SAGE FOCUS EDITIONS
1. POLICE AND SOCIETY edited by DAVID H. BAYLEY
2. WHY NATIONS ACT: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES FOR
COMPARATIVE FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES
edited by MAURICE A. EAST, STEPHEN A. SALMORE,and
CHARLES F. HERMANN
3. EVALUATION RESEARCH METHODS: A BASIC GUIDE edited by LEONARD RUTMAN
4. SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AS ADVOCATES: VIEWS FROM THE APPLIED DISCIPLINES
edited by GEORGE H. WEBER and GEORGE J. McCALL
5. DYNAMICS OF GROUP DECISIONS
edited by HERMANN BRANDSTATTER,
JAMES H. DAVIS, and HEINZ SCHULER
QYNflMICS °
GROUP
DECISIONS
edited by
Hermann Brandstatfer
,James H. Davis, and
Heim Schuler
Crott, H. W., and G. F. MUUer. Der Einfluss des Anspruchsniveaus und der Erfahrung auf Ergebnis und Verlauf dyadischer Verhandlungen bei vollstandiger Infoimation
der Verhandelnden. Zeitschrift fur experimentelle und angewandte Psychologie,
1976, XXIII, 548-568.
Deutsch, M., and R. M. Krauss. The effect of threat upon interpersonal bargaining.
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 61, 181-189.
Druckman, D., K. Zechmeister, and D. Solomon. Determinants of bargaining be-havior in a monopoly situation: Opponent'
s concession rate and relative
defen-sibmy. Behavioral Science, 1972,17, 514-531.
Froman, L. A., and M. Cohen, Jr. Threats and bargaining efficiency. Behavioral
Science, 1969, 14, 147-153.
Gallo, P. S., Jr. Effects of increased incentives upon the use of threat in bargaining. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966,4, 14-20.
Griesinger, W. D., and J. W. Livingston, Jr. Toward a model of interpersonal motivation in experimental games. Behavioral Science, 1973,18, 173-188. Komorita, S. S., and A. R. Brenner. Bargaining and concession making under bilateral
monopoly. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 9, 15-20. MacCrimmon, K. R., and D. M. Messick. A framework for social motives. Behavioral
Science, 1976, 21, 86-100.
McClintock, C. G. 1972. Social motivation: A set of propositions. Behavioral Science,
1972,17, 438-454.
McClintock, C. G., and S. P. McNeel. Reward and score feedback as determinants of
cooperative and competitive behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-ogy, 1966a, 4, 606-615.
. Reward level and game playing behavior. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1966b, 10, 98-102.
Messick, D. M., and C. G. McClintock. Motivational bases of choice in experimental
games. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1968,4, 1-25.
Siegel, S., and L. E. Fouraker. Bargaining and Group Decision Making: Experiments
in Bilateral Monopoly. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.
Walster, E., E. Berscheid, and G. W. Walster. New directions in equity research. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973,25, 151-176.
Yukl, G. A. Effects of situational variables and opponent concessions on a bargainer'
s
perception, aspiration, and concessions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-ogy, 1974,29, 227-236.
15
SOCIAL DECISION SITUATIONS: INTEGRATION AND APPLICATION
Hermann Brandstatter and Heinz Schuler
The first chapter of this book,
by Nagao, VoUrath, and Davis, points out
the diversity of empirical research and theoretical reasoning on socialdecision or choice situations, both in origins and current status. It also
makes clear how the work reported in this volume is related to similar
research activities elsewhere.
This final chapter looks briefly at a
tax-onomy of social decision situations,at research strategies facilitating
theoretical integration,and at problems associated with the application of
results.
Nominal classifications like "mixed-motive interaction" and "
coopera-tive interaction" prove useful in grouping experimental literatu
re. Real-lifechoice situations,
however, can perhaps be described better by a set of
dimensions on which the situation in question can be rated. The
dimen-sions we wish to propose are derived from a preliminar
y phenomenologicalanalysis of social decision situations. Future research must determine if
they are not only intuitively plausible but also useful for theoretical
differentiation and integration of the field. Five task and two social
relations dimensions will be proposed.
The five task dimensions are: (a) prominence of the probabilities of
events (including the probabilities of outcomes of a social decision); (b) prominence of the values of events (including the values of outcomes of a 263
264 DYNAMICS OF GROUP DECISIONS
social decision); (c) prominence of the allocation of resources among the members of a group; (d) perceived verifiability of the correctness of the
social decision; (e) perceived importance of the consequences of the social decision. Examples may clarify the meaning of these dimensions. A com-mission of experts can disagree about the efficiency of measures to curb
unemployment (high prominence of probabilities of outcomes) but agree
on the evaluation of unemployment as a deplorable state (low prominence of the evaluation of a state). On the other hand, a committee in charge of
reforming penal law may agree on estimating the probabilities of crimes
and on estimating the efficiency of preventive measures, but disagree about the ethical acceptability of the death penalty and life sentences as a measure to prevent criminal acts. In bargaining for a lower price of a commodity, the central controversy is not one of probabilities or values, but of which one of the groups will receive what portion of the benefits
and bear what costs. Some choice situations have a clearly verifiable
solution, whether by logical reasoning, by empirical operation or by comparison with a social norm; others lack such a verifiable solution. Finally, situations may vary in perceived importance of consequences.
Any social choice situation relates to all five dimensions, although to varying degrees. A conflict over the distribution of benefits and costs is prominent in a bargaining situation, but can also become salient in a group cooperating in the search for the correct solution to a problem-such as when competition arises for influence and prestige. The value controversy, too, can emerge from any discussion of facts and probabilities of possible outcomes. Verifiability of a social decision and importance of its conse-quences may vary widely within almost any kind of social choice situation. We propose the following dimensions of social relations among mem-bers of a group: (f) perceived social dependence; (g) perceived obligations
to a constituency.
The perceived social dependence is high, for example, in situations where: a group must decide under a unanimity rule, individual responses can be observed by the other group members, members of the group expect future interaction, or members of the group can reward and punish one another. Perceived social dependence is low, conversely,, for a person not actively participating in a discussion when listening to it before individually deciding the issue, when not caring about friendliness or hostility of the others, or when no obligation to the group decision is
experienced.
Obligations to a represented group may vary from no obligation at all to strict orders concerning the range of allowed concessions. Even if no formal delegation exists, a person in a social choice situation may feel more or less obliged to persons or groups not participating in the decision.
Hermann Brandstatter and Heinz Schuler 265
It will be necessary to develop procedures that allow reliable measure-ment of decision situations on these various dimensions. Further analysis will lead to a more satisfactory differentiation and definition of the dimensional structure. It should be useful for describing real-life as well as
experimental social choice situations, and facilitate in the judgment of external validity.
Since any social decision situation may change its character in the course of interaction, the general descriptive system should be viable also in measuring those changes. More specific descriptive systems like the Interaction Process Analysis and its modifications (Bales, 1970), or the Conference Process Analysis (Morley and Stephenson, 1977) can be con-ceived of as rather microscopic analyses of selected classes of social choice
situations. They can and should be related to the more comprehensive and less differentiated dimensions proposed here.
A brief look at some of the experiments reported in this volume suggests that the aforementioned dimensions could prove useful in theory building and hypothesis testing. For example, Verhagen's experiment is based on the assumption that in matters of value, when probabilities of
events are not salient, agreement with a co-oriented peer immunizes
against the influence of an expert. Depending on whether probabilities or
values, or both, were salient in the various discussion experiments reviewed
by Brandstatter, verbal aggressiveness of a discussant apparently was
per-ceived differently and elicited different responses in others. When the
social choice situation is characterized mainly by controversy over the
distribution of benefits and costs, as in the research reported by Morley, Stephenson, Mikula and Schwinger, Muller and Crott, we have an area of research not only marked by a special name,
"
mixed-motive interaction, "
but also structured by specific theories. The verifiability of the social
decision seems to be relevant for explaining the results of experiments
reported by Zaleska. The importance of consequences of a social choice is
the dimension on which real negotiation groups analyzed by Stephenson, and real decision committees analyzed by Riittinger, differ from the laboratory experiments reported in this volume. Within the laboratory
setting, the experiment of Muller and Crott as well as that of Lambert
focus on the importance of consequences by varying the amount of money
at stake.
In the studies reviewed or reported in this volume, various degrees of social dependence with specific theoretical implications have also been realized. Social dependence is high when a unanimous decision must be
made as in the experiments of Lambert and Zaleska,but also in Muller and
Crott's bargaining experiment and in Stephenson's real negotiation groups.
subjects observing a discussion and giving private ratings of their
prefer-ences, as in the experiment of von Rosenstiel and Stocker-Kreichgauer.
Furthermore, links between different types of social decision
experi-ments could be established by defining a broad category of dependent
variables "
yielding to the partner'
s demand,"
including meeting the
part-ner'
s judgments of facts and values as well as meeting wishes in
interper-sonal allocation of resources. Virtually all experiments reported in this volume have in common a dependent variable of"
yielding to the partner'
s
demand," whether this demand is openly stated or inconspicuously hinted. No doubt the proposed dimensions can be criticized for many reasons, but few would disagree that the multiplicity of situational variables facing experiments on social choice must be reduced to a few key concepts by
combining variables presumably functioning in a similar way. Witte (1977)
has taken an important step in that direction with stimulating ideas for
theoretical integration of small group research.
Phenomenological analysis of one's own and the other's subjective experience may prove helpful in developing integrative concepts and promoting theory. To find out how a person structures various social decision situations, possibly with a quite restricted number of concepts along with how he plans his actions within this cognitive structure, is an important step toward understanding the social process. Thinking aloud or the retrospective comments of group members viewing a videotape of their earlier discussion are promising, although cumbersome, methods for
ana-lyzing subjective experience.
A great deal of experimental work seems to be lacking sensitive and circumspect analysis of subjective experience, causing a tremendous loss of
time and effort. To strive for improvement of phenomenological analysis
(both of subjective experience and observed behavior) is probably the best way not only to overcome the dissipation of experimental efforts, but also
to secure external validity and social relevance of laboratory experiments.
Having collected information on the perception of social choice situa-tions by the flexible and rather unrestricted procedures of "
thinking
aloud"
or "playback comments," one may proceed to more precise methods of scaling or factor analysis of perceived similarities of social choice situations, and of deriving thereby the dimensions that people use
in their cognitive structuring of situations (see Magnusson, 1976). One
may hope that phenomenological and statistical procedures can be com-bined in a way that the specific strengths of the two kinds of methods cumulate whereas their specific weaknesses neutralize each other in estab-lishing a finally acceptable system for measuring social decision situations. Let us consider, as a final question, what the papers in this volume, and
research on social decision processes, may contribute to better
understand-ing of behavior outside the laboratory or to improvunderstand-ing social choice
actions by improved control of conditions and consequences. Can we
directly apply laboratory results and related theory to real-life social
action, or must an additional link be typically constructed to connect the
two realms? Or, must we even admit that, aside from the satisfaction of curiosity, little is to be expected from such research? The answer to this
general question, tentative and constantly subject to revision, has to be
discriminative with respect to differing contributions and scope as well as
with regard to our ultimate goals. In other words, we must ask whether
our efforts are aimed exclusively at a better understanding of human social behavior, or whether we also hope to improve interaction processes and
their consequences.
In some respects, the "Studies in Cooperative Interaction: Cognitive Aspects" stand ready to be generalized with the least difficulty.This seems
to be more often the case when the thrust of the investigation lies with individual cognition rather than with processes of interactional dynamics.
Paradoxically, this happens when social psychology is minimally social. It
may well be that we are coping with the most refractory field of
psychol-ogy in this respect. Recall, for example, the early investigations in cog-nition by the "
Wurzburg School" of the 1920s. There was no essential
problem of generalization for the results Karl Biihler and his colleagues
gained from trained subjects "
thinking aloud," although even here the subjects may have been far from representative in their sophistication in
psychology. There are, however, several areas in modern psychology as
well where problems of external validity hardly exist.
Doise's paper may be one of the more fortunate in this regard. The
results of his investigations, based on the work of Piaget, presumably hold
for classroom and other interaction settings. These processes might be expected, of course, to interact in any given situation with several others , altering accordingly the exact character of experimental results.
More difficult to generalize are results from studies of variables which
are changed by the very characteristics of the group; examples might be
the dependency of decisional risk level on group size or of the conflict resolution process on group homogeneity. Recent reports of the search for
the risky shift phenomenon in real group decisions may have been too
pessimistic. Janis'
(1972) analysis of the victims of groupthink show there
is something to such phenomena, but the numerous failures to demon-strate risky shifts in actual groups indicate that real decisions must be different from decisions in the laboratory,perhaps not only in complexity but in basic structure. It does not seem unreasonable, then, to provide laboratory group decisions with better opportunities to achieve external validity by placing subjects in the roles of real decision makers, as in the
268 DYNAMICS OF GROUP DECISIONS
reported studies with mock trials. Should these studies prove generalizable, they promise not only to be descriptive of real events or processes, but also to suggest an important means for studying diverse decision pro-cedures. (For example, studies are underway at the University of Augsburg comparing certain German and U.S. trial procedures.)
More problematic is the extension beyond the laboratory of experi-mental results addressing persuasion processes. These are the object of
various contributions in the first and second parts of this volume. Results
and applications of such complex experimental procedures depend exten-sively on the particular operationalizations of variables. Experimental biases also may operate in such studies to an especially high degree. The
introduction to Part II remarked upon the difficulty inherent in
generaliza-tion from this type of study. Moreover, it may be difficult to recognize the
nature of any implications for improvements in social decision processes.
For example, is the finding that some sorts of friendly behavior tend to
enhance influence over discussion partners to be welcomed or decried?
Such effects may have advantages as well as disadvantages in practical
social choice situations. However, while such research may have no
obvious immediate application, as in many gaming or bargaining experi-ments, it should certainly contribute to a better general understanding of
how group decisions occur.
There have been numerous claims of external validity for mixed-motive
research results. Among the most ambitious was Deutsch'
s (1969, p. 1091)
claim that games of conflict are relevant to war and peace. Whether such expectations are accurate is not much less questionable now than at the time they were first expressed. Therefore, critics have especially scored conflict games as unsuitable, lacking much mundane realism. Not only are
theories and experimental results ideally to be linked to each other, but both in turn must be related explicitly to the questions and problems of
social life which initiated the research activities.
It would not seem unfair to assess now the return on the tremendous
investment of resources in experimental gaming, by systematically seeking
the ecologically relevant combinations of models, hypotheses, and results that best satisfy the questions about social reality that initiated the
research efforts.
To avoid an overly pessimistic view, it must be said that some of the
results from studies of conflict games have withstood the test of
general-izability in quite different settings, e.g., the observation that eye contact,
verbal communication, and physical closeness all benefit cooperation.
Looking at the wider field of experimental bargaining and negotiation studies (as reported by Morley in this volume), many results appear which apparently generalize to real life; these seem to be the product of
experi-Hermann Brandstatter and Heinz Schuler 269
mental simulations that capture the crucial characteristics of real
bargain-ing situations. Also relevant in this connection is a study reported by Tietz
(1976) in which data on student aspiration levels were collected whilestudents were playing the part of wage negotiators with a high degree of
realism. Studies comparing self-dependent behavior in bargaining with the
behavior of representatives also belong to this category. By linking these
data to field observations of practical policy,showing, say, that
representa-tives of political groups tend to be more extreme than their constituency, a wide and important range of applications comes to mind.
Experiments in reward allocation look somewhat less favorable at first
glance; only very small rewards are to be distributed to member-s the
important variable of "power" is neglected, and other restrictions make
many such studies inadequate simulations of highly complex social situa-tions. It might seem that only less global results which can be recognized
in everyday interaction, like the "politeness ritual," are generalizable. While this may be true for many of these studies, the nucleus which they
all share is indeed relevant for matters of importance to our social world.
Adams (e.g., 1965) has claimed that equity theory makes meaningful
statements about reactions to perceived social inequality and to differentmodes of economic resource distribution. Perhaps, one ought to view the
research to date as preliminary. But, there can be no doubt that further
progress in this direction belongs to the most important work psychology
can perform today, because these questions are directed to some of the most important problems to be solved within the next decades.
It holds for all studies of group decision processes that a sufficient amount of external validity will only be attained by large investments of
creative effort including methodology. Subjects, settings, group size, dis-cussion topics, and many other determinants of outcomes must be varied,
as well as reasonable dependent variables recognizable in the world beyond
the laboratory,
in order to gain results that bear at least some plausible
generalizability. But, the notion of a map where the terra incognita is
eventually charted seems to be an erroneous one; the unknown also
increases as we proceed. There is another picture we consider more
reasonable and,by far, more economical. It is the picture of stones thrown into a brook in sufficient number and distance from each other such that
one may reach the other bank-with a certain risk but perhaps with dry feet. Part of this technique is, of course, to have at least some idea where
the other bank is located.
All things considered, answers to the questions of generalizability and
the applicability of results from studies of social decision processes do not
markedly better. In some cases, the findings even appear to be of great
social relevance. We must set about further tests.
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