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ZEW Conference on the

Economic Methods in

Competition Law Enforcement

24 and 25 June 2011 in Mannheim, Germany

The ZEW Centre for European Economic Research and the Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation (MaCCI) are pleased to announce their conference “Economic Methods in Competition Law Enforcement”. It aims at stimulat- ing discussion between academic researchers and practitioners in the various competition authorities, legal counsel and economic consultancy firms regarding the application of theoretical and empirical industrial organization econom- ics in the legal process of competition law enforcement. Theoretical, empirical as well as antitrust case study-oriented articles are welcome.

Topics of Interest: The conference aims to discuss economic tools and empirical techniques that can be used in all stag- es of the legal process of competition law enforcement:

ͮDetection and investigation

ͮCase selection and construction

ͮFinal decision, design and implementation of remedies

ͮLitigation

Within this process, quantitative methods may be applied with the purpose of:

ͮIdentifying anticompetitive behaviour (e.g., econometric investigation of market power)

ͮScreening markets for violations of competition law

(e.g., behavioural screens for cartel detection, structural monitoring for competition problems)

ͮInvestigating causality (e.g., price-concentration studies) and effects (e.g., simulation of competitive effects of mergers)

ͮEstablishing appropriate remedies (e.g., simulations of remedies based on structural models)

ͮCalculating antitrust damages (e.g., yardstick, cost-based, simulation methods to determine price overcharges) Invited Speakers: Louis Kaplow (Harvard Law School) · Gregory K. Leonard (NERA Economic Consulting) · Gregory Werden (Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice)

Scientific Committee: Yuliya Bolotova (Cornell University) · Stephen Davies (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia) · Ulrich Kaiser (University of Zürich and ZEW) · Volker Nocke (University of Mannheim) · Martin Peitz (Univer- sity of Mannheim and ZEW) · Maarten Pieter Schinkel (ACLE, University of Amsterdam) · Philipp Schmidt-Dengler (Uni- versity of Mannheim) · Frank Verboven (K.U. Leuven)

Local Organising Committee: Kai Hüschelrath · Nina Leheyda

Submission of Papers or Abstracts: Full papers as well as extended abstracts may be submitted. All proposals must in- clude the following information: An abstract of up to 500 words, authors’ full name and affiliation, contact details for corresponding author such as address, phone, and e-mail.

All papers or abstracts should be submitted electronically to the organising committee via the e-mail address econen- force2011@zew.de as doc or pdf files (preferably pdf) no later than 15 April 2011. Proposals must be in English. They will be peer reviewed. Authors of accepted papers or abstracts will be notified no later than 15 May 2011. Presenters may kindly be asked to discuss another paper. Young researchers are particularly encouraged to submit proposals.

Registration Fee: The conference fee is € 160. It covers conference materials, coffee breaks, lunch breaks and the con- ference dinner. For participants who present a paper, the conference fee is reduced to € 50. An informal get-together is planned on the evening of 23 June 2011.

Further Information: The conference website at http://www.zew.de/econenforce2011 will provide updated information concerning registration details, travel and accommodation facilities, etc.

Call for Papers

Contact:

ZEW, Centre for European Economic Research

Nina Leheyda · Department of Industrial Economics and International Management P.O. Box 10 34 43 · 68034 Mannheim · Germany

Phone: +49 621 1235-172 · Fax: +49 621 1235-170

E-mail: econenforce2011@zew.de · Internet: http://www.zew.de/econenforce2011

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