A European Approach to the New Strategic Space Environment
This issue of the "ESPI Perspectives" series presents a discussion on Europe as a space power and the European approach to security in space. To use space for security, there must be security in space. While Europe acknowledges the importance of using space assets for achieving security, there is a lack of recognition of space as a strategic environment, including antagonistic threats in space. Therefore, it is argued that Europe needs a strategy or policy to address the issue of space control and to bind the various elements of space power together.
1. Introduction
Space, or rather, the orbits used by Man today can be described as being congested and contested. Space is congested in the sense that the number of actors in space is increasing along with the escalating amount of space debris. Space is also contested in the sense that more nations strive to become space powers.
Due to the development of counterspace capabilities, amongst others anti-satellite weapons, the visions of the space powers sometimes turn into visions of power in space.
Therefore, in view of the increasing dependence on space assets for the daily lives of the citizens in Europe one must consider how the European community should approach the issue of space power, or more precisely how Europe should act to secure these space assets. Among others, the goal of this paper is to explore whether a nation, or a group of nations, can reach for space power without actually developing the means of applying power in space.
2. The Concept of Space Power
The world today can be described as multipolar with many actors vying for a place in space. The technical development coupled with political ambitions entails a world where several actors seek to obtain space power. This is nothing controversial, as the basic treaty levelling the playing field of space, the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, clearly states that “Outer space,
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind (…)”.
Thus the global community welcomes more actors in space, but must at the same time find a way to relate to a situation where space power is theoretically within the reach of every nation.
The European Space Policy (ESP)1 acknowledges this, as it clearly states that Europe’s strategic mission in space will be built on the peaceful exploitation of outer space by all states.
There are as many definitions of the term space power as there are analysts and authors. Space power could be something to have, something to be, or something to use. Space power can be defined as “the pursuit of national objectives through the use of space capabilities”2, i.e. a nation can strive for a position as a “power” by the exploitation of space. This is not the same as being a power in space in the way that a nineteenth century nation with a large navy could be described as a “sea power”. Space power does not necessarily mean “having power in space”. This, if true, is an important distinction as it implies that a nation can have space power
1 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: “European Space Policy”, COM (2007) 212 final, Brussels 26 April 2007.
2 This definition and a discussion on Space Power in Europe can be found in: Peter, Nicholas. “Space Power and Europe in the 21st Century”, ESPI Perspectives No 21, April 2009.
Lars HÖSTBECK andEva BERNHARDSDOTTER, Swedish Defence Research Agency
PERSPECTIVES E S P I
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or could be a space power without any military offensive capabilities in space. Imagine eighteenth or nineteenth century Britain without an offensive military sea capability: it could not pretend to be a sea power by name or by achievements.
Europe, and more specifically the EU together with ESA and some of the larger member states, has all the prerequisites for being a space power on the same level as the four existing major space actors: the United States, Russia, China and India. There is, however, one key difference between Europe and the other four space powers. The US, Russia (during the Soviet era) and China have all tested space weapons, while India has publicly announced its intention to develop space weapons.3 The doctrine of space control4 is obviously embraced to some extent by all four major space powers, while this is not the case in Europe.
Indeed, Europe has no policy, no strategy, no doctrine documents that approach the concept of space power, with ideas on how to relate to space control. The only policy element that comes close is the proposal for a Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, a document important in its own right, but only valuable as long as all the major space powers subscribe to it. If one or more of the major space powers would choose to ignore the Code of Conduct and continue to develop space control capabilities, Europe would have to develop its own policy towards handling the possible use of power in space by other space actors.
As mentioned above, one of the foundations of the ESP is the peaceful exploitation of outer space by all states. By definition, this would mean that any reference to non-peaceful activities in space would be contrary to the basic assumption of the ESP. This can be exemplified by the fact that the ESP clearly states that space based capabilities must be protected against disruption, but makes no effort in defining what these disruptions might be and how to protect
3 Public statement made by DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) Director General V. K.
Saraswat in January 2011. See Peter B. de Selding. “India Developing Anti-Satellite Spacecraft,” (Space.com, January 11 2010). http://www.space.com/news/india-antisatellite- plans-100111.html. Accessed 17 Oct 2011.
4 Lupton, David E.: ”On Space Warfare”, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 1998.
European space capabilities against them.
There are obviously some lacunae in the space policy of Europe. If Europe has the ambition to be a space power in the broadest sense, this should be remedied. The argument is not to develop a European doctrine on space control, or European space weapons. Along the lines of thinking presented by Oberg and Peters5, Europe should complement the strategic elements that are the prerequisites for space power with a comprehensive policy that acknowledges the existing space control doctrines of other space powers. Such a comprehensive policy must be a credible description as to how Europe would manage antagonistic threats to the European space infrastructure.
3. European Use of Space Assets for Security The line between security and defence is blurring. The countries in Europe are interconnected and face global threats such as terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration. A European security and defence culture is emerging in parallel with national security cultures encapsulated in the logic of the European Security Strategy (introduced 2003).6
The importance of space assets for Europe’s social and economic development, as well as for its defence and security, is recognised today.
Examples of internal security mission areas that rely on space assets include for example intelligence, critical infrastructure protection, transportation, border security and disaster management.7 Space assets have been identified as key elements of the security and defence policy at a European level.8 The flagship programmes GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security) and Galileo, along with various projects related to space and security in the 7th Framework Programme, constitute a manifestation of the impetus towards coordinating and using space assets for enhancing security.
5 Oberg, James E: “Space Power Theory”, US Space Command, 1999.
6 Kirchner, Emil J. “European Union Moving Towards a European Security Culture?”, in National Security Cultures, (eds. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling), Routledge, 2010.
7 Remuss, Nina-Louisa: “Space and Internal Security – Developing a Concept for the Use of Space Assets to Assure a Secure Europe”. ESPI Report 20, September 2009.
8 Pasco, Xavier: ”Space Capabilities for Crisis Management:
Reducing Gaps, Improving Action”, Recherches &
Documents No 05/2010, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS).
Europe has all the prerequisites for being a space power but lacks a strategy or policy for how to approach the use of power in space by others.
4. Threats to Space Infrastructure
While space systems are used, amongst other things, for protecting critical infrastructure, it is of vital importance to acknowledge that they too are part of the critical infrastructure and therefore need protection. Today’s available technology and global politics warrant a strategy to secure the infrastructure in space. In addition to natural phenomena (such as space weather) and the inevitable amassment of space debris, as the result of simply launching objects into space, antagonistic threats to space assets also include kinetic weapons (ballistic missiles or other satellites) and directed energy weapons (lasers and High Powered Microwaves, HPM).
Kinetic weapons cause permanent destruction of the target resulting in debris, whereas directed energy weapons can cause temporary damage such as laser dazzling of satellite sensors.
Further antagonistic threats include intentional interference with the satellite signal through electronic jamming or spoofing, cyber attacks and physical attack on ground stations.
The use of force against satellites and signals in space is not a distant “Star Wars” scenario resulting from an escalated arms race in space.
The threat is real and tangible. Use of weapons in space against satellites has been a reality since the 1960s, when the two superpowers conducted experimental nuclear tests and detonated mines in space.9 The 21st century saw the destruction of two satellites in low Earth orbit by ballistic missiles. Ballistic missile technology and missile defence capabilities are no longer the prerogative of a few. The debate on whether there is or not an arms race in space today is ongoing. Notwithstanding the arms issue, space is a strategic environment, which currently is neither a sanctuary nor a battlefield. It is a well established fact that space systems provide tactical advantages to the war fighter, as well as strategic benefits to states. Thus it is safe to assume that at some point in time space systems will be regarded as militarily acceptable targets.
9 In 1962 the US conducted a high-altitude nuclear test called Starfish Prime which incapacitated several satellites in low Earth orbit. The Soviet system Istrebitel Sputnik was tested during the 1970s and consisted of a satellite with an explosive charge that was detonated upon interception with the target satellite.
5. US National Space Policy and National Security Space Strategy
The US position on space security influences the global discourse on the topic and is conveyed through the National Space Policy10 (NSP) and the National Security Space Strategy11 (NSSS). Securing space infrastructure is an essential question, and the documents outline a multilayered approach to prevent, deter and respond to attacks on space assets. The cornerstones of this approach are diplomacy, international collaboration, Space Situational Awareness (SSA), resilience and the right of self defence.
The US Departments of State and Defence are engaged in diplomatic efforts to promote norms and guidelines for responsible behaviour in space, such as participating in the EU initiative for a Space Code of Conduct and in the discussions on PAROS12 at the Conference of Disarmament (CD). International collaboration, which is manifested in multinational satellite programmes, or enhanced situational awareness of the space environment, can contribute to deterring attacks on space assets.
Achieving resilience of space capabilities and assets implies not only the deterrence of attacks, but also the protection of space assets, the redundancy of space services, and the recovery in the event of an attack through the rapid rebuilding and replacement of lost assets.
Hence, the importance of Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) is recognised, together with deterrence and protection.13 Finally, consistent with the UN principle of self- defence, both NSP and NSSS assert the right to respond to attacks on US space systems.
10
“National Space Policy of the United States of America”, June 28 2010. Available at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space _policy_6-28-10.pdf. Accessed 11 Oct 2011.
11 ”National Security Space Strategy”, January 2011. Avail. at:
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/doc s/NationalSecuritySpaceStrategyUnclassifiedSummary_Jan 2011.pdf. Accessed 11 Oct 2011.
12 The US actively participates in the discussions on
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) albeit distinctly rejecting the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty (PPWT) proposal.
13 Pagkratis, Spyros. “International Cooperation in the New U.S. Space Policy: Opportunities for Europe”, ESPI Perspectives No. 42, December 2010.
The fact that space is a strategic environment is recognized in US policy and strategy documents.
The use of space assets for security is recognized in Europe, but these assets must also be secured against antagonistic threats.
6. ESP and a Space Strategy for the European Union
The European Space Policy (ESP) is a joint document between the European Commission and the European Space Agency (ESA). It was adopted by the EU-ESA Space Council in the spring of 2007. It was further developed by the communication Towards a Space Strategy for the European Union that Benefits its Citizen14 in April 2011. While the ESP of 2007 avoids the discussion on antagonistic threats to space infrastructure, the 2011 communication recognizes the existence of such threats. The strategy notes that some member states have relevant resources to respond to the risks, but that these sources are inadequate and lack coordination. Consequently, in the words of the communication the EU is “…largely dependent on the resources and the good will of non- Member States”.
Europe has taken action in two areas. The first is in the area of Space Situational Awareness (SSA), where a programme was started by ESA.
The European Union is also expected to play a role in the implementation and governance of a future European SSA system. The second is in the diplomatic arena, where the Union has taken the initiative to develop a proposal for a Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. This is a separate initiative, not originating from the EC or ESA, but from the European Council.
An area where Europe has not taken action is in the development of offensive counter-space capabilities. The consensus among the EU Member States seems to be the one suggested in the proposed Code of Conduct. In contrast to this non-offensive policy however, the European Defence Agency (EDA) had, in its long term vision of 2006, pointed to a potential future need of a European offensive counter-space capability.15
In conclusion, there are various components of a space power policy floating around in the European defence and security community, but they are un-coordinated and they lack a common framework that would forge them into a unified strategy for Europe as a space power.
One explanation for this would be the fragmented field of policy making bodies in the
14 Towards a Space Strategy for the European Union…
15 An initial long term vision for European defence capability and capacity needs, Adopted by EDA Steering Committee October 2006.
http://www.eda.europa.eu/Libraries/Documents/Long- Term_Vision_Report.sflb.ashx.
Accessed 5 Sep 2011.
European Space arena.
7. The Many Actors in Europe
Unlike in the case of its US counterpart, the European defence and security community faces a problem of complexity, arising from the fact that it is a community of many different actors. This characteristic is exacerbated by the fact that Europe is not a single nation, but it rather asserts its influence in the space arena on many different levels; national, multinational and institutional. Europe itself does not constitute an actor in space; rather it envelops a broad range of actors such as individual nations and intergovernmental organisations. The stakeholders in the space arena in Europe include EU, ESA, EDA, NATO and individual nations as shown in Figure 1 (see page 8).
One of the consequences of the fragmentation in the European space policy field is the great variety of points of view expressed, either convergent or divergent. When seen from the outside, this situation can be confusing. A common mistake made by the other major space powers is to believe that the European Union, and thus the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), has access to all national and ESA space assets in Europe. This gives from an intelligence perspective, the impression that the EU and CSDP has better space based intelligence sources than it really has. We should also remember that strategic intelligence is not shared, it is exchanged, and our international partners could wrongly believe that intelligence supplied to a European nation in an exchange program could by default be accessible for the EU, which of course is not the case.
At present, this is not a major problem. Against the backdrop of possible future counterspace capabilities of non-European space powers, however, this confusion can have implications for the security of all European space assets, regardless of their owner. Some future space power bearing a grudge against one member state could target another member states space system, in the belief that all European systems are common assets.
A possible way to remedy this situation would be for Europe to increase its engagement in the international space dialogue, in order to increase The concept of Europe as a space power and its approach to security in space are complicated by the existence of many different actors in Europe.
the other space powers’ understanding of the fragmented European space arena. With the proliferation of space technology and missile technology, this situation merits more attention.
The responsibility for explaining the ownership and use of European space assets must be shared between the EU, the member states and the multinational organisations such as ESA and EUMETSAT. If and when defensive action is taken to secure access to critical space infrastructure, careful consideration should be given to deciding whether it should be done on a national, or a common European level, regardless of each asset’s specific ownership.
8. Approaches to Secure the Infrastructure in Space
A host of approaches can be applied to secure the space infrastructure, none of which is exclusive of the other (see Fig. 2). For the purpose of this ESPI Perspectives issue, the various approaches have been structured in layers, ranging from diplomatic action to the use of destructive force in space.
The first level entails the manifestation of soft power16 and it is mainly viewed as a preventive approach. Transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) constitute important policy tools to preserve global security, including security in space.17 Diplomacy, engagement in international efforts to promote space security, transparency when conducting space activities, a declaration of space policies and the entrance into legally binding treaties may all contribute to prevent aggressions in space.
On the second level one can place SSA, which is paramount in today’s congested space environment. Apart from the vital task of surveying space debris, SSA capabilities can be used to detect imminent counterspace attacks, to determine an aggressor’s intentions, to verify treaty compliance, and to act as a forensic instrument in the aftermath of an attack. But perhaps more importantly, SSA can prevent aggression in space through its deterrence aspect. Sharing SSA data and collaborating on SSA programmes constitute confidence building measures, ultimately resulting in improved SSA services that increase deterrence.
16 Soft power means the ability to achieve a desired outcome through attraction (arising from culture, political ideals and policies) rather than coercion or payments. See: Nye, Joseph S. Jr. “Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics”, Public Affairs, 2004.
17 Robinson, Jana, Schaefer, Matthew Paul, Schrogl, Kai-Uwe and Von der Dunk, Frans (eds.), “Prospects for
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Space, ESPI Report 27, September 2010.
On the third level is placed passive, or rather defensive, protection of space systems and signals, which entails various measures to make them more resilient to attacks, although defending against a kinetic attack is nearly impossible. These efforts include radiation hardening against nuclear attacks, automated mechanical shutters against laser dazzling and data encryption and anti-jamming techniques, to mention a few.18 Another approach, placed on level four, would be to increase space services’
redundancy, which implies, among other, the deployment of satellite constellations instead of unitary spacecraft, or the ability to rapidly replace incapacitated satellites. The latter capacity is related to the concept of ORS, which is currently under development in the US.
Although the ORS concept is mainly associated with future military space needs and the provision of tactically responsive space capabilities to the war fighter on the ground, certain of its elements are also applicable for securing space infrastructure, such as the development of launch on demand technologies, capable of replacing satellites in orbit at a short notice.
At the top of the space infrastructure protection pyramid are two levels (five and six) that represent the transition from a defensive to an offensive approach, through the development and deployment of counterspace capabilities aimed at deterring and/or responding to attacks on space systems. The first of the offensive layers involves non-destructive offensive capabilities such as jamming the communication signals from the satellite or dazzling its sensors.
They are offensive because they aim at negating an adversary’s access to its space systems, but they are non-debris creating and their effects are not permanent, making the space assets accessible again once the conflict is resolved.
On the other hand, the top level of the pyramid consists of destructive counterspace capabilities with permanent effects. These can be either non-debris creating in the form of using laser and HPM weapons against satellites, or debris- creating in the form of kinetic energy anti- satellite weapons.
A range of possible approaches for securing infrastructure in space is described above in the
18 Remuss, Nina-Louisa. Op. cit.
For securing space assets there is today no coordination of European resources, nor is there a coherent discussion on how to use these.
pyramid model. In fact, actors in space today are positioned throughout all levels of the pyramid. A few examples of space actors’ approaches to secure space infrastructure are presented in table 1 below. The table should not be considered as exhaustive, but serves to highlight the great variety of approaches and disparity of capabilities between the selected actors.
According to this table, the US is the one actor that can be said to occupy all levels of the pyramid, thereby displaying a full range of approaches. The US has the largest and most developed SSA-capability in the world, based on the Space Surveillance Network (SSN), which has been further augmented through the launch of the SBSS-satellite (Space Based Space Surveillance). Like the US, Russia has a dedicated space surveillance system. Though not as extensive, China also has a network of systems for space surveillance. Finally, given India’s investments in space, we can assume that it has ambitions to develop SSA-capabilities as well. The US, Russia and China all have destructive counterspace capabilities. India may likewise place itself at the top of the pyramid given its expressed ambition to develop kinetic energy ASAT capabilities.
Figure 2: Levels of securing infrastructure in space. CS – CounterSpace, ORS – Operationally Responsive Space, SSA – Space Situational Awareness, TCBM – Transparency and Confidence Building Measure.
In Europe, the development of a European SSA- system is ongoing as part of the ESA SSA- Programme, with the participation of EDA. Some European countries have national SSA- resources and analysis capabilities that can contribute to a European SSA-system, such as Germany (TIRA), France (GRAVES, TAROT, and ARMOR), UK (RAF Fylingdales) and Norway (GLOBUS II).19 Some of these systems
19 TIRA - Tracking and Imaging Radar, GRAVES - Grand Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatiale, TAROT - Télescope à Action Rapide pour les Objets Transitoires, ARMOR - radar located on the French tracking ship Monge, Royal Air Force
are also used to provide ballistic missile launch early warning capabilities, while France has launched, in addition to ground and sea-based detection capabilities, two space-based early warning demonstrators (Spirale 1 and 2).
France and the UK use hardening to protect military satellites against nuclear attacks at high altitudes.20 ESA and EDA are exploring ways to secure communication signals between satellites and ground stations. Once operational, Galileo’s public regulated service (PRS) is expected to be able to withstand jamming attempts and to be robust enough in order to ensure continuity of service. PRS is protected by each EU member state against abuse by hostile groups.21
On the other hand, no common rapid deployment plan exists for European satellites, similar to the ORS concept developed in the US.
The European approach to responsive space (which differs from ORS concept) is addressed in the ESA study GIANUS that seeks to integrate mission architectures for crisis response purposes. The use of nano-satellites, in the context of responsive space and securing space assets, is explored by SSTL in the UK through the “Angels” (Autonomous Nano-satellite Guardian Evaluating Local Space) and
“Demons” (Deployable Monitoring Nano- satellites) concepts, where the former aims to protect a host satellite and the latter to inspect or disrupt hostile satellites.22
The means of soft power to secure space assets are available to all actors in space, although the approaches taken can vary among the different space actors. China and Russia have introduced to the CD a proposal for a treaty to ban the placement of weapons in space. In 1983 the Soviet Union (and later Russia in 2004) pledged not to be the first to place antisatellite weapons in orbit. The US conveys the message of responsible behaviour, diplomacy and TCBMs through its national space documents and participates in discussions in the CD on PAROS.
The EU (and thereby all member states) is pursuing the creation of a set of guidelines for conducting space activities. The proposal for a Space Code of Conduct, managed by the
Fylingdales and Globus II are radars operated under bilateral agreements with the US.
20 Remuss, Nina-Louisa. Op. cit.
21 Ibid.
22 Presentation by Sir Martin Sweeting, SSTL, at the conference Military Satellites 2010 in London 12-13 July 2010. Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL) is a company based in UK and US. Primary shareholder since 2009 is EADS Astrium with Surrey University.
European External Action Service, is being discussed with space actors across the world.
The existence of a European space policy is also noteworthy, as national policies are important means to convey intentions and directions, while promoting transparency.
Actor Approach
USA Diplomacy, TCBM, SSA, ORS, passive protection, counterspace
China Diplomacy, SSA, counterspace
Russia Diplomacy, TCBM, SSA,
passive protection, counterspace India Development of SSA and
counterspace
EU Diplomacy, TCBM, passive protection
ESA Development of SSA, passive protection EDA Development of SSA,
passive protection France SSA-resources, passive
protection, BMW
UK SSA-resources, passive protection,
BMW, development of nano- satellites
Germany SSA-resources, passive protection
Table 1: List of selected actors and their approaches to securing the infrastructure in space. BMW (Ballistic Missile Warning).
9. Conclusions and Recommendations
When juxtaposing European space capabilities to those of other space actors, it becomes clear that Europe has the prerequisites to be regarded as a space power, provided that it is possible to be a space power without the option to wield military power in space. The first key issue for Europe is to consider the integration of the various strategy elements from different actors into a comprehensive, all-encompassing European space strategy that can transform Europe into a true space power.
The citizens of Europe are already heavily dependent on space assets for their welfare and economic growth. From the “personal” use of space by the satellite navigation receivers in our mobile phones to the very complex flagship programmes Galileo and GMES, Europe has shown a willingness to pursue both national and common objectives through the use of space capabilities. However, Europe’s increasing dependence on space systems has created a
critical infrastructure that has to be secured one way or another.
In this context, it comes as no surprise that the latest European Commission’s communication of 201123 takes note of a lack of coordination of European resources and of a consequent dependence on the resources and goodwill of third parties, which implies two things. The first is that the EC admits that we have to rely on the goodwill of others, either not to use their counterspace resources against us, or to lend us their resources to use them against our adversary. The other implication is that the EC is considering using counterspace resources to secure the European space infrastructure. This is what EDA has captured and included in the long term vision from 2006 where counterspace capabilities are mentioned.
It is important to take notice of the fact that the discussion in Europe today on what the resources for securing the critical space infrastructure could be, is fragmented and not conducted within a single framework. It is in this light that the EDA long term vision has to be assessed. It is not a proposal for European offensive space weapons, but an area where EDA would be able to contribute to a greater European cause, if European policy develops in that direction. The same can be said of the Council initiative for a comprehensive Space Code of Conduct.
The various actors in the European defence and security community all have their restrictions and mandates. These dictate which level or levels in the pyramid of approaches to secure the space infrastructure each actor can contribute to. The challenge for Europe is to find a forum for a unified and comprehensive discussion as to how high in the pyramid Europe is prepared to climb and under what circumstances any next level should be explored.
A preliminary analysis of the situation would conclude that the diplomatic level has been reached with coordinated EU statements in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on the PAROS agenda item and with the development, by the Council, of the Space Code of Conduct. A European SSA-system is also in the making
23 Towards a Space Strategy for the European Union…
Europe must contemplate the basis for a strategy for space that addresses the concept of space power and the extent of space deterrence.
through studies conducted by ESA and, despite the fact that not all ESA members have subscribed to the concept, it is still ongoing. The passive protection of satellites is largely the responsibility of their owners. Some systems are probably hardened, others are not. There could be a policy stating that space systems used for European crisis management should have passive protection, but it is by no means clear which actor should issue such a recommendation. Nor is it clear who could be the instigator of an “operational responsive space” capability for Europe, in the US sense of the term, when all critical European systems have different owners and are governed in different ways. A partnership with other major space powers might be a better way to address the issue of redundancy in space assets than to have a “quick launch” capability.
The real question however, is if Europe can become and remain a space power with the capabilities belonging to the first four layers of the pyramid, or if Europe has to venture into the doctrine of space control and counterspace capabilities. The current policy of Europe is to stay at the fourth level and not develop counterspace capabilities. In the short term this is feasible but the policy should be augmented by: a) a comprehensive strategy that binds the various elements of space power together, b) a strong external relations policy and diplomatic efforts and c) an independent SSA system.
Furthermore, there must be a readiness to explore where the boundaries lie for such non- offensive space power strategy and what indicators to use for the development of a European strategy for space which outlines space deterrence
Figure 1: The many actors in the European defence and security community. EDA – European Defence Agency, ESA – European Space Agency, EU – European Union, NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Countries in bold are members of NATO. The countries on the right hand side are geographically located in Europe, some of which have applied for EU-membership.
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