Prof. Dr.
(TU NN)Norbert Pohlmann
Institute for Internet Security - if(is)
Westphalian University of Applied Sciences Gelsenkirchen, Germany www.if-is.net
Network Security in
Building Networks
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 2
Content
IT Security over time
Changes in the general condition
IT Security Situation Today
Some IT Security Solution
Paradigm Shifts in IT and IT Security
Summary
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecur ity -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 3
Network Security over time
Overview: Our Problem
Network security
problems
Time
Today
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecur ity -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 4
IT Security over time
Overview: Our challenge
Network security
problems
Time
Today
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 5
Changes in the general condition
Basic conditions
The Internet is going beyond all borders and cultures!
Problems with criminal prosecution in a lot of countries Different opinions about what is right and what is wrong Different legal frameworks
Radical change and development in IT
Mobile devices, Social Networks, Cloud Computing, …
new Player, new operation systems, new IT concepts, new attacks Internet of things: SmartGrid, SmartCar, SmartTraffic, SmartHome, … e.g. nuclear phase-out provides more risk on the Internet
The kind of values that we have to protect are changing over the time
bits and bytes are changing
from data and information to knowledge into intelligence
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any
Imbalance of power in cyberspace between attackers and defenders
Highly motivated and skilled attackers
We see an innovation in attack models and the attackers are getting more professional (Successful business concepts)
The attacker operating in secrecy from almost anywhere in the world,
Use a lot of computers (Malware, botnets) with unlimited power
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Changes in the general condition
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 7
IT Security Situation Today
Threat Potential (1/8)
Too many vulnerabilities in our software
The quality of software of the operating systems and applications is not good enough!
Error rate:
Number of errors (bugs) per 1,000 Lines of Code (LoC).
Operating systems have more than 10 million LoC
more than 3,000 errors
(Error rate 0.3 )
and thus too many
potential vulnerabilities
Error rate Classification of programs
< 0.5 stable programs 0.5 … 3 maturing programs
3 … 6 unstable programs 6 … 10 error-prone programs
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 8
IT Security Situation Today
Threat Potential (2/8)
Insufficient anti-malware protection (1/2)
Anti malware solutions have a too low detection rate only 75 to 95%!
In case of direct attacks less than 27% 0% 27% 100% Day 3 24h Day 14 proactive detection signature-based detection Security gaps
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 9
IT Security Situation Today
Threat Potential (3/8)
Insufficient anti-malware protection (2/2)
One in 25 computers has malware!
Data theft / data manipulation (Key logger, Trojan horses, …) Spamming, click fraud, use of computing power, …
data encryption / ransom, …
Cyber War (Advanced Persistent Threat - APT) SUXNET, Frame, …
One of the biggest threats for the moment!
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 10
IT Security Situation Today
Threat Potential (4/8)
No international identity management
(2013)
Passwords, passwords, passwords, …
are still the tools for authentication in the Internet!
Identification is valid in corporation or customer environment, but not international!
Federation approaches are not yet widespread enough!
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 11
IT Security Situation Today
Threat Potential (5/8)
Insecure websites in the field
Today most of the malware is distributed by insecure websites
2.5 % of the German measured websites are infected with malware.
(
US ~ 1.01;
Japan ~ 0.51; …)Reasons for insecure websites
Many websites / webserver are not implemented securely Patches are not or very late installed
There is no responsibility for own websites!
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any
IT Security Situation Today
Threat Potential (6/8)
Smartphones become a challenge
Losing the mobile devices
Constantly changing insecure environments (airports, railway stations, cafés...) ...
… thus the probability of loss is much higher!
(mobile phone statistic in London taxies)
Apps as spyware / malware
(mass instead of class)
Movement profile
Public Inspections
False or manipulated hotspot
(trustworthiness)
Consumerization or Bring Your Own Devices (BYOD)
12 stop the thief Address of the secretay Address of the competitor
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 13
IT Security Situation Today
Threat Potential (7/8)
Cloud Computing becomes a challenge
“The cyber” provides additional points of attacks
Identity theft, session hijacking, vulnerabilities in shared services, separation of corporate data, and so on
I do not know the places where my data is stored and who has the opportunity to read the data!
How can I be sure that the data still exists?
The aspect “Trust” becomes much more important
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 14
IT Security Situation Today
Threat Potential (8/8)
Internet User
Internet users need to know the problems of the Internet or they harm themselves and others ( Internet competence)
BITKOM survey: (Germany 2012)
Almost one in three Internet users is not adequately protected! - no personal firewall (30 %)
- no anti malware (28 %)
- is careless about e-mails and links - etc.
Study „Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group“:
57 % of the Internet users have ever opened spam e-mail or clicked links in spam e-mails
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecur ity -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any
Some Network Security Solution
Idea of a central firewall system
15
Firewall
System
Building Networks
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecur ity -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 16
Some Network Security Solution
Assessment of a central firewall system
Assets protocol state machine entity Transmitter (T) Receiver (R) entity action u action t+1 action t action 3 action 1 action 2 action ak sj integration and enforcement module protocol element result of analysis
set of rules security relevant event (ei) ri result of decision analysis modul decision modul xi protocol element state machine Firewall Systems Security Management xi xi ak = action-select( protocol-state-machine(xi, sj), authenticity(xi, tl),
result-of-decision( analysis(xi), security-management(rules) ), functionality-of-the-firewall-system() )
User: Configuration
Producer: Implementation Producer: Depth of analysis
Trustworthiness
Authentication
Producer: Trustworthiness of the Implementation of the Security Services
User: Security Policy
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any
Smart Metering Gateway
Introduction
Essential part of the (German) smart grid activities
Connects Smart Homes and the Wide Area Network (WAN)
Smart components: solar power plants, smart cars, smart fridges, smart digital meters, …
Exchange of meter and grid condition data Accounting of meter data
Ensure integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of data Data privacy problems
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any
Smart Metering Gateway
Environment of the Gateway
18 Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System
Technical guide line BSI TR-03109 Defines security mechanisms and other requirements
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecur ity -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any
Smart Metering Gateway
Security Objectives
Security mechanisms Threads TLS/SSL -Encryption Digital Signature T imestamp Anonymisation and Pseudonymisation Physical Pr otection (Security Module) Data manipulation X X XMeter data manipulation X X X X
Data disclosure X X
Physical manipulation X
shortened representation
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 20
Paradigm Shift
– (1)
More
responsibility
less
indifference
Producer responsibility
Software and hardware will better matched and problems would be better identified and solved.
Validation / Certification
Independent and qualified organization prove (improve) the quality of IT (security) products and solution
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 21
Paradigm Shift
– (2)
More
proactive
less
reactive
IT security
Reactive IT Security Systems
Today we use a lot of reactive IT security solutions and that means we are always running behind the attacker.
The idea of reactive IT security is, if we detect an attack, we try to protect us as fast as possible to reduce the damage.
For example “reactive IT security systems” are Firewall Systems
Intrusion Detection Solutions Anti-Malware products
Anti-Spam /-Phishing …
„Airbag approach“:
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 22
Paradigm Shift
– (2)
More
proactive
less
reactive
IT security
Proactive IT Security Systems
We need much more proactive IT security to protect our values. Our IT systems will be more robust and much more trustworthy with the idea of proactive IT security.
Here we use for example a security kernel with separation and isolation
technology combined with intelligent cryptographic security mechanisms.
(
Trustworthy Basis
)
„ESP strategy“:
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecur ity -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any OS 23
Paradigm Shift
– (2)
Trustworthy Base
Hardware OS OSSecurity Kernel / Virtualization
App
Strong Isolation Policy EnforcementApp
Modularization Trusted Computing Base VirtualizationTrusted Software Layer
App
Security Module Trusted Boot Remote Attestation, Binding, Sealing … Trusted Plattform Integrity Control Robustness/Modularity Trusted Interaction Trusted Process Security ManagementApp
App
Trusted Virtual Domains Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 24
Paradigm Shift
– (3)
More object less
perimeter
security
Perimeter security
Defense Model:
Protect a set of computer systems and networks with the help of Firewalls, VPNs, Intrusion detection and so on.
Assumption: The computers and the networks are fixed installed. Evaluation:
Modern world uses
flexible and distributed mobile devices. Perimeter security can’t
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 25
Paradigm Shift
– (3)
More object less
perimeter
security
Object Security (Information Flow Control)
Idea:
Domain object-oriented security, in which the objects are provided with rights.
The rights define who can use the object with which action in which IT environment
Object Lifecycle Protection
Distributed Policy Enforcement (even on foreign systems)
generation
processing destruction
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecur ity -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 26
Paradigm Shift
– (4)
More
collaboration
less
separation
Imbalance of power in cyberspace between attackers and defenders.
Prof . Norb ert P ohlm ann , Ins titute for I ntern et S ecuri ty -if (is), W estpha lian U niv e rsity of A pplie d Science s Ge lsen kirch en, G erm any 27
The Trouble of Network Security
Summary
It is very important that we use network security in the right way Changes in the general condition !
Radical change in IT (Mobile devices, Social Networks, Cloud , …)
The protected values are constantly rising and changing over the time Attack models are innovating and attackers are getting more professional
Over the time our IT security and privacy problems are getting bigger and bigger!
We need paradigm shifts in IT and IT security, so that we can build trust in using the networks and the Internet in the future
More responsibility less indifference
More proactive less reactive IT security
More object less perimeter security
More collaboration less separation
Prof. Dr.
(TU NN)Norbert Pohlmann
Institute for Internet Security - if(is)
Westphalian University of Applied Sciences Gelsenkirchen, Germany www.if-is.net