomy between the Realist and the Constructivist views which dominates the modern philosophy of mathematics is misleading. With time not only the doctrines but also what is considered as the opposites change.
Wittgenstein’s approach is in a way transversal to both. What is essential to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is that philosophy is a descriptive activity. So the aim of the philosopher of mathematics is to understand mathematics as it is. It is no part of the philosopher’s task to rewrite all or part of mathematics in new and better ways. The philosopher wants to describe mathematics, but needs to be careful to separate mathematics itself from the philosophy of mathematics.
For Wittgenstein philosophy and mathematics have nothing to say to one another. It would seem that no philosophical opinion could affect the procedures of the mathematicians.
Wittgenstein saw the distinction between mathematics itself, on one hand and what is said about mathematics, on the other, as being of fundamental philosophical importance.
Wittgenstein asserts in “Philosophical Investigations” (Wittgenstein 1956) that there are no mathematical propositions or truths.
Mathematics has its foundation in the activity of calculating.
Thus for Wittgenstein an empirical regularity lies behind a mathematical law.
The mathematical law does not assert what the regularity obtains.
Wittgenstein claims that what we are doing in mathematics is calculation. If we do not prove anything in logical sense, so no possibility of producing a logical contradiction does arise. It means that a calculus is consistent if we calculate in it. Indeed, no proof could tell us that “this calculus is inconsistent or consistent”, because there is no calculus which itself can prove anything.
Wittgenstein emphasizes that the calculi which make up mathematics are extremely diverse and heterogeneous – what he calls the “motley” mathematics.
Wittgenstein insists that to accept a theorem is to adopt a new rule of language. It follows from the statement that our concepts cannot remain unchanged at the end of the proof. For an intuitionist, every natural number is either prime or composite. So we have a method for deciding whether this number is prime or not. But Wittgenstein argues that we do not have reliable method even to construct the numbers.
Wittgenstein’s main reason for denying the objectivity of mathematical truth is his denial of the objectivity of proof in mathematics, his idea is that a proof does not compel acceptance.
This idea is closely connected with Wittgenstein’s doctrine that the meaning is the use.
Wittgenstein’s constructivism is seen as a much more restricted kind than Brouwer’s intuitionism.
It seems that Wittgenstein is a strict finitist, because he held that the only comprehensible and valid kind of proof in mathematics takes the form of intuitively clear manipulations with concrete objects.
Developing further Brouwer’s views Heyting asserts (cf. Heyting 1974) that proofs are mental constructions with fulfilments of intensions.
Heyting explained mathematical propositions as expressions of intentions, «intensions» none only refer to the states of affairs thought to exist independently of us but also to the experiences thought to be possible.
Martin-Löf’s views in this are similar to Heyting’s.
Martin-Löf asserts that a proof is not an object, but an act, (cf. Martin-Löf, 1996).
So a proof is a cognitive act or a process before it is an object, an act or a process in which we come to see or grasp something intuitively.
Also Martin-Löf’s system of intuitionistic type theory uses four basic forms of judgment, among which are the two that «S is a proposition» and «a is a proof (construction) of the proposition S». Martin-Löf notes that we can read these, equivalently, as «S is an intention» and
«a is a method of fulfilling the intention S». Thus, we can understand his system as a formalization of the informal concepts of intentionality, intuition and evidence.
Let us now turn briefly to Dummett’s views, because Dummett has a very original and interesting view on problems of the philosophical basis of proof.
Dummett, who agrees with Wittgenstein on the role of language in mathematics, believes there is no way to approach the question about proof independently of investigation in the philosophy of language.
Dummett contrasts his view with the position that the meaning of proposition is determined by its truth conditions.
For Dummett only the use of language determines the meaning of an individual statement. One of the things that disappears with the idea of mental acts and processes in Dummett’s approach is the philosophical objection to the form of intuitionism based on solipsism. But we shall argue that Dummett goes too far here. Dummett’s account of intuitionism contains no theory of intentionality, fulfilled intentions and evidence. He suggests no theory of mathematicians as cognitive information “processors”, the cognitive structure of mental acts and meaning of mental representations and the like. We think that if the proof is really to be understood as either a cognitive act or as an objectification of an act then these notions must figure in our understanding of the philosophical basis of intuition.
Thus it is clear that the philosophical basis of intuitionistic mathematics is best understood along the lines suggested by Heyting’s investigations. So according to the views of intuitionists, the main source of intuitionistic mathematics and criterion of the validity of its constructions is intuition. Conclusions of intuitionistic mathematics are not obtained by precisely established rules which could be united in a logical system. On the contrary evidence of any separate conclusion is considered directly. The essence of the mathematical proof consists not in logical conclusions and in design of mathematical systems. It is obvious that mathematical activity is defined not with language and logic but as constructive activity of pure thinking.
Proceeding from the position that the intuitionistic mathematics is a mental process, obviously, any language including the language of formalization cannot be an equivalent model of the given system as the thinking cannot be reduced to a finite number of formal rules. Logic is only a true imitation of mathematical language. Logic
About Wittgenstein’s mathematical epistemology - Olga Antonova / Sergei Soloviev
and language arise after mathematics and the mathematical systems do not depend on logic. Thus, on the one hand, the mathematics do not depend on logic, on the other, logic is applied mathematics.
Parts of mathematical practice are a product of the cognitive “make up” and in those parts where our idealizations exist laid the possibilities of antinomies, paradoxes and illusions.
Just as traditional rationalistic metaphysics existed, so the parts of mathematical practice that cannot be constructively justified actually do exist. Sometimes their distinction cannot be described in terms of usual (but transitory) oppositions between the “classical” and the
“constructive”.
Humans are bound to project their knowledge beyond their actual or even possible experience but there is an intersubjective agreement in doing so, even if the specific views that result from this are sometimes very different.
References
Bernays, Paul 1959-1960. Comments on Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Ratio II.
Brouwer, L.E.J. 1948. : Consciousness, philosophy and mathematics. 1 In Philosophy of mathematics. Selected readings.
Second edition. P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam (eds.). pp. 90-96 Dummett, Michael 1959 Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophical Reviews, V. 68(3).
Glock, H.G. 1996 A Wittgenstein Dictionary. Oxford University Press.
Heyting, Arendt 1974. Intuitionistic views on the nature of mathematics. Synthese, 27. pp. 79-91.
Martin-Lof, Per 1996. On the meaning of the logical constants and the justifications of the logical laws. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 11–60. Scandinavian University Press.
Stern, David 1995. Wittgenstein on Mind and Language. Oxford University Press,
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1922. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
German text with an English translation by C.K. Ogden; with an introduction by Bertrand Russell. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1953. Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M.
Anscombe and R. Rhees (eds.), G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1956. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees and G.E.M. Anscombe (eds.), G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell, revised edition 1978.
(Significs 1989). Essays on Significs. Papers presented on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the birth of Victoria Lady Welby (1837–1912) Edited by H. Walter Schmitz . Foundations of Semiotics 23. 1989. xv, 313 pp.
Der Vorrang der Logik vor der Metaphysik bei Wittgenstein
Thiago Aquino, University of Munich, Germany, Stipendiat von Capes – Brasília, Brazil
Die Frage nach den Zusammenhängen zwischen dem Tractatus logico-philosophicus und dem Erbe der kantischen Philosophie hat die Wittgenstein-Interpretation in vielen Hinsichten bewegt. Ein möglicher Beitrag zu dieser Interpretationslinie kann durch eine Vergleichungsanalyse, die die Einstellung beider Philosophen hinsichtlich derselben Frage näher in den Blick rückt, geleistet werden. Der gemeinsame Ausgangpunkt des Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus und der Kritik der reinen Vernunft ist die Problematik der Grenzbestimmung. Die Festlegung der Grenzen des theoretischen Diskurs ist die erste und vielleicht die einzige Aufgabe der (theoretischen) Philosophie.
Die Lösung der Frage nach dem Sagbaren und Erkennbaren soll ein sicheres Kriterium für die Unterscheidungsverfahren zwischen sinnvollen und sinnlosen bzw. möglichen und unmöglichen Probleme auflegen. Die Durchführung dieses Projekt setzt eine Bedingung voraus, die eine eigene und schwierige Problematik in sich beinhaltet. Um die Grenzen des sinnvollen Satzes zu bestimmen, muss man im Vorhinein begreifen, wie und inwiefern die Bedingungen der Sprache bzw. des Urteilens mit der internen Struktur der Welt bzw.
der Gegenständlichkeit übereinstimmen kann. Das heißt, in der Grenzbestimmung wird nicht nur die Erkenntnis und Sprache beschränkt, sondern gleichzeitig die Form der Erfahrung bzw. der Welt mitbestimmt.
Es stellt sich dann die grundsätzliche Frage: Wie werden die Bedingungen eines objektiven Diskurs über die Natur mit den Bedingungen einer Antizipation der Form der Erfahrung bzw. der Welt reflexiv miteinander verbunden? Anscheinend kann allein eine transzendentale Logik eine Antwort auf diese Problematik geben. Die Absicht dieses Aufsatzes ist die Idee und Begriff der transzendentalen Logik bei Kant und Wittgenstein zu analysieren.
I. Definition:
Das zentrale Thema einer transzendentalen Logik ist die Erörterung des Verhältnisses zwischen dem theoretischen Diskurs und der Welt. Der Idee einer solchen Logik liegt die Einsicht zum Grunde, dass das Verhältnis eine gewisse Identität (Isomorphie) zwischen den diskursiven und objektiven Strukturen voraussetzt. Welche sind die Bedingungen des reinen Denkbezuges auf Gegenstände bzw. abbildenden Beziehung zur Welt? Die traditionelle Formulierung dieser Frage befindet sich am kantischen Werk.
In der Kritik der reinen Vernunft unterscheidet Kant nach verschiedenen Kriterien die formale von der transzendentalen Logik. Die formale Logik ist eine a priori normative Wissenschaft der Regeln des Denkens, sie analysiert die „Form des Denkens überhaupt“(A55 B79).
Formal ist die Logik aufgrund des nicht-empirischen Charakters ihrer Regeln, die unter Abstraktion jeder Form von Gegenständen behandelt werden. Mit anderen Worten kann gesagt werden, dass das Formal-Logische lediglich die Gesetzgebung der Urteile betrifft. Die transzendentale Logik dagegen zeichnet sich durch einen nicht-
empirischen Inhalt, nämlich den „transzendentalen Inhalt“(B 105) der reinen Begriffe a priori. Das Transzendental-logische betrifft die Regeln des reinen Denkens eines Gegenstandes überhaupt. Die transzendentale Logik erklärt, „dass und wie gewisse Vorstellungen (Anschauungen oder Begriffe) lediglich a priori angewandt werden, oder möglich sein.“(B 80). Das Projekt einer transzendentalen Logik, nämlich die Bestimmung des apriorischen Gegenstandbezug der Vorstellungen, impliziert eine Rechtfertigung des Anspruchs auf a priori Erkenntnis und fordert die Beantwortung der Frage: Mit welchem Recht wendet der Verstand a priori Begriffe auf Gegenstände der Sinne an?
Im Tractatus findet man keine direkte Bemerkung über die Unterscheidung zwischen der formalen und transzendentalen Logik. Das hat zur Folge, dass verschiedene Interpretationen sich herausgebildet haben.
Man könnte drei Möglichkeit vorstellen: (i) Zu negieren, dass die Unterscheidung überhaupt im Tractatus vorkommt und den Terminus „transzendental“ im Sinne
„Transzendent“ lesen; (ii) Die Unterscheidung im Tractatus als eine Differenzierung von Aspekten einer selben Struktur. Diese Lesart kann in die These formuliert werden:
„die formale Logik ist als solche Transzendental“(Transzendentalität der Logik); (iii) man kann aber auch die Unterscheidung streng als Trennung zwischen der logischen Syntax (formale Logik), verstanden als die Gesamtheit aller Regeln der Zeichenverbindung, und der transzendentalen Logik betrachten. In den beiden letzen Fällen bleibt offen was unter „Transzendental“ zu verstehen ist. Keine von den Interpretationsmöglichkeiten wird hier verteidigt werden. Stattdessen wendet sich der Aufsatz dem Begriff des Transzendental.
Hinsichtlich dieses Begriffs hat die Interpretation viele Schwierigkeiten zu überwinden, weil genauso wenig wie die formale die transzendentale Logik nicht näher erläutert wird. Der Begriff „Transzendental“ kommt im Tractatus nur zweimal (6.13; 6.421) ohne Definition vor, um jeweils die Ethik und Logik näher zu bestimmen.1 Und es ist nicht rein wörtlich ersichtlich, ob dieser Begriff ein bestimmtes Ermöglichungsverhältnis zwischen einer Bedingung und einem Bedingten nennt oder einfach auf etwas Transzendentes hinweist. Was die Logik betrifft, soll ihre Transzendentalität darin liegen, dass sie „keine Lehre [ist], sondern ein Spiegelbild der Welt.“(6.13) Entscheidend in diesem Kontext ist zweifellos die Idee des Spiegelns.
Die Hintikkas weisen auf die Wichtigkeit der terminologischen Unterscheidung zwischen Abbildung und Widerspiegelung im Tractatus (1996, S.159) hin. Im ersten Fall stellt ein Satz einen Sachverhalt dar, im zweiten spiegelt die logische Form die Form der Wirklichkeit wider.
Beide Beziehungen hängen aber gewissermaßen von einander ab. So wie sie die Hintikkas definieren, besagt der Widerspiegelungsgedanke, dass „jede zulässige Verbindung von Namen einen Sachverhalt abbildet(...), und zwar einen Sachverhalt, der in einer möglichen Welt besteht.“(1996, S. 160). Einerseits setzt die Abbildung die Widerspiegelung voraus. Nur weil die Struktur des Satzes mit der Struktur der Welt übereinstimmt (widerspiegelt),
1 Wenn es wirklich so ist, dass „Ethik und Ästhetik Eins [sind].“ (6.421), dann ist die Ästhetik auch Transzendental.
