Supplementary Material: Cognition and Behavior in Context: A Framework and Theories to Explain Natural Resource Use
Decisions in Social Ecological Systems
Table of Contents
SM-A. SES behaviors ... 2
Results from a short survey of SES scholars ... 3
Table A2. Behavioral Patterns. ...3
Table A3. Prioritized Behaviors ...4
SM-B. Theories: Mapping and Glossary ... 6
B1. Theory Map ... 6
B2. Glossary... 9
Active Learning ... 9
Affordance Theory ... 9
Attention Restoration Theory ... 9
Attitude-Behavior-Context (ABC) Theory ... 9
Bounded Rationality (Satisficing) ... 9
Choice Architecture ... 9
Cognitive Hierarchy Theory ... 9
Conditional Cooperation ... 10
Confirmation Bias ... 10
Decision Modes Theory ... 10
Embodied Cognition ... 10
Habitual Behavior ... 10
Hyperbolic Discounting ... 10
Inequity Aversion ... 10
Mental Models ... 11
Psychological Risk Dimensions ... 11
Prospect Theory... 11
Reinforcement Learning ... 11
Selective Attention ... 11
Sense of Place... 11
Social Identity Approach ... 11
Social Influence and Persuasion ... 12
Social Learning Theories ... 12
Social Network Structure ... 12
Social Norms ... 12
Stress Reduction Theory... 12
Sunk Cost Accounting... 12
Theory of Planned Behavior ... 12
Trust and Reciprocity ... 12
Query Theory ... 13
Value-Belief-Norm Theory ... 13
SM-C. Additional Use-Cases ...13
SM-D Snapshot of Crowdsourced Theories...13
References ...17
SM-A. SES behaviors
Purpose: To make concrete what are relevant behaviors in Social-Ecological systems research. We want to use this to have those behaviors in mind as they would benefit from gaining understanding and for us to have in the back of our minds by selecting and connecting to theories from behavioral, social and cognitive sciences.
Approach: approach social-ecological systems researchers in our network about behavior they typically would encounter and would want to understand. We emailed 11 colleagues in Maja Schlüter and Nanda Wijermans’
network and got 7 responses and followed up on some by email to ask for clarification or deepening. We distilled a list of behaviors and grouped them into behavior patterns mostly affected by the individual, social or the environment.
In the following details on the email that we send (Table A1), the distilled info we got (Table A2 and A3).
Table A1. The email sent to 11 colleagues to get at relevant behaviors in SES Subject: Collecting relevant behaviours in SES
Dear X,
<personalised intro>. We are in the process of connecting relevant social science theories to behavioural
phenomena in SES while collaborating with Elke Weber and Sara Constantino (cognitive psychologist, Princeton collaboration). Now we started by listing behaviours that are relevant to our community, either because they are different from what we expect from economic rationality, or because they are common and important for sustainable outcomes or because they cannot be explained. We were wondering whether we can pick your brain, to help us collect relevant behaviours of individuals, groups that you experienced or heard of in the field.
1) Below this email you find a list of behavioural examples we could think of. Can you add more examples of common behaviors that do not follow an economic rationality?
2) Which of these behaviors do you think is particularly relevant for SES issues?
We would greatly appreciate your input!
Best wishes, Maja and Nanda
---
Behaviour list:
• Fishers (farmers) continue to fish (farm) when they no longer make profits and even in the face of economic losses.
• Actors stop an income activity before all profits have been extracted, e.g. bike couriers and taxi drivers go home for the weekend/quit for the day once an income threshold has been reached
• Actors try to balance tradeoffs between multiple goals, such as income versus family activities, which may lead to decisions that are suboptimal on all goals
• People engage or not engage in a cooperative activity (e.g. reach/join in agreements) even when it is profitable for them to do so
• Fishers compete with each other but also cooperate: Fishers are friendly with each other and seek support from other fishers when it comes to conviviality and safety at sea but at the same time are competitive about the best fishing sites and size of catch.
• A fisher may target the species that is most accessible over the one that is most profitable
• People protesting about the location of renewable energy infrastructure even though they support the idea in general, e.g. wind turbines
• A history of collaboration makes it more likely to collaborate in future
• Conflicts in one part of community life affect other key areas of civic life, which in turn affects the capacity of local inhabitants to reach agreements about the provision of environmental goods and services. (Basurto 2016)
• Actors may have (or perceive themselves to have) no (or a limited set of) options as a result of their position in a social hierarchy, informational constraints, limited access to resources etc.
• Actors expect other actors (higher in the hierarchy) to solve their problems
• The decision of an actor is triggered by its environment, e.g. good bicycle paths will motivate more people to ride their bikes
Results from a short survey of SES scholars
Table A2. Behavioral Patterns.
Individual
• People protesting about the location of renewable energy infrastructure even though they support the idea in general, e.g. wind turbines
• Fishers often say they are the ones who want to preserve the fish stocks the most of all people but then continues with unsustainable fishing practices.
o ”Depending on their situations, some people simply may be unaware of environmental problems; others may be aware but not convinced they can do anything about them; and others simply may not have the resources required to do something about them or may reckon that the effort is not worth it, given costs and other obligations.” (McCay 2002, p.
364-365).
• People ignore climate change even though they assess it as a current, visible, local, personal threat and are deeply concerned (hence, people do not change their behavior; e.g. they do not upgrade their house to storm-resistant standards, fishers do not attach greater importance to climate information events with special focus on fisheries).
• Effect of experiences on assessing future events: People who survive climate events, like flooding, become convinced that they are less likely to be affected by future ones (and thus do not show adaptive behaviour, e.g. in terms of moving further away from the coastline or installing a sump pump in their basement).
• Tendency of people to fit evidence of risk to positions that predominate in groups of those they most strongly identify with. Individuals particularly trust those who share similar worldviews and choose to believe in what those around them believe (social turning towards one’s ingroup). For example, a strong ingroup belief of invulnerability to climate change impedes adaptive climate action among fishers who actually feel vulnerable and are concerned).
• People chose an alternative that is more expensive in the long term, because it can be paid in smaller units so they don’t have to save money.
o Agriculture example: people buy firewood for cooking on a daily basis despite having access to a gas cooker that would be less expensive on a monthly basis, but must be paid for the full month at once when filling up the gas bottle.
o Fisheries example: Actors regardless of potential gains from more biomass/opportunities in the ecosystem, tend to spend the same routine time out at sea.
• Prioritising other aspects than direct profit contributing actions. Valuing other aspects than profit- generation.
o Not-working when being poor. For example (SSF) Low income actors value rest and relaxation and can prioritise this over going to sell the products themselves or going out on extra days as means to land more.
o Not investing in bigger/modern operations. For example, (SSF) Actors can value independence and agency in their decision making and stick to smaller less "efficient"
operations over going out on a bigger/more modern boat with multiple other agents, depending on their personalities/characters.
o Spending money on gifts. For example (SSF), maintaining/supporting relations - actors give away sellable products as gifts or blessings linked to social standing/cultural traditions despite income that can be generated from them and small margins.
o Supply loyalty to middle men or patrons even when economic ties are not present or transactions are not optimal in economic sense (e.g. in Indonesia (e.g., Miñarro et al. 2016) but many papers show this)
o Sell lower prices / reduce overall profits (SSF) to prevent moral losses or losing social standing in their immediate environment, which may be caused if they disrupt current sales arrangements.
o Wanting/lobby for modernisation. (SSF)Narratives of modernisation often dominate actor's ambitions for their fisheries, regardless declining landings/reducing environmental health e.g. coastal communities in Philippines often wanted fish processing factories, Zanzibar fishers want big modern vessels and high tech gear.
o Wanting to have a particular job (even when it is not necessarily profitable). Actors look up to/aspire to be/want to upgrade to- typically the actors further downstream from them in the value chain e.g. fishers want to be brokers, brokers want to bigger wholesalers; regardless the market/environmental signals from the fisheries (but maybe this is economic
rationality)
o Risk for status: Fishers taking significant health and safety risks to gain social standing (and not necessarily maximising catch) (example in dive industry in Costa Rica – (e.g. see Naranjo-Madrigal and van Putten 2019)
o People risking their lives (e.g. in the amazon) by being shot to protect turtle nesting sites (and not being paid to do so – or no obvious financial gains).
Social (others are affecting my decision making)
• Following what most people do instead of using their own information/making independent decisions:
o SSF observation: Actors often make business decisions based on social surroundings e.g.
what the neighbours are doing, rather than calculated economic profit related decisions Environment (physical and social/cultural structures/constraints play a role in my decision making)
• Behavioural setting - re-occurrence of behaviour in a certain physical environment (mimicking) - mix of norms and environment under certain circumstances - e.g. skateboarding at a certain location.
• Role of structures, more than behaviour, but norms around gender, ethnicity and family can affect the decisions an actor makes for example regarding income generating activity, so that someone doesn’t do what is otherwise available and economically rational due to these norms.
• People buying fishing quota when abundance / catches are low. The reason is not to maximise short term profit but to accumulate quota (and in the hope that abundance will improve in the future) (e.g.
Leon et al (2015) doi:10.1093/icesjms/fsu246).
Table A3. Prioritized Behaviors identified as most relevant or common. there is no ranking in the list provided, people mentioned different behaviours.
• The decision of an actor is triggered by its environment, e.g. good bicycle paths will motivate more people to ride their bikes
• People protesting about the location of renewable energy infrastructure even though they support the idea in general, e.g. wind turbines
• Actors may have (or perceive themselves to have) no (or a limited set of) options as a result of their position in a social hierarchy, informational constraints, limited access to resources etc.
• Actors expect other actors (higher in the hierarchy) to solve their problems
• Fishers (farmers) continue to fish (farm) when they no longer make profits and even in the face of economic losses.
• Actors try to balance trade-offs between multiple goals, such as income versus family activities, which may lead to decisions that are suboptimal on all goals
• A fisher may target the species that is most accessible over the one that is most profitable
• A history of collaboration makes it more likely to collaborate in future
SM-B. Theories: Mapping and Glossary
B1. Theory Map
SM-B1.a Theory Map:Mapping of Theories onto the Framework Elements and Processes. This table shows the mapping of our theory selection onto the processes and elements of the HuB-CC framework in Figure 1. The elements and processes fundamental to a specific theory are indicated by an “x”. Canonical references for each theory, or class of theories, are included in the but-last column and an assessment on the degree of formalization is indicated in the last column.
Conceptual Origin of Theories
Theories
Perception Attention Learning & Updating External Information Search Memory Search Valuation Choice Behavior Stable Characteristics Situational Characteristics Social and Biophysical Environment References Degree of Formalization
constraints Bounded Rationality (Satisficing) x x (Simon, 1957) high
constraints Cognitive Hierarchy Theory (or K-level reasoning in Behavioral Game Theory)
x x x (Camerer et al., 2004) high
constraints Confirmation bias (theories related to selective and biased memory search)
x x (Plous, 1993) low
constraints Hyperbolic Discounting (and other discounting theories, including psychological distance)
x (Ainslie & Haslam, 1992; Laibson, 1997)
high
constraints Prospect Theory x x x x (Kahneman & A
Tversky, 1979)
high
constraints Psychological Risk Dimensions x x x x (Fischhoff et al., 1978) low-medium
constraints Selective Attention x x x x x x (Posner & Petersen,
1990)
medium
constraints Query Theory x x x (Hardisty et al., 2010;
Johnson et al., 2007)
low
context (physical) Affordance Theory x x x x (Gibson, 1977) low
context (physical) Attention Restoration Theory x x x x (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1989) low
context Mental Models x x x x (Johnson-Laird, 2010) low
context (physical) Sense of Place x x x x (Tuan, 1977) low
context (social) Social Identity Theory & Social Categorization Theory) x x x x (Reicher et al., 2010;
Tajfel & Turner, 1986) low
context (social) Social Influence & Persuasion x x x x (Cialdini, 1993) low
context (social) Social Norms x x x x x x (Bicchieri, 2006) medium
context (physical) Stress Reduction Theory x x (Ulrich, 1993; Ulrich et
al., 1991)
medium
dynamics Active Learning x x x x x (Gureckis & Markant,
2012)
high dynamics Reinforcement Learning (incremental learning theories) x x x x x (Sutton et al., 1998) high
dynamics Social Learning (in the context of NRM) x x x x (Bandura, 1977; Reed et
al., 2010)
medium multiplicity Conditional Cooperation (cooperation and reciprocity) x x x (Gächter, 2006) medium-high
multiplicity Decision Modes Theory x x x (Weber et al., 2005;
Weber & Lindemann, 2007)
low
multiplicity Inequity Aversion (and fairness) x x x (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) high
multiplicity Theory of Planned Behavior x x x x (Ajzen, 1991) medium
multiplicity Value-Belief-Norm Theory x x x x (Stern et al., 1999) medium
multiplicity Sunk Cost Accounting x (Arkes & Blumer, 1985) low
multiplicity Trust and Reciprocity (trait-based) x x x x x (Berg et al., 1995) medium-high
multiplicity ABC Theory (Attitudes, Behaviors, Contexts) x x x (Stern, 2000) medium
context Choice Architecture x x x x x (Johnson et al., 2012) low
constraints, context Embodied Cognition x x x x x x x (Wilson, 2002) low
dynamics Habitual Behavior x x x x x (Graybiel, 2008) low-medium
context (social) Social Network Structure (and Social Capital) x x x (Centola, 2010;
Granovetter, 1985; Rand et al., 2011)
low-medium- high
SM-B1.b Theory Map: Crowdsourced Mapping of Theories onto the Framework Elements. To assess consistency in our mapping, we sent the mapping exercise to 12 domain experts and asked them to independently map the theories they were familiar with onto the framework. They indicated their confidence on a range from *** (high confidence) to ** (moderate confidence) to * (low confidence). We scored the cells as being worth 3, 2 or 1 points per respondent depending on their reported level of confidence. The cells with thick borders reflect the original mapping choices of the authors (SM-B1.a)
B2. Glossary
Below, we briefly describe the 31 theories from our selection and mapping. For each theory, their conceptual origin and core reference are given. In the description we use [ ! ] to indicate the connections to the elements and processes of the framework. Here, we take liberties with the use of the word theory to include concept, model, framework and other constructs that have been developed to explain aspects of human behavior and decision making.
Active Learning (Gureckis & Markant, 2012)|dynamics:
In active and self-directed learning an individual decides how and what to sample from the environment in order to resolve uncertainty [learning and updating!; external information search!]. By actively interacting with their social and biophysical environments [!], individuals directly shape what they know about the world and can actively test their working hypotheses about the world and updated old hypotheses, in contrast to passive learning, where they are not in control of the information they sample. In supervised and instruction learning, individuals are given training sets (input-output pairs) or instructions from which they can learn properties of the environment and extrapolate to unknown quantities. In one-shot learning,
Affordance Theory (Gibson, 1977)|context:
Affordances are the benefits that the physical details of an object within an individual’s social and biophysical environment [!] can provide. Affordances are perceived by an individual and thus the affordances of the same object may be perceived differently between individuals [perception!]. These differences can occur due differences in situational characteristics and perceptions [situational characteristics!]. Further, understanding the affordances of objects can inform their design to optimize how individuals interact with them. Handles on doors that need to be opened inward and push plates on doors that need to be opened outward, for example, are affordances that facilitate appropriate responses [behaviour!].
Attention Restoration Theory (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1989)|context:
Attention restoration theory states that if attention is depleted, it can be replenished through interaction with the natural environments [social and biophysical environment!] and/or perceiving nature [perception!]. Attention can be depleted for a variety of reasons, for example, physical or social stress. The characteristics of a natural environment allow an individual to rely on involuntary attention rather than focusing on challenging or stressful situations [situational characteristics!]. Through interaction with the biophysical environment, attention is replenished and activities can be resumed effectively [social and biophysical environment!]. The individual can also reflect on these experiences to restore their attention [memory search!].
Attitude-Behavior-Context (ABC) Theory (Stern, 2000)|multiplicity:
The Attitude-Behavior-Context (ABC) Theory assumes that behaviour[!] is a function of the decision maker (attitudes) and their social and biophysical environment [!]. It relates an individual’s attitudes and the difficulty of completing a given action to the likelihood of performing a given action. If in a certain situation[!] an action is too difficult, it is unlikely to be completed even if an individual cares about it.
Bounded Rationality (Satisficing) (Simon, 1957) | constraints:
Bounded rationality refers to cognitive (including effort), informational, and time limitations that constrain decision making. These constraints can lead decision-makers to satisfice, seeking a satisfactory solution rather than an optimal one. This means that choice alternatives are not necessarily evaluated on all attributes, but only on an important subset of attributes [Valuation!]. It also means that in contexts where a decision-maker is contending with many options, they may stop searching and choose an option that is “good enough,” without evaluating all other options [Choice!].
Choice Architecture (Johnson et al., 2012)|context:
Choice architecture describes how the structure or way in which choices are presented to an individual will affect their decisions [!]. Framing choice alternatives as gains or losses relative to different references or making one alternative the default option that will apply if no decision is made have been shown to affect how people perceive [!] the choice alternatives (see Prospect Theory) and the order in which they search their memory [!] for arguments supporting them. Features of the physical and social environment[!] shape the choice environment and thus create an important situational characteristic [!] that shapes decisions.
Cognitive Hierarchy Theory (Camerer et al., 2004) | constraints:
Cognitive hierarchy theory is a behavioral game theoretic approach that describes strategic decision-making in social situations, and the processes through which these choices are made [choice!]. According to this theory, individuals in strategic dilemmas differ in their level or depth of reasoning about the beliefs and strategies of other players and their own best responses to these beliefs [stable characteristics!]. The lowest reasoners consider no contextual information, but only their own payoffs for different response options. Going up the cognitive hierarchy, players will also incorporate what they know about the knowledge and payoffs of other players [social environment!].
Conditional Cooperation (Gächter, 2006)|multiplicity:
Conditional Cooperation describes an individual who is willing to cooperate or act fairly only if they perceive that the individuals in their social environment [!] are also cooperating. This cooperation choice [!] is thus defined largely based on situational characteristics [!].
Confirmation Bias (Plous, 1993) | constraints:
Confirmation bias refers to the observation that decision makers selectively attend to [Attention!] and search for [Memory Search!] information that confirms their beliefs. The individual excludes information that would allow them to come to a different conclusion, and instead reaffirms what they previously believed. Confirmation bias can occur in a wide variety of situations, but especially when an individual values their belief greatly [Situational Characteristics!].
Decision Modes Theory (Weber et al., 2005; Weber & Lindemann, 2007) |multiplicity:
Decision Modes Theory states that decisions are made using qualitatively different modes of decision-making:
calculation-based, emotion-based, and rule-based processes. These modes reflect different decision-making processes which are used in different situations to different degrees. The modes that an individual uses to make a decision can be influenced by an individual’s social and biophysical environment[!]. An individual may place different values on different choice options when deciding depending on which decision mode they are employing, and the mode chosen will influence their valuation[!] and choice[!].
Embodied Cognition (Wilson, 2002) | constraints & context:
Embodied cognition is a theory that states cognition is not entirely determined by the brain, but also by the body and tools. Many tasks involve physical action [attention!;behavior!]. In this approach, cognition is shaped by the body’s interaction with its social and biophysical environment [!]. Bodily feedback shapes a decision maker’s subsequent perceptions [!] and internal and external information search [Memory Search!; External Information Search!].
Habitual Behavior (Graybiel, 2008) |dynamics:
Habitual Behavior is a type of behavior[!] that is performed semi-automatically by an individual in a perceived [!] situation. An individual may not have conscious awareness that they are performing a habitual behavior.
These behaviors are learned through repeated actions or experiences within one’s environment and can be difficult to change or undo [learning and updating!; situational characteristics!]. Habitual Behavior can be seen in a variety of circumstances and is shaped within an individual’s social and biophysical environment[!].
Hyperbolic Discounting (Ainslie & Haslam, 1992; Laibson, 1997) | constraints:
Hyperbolic discounting is a model of valuation [!] of choice alternatives depending on how removed they are in time, where alternatives that are not available immediately are less valuable than those that can be obtained immediately. This steep preference for the present is ‘present bias’ Hyperbolic discounting differs from exponential discounting, in which the value of an option decreases by a constant amount for a given increase in delay (say a week). A hyperbolic discounter is likely to choose to receive an option today over a better option a week from today. However, when the same items are available in a year, or in a year and a week, they will choose the better reward option, demonstrating present bias.
Inequity Aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) |multiplicity:
Inequity Aversion is the idea that some individuals [stable characteristics!] care about the way in which the outcomes of their decisions affect others [social and biophysical environment!]. In particular whether the outcomes will (or will not) contribute to an uneven distribution of rewards or punishments. A person who is inequity averse may be willing to reduce their own material benefits or to pay a cost to even things out [valuation!]. Greater inequity aversion is associated with greater cooperation.
Mental Models (Johnson-Laird, 2010)|context:
Mental models guide one’s own decisions and how one makes sense of other’s actions. They are a representation of the connections, relations and influence between different objects or people. They in turn shape how an individual perceives[!] their environment and what information they search for in memory [!]. They can be changed or revised [learning!] with additional experiences [situational characteristics!].
Psychological Risk Dimensions (Fischhoff et al., 1978) | constraints:
Psychological risk dimensions account for how members of the general public (in contrast to experts) perceive [!] the riskiness of different actions or hazards [social and biophysical environment!]. These risk dimensions do not refer to the value of outcomes or probabilities, but to how the hazard is experienced or perceived [!], for one on a dimension of dread (emotional reaction) and secondly on a dimension of controllability. Scoring high on a psychological risk dimension (high dread, or feeling that a hazard is unknown and hard to control) makes a hazard likely to be attended (!) to. When deciding whether to act, people weigh the perceived [!] risk against the perceived [!] benefits of taking such risk. If the benefit outweighs the risk in an individual’s valuation [!], they will be likely to participate in the risky action.
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & A Tversky, 1979) | constraints:
Prospect theory summarizes the results of a large number of empirical studies and describes how individuals choose between risky prospects (lotteries or other choices whose outcomes are only known probabilistically at the time of decision). It builds on expected utility theory, but assumes that outcomes are evaluated [Valuation!]
relative to a reference point as either relative gains or relative losses, which have different utility/value functions:
for gains, people tend to be risk averse, while for losses they are risk seeking [Stable characteristics!]. On top of that, the utility/value function is steeper for losses, meaning that they react more strongly to outcomes encoded as losses than gains. For example, the pain from losing $1,000 might only be compensated by the pleasure of earning $2,000. The reference point is often equated with the status-quo, but can also be something else, e.g., what one expects to get and can be influenced by internal states or the external environment [Situational characteristics!; Environment!]
Reinforcement Learning (Sutton et al., 1998) |dynamics:
Reinforcement Learning describes how an individual’s behavior is affected or shaped by the consequences of past choices. If an individual experiences positive (negative) consequences following a certain behavior, they will be more (less) likely to repeat this behaviour. Thus, an individual may learn and update their behaviors based on reinforcement [learning and updating!]. The tradeoff between doing what is most positive (exploit) and exploring something new (explore) may differ from one person to the other [stable characteristics!]. The social and physical environment [!] will determine which behaviors and beliefs are positively and negatively reinforced, thus updating internal representations of values of different choice options [situational characteristics!].
Selective Attention (Posner & Petersen, 1990) | constraints:
Selective Attention [!] is the neural process that allows the decision maker’s perception [!] to focus on something in the external social and biophysical environment [!], External Information Search[!] or the internal environment [Memory Search!, Situational Characteristics!] at a specific time. Selective attention refers to the intentional or passive prioritization of some stimuli over others, making the individual’s attention “selective.”
Some theories suggest that selective attention derives from cognitive constraints, which limit the ability to perceive many phenomena at once and can facilitate the prioritization of the most important or salient stimuli in a given moment.
Sense of Place (Tuan, 1977) |context:
Sense of place is a construct that describes how people perceive their spatial surroundings and the relationship between themselves and their environment. This is often tied to the values that an individual holds towards a given place or region [valuation!], which can be tied to characteristics of the spatial environment or social relationships that the individual values [stable characteristics!; social and biophysical environment!]. These characteristics can be made more or less salient by a given situation [situational characteristics!].
Social Identity Approach (Reicher et al., 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1986)|context:
The social identity approach (social identity theory and social categorisation theory) explains group dynamics and social movements by categorizing actors into “us” and “them”. Individuals have multiple social identities [situational characteristics!] and different social settings [social environment!] elicit different social identities,
Social Influence and Persuasion (Cialdini, 1993) |context:
Social influence is one means by which an individual’s behavior/beliefs/ideas are shaped by their social environment [!]. Persuasion is a type of social influence that appeals to reason or emotion to defend a certain view or action. Situational characteristics[!], such as the amount of trust in other’ messages or actions, may influence the efficacy of social influence or persuasion. Social influence can affect how an individual perceives the value of a choice [valuation!] and may also directly influence choice [!].
Social Learning Theories (Bandura, 1977) |dynamics:
Social learning theory primarily describes how individuals change their knowledge, values or norms in general and specific contexts [stable characteristics!, situational characteristics!] through learning [learning and updating!] from observing or interacting with other individuals in their social environment [!]. This theory thus applies to individuals in groups and their interactions within their social and biophysical environments [!]. In natural resource management, social learning occurs when there is a change in understanding that emerges from social interactions between actors and when it goes beyond the individual and becomes situated within the wider social units or communities of practice. Social Learning Theory is an important idea within the field of natural resource management because of its importance in adaptive and participatory approaches.
Social Network Structure (Centola, 2010; Granovetter, 1985; Rand et al., 2011)|context:
Social Network Structure describes how individuals are connected to other social actors, such as individuals and organizations, in dyadic ties and the overall shape of these networks at the macro level. The local and global shape of these structures affects how information or norms are transmitted in a society [learning and updating!], the network dynamics, and whether there are focal or influential actors, often those with many connections or ties to other actors. Networks can change through the making or breaking of social ties based on situational needs [situational characteristics!] that depend on the social and biophysical environment [!].
Social Norms (Bicchieri, 2006) |context:
Social norms reflect rules or beliefs about the appropriateness of a behavior for a particular social situation. One can distinguish injunctive or descriptive norms. Injunctive norms refer to rules or beliefs about what is morally acceptable behavior, whereas descriptive norms describe what is actually done. Descriptive norms can thus be regarded as a predominant behavioral pattern within a group. Individual’s are particularly influenced by their perceptions of these descriptive norms, which can deviate from the actual behavioral patterns [Perception!], supported by a shared understanding of acceptable actions [selecting a subset of Situational Characteristics!
from the full set of Stable Characteristics!] that will influence Valuation [!] and Choice [!]. Both types of norms are created by observations of the Social and Biophysical Environment [!] and sustained through social interactions.
Stress Reduction Theory (Ulrich, 1993; Ulrich et al., 1991) |context:
Stress reduction theory, similar to attention restoration theory, is focused on the positive benefits of the natural environment in reducing stress. By interacting with the natural environment, individuals can reduce their overall stress levels [social and biophysical environment!]. While stress can vary largely based on an individual’s situational characteristics, spending time in nature can be helpful for reducing various forms of stress [situational characteristics!].
Sunk Cost Accounting (Arkes & Blumer, 1985) |multiplicity:
Sunk Cost Accounting explains that an individual or organization will place more value[!] on a given task if they have already invested time and resources into that task or project. A sunk cost is a cost that has been spent on a project and cannot be recouped, and so should in theory not affect the current decision. Despite this fact, an individual may perceive that it is best to continue with the project and this may scale with the sunk cost.
Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991) |multiplicity:
The Theory of Planned Behavior suggests that an individual's choice [!] and behavior [!] are associated with attitudes (behavioural beliefs, stable and situational characteristics!), subjective norms (normative beliefs, stable and situational characteristics!) and perceived behavioural control (control beliefs). An individual’s beliefs are affected by the social and biophysical environment [!]. Together they form an individual’s intention. The behaviour that results from this intention is then mediated by the perceived behavioural control.
Trust and Reciprocity (Berg et al., 1995) |multiplicity:
Trust and Reciprocity describe how an individual’s decisions may be influenced by the actions of others [choice!]. If an individual is treated positively (negatively) by another individual, they will likely reciprocate
with positive (negative) actions [perception!, valuation!, stable characteristics!]. Trust is a belief in the benevolence of others, and can be based on past experience. In this sense, trust and reciprocity are dependent on an individual’s present and past social environment [!].
Query Theory (Hardisty et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 2007) | constraints:
Query theory postulates that choices are constructed through multiple “queries” or questions that decision makers ask themselves, issued sequentially to their recollections about previous experiences [memory search!]
and about arguments for choosing each of the different choice options. These queries are issued automatically and without conscious awareness, and the balance of evidence in favor of all considered options [valuation!]
determines the choice. The order in which queries are issued, all other things being equal, contributes to how many arguments for a choice option are retrieved, because the first query will inhibit arguments for all other choice alternatives, which are response competitors. Thus, it is important how either chronic or situational factors direct initial attention [!] to specific choice options.
Value-Belief-Norm Theory (Stern et al., 1999)|multiplicity:
Value-Belief-Norm Theory considers how an individual’s behavior[!] may be shaped through emphasizing a value and explaining why this value may be threatened, leading an individual to act to protect the value. This theory can be applied in a variety of ways based on the situational characteristics [!] of a given circumstance. In addition, the behavior relies on an individual’s values which may be shaped, in many ways, by their social and biophysical environment [!]. Further, an individual’s behavior may vary based on the extent to which they believe the given value is important [stable characteristics!].
SM-C. Additional Use-Cases
If an SES researcher wants to understand why fishers more than double their efforts once they learn that a particular area is earmarked for protected status (McDermott et al. 2019), she might turn to the framework to get inspiration about relevant elements and processes of decision making that may lead to this outcome. When going through the different elements of the framework, ‘Perception’, ‘Valuation’, and the broader ‘Social and Biophysical Environment,’ and ‘Situational Characteristics’ stand out as important concepts to investigate further as they relate to the particular decision task and a change in the environment, resulting in the activation of new situational characteristics. Perception and the broader context influence how the fisher perceives that something has changed, while valuation determines how this perception is acted upon. Furthermore, changes in goals, values, social norms and emotional state brought on by the new information may influence whether the fisher will increase his effort in anticipation of the regulation. Once those key processes and elements have been identified, the researcher can turn to the theory map to identify theories that address the selected framework elements. The following theories, for instance, include ‘Perception’ as a central element: prospect theory, selective attention, psychological risk dimension, embodied cognition, mental models, choice architecture, affordance theory, attention restoration theory, social norms, reinforcement learning and habitual behavior. Of these, prospect theory, psychological risk dimension and social norms seem particularly relevant since they also implicate ‘Valuation’.
The broader social and ecological context influences how a fisher receives new information about the possible protection status, which may affect his emotional state because the perception of scarcity becomes more salient.
It is an open question whether it matters for behavior from where the fisher receives this information, e.g. through his social networks or the media. Answering this question would require further empirical or experimental research. Concerns about decreasing future income may increase the perception of risk (psychological risk dimension) and emphasize present consumption vis a vis long-term sustainability of the resource (hyperbolic discounting), resulting in the overharvesting of the resource. These choices may in turn establish a new social norm as more and more fishers increase their fishing effort. In summary, the framework and theory table jointly point to relevant processes and theories for the behavior, assisting a researcher in identification and selection of theories and processes that can be used to guide data collection, foster a deeper understanding of the observed behavior, and for developing formal models of the behavior.
SM-D Snapshot of Crowdsourced Theories.
Below is an extended collection of theories from a crowdsourcing exercise. These theories were solicited by a mass email to SES researchers who employ different methodological approaches in their research but who have used social science theories to inform their work. The focus of the theories ranges from the individual, to the
extend our framework to better account for the collective/group and institutions/governance theories in future work.
References
Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Ainslie, G., & Haslam, N. (1992). Hyperbolic discounting. In Choice over time (pp. 57–92). Russell Sage Foundation.
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50(2), 179–211.
Arkes, H. R., & Blumer, C. (1985). The psychology of sunk cost. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 35(1), 124–140. https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(85)90049-4
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History. Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1), 122–142. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1027
Bicchieri, C. (2006). The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge University Press.
Camerer, C. F., Ho, T.-H., & Chong, J.-K. (2004). A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(3), 861–898. https://doi.org/10.1162/0033553041502225
Centola, D. (2010). The Spread of Behavior in an Online Social Network Experiment. Science, 329(5996), 1194–
1197. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1185231
Cialdini, R. B. (1993). Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion.
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817–868. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556151
Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., Read, S., & Combs, B. (1978). How Safe Is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of Attitudes Toward Technological Risks and Benefits. Policy Sciences, 9, 127–
152. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00143739
Gächter, S. (2006). Conditional cooperation: Behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications (Working Paper No. 2006-03; CeDEx Discussion Paper Series). The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham.
Gibson. (1977). The theory of affordances. In The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Hilldale.
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91(3), 481–510. https://doi.org/10.1086/228311
Graybiel, A. M. (2008). Habits, Rituals, and the Evaluative Brain. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 31(1), 359–
387. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.neuro.29.051605.112851
Gureckis, T. M., & Markant, D. B. (2012). Self-Directed Learning: A Cognitive and Computational Perspective.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(5), 464–481. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691612454304 Hardisty, D. J., Johnson, E. J., & Weber, E. U. (2010). A dirty word or a dirty world? Attribute framing, political
affiliation, and query theory. Psychological Science, 21(1), 86–92.
Johnson, E. J., Häubl, G., & Keinan, A. (2007). Aspects of endowment: A query theory of value construction.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 33(3), 461–474.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.33.3.461
Johnson, E. J., Shu, S. B., Dellaert, B. G. C., Fox, C., Goldstein, D. G., Häubl, G., Larrick, R. P., Payne, J. W., Peters, E., Schkade, D., Wansink, B., & Weber, E. U. (2012). Beyond nudges: Tools of a choice architecture. Marketing Letters, 23(2), 487–504. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11002-012-9186-1
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2010). Mental models and human reasoning. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(43), 18243. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1012933107
Kahneman, D., & A Tversky. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Vol. 47., 263-292.
Kaplan, R., & Kaplan, S. (1989). The experience of nature: A psychological perspective. Cambridge University Press.
Laibson, D. (1997). Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 443–
478. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555253
Plous, S. (1993). The psychology of judgment and decision making. Mcgraw-Hill Book Company.
Posner, M. I., & Petersen, S. E. (1990). The attention system of the human brain. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 13, 25–42. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ne.13.030190.000325
Rand, D. G., Arbesman, S., & Christakis, N. A. (2011). Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(48), 19193–19198.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1108243108
Reed, M., Evely, A., Cundill, G., Fazey, I., Glass, J., Laing, A., Newig, J., Parrish, B., Prell, C., Raymond, C., &
Stringer, L. (2010). What is Social Learning? Ecology and Society, 15(4). https://doi.org/10.5751/ES- 03564-1504r01
Reicher, S. D., Spears, R., & Haslam, S. A. (2010). The social identity approach in social psychology. In M.
Wetherell & C. T. Mohanty (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Identities. Sage.
Stern, P. C. (2000). New Environmental Theories: Toward a Coherent Theory of Environmentally Significant Behavior. Journal of Social Issues, 56(3), 407–424. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00175
Stern, P. C., Dietz, T., Abel, T., Guagnano, G. A., & Kalof, L. (1999). A Value-Belief-Norm Theory of Support for Social Movements: The Case of Environmentalism. Human Ecology Review, 6(2), 81–97. JSTOR.
Sutton, R. S., Barto, A. G., & others. (1998). Introduction to reinforcement learning (Vol. 135). MIT press Cambridge.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & A. W. G (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 276–293). Nelson Hall.
Tuan, Y.-F. (1977). Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience. U of Minnesota Press.
Ulrich, R.S. (1993). S.R. Kellert, E.O. Wilson (Eds.), The Biophilia Hypothesis, Island Press (1993), pp. 74-137.
In Biophilia, biophobia, and natural landscapes.
Ulrich, R.S., Simons, R. F., Losito, B. D., Fiorito, E., Miles, M. A., & Zelson, M. (1991). Stress recovery during exposure to natural and urban environments. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 11(3), 201–230.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0272-4944(05)80184-7
Weber, E. U., Ames, D. R., & Blais, A.-R. (2005). ‘How Do I Choose Thee? Let me Count the Ways’: A Textual Analysis of Similarities and Differences in Modes of Decision-making in China and the United States.
Management and Organization Review, 1(1), 87–118. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740- 8784.2004.00005.x
Weber, E. U., & Lindemann, P. G. (2007). From intuition to analysis: Making decisions with our head, our heart, or by the book. Intuition in Judgment and Decision Making, 191–208.
Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9(4), 625–636.
https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196322
