Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Economics of Climate Change and Science of Global Warming
Debate:African Perspectives
Nwaobi, Godwin
QUANTITATIVE ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUREAU, NIGERIA
7 May 2013
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/46807/
MPRA Paper No. 46807, posted 08 May 2013 21:23 UTC
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gcnwaobi@quanterb.org +234-8035925021
[www.quanterb.org]
QUANTITATIVE ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUREAU PLOT 107 OKIGWE ROAD P. O. BOX 7173
ABA, ABIA STATE, NIGERIA, WEST AFRICA.
MAY, 2013
1 1.0. INTRODUCTION
Traditional economists viewed the economic system in terms of the reciprocal circulation of income between producers and consumers, and focused on the problem of allocating resources efficiently between different uses to meet unlimited wants. On the other hand, environmental and resource economists consider the environment (along with the planet’s resources) as a sub-part of the economic system. Here, growth is conceptualized as a solution rather than as the cause of environmental problems, and the expansion of an economy can continue into the future by following a balance growth path (without any apparent limits). Unfortunately, scholars here argued that the narrowness of the neoclassical approach to environmental and ecological issues has made it difficult to understand and address environmental problems ( Venecatachalem, 2007; Daly, 1996; Hallegatte,2011).
Critically, ecological economists have viewed the economic system as a part of the larger ecosystem, which is the source of natural resources used in an economy as well as a sink for the wastes produced in it. Figure 1.1 shows that it receives inputs (such as energy and material resources) from the broader natural systems and produce wastes and pollution as outputs. Here these inputs and outputs from and to the ecosystem constitute what is known as the through put of an economy (UNCTAD, 2012; Good land and Daly, 1996).
Yet, it is important to note that whilst environmental economists focus on allocation issues, ecological economists emphasize the overall scale of the
2 Energy
Material
Economy Ecosystem
Pollution
Waste
Recycle
economy as a key policy issue. Thus, at the global level, as the economy grows bigger and bigger, it reduces the capacity of the ecosystem to perform its source and sink functions continuously. In other words, as the scale of economic activity increases, the earth’s carrying capacity” will be exceeded.
FIGURE 1.1 THE EARTH SYSTEM: ECOSYSTEM AND ECONOMY SUBSYSTEM
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However, in reality the relationship between the Inputs and outputs and the overall effects of economic activity on the environment are continually changing. Figure 1.2 illustrates that the scale of the economy is only one of the factors that will determine environmental quality. Therefore, the key question is whether the factors that tend to reduce environmental damage per unit of activity can more than compensate for any negative consequences of the overall growth in scale (World Bank, 1992).
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FIGURE 1.2 ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY INTE
X X X
ECONOMIC POLICIES AFFECT PRODU- CTIVITY AND THE COMPOSITION OF
OUTPUT
SCALE OF THE ECONOMY
(INCOME PER CAPITA
POPULATION) X
OUTPUT STRUCTURE
INPUT/OUTPUT EFFICIENCY
ENVIRONMENT DAMAGE PER UNIT OF
INPUT ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICIES CHANGE INCENTIVES
FOR USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
RESOURCES
ENVIRONME INVESTME
INCUR CO AND GENER
BENEFIT
DEMAND FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT RISES AS INCOME
PER CAPITA GROWS
GREATER EFFICIENCY
REDUCES DEMAND FOR
RESOURCE INPUTS
CLEANER TECHNOLOGIE
PRACTICES RE EMISSIONS WA AND DEGRADA
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Just as the past has been complex and nonlinear, any projections of the future are uncertain. Yet, the climate change may be the single factor that makes the future very different, impeding the continuing progress in human development that history would lead us to expect. While international agreements have been difficult to achieve and policy responses have been generally slow, the broad consensus is clear: climate change is happening (and it can derail human development)
In fact, it is expected to significantly affect sea levels and weather patterns and possibly human settlement and agricultural productivity. Clearly, climate change is one of the most complex challenges of the 21st century. Indeed, no country is immune and no country alone can take on the interconnected challenges posed by climate change (including controversial political decisions, daunting technological change) and far reaching global consequences, as the planet warms, rainfall patterns shift and extreme events such as droughts, floods, and forest fires become more frequent. Again, millions in densely populated coastal areas will lose their homes as the sea level rises. Poor people everywhere also face prospects of tragic crop failure, reduced agricultural productivity as well as increased hunger, malnutrition and disease.
Obviously, the impacts of a changing climate are already being felt with more droughts, more floods, more strong storms and more heat waves (taxing individuals, firms, and governments) by drawing resources away from development. Thus, continuing climate change (at current rates) will pose increasingly severe challenges to development. In fact, by century’s end, it could lead to warming of 5oc or more compared with preindustrial times and to a vastly different world from the present time. And yet with more extreme weather events, most ecosystems stressed and changing; many species are
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doomed to extinction while whole island nations threatened by inundation.
Regrettably, even our best efforts are unlikely to stabilize temperatures at anything less than 2oc above preindustrial temperatures warming that will require substantial adaptation (World Bank, 2010). In particular, sub-Saharan Africa suffered from natural fragility (two-thirds of its surface area is desert or dry land) and high exposure to droughts and floods; which are forecast to increase with further climate change. Notably, the region’s economies are highly dependent on natural resources while biomass provides eighty percent of the domestic primary energy supply. Therefore, inadequate infrastructure could hamper adaptation efforts with limited water storage despite abundant resources. Similarly, water is the major vulnerability in North-Africa (word’s driest region) where per capita water availability is predicted to halve by 2050 even without the effects of climate change. Here, the increased water scarcity combined with greater variability will threaten agriculture; and vulnerability is compounded by a heavy concentration of population as well as economic activity in flood-prone coastal zones.
In general, the growing concern about climate change and environmental issues presents several challenges for African countries in their quest for economic development.
Indeed, African countries have obligations under the United Nations Framework convention on climate change to contribute to the global mitigation and adaptation agenda. While there are currently no binding mitigation obligations parse on African countries; this may change in the future as greenhouse gas emissions rise faster (especially in African countries).
Thus, African countries will have to take these future potential developments in climate change negotiations into account when framing their development
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strategies. In other words, African countries have to become key players in the climate change policies; and these policies must be integrated into development strategy. Using the environmental impact and sustainability applied general equilibrium model, this paper investigates the African case scenarios. The rest of this paper is divided into six sections. Section two presents the science of global warming. The economics of climate change is the theme of section three. Section four discusses the African experience while analytical framework is presented in section five. Policy implications are highlighted in section six while section seven concludes the paper.
8 2.0 GLOBAL WARMING SCIENCES
Generally, the world’s population shares the use of global resources: the atmosphere (troposphere and stratosphere) and the oceans beyond the exclusive economic zones surrounding land masses. These resources are often known as the global resources because of their global ownership status. Thus, four global environment issues can be identifies: Global atmosphere in the context of the green house effect, global troposphere in the context of depletion of the ozone layer, Antarctica case and biodiversity. As a natural phenomenon, the green house effect is a process in which energy from the sun (solar radiation) passes through the atmosphere fairly freely, but the heat radiated back from the earth is partially blocked or absorbed by gases in the atmosphere. This blocking or absorption occurs at a lower frequency and can be trapped by atmospheric gases. Energy is therefore radiated from the sun at a high frequency and consequently not absorbed well by the atmospheric gases surrounding the earth. Figure 2.1 illustrates this process at work (Pearce and warford, 1993). And the reported numbers represent the index of incoming solar radiation (McCracken and Luther, 1986). Here, for every 100 units of incoming short wave solar radiation, some 31 units (8 + 17 + 6) is reflected back from the air, clouds and the earth’s surface. This therefore leaves 69 units to account for. Of these, 23 units (19 +4) are absorbed by clouds, atmospheric vapor, ozone, and dusts. Then, the earth (including the oceans) absorbs 46 units (100 – 31 – 23). But incoming and outgoing radiation must balance. Thus, the 100 units (incoming radiation) minus 23 units (earth’s surface) equals 69 units that must be reflected back as long wave radiation.
However, these sums are complicated because long wave radiation going from the earth’s surface does not pass through clouds vapor and atmosphere gases easily.
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Clearly, this creates a bounce-back effect as can be seen at the right hand side of figure 2.1. Here, 24 units of long wave radiation are emitted as latent heat (heat carried into the atmosphere by water evaporating from the oceans as well as land surface waters). And yet another 7 units are emitted as sensible heat flux (direct heating of the atmosphere by the warm earth). Because there is a bounce- back effect of 100 units, outgoing long wave radiation must be 115 units since (115 – 100) + 7 + 24 = 4 6 which is the radiation absorbed by the earth’s surface.
Consequently, this radiation absorbed by clouds, water vapor and carbon dioxide produces the green house effects (warming of the atmosphere indeed, this warming is natural and without it there could be no life on earth because the average temperature of the earth’s surface would be below the freezing point of water. Thus, it is the additional warming that causes concern.
In fact, the atmospheric trace gases that trap the outgoing long wave radiation have been increasing, further reducing the ability of the radiation from the earth to travel through the gases and adding to the warming effect. In other words, without these increased gas concentrations, the earth would maintain its existing equilibrium temperature. With the gases, the temperature will increase and the increased warming has many potentially damaging effects.
Clearly, the gases producing this layer around the earth are water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, chlorofluoro carbons (CFCs) and ozone. Surely, these gases are a mix of natural events and anthropogenic factors (which are induced by humans). Indisputably, the climate is changing and there is a scientific consensus that the world is becoming a warmer place, principally attributable to human activities. In other words, the warming of the climate system is unequivocal. In fact, for nearly one million years before the
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industrial Revolution, the carbon dioxide (Co2) concentration in the atmosphere ranged between 170 and 280 parts per million (PPM).
FIRURE 2.1 GREEN HOUSE EFFECT: GLOBAL WARMING SPACE
ATMOSPHERE
4 Absorbed by
Clouds Absorbed by Water vapour, Dust and Ozone
Incoming Solar Radiation
100
Short wave Long wave
Outgoing radiation
ABSORBED LONG WAVE RADITATION
8 17 6 9 40 20
106 Back scattered
by air
Net emission by water vapour,
carbon dioxide and ozone
Absorbed By Clouds, Water Vapour, Carbon
Dioxide And Ozone
Sensible heat flux Reflected
by clouds
Reflected by surface
Emissionby clouds
Latent heat flux
115 100 7 24 OCEAN AND LAND 46
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However, levels are now far above that range (387ppm) higher than the highest point in at least the past 800,000 years and the rate of increase may be accelerating. Here, some of the pollutants introduced by humans warm the earth and some cool it. Again, some are long-live and some are short-lived.
By trapping infrared radiation, carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and halocarbons warm earth and because the increased concentrations of these gases persist for centuries, their warming influence causes long-term climate change. In contrast, the warming influence of methane emissions persists for only a few decades and the climatic influence of aerosols which can either be heat-trapping such as black carbon (soot) or heat reducing such as reflective sulfates, persist for only days to weeks. Therefore, while a sharp decline in the Co2 emissions from the combustion of coal incoming decades would reduce long term warming, the associated reduction in the cooling effect from sulfur emissions caused mainly by coal combustion would lead to an increase of about 0.5oc. As at today, temperatures are already 0.8oc above preindustrial levels. In facts, were it not for the cooling influence of reflective particles (such as sulfate aerosols) and the decades that in takes ocean temperatures to come into equilibrium with the increased trapping of infrared radiation, the global average temperature increase caused by human activities would likely already be about 1oc warmer than it is today. Thus, the current elevated concentrations of green house gases alone are near to committing the world to a 2oc warning, a level beyond which the world can expect to experience very disruptive dangerous consequences ( IPCC, 2007a, IPCC, 2007b; Baker, 2007;
Karl, et. al. 2009)
Regrettably, the physical impacts of future climate change on humans and the environment will include increasing stresses on and even collapses of
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ecosystems, biodiversity loss, changing timing of growing seasons, coastal erosion and aquifer salinization, permafrost thaw, ocean acidification; as well as shifting ranges for pests and diseases. Yet, the physical effects of future climate change will have varying impacts on people and the environment at different temperature increases and in different regions. However, if temperature reaches 2oc above preindustrial levels, water availability will be reduced for another 0.4 – 1.7 billion people in mid latitudes and semiarid low latitude. Here, those affected by severe water shortages will be mainly Africa and Asia (world ban, 2010; Smith, 2009, and parry, 2007). At these higher temperatures, most coral reefs would die and some crops (particularly cereals) could not be successfully grown in the altered climates prevailing in low latitude regions. Again, about a quarter of plants and animal species are likely to be at increased risk of extinction. Communities will also suffer more heat stress and coastal areas will be more frequently flooded.
On the other hand, if temperatures rise to 5oc above preindustrial levels, the consequences are enormous. Here, about three billion additional people would suffer water stress; corals would have mostly died off; some fifty percent of species worldwide would eventually go extinct; productivity of crops in both temperate and tropical zones would fall; about thirty percent of coastal wetlands would be committed to several meters of sea-level rise; and there would be substantial burden on health systems from increasing malnutrition and diarrhea and cardio respiratory diseases. Naturally, terrestrial ecosystems are expected to shift from being carbon sinks (storage) to being a source of carbon. And whether this carbon is released as carbon dioxide or methane, it would still accelerate global warming. Furthermore, many small Island states and coastal plains would be flooded by storm surges and sea-level
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rise as the major ice sheets deteriorate and the traditional ways of life of Arctic peoples would be lost as the sea ice retreats. In particular new analyses suggest that drought in West Africa and a drying of the Amazon rain forest may be more probable than previously thought (IPCC, 2007). Indeed, while scientific uncertainty has often been cited as a reason to wait for more evidence before acting to control climate change; the recently observed surprises suggest that uncertainty can cut the other way as well and that outcomes can be worse than expected. Consequently, the existence of uncertainties warrant a precautionary approach to climate change given the potential for irreversible impacts and the inertia in the climate system, in infrastructure and technology turnover as well as socioeconomic systems.
14 3.0 CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS
Indeed, development that is socially economically and environmentally sustainable is a challenge, even without global warming. Thus, sustainable development can be defined as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
That is, unmitigated climate change is incompatible with sustainable development. However, climate change is costly (whatever the policy chosen).
Thus, spending less on mitigation will mean spending more on adaptation and accepting greater damages. Here, the cost of action must be compared with the cost of inaction. Unfortunately, this comparison is complex because of the considerable uncertainty about the technologies that will be available in the future, the ability of societies and ecosystems to adapt; the extent of damages that higher greenhouse gas concentrations will cause; and the temperatures that might constitute thresholds or tipping points beyond which catastrophic impacts occur.
Consequently, economists have typically tried to identify the optimal
climate policy using cost- benefit analysis. However, these results are sensitive to the particular assumptions about the remaining uncertainties and to the normative choices made regarding distributional and measurements issues. Thus, economists continue to disagree on the economically or socially optimal carbon trajectory. Yet, the advocates of a more gradual reduction in emissions conclude that the optimal target (the one that will produce the lowest total cost) could be well above 3oC (Nordhaus, 2008). Indeed, the large uncertainties about the potential losses associated with climate change and the possibility of catastrophic risks may well justify earlier and more aggressive action than a simple cost- benefit analysis would suggest. This incremental amount could be thought of as the insurance premium to keep climate change within a safer band.
In other words, spending less than half a percent of GDP as Climate
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Insurance could well be a socially acceptable proposition. At present, the world spends about three percent of global GDP on insurance. But beyond the question of climate insurance is the question of what might be the resulting mitigation costs and the associated financing needs. In the medium term, estimates of mitigation costs in developing countries range between $140 billion and $175 billion annually by 2030. Table 3.1 shows that this represents the incremental costs relative to a business-as-usual scenario (World Bank, 2010).
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TABLE 3.1 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2030 (2% TRAJECTORY):
MITIGATION COST AND FINANCING NEEDS
S/N MODEL
MITIGATION COSTS
FNANCING
1
IEA (IEA, 2009)
̶ 565
2
MACKINSEY (Mckinsey, 2009)
175 563
3
MESSAGE (IIASA, 2009)
̶ 264
4
MINICAM (Edmond, 2008)
139 ̶
5
REMIND (Knopf, 2010)
̶ 384
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However, financing needs will be higher as many of the savings from the lower operating costs associated with renewable energy and energy efficiency gains only materialize overtime. Unfortunately, financing has historically been a constraint in developing countries, resulting in under investment in infrastructure as well as a bias toward energy choices with lower upfront capital costs (even when such choices eventually result in higher overall costs). Yet, in the longer term, mitigation costs and income will increase overtime to cope with growing population and energy needs.
Table 3.2 shows that the present value of global mitigation costs to 2100 is expected to remain well below one percent of global GDP with estimates ranging between 0.3 percent and 0.7 percent (World Bank, 2010). However, developing countries mitigation costs represents a higher share of their own GDP (ranging between 0.5% and 1.2%). While few still debates the need for action to mitigate climate change, controversy remains over how much and how soon to mitigate.
In fact, holding the changes in global average temperatures below dangerous levels would require immediate and global actions (actions that are costly) to reduce emissions from projected levels by 50 to 80 percent by 2050. Yet, the economic assessments of climate change policies must factor in the uncertainties about the size and timing of adverse impacts and about the feasibility, cost, and time profiles of mitigation efforts. Here, a key uncertainty missed by most economic models is the possibility of large catastrophic events related to climate change. In fact, the underlying probability distribution of such catastrophic risks is unknown and will likely remain so. Surely, more aggressive mitigation almost will reduce their likelihood (though very difficult to assess by how much). Thus, the possibility of a global catastrophic (even one with very low probability) should increase society’s willingness to pay for faster and more aggressive mitigation to the extent that it helps to avoid calamity.
18 TABLE 3.2 GLOBAL 2100:
PRESENT VALUE MITIGATION COSTS (% OF GDP)
S/N MODELS WORLD
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
1
DICE
(Nordhaus, 2008)
0.7 ̶
2
FAIR (Hof, 2008)
0.6 ̶
3
MESSAGE (IIASA, 2008)
0.3 0.5
4
MINICAM (Edmond, 2008)
0.7 1.2
5
PAGE (Hope, 2009)
0.4 0.9
6
REMIND (Knopf, 2010)
0.4 ̶
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Even without considering these catastrophic risks, substantial uncertainties remain around climate change’s ecological and economic impacts. Again, the likely pace and ultimate magnitude of warming is unknown. That is, how changes in climate variability and extremes (not just changes in mean temperature) will affect natural systems and human well being is uncertain.
These uncertainties only increase with the pace and amount of warming. And greater uncertainty requires adaptation strategies that can cope with many different climates and outcomes. Such strategies exist but they are less efficient than strategies that could be designed with perfect knowledge. Therefore, uncertainty is costly and more uncertainty increase costs. Without inertia and irreversibility, uncertainty would not matter so much; because decisions would be reversed and adjustments would be smooth and costless. But tremendous inertia (in the climate system, in the built environment, in the behavior of individuals, in the behavior of institutions) make it costly, if not impossible; to adjust in the direction of more stringent mitigation if new information is revealed or new technologies are slow to be discovered.
Consequently, inertia greatly increases the potential negative implications of climate policy decisions under uncertainty. And uncertainty combined with inertia and irreversibility argues for greater precautionary mitigation. In other words, the economics of decision making under uncertainty makes a case that uncertainty about the effects of climate change calls for more rather than less mitigation.
Despite the global economic chaos, the case for urgent action against climate change remains. And it becomes more pressing given the increase in poverty and vulnerability around the world. Thus, recent public debates have
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focused on the possibility of using fiscal packages to push for a greener economy, combating climate change while restoring growth.
In other words, how can both the economic slump and climate change be tackled with the fiscal stimulus? Investment in climate policy can therefore be an efficient way to deal with the economic crisis in the short term.
Yet, incorporating sound low-carbon and high resilience components in
fiscal expansions to combat the financial crisis will not be enough to thwart the long-term.
Therefore, fundamental transformations are needed in social protection, in carbon finance, in research and development, in energy markets as well as in the management of land and water. Over the medium and long-terms, the challenge is to find new paths to reach the twin goals of sustaining development and limiting climate change. Clearly, reaching an equitable and fair global deal would be an important step toward avoiding worst-case scenarios. But it requires transforming the carbon—intensive lifestyle of developed countries and the carbon—intensive growth paths of develop countries. Consequently, modifications in social norms that reward a low-carbon lifestyle could prove a powerful element of success. But behavioral change needs to be matched with institutional reform, additional finance and technological innovation to avoid irreversible, catastrophic increases in temperature. And for dealing with climate change, additional climate — smart regulation is needed to induce innovative approaches to mitigation and adaptation. Indeed, such policies create an opening for the scale and scope of government interventions needed to correct climate change, which perhaps, is the biggest market failure in human history.
Therefore, an effective international climate regime must integrate development concerns, breaking free of the environment-versus-equity dichotomy. In other words, a multi track framework for climate action (with
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different goals or polices for developed and developing countries) may be one way to move forward. Certainly, this framework would need to consider the process for defining and measuring success in the global context. Clearly, promising initiatives are emerging but applying them on the necessary scale will require money, effort, ingenuity and information.
With the global economy set to quadruple by mid-century, energy-related carbon dioxide emission would (on current trends) more than double, putting the world onto a potentially catastrophic trajectory that could lead to temperatures more than 5oC warmer than in preindustrial times. In order to limit warming to 2oC, global emissions would have to peak no later than 2020 and the decline by 50 - 80 percent from today’s levels by 2050, with further reductions continuing to 2100 and beyond. Delaying actions by 10years would make it impossible to reach this goal. Therefore, the inertia in energy capital stocks means that investments over the next decade will largely determine emissions through 2050 and beyond. Unfortunately, delays would lock the world into high carbon infrastructure and later requiring costly retrofitting and premature scrapping of existing capital stocks. Indisputably and economically, the time for action is now.
22 4.0 AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
Africa is the second largest of the earth’s continents, covering about 30, 330,000 Sq Km (including its adjacent Islands). Geographically, the African continent is characterized by Plateau Land, with a few distinct mountain ranges and a narrow coastal plain. It is commonly divided along the lines of the Sahara Desert (world’ largest desert) which cuts a huge swath through the northern half of the continent while the countries north of the Sahara make up the region of North Africa. Indeed, Africa has a proud (noble) history and it is widely believed that human life began in Africa. However, the last five hundred years in Africa have been dominated the by foreign colonization, political and ethnic struggles that have hampered Socio—industrial development. In fact the continent remains rural and it is the least developed of any continent after Antarctica. Although, agricultural is the main economic activity in Africa, devastating famine (disease outbreaks) are common. Yet, Africa is rich in natural resources; and part of its economic base is the export of this wealth.
Naturally, the African climate (more than that of any other continent) is generally uniform.
This observation results from the position of the continent in the tropical zone;
the impact of cool ocean currents; and the absence of mountain chains (serving as climatic barriers). While several Africa climatic zones can be distinguished, Africa vegetation can be classified according to rainfall and climate zones. On one hand, the tropical rain forest (where the average rain is more than 1270mm) has a dense surface covering of shrubs, ferns, and mosses (above which tower evergreens) oil palms, and numerous species of tropical hardwood trees. On the other hand, a mountain forest zone (with average annual rainfall only slightly less than in the tropical rain forests) is found in the high mountains of Africa.
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Fortunately, Africa is very rich in mineral resources, possessing most of the known mineral types of the world. In fact, many of these minerals are found in significant quantities (although with uneven geographic distribution). Apart from the abundant fossil fuels, major deposits of coal, petroleum, and natural gas exists. Other important minerals include gold, diamonds, copper, bauxite, manganese, nickel, platinum, cobalt, radium, germanium, lithium, titanium, phosphates, ore, chromium, tin, zinc, lead, thorium, zirconium, vanadium, antimony, beryllium, clays, mica, sulfur, salt, natron, graphite, limestone, and gypsum.
Traditionally, the vast majority of Africans have been farmers and herders who raised crops and livestock for subsistence. Here, manufacturing and crafts are carried on as part—time activities while industrial specialization, communication networks and elaborate governmental structures maintained the flow of commerce. Although, a number of Africa States have considerable natural resources, few have the finances to develop their economics. However, foreign private enterprise has often regarded investment in such underdeveloped areas as too risky. Yet the major alternative sources of financing are national and multinational lending institutions. Indeed, expectations in African nations for a better living standard have increased; and the prices of consumer and other manufactured goods have kept pace but the prices of most African primary products have lagged behind.
Regrettably, a worldwide recession in the early1980s multiplied difficulties that were initiated by the oil—price increases of the 1970s. In fact, serious foreign—
exchange problems and ballooning foreign debt aggravated public discontent.
Consequently, famine and drought plagued the northern and central regions and many refugees left their homes in search of food (thereby increasing the problems of the host countries).
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Again, in the late 1980’s and 1990’s, protracted Local conflicts in some parts of the continent destabilized governments, halted economic progress and cost the lives of thousands of Africans. Yet, Africa has experienced solid improvement in economic performance in the recent years. The continent as a whole grew (statistically) at an average rate of 5.7% in 2006 and 5.8% in 2007 in real terms, up from an average of 3.4% in the 1998—2002 years (United Nations, 2009).
Notably, the impressive growth since the beginning of the 21st century (its economics ability to weather the storm of the recent crisis and the resumption of growth by nearly all countries in 2010) suggest that Africa is one of the world’s emerging economic powers. However, Africa’s momentum slowed in 2011 (weighed down by contraction of economic activity in North Africa) due to political unrest as well as global economic and financial crisis. Yet, growth prospects remain optimistic, with output for the continent as a whole expected to recover strongly in 2012 and beyond.
Despite the observed accelerated growth in Africa over the past decade, progress in social development remains slow.
Regrettably, the experienced rapid economic growth has not translated into commensurate reductions in poverty and hunger in Africa (United Nations 2012).
Clearly, ensuring environmental sustainability has a great impact on reaching most of the other goals. In other words, preserving and properly managing the environment is an essential foundation for sustainable development and poverty reduction. In particular, emissions of CO2 per capita are an important indicator in assessing progress towards environmental sustainability and climate change. Unfortunately, Africa is very vulnerable to climate change given its low capacity to respond and adapt; but the continent emits quite little greenhouse gas relative both to its population and to other
25
regions. Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and, 4.4 shows the comparative picture of the emission intensities (impacts) in Africa as well as the rest of the world.
TABLE 4.1 COMPARATIVE ENERGY RELATED EMISSIONS:
AFRICAN DATA
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
CO2
EMISSIONS ANNUAL TOTAL MILLIONS METRIC TONS
CO2
EMISSIONS PER
CAPITA METRIC TONS
CO2
EMISSIONS PER
CAPITA METRIC TONS
CO2
EMISSI- ONS ANNUAL WORLD TOTAL PERCEN- TAGE SHARE
CUMULA- TIVE EMISSIONS CO2
EMISSIONS BILLION METRIC TONS
TOTAL PRIMARY ENERGY SUPPLY
MILLION TONS (OIL)
S/N COUNTRIES 1990 2005 2007 1990 2005 2005 1850–2005 1990 2006
1 ALGERIA 68 91 4.1 2.7 2.8 0.34 2.8 23.9 36.7
2 ANGOLA — — 1.4 — — — — 6.3 10.3
3 BENIN — — 0.5 — — — — 1.7 2.8
4 BOTSWANA — — — — — — — 1.3 2.0
5 BURKIN- AFASO
— — 0.1 — — — — — —
6 BURUNDI — — 0.0 — — — — — —
7 CAMEROON — — 0.3 — — — — 5.0 7.1
8 CAPE VERDE — — — — — — — — —
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9 CENTRAL AFRICA REP.
— — 0.1 — — — — — —
10 CHAD — — 0.0 — — — — — —
11 COMOS — — — — — — — — —
12 CONGO REP. — — 0.4 — — — — 0.9 1.2
13 CONGO DEM. REP.
— — 0.0 — — — — 11.9 17.5
14 COTE D’IVOIRE
— — 0.3 — — — — 4.4 7.3
15 DJIBOUTI — — — — — — — — —
16 EGYPT 81 149 2.3 1.5 2.0 0.56 3.2 32.0 62.5
17 EQUATORIA L GUINEA
— — — — — — — — —
18 ERITREA — — 0.1 — — — — — 0.7
19 ETHIOPIA — — 0.1 — — — — 15.0 22.3
20 GABON — — — — — — — 1.2 1.8
21 GAMBIA — — — — — — — — —
22 GHANA — — 0.4 — — — — 5.3 9.5
23 GUINEA — — 0.1 — — — — — —
24 GUINEA BISSAU
— — — — — — — — —
25 KENYA — — 0.3 — — — — 11.2 17.9
26 LESOTHO — — — — — — — — —
27 LIBERIA — — 0.2 — — — — — —
28 LIBYAN ARAB JAM
37 47 9.3 8.4 7.9 0.18 1.3 11.5 17.8
29 MADAGASCAR — — 0.1 — — — — — —
27
30 MALAWI — — 0.1 — — — — — —
31 MALI — — 0.0 — — — — — —
32 MAURITANIA — — 0.6 — — — — — —
33 MAURITIUS — — — — — — — — —
34 MAYOTTE — — — — — — — — —
35 MOROCCO 20 41 1.5 0.8 1.4 0.16 0.9 7.2 14.0
36 MOZAMBIQUE — — 0.1 — — — — 6.0 8.8
37 NAMIBIA — — — — — — — — 1.5
38 NIGER — — 0.1 — — — — — —
39 NIGERIA 68 97 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.36 2.3 70.9 105.1
40 REUNION — — — — — — — — —
41 RWANDA — — 0.1 — — — — — —
42 SAINT HELEN
— — — — — — — — —
43 SAOTME PRINCIPE
— — — — — — — — —
44 SENEGAL — — 0.5 — — — — 1.8 3.0
45 SEYCHELLES — — — — — — — — —
46 SIERRA LEONE
— — 0.2 — — — — — —
47 SOMALIA — — — — — — — — —
48 SOUTH AFRICA
255 331 9.0 7.2 7.1 1.25 14.1 91.2 129.8
49 SUDAN — — 0.3 — — — 10.7 17.7
50 SOUTH SUDAN
— — — — — — — — —
28
51 SWAZILAND — — — — — — — —
52 TANZANIA — — 0.1 — — — — 9.8 20.8
53 TOGO — — 0.2 — — — 1.3 2.4
54 TUNISIA — — 2.3 — — — 5.1 8.7
55 UGANDA — — 0.1 — — — — —
56 WESTERN SAHARA
— — — — — — — —
57 ZAMBIA — — 0.2 — — — — 5.5 7.3
58 ZIMBABWE — — 0.8 — — — — 9.4 9.6
59 LOW INCOME
549 70.7 0.3 0.7 0.6 2.66 24.0 400.2 575.5
60 HIGH INCOME
10999 13207 12.5 11.8 12.7 49.75 750.1 4479.4 5659.1
61 WORLD 20693 26544 4.6 4.0 4.2 100.00 1169.1 8637.3 11525.2
29
TABLE 4.2: CARBON INTENSITY AND NON-CO2 EMISSIONS:
COMPARATIVE DATA
1 2 3 4
NON-CO2 EMISSIONS ANNUAL TOTAL
METRICTONS EQUIVALENT (MILLIONS)
CARBON INTENSITY ENERGY METRICTONS: CO2
PERTON OIL EQUIVALENT
S/N COUNTRIES 1990 2005 1990 2005
1 NIGERIA 9.6 15.5 2.86 2.63
2 EGYPT 8.5 16.0 2.54 2.43
3 LIBYA ̶ ̶ 3.16 2.65
4 MOROCCO ̶ ̶ 2.72 3.08
5 NIGERIA 25.8 66.2 0.95 0.92
6 SOUTH AFRICA 10.6 12.5 2.79 2.59
7 LOW INCOME 115.5 256.4 1.38 1.26
8 MIDDLE INCOME 1168.3 1279.4 2.41 2.49
9 HIGH INCOME 577.2 557.1 2.44 2.32
10 WORLD 1861.0 1978.9 2.39 2.35
30
TABLE 4.3: LAND-BASED EMISSIONS: CO2 (DEFORESTATION BASED) AND CH4/N2O (AGRIC BASED)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TOTAL EMISSIO NS
ANNUAL AVER AGE
METRICTONS
PER CAPITA EMISSIONS ANNUAL AVERAGE METRICTONS PER RANK
AVERAGE SHARE TOTA L EMISSIONS PERCENTAGE
%
ANNUAL TOTAL CO2
EQUIVALENT METRICTONS MILLIONS
SHARE OF TOTAL %
PER CO EQU ME
MILLIO NS
RANK PER RANK
S/N COUNTRIES 1990- 2005
1990- 2050
2000-2050
2000- 2050
2000-2050 19
1 CAMEROON 70 12 3.9 18 1.2 — — —
2 CONGO DEM. REP
OF 176 04 3.0 24 3.1 36 75 1.2 0
3 ETHOPIA — — — — — 39 55 0.9 0
4 NIGERIA 158 05 1.1 40 2.8 75 115 1.9 0
5 TANZANIA 51 19 1.3 35 0.9 — — —
6 ZAMBIA 106 09 9.3 06 1.9 — — —
7 ZIMBABWE 40 22 3.1 22 0.7 — — —
31
TABLE 4.4 2050: PROJECTED CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACT IN AFRICA
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
PHYSICAL IMPACTS CHANGE IN
TERMPERA TURE OC
PHYSICAL IMPACTS CHANGE IN HEAT WAVE DURATION NO OF DAYS
PHYSICAL IMPACTS PRECIPTA-
TION
% CHANGE
PHYSICAL IMPACTS PRECIPITA-
TION INTENSITY
% CHANGE
AGRIC IMPACTS
AGRIC OUTPUT % CHANGE
AGRIC IMPACTS AGRIC YIELD % CHANGE
S/N COUNTRIES 2000-2050 2000-2050 2000-2050 2000-2050 2000-2050 2000-2050
1 ALGERIA 1.9 22.2 -4.9 7.2 36.0 -6.7
2 BURKINA
FASO 1.4 5.7 0.3 0.0 -24.3 -4.4
3 CAMEROON 1.3 2.0 0.9 3.0 -20.0 -6.6
4 CONDO DEM
REP 1.4 2.0 0.8 3.1 -14.7 -7.0
5 COTE DIVORE 1.3 1.9 -0.3 -0.2 14.3 -12.9
6 EGYPT ARABA
REP OF 1.6 14.7 7.0 -1.6 11.3 -27.9
7 ETHPOPIA 1.4 3.1 2.4 5.0 -31.3 0.5
8 GHANA 1.3 1.3 1.0 0.8 -14.0 -10.1
9 KENYA 1.2 2.5 7.5 8.0 -5.5 6.1
10 MALAWI 1.4 7.5 -0.1 2.4 -31.3 -3.0
11 MALI 1.7 16.1 8.4 3.8 -35.6 -9.6
12 MOROCCO 2.1 21.1 -16.8 5.3 -39.0 25.2
32
13 MOZABIQUE 1.3 5.9 -2.7 1.4 -21.7 -10.4
14 NIGER 1.6 16.1 5.6 2.5 -34.1 -1.7
15 NIGERIA 1.3 4.1 0.6 1.1 -18.5 -9.9
16 SENEGAL 1.6 6.0 -1.9 3.1 -51.9 -19.3
17 SOUTH
AFRICA 1.5 9.5 -4.5 1.4 -33.4 -5.2
18 SUDAN 1.6 9.5 -0.6 -0.1 -56.1 -7.0
19 TANZANIA 1.3 2.3 4.4 6.0 -24.2 -2.0
20 TO GO 1.3 1.5 -2.0 -0.5 — -14.0
21 UGANDA 1.3 1.7 3.4 6.6 -16. 8 -5.0
22 ZAMBIA 1.5 8.1 0.6 3.9 -39. 6 1.3
23 ZIMBABWE 1.5 12.3 -3.7 4.8 -37.9 -10.6
33
TABLE 4.5: OZONE DEPLETING SUBTANCES: AFRICAN CONSUMPTION CHANGE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
S/N COUNTRIES INCOME STATUS
AN
INCREASE 200-2009 (%)
A
REDUCTION IN MORE THAN 50%
2000-2009 (%)
A
REDUCTION IN LESS THAN 50%
2000-2009 (%)
RGIONS
1 ALGERIA UMC - -91.5 - NORTH
AFRICA (NA)
2 ANGOLA LMC - -67.0 - CENTRAL
AFRICA (CA)
3 VENIN LIC - -50.9 - WEST
AFRICA (WA)
4 BOTSWANA UMC 66.7 - - SOUTHERN
AFRICA (SA)
5 BURKINAFASO LIC - - -23.5 WESTERN
AFRICA (WA)
6 BURUNDI LIC - -86.5 - EAST
AFRICA (EA)
7 CAMEROON LMC - -74.9 - CENTRAL
AFRICA (CA)
8 CAPE VERDE LMC - - -5.26 WEST
AFRICA (WA) 9 CENTRAL
AFRICA REP.
LIC - - -26.5 CENTRAL
AFRICA (CA)
10 CHAD LIC - - - WEST
34
AFRICA (WA)
11 COMOROS LIC - - - EAST
AFRICA (EA)
12 CONGO REP. LMC - -74.9 - CENTRAL
AFRICA (CA) 13 CONGO DEM.
REP.
LIC - - - CENTRAL
AFRICA (CA) 14 COTE
D’IVOIRE
LMC - -67.3 - WEST
AFRICA (WA)
15 DJIBOUTI LMC - -94.2 - EAST
AFRICA (EA)
16 EGYPT LMC - -71.3 - NORTH
AFRICA (NA) 17 EQUATIORIAL
GUINEA
LIC - -71.9 - CENTRAL
AFRICA (CA)
18 ERITREA LIC - -95.7 - EAST
AFRICA (EA)
19 ETIOPIA LIC - -96.4 - EAST
AFRICA (EA)
20 GABON UMC 83.3 - - CENTRAL
AFRICA (CA)
21 GAMBIA LIC - -74.2 - WEST
AFRICA (WA)
22 GHANA LIC 42.3 - - WEST
AFRICA (WA)
23 GUINEA LIC - - - WEST
AFRICA
35
(WA) 24 GUINEA
BISSAU
LIC - -85.0 -42.0 WEST
AFRICA (WA)
25 KENYA LIC - - - EAST
AFRICA (EA)
26 LESOTHO LMC 329.2 -84.7 - SOUTH
AFRICA (SA)
27 LIBERIA LIC - -88.3 - WEST
AFRICA (WA) 28 LIBYAN ARAB
J.
LMC - -91.9 - NORTH
AFRICA (NA)
29 MADAGASCAR LIC 132.4 - - CENTRAL
AFRICA (CA)
30 MALAWI LIC - -91.5 - EAST
AFRICA (EA)
31 MALI LIC - -52.3 - WEST
AFRICA (WA)
32 MAURITANIA LIC 30.8 - - WEST
AFRICA (WA)
33 MAURITIUS LIC - -61.2 - EAST
AFRICA (EA)
34 MAYOTTE UMC - - - EAST
AFRICA (EA)
35 MOROCCO LMC - -87.9 - NORTH
AFRICA (NA)
36 MOZAMBIQUE LIC - 70.7 - EAST
AFRICA (EA)
36
37 NAMIBIA UMC - -74.9 - SOUTH
AFRICA (SA)
38 NIGER LIC - - -79.09 WEST
AFRICA (WA
39 NIGERIA LMC - -92.0 - WEST
AFRICA (WA
40 REUNION - - - - EAST
AFRICA (EA)
41 RWANDA LIC - -87.5 - EAST
AFRICA (EA)
42 SAINT HELEN - - - - WEST
AFRICA (WA) 43 SATOME
PRINCIPE
MC 2.5 - - CENTRAL
AFRICA (CA)
44 SENEGAL LIC - 69.0 - WEST
AFRICA (WA)
45 SYCHELLES UMC 55.6 - - EAST
AFRICA (EA)
46 SIERRA LEONE LIC - 91.5 - WEST
AFRICA (WA)
47 SOMALIA LIC - - -42.4 EAST
AFRICA (EA) 48 SOUTH
AFRICA
UMC - 57.1 - SOUTH
AFRICA (SA)
49 SUDAN LMC - 75.3 - NORTH
AFRICA (NA)
50 SOUTH - - - - NORTH
37
SUDAN AFRICA
(NA)
51 SWAZILAND LMC 475.0 - - SOUTH
AFRICA (SA)
52 TANZANIA LIC - -94.6 - EAST
AFRICA (EA)
53 TOGO LIC - - -47.6 WEST
AFRICA (WA)
54 TUNISIA LMC - -89.2 - NORTH
AFRICA (NA)
55 UGANDA LIC - - - EAST
AFRICA (EA) 56 WESTERN
SAHARA
- - -100.0 - NORTH
AFRICA (NA)
57 ZAMBIA LIC - -92.7 - EAST
AFRICA (EA)
58 ZIMBABWE LIC - -93.1 - EAST
AFRICA (EA)
38
From the above tables, the carbon dioxide emissions annual total (million metric tons) is the total CO2 emission from the energy sector, including electricity (heat) production, manufacturing, construction, gas flaring, transportation, and other industries (WRI, 2008; world bank, 2010).
However, emissions from industrial processes (primarily cement production) that amounts to approximately four percent of global energy—related CO2
emissions are not included. The carbon dioxide emissions change (%) is the percentage change in energy—related CO2 emissions between 1990 (base year) and 2005. The carbon dioxide emissions per capita (metric tons) is the annual emissions divided by midyear population and expressed in tons of CO2 per person. Again the carbon dioxide emission share of world total (%) is the share of worlds total energy—related CO2 emissions attributed to a given country, income group or region. Similarly, the carbon dioxide emissions cumulative since 1850 (billion metric tons) is the cumulative CO2 emissions between 1850 and 2005. Here, the sources of emissions include combustion of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels as well as cement production and gas flaring (DOE, 2009).
In contrast, the annual total none—CO2 emissions (million tons of CO2 equivalents) are the total methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions in CO2 equivalent from the energy sector. This indicator includes emissions from biomass combustion; oil and natural gas systems, coal mining and other stationary and mobile sources. Here, the CO2 equivalent expresses the quantity of a mixture of greenhouse gases in terms of the quantity of CO2 that would produce the same amount of warming as would the mixture of gases. Yet, the carbon intensity of energy (metric tons of CO2 per ton of oil equivalent) is the ratio of carbon dioxide emissions to energy production; and this ratio measures the greenness of energy production that is expressed in tons of CO2 per ton of oil equivalents. On the other hand, the carbon intensity of income (metric tons of CO2 per thousand PPP &of GDP) is the ratio of carbon dioxide emissions to
