Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Information theory of firm
Ledenyov, Dimitri O. and Ledenyov, Viktor O.
James Cook University, Townsville, Australia
31 March 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/63380/
MPRA Paper No. 63380, posted 01 Apr 2015 07:51 UTC
1 Information theory of firm
Dimitri O. Ledenyov and Viktor O. Ledenyov
Abstract – The article formulates the information theory of firm, introduces the concept of firm as an operating system, which controls the firm’s operation by the means of the information resources processing, in an analogy with the operating system at a microprocessor in the computing devices, represents the director as an information processing element, describes the board of directors as the electronically-scanned electronically-steered phased array radar, considers the scientific problem of strategy creation by the interlocking interconnecting overlapping directors in the boards of directors in the firms in the economic system with the induced nonlinearities. We highlight a fact that the director makes the information sensing, filtering, processing, resonant absorption, analysis, decision making, strategy creation, hence it can be empirically represented as a processing element with the Harvard or von Neumann director’s mindset architectures in line with the digital signal processing science. We think that the board of directors in corporate governance system can be theoretically represented as the electronically-scanned electronically-steered phased array radar with a certain number of electronic devices (directors can be modeled as electronic devices with the active antenna elements, filters banks, digital signal processors, memory chipsets in agreement with the microwave and digital signal processing sciences). We developed the MicroITF operating system and software programs, 1) to control the firm operation by the means of the information resources processing; 2) to accurately characterize the director’s performance by means of a) the filtering of the generated/transmitted/received information by the director into the separate virtual channels, depending on the information content, and b) the measurement of the levels of signals in every virtual channel with the generated/transmitted/received information by the director, in the overlapping interconnecting interlocking directors networks in the boards of directors in the firms during the Quality of Service (QofS) measurements process, and 3) to create the winning virtuous business strategies by the interlocking interconnecting directors in the boards of directors in the firms, using the patented recursive artificial intelligence algorithm.
JEL code: C0, G21, G24, G30, G32, G34, G38, G39, L1, L4, L11, L25, L60, M2, M16 . PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 89.65.-s, 89.75.Fb .
Keywords: information theory of firm, firm business strategy creation, optimal corporate governance structures, board of directors composition, interlocking directors networks, boards seats accumulation number, information flows measurements, operating systems in computing devices, digital signal processing, information absorption, econophysics, microeconomics.
2 Introduction
The foundational principles in the economics and finances in Joseph Penso de la Vega (1668, 1996), Mortimer (1765), Bagehot (1873, 1897), von Böhm-Bawerk (1884, 1889, 1921), Hirsch (1896), Bachelier (1900), Schumpeter (1906, 1911, 1933, 1939, 1961, 1939, 1947), Slutsky (1910, 1915 1923), von Mises (1912), Hayek (1945), Ellis, Metzler (1949), Friedman (1953), Baumol (1957), Debreu (1959), Dodd (2014) created an essential theoretical framework for a better understanding of economic environmental opportunities and limitations towards the possible business activities by the economic agents, making it possible to formulate the modern evolutionary theory of firm in Babbage (1832), Ueda (1904, 1937), Marshall (1923), Berle, Means (1932a, b), Ohlin (1933), Coase (1937), Barnard (1938, 1948, 1949, 1958), Solow (August 1957), Modigliani, Miller (June 1958), Baumol (1959, 1962), Penrose (1959), Marris (May 1963), Telser (1963), Williamson (1964, 1975, 1988), Cyert, March (1963, 1992), Fogel (1964), Manne (1965), Stigler (1968), Mano (1968-1969, 1970-1971, 1972-1973 1975-1976, 1978, 1980-1981, 1987, 1994, 1995), Black, Scholes (1973), Black, Cox (1976), Merton (1973, 1974), Lee (1975), Jensen, Meckling (1976), Jensen, Ruback (1983), Jensen (1986, September- October 1989, 1993, 2007), Jensen, Murphy (1990), Fama (1980), Fama, Jensen (1983, 1985), Demsetz (1983, 1997), Wernerfelt (1984, 1995), Lode Li (1986), Perrow (1986), Hart, Moore (1990), Hart (2011), Sterman (2000), Williamson (2002), Kantarelis (2007), Spulber (2009), Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O(2013b), where the evolution of the firm includes the three clearly identified stages in Chandler (1962, 1977, 1993, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005), Chandler, Daems (1980): 1) Barriers to entry creation; 2) Strategic boundaries definition, and 3) Limits to growth evaluation. The director of firm, who is a Leader, a Catalyst, a Believer, a Visionary, is elected or appointed to the board of directors to achieve the firm’s strategic business goals during the evolution of enterprise in Armstrong (1977, 2006). As we know, there are the two main conditional classifications of directors types: 1) Director-Leader, who introduces the leadership attributes such as being inspirational and visionary in Covey (2004), De Vries (2006), Heyden (2006), Galunic (2006), Nicholson (2007), Rao (2007), Kirkbride (2007), Emmerik (2009), Wendt, Euwema, van Emmerik (2009), Kozlowski (2009), Eisen (2010), Pietersen (2010); 2) Director-Manager, who performs the management of enterprise in Dai (2007), Fryer (2009). In the numerous founded firms in the competitive industrial clusters in Porter (2008), there are the one- and two-tier directors’ boards systems in Postma, van Ees (2001) with the interlocking interlinking interconnecting directors’ networks in Dooley (1969), Mariolis (1975), Bunting (1976), Burt (1980), Pennings (1980), Mintz, Schwartz (1981), Schoorman, Bazerman, Atkin
3 (1981), Palmer (1983), Ornstein (1984), Meeusen, Cuyvers (1985), Stearns, Mizruchi (1986), Mizruchi, Stearns (1988), Mizruchi (1996), Postma, van Ees (2001) Rommens, Cuyvers, Deloof (November 2007), Santella, Drago, Polo, Gagliardi (2009), Uddin (2012). In this empirical condensed research essay, the authors would like to do the following things: 1) to create the information theory of the firm, 2) to review the interconnecting interlocking directors networks configurations in the boards of directors of publicly traded and non-traded firms, and 3) to research the strategy creation problem by the interlocking interconnecting directors in the boards of directors in the firms during the strategic governance of firms in the challenging time, when the innovation breakthrough processes originate the creative innovative disruptions appearances during the capitalism evolution in Schumpeter (1911, 1939, 1947), Christensen (Christensen (June 16, 1977; Fall, 1992a, b; 1997; 1998; December, 1998; April, 1999a, b, c;
1999a, b; Summer, 2001; June, 2002; 2003; March, April, 2003; January, 2006), Bower, Christensen (January, February, 1995; 1997; 1999), Christensen, Armstrong (Spring, 1998), Christensen, Cape (December, 1998), Christensen, Dann (June, 1999), Christensen, Tedlow (January, February, 2000), Christensen, Donovan (March, 2000; May, 2010), Christensen, Overdorf (March, April, 2000), Christensen, Bohmer, Kenagy (September, October, 2000), Christensen, Craig, Hart (March, April, 2001), Christensen, Milunovich (March, 2002), Bass, Christensen (April, 2002), Anthony, Roth, Christensen (April, 2002), Kenagy, Christensen (May, 2002; 2002), Christensen, Johnson, Rigby (Spring, 2002), Hart, Christensen (Fall, 2002), Christensen, Verlinden, Westerman (November, 2002), Shah, Brennan, Christensen (April, 2003), Christensen, Raynor (2003), Burgelman, Christensen, Wheelwright (2003), Christensen, Anthony (January, February, 2004), Christensen, Anthony, Roth (2004), Christensen, Baumann, Ruggles, Sadtler (December, 2006), Christensen, Horn, Johnson (2008), Christensen, Grossman, Hwang (2009), Dyer, Gregersen, Christensen (December, 2009; 2011), Christensen, Talukdar, Alton, Horn (Spring, 2011), Christensen, Wang, van Bever (October, 2013)). The authors will apply the sophisticated econometrical econophysical techniques with the purpose to accurately characterize the firm within the information theory of the firm, achieving the strategic research goals in Schumpeter (1906, 1933), Bowley (1924), Fogel (1964), Box, Jenkins (1970), Grangel, Newbold (1977), Van Horne (1984), Taylor S (1986), Tong (1986, 1990), Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lee, Lutkepol (1988), Hardle (1990), Grangel, Teräsvirta (1993), Pesaran, Potter (1993), Banerjee, Dolado, Galbraith, Hendry (1993), Hamilton (1994), Karatzas, Shreve (1995), Campbell, Lo, MacKinlay (1997), Rogers, Talay (1997), Hayashi (2000), Durbin, Koopman (2000, 2002, 2012), Ilinski (2001), Greene (2003), Koop (2003), Davidson, MacKinnon (2004), Cameron, Trivedi (2005), Vialar, Goergen (2009).
4 Review of literature toward accurate characterization of directors in
interconnecting interlocking overlapping directors’ networks in boards of directors in theory of firm
Let us make a chronological literature review to accurately characterize both the directors and the interconnecting interlocking overlapping directors’ networks in the boards of directors in the theory of firm, aiming to create a coherent picture on a range of the researched problems, the obtained research results and the progress made in the field of our research interest. The authors would like to higlight the fact that the research on the firm (the business enterprise) was in the scope of responsibilities by the National Bureau of Economic Research in the USA for a long time in Mitchell (February 7 1921). We would like to begin with the important fundamental research in the economics in Brandeis (1915, 1933). The corporate managers’ functions, modern corporation structures and private property meaning have been considered in Berle (1932), Berle, Means (1932). The problems on the business administration have been uncovered in Selznick (1949, 1957). The nature of business elite’s power has been described in Mills (1956). The issues such as the critical evaluation of corporate director, the boards of directors possible structures and the corporate strategy creation have been considered in Vance (1964, 1968, 1983). A series of research articles by Williamson (1964, 1975, 1984, December 1985, 1988, 1996, 2002, 2007) has been focused on the corporate governances problems in the theory of firm. The topics on the board of directors and effective management in the firm have been discussed in Koontz (1967). Travers (1968), Dooley (1969) researched the interlocks in the corporate management. The research on the state in the capitalist society has been presented in Miliband (1969). The power and functions of the boards of directors from the theoretical synthesis point of view have been studied in Zald (1969). The higher circles have been described in Domhoff (1970). Bunting, Barbour (Autumn 1971), Bunting (1976) presented a study on the interlocking directorates in large American corporations, 1896 - 1964. The directors, board of directors and president have been precisely characterized in Mace (1971, 1986), Mace (March- April 1972). Child (1972) focused his research on the organizational structure, environment and performance. The formation of the sphere of influence has been discussed in Levine (1972). The theory of organization has been formulated in Pfeffer (1972, 1973, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1987, 1991), Pfeffer, Salancik (1978, 2003). Bacon (1973, 1993) discussed the corporate directorship practices, the corporate boards problems and the corporate governance issues. Blumberg (1973) presented his reflections on the proposals for the corporate reform through change in the composition of the board of directors. Granovetter (1973) highlighted the strength of weak ties.
5 The economic theory of agency has been formulated in Ross (1973). Allen (1974) described the interlocking corporate directorates. Doreian (1974) presented his thoughts on the connectivity of social networks. Zeitlin (1974) discussed the problems on the corporate ownership and control.
Mariolis (1975) studied the interlocking directorates in the corporations. Buchmann (1976) researched the organization related problems. Burt (1976, 1983) characterized the social networks, co-optations principles, and corporations. Cuyvers, Meeusen (1976, 1985) discussed the networks of corporate power in Belgium. Wilson (1976) researched the unlocking interlocks.
Hughes, John, Mackenzie (1977) characterized the trends in interlocking directorships. Freeman (1979a, b) presented his vision on the social networks. The boards of directors in English and American companies through 1920 in time of the formation of the big enterprises in the 19th and early 20th centuries have been researched in Karjala (1979). Koenig, Gogel, Sonquist (1979) created the models of the significance of interlocking corporate directorates. Mokken (1979) investigated the cliques, clubs and clans nature in the society. Andrews (November-December 1980) studied the directors' responsibility for corporate strategy. Andrews (May-June 1981a) researched the board's role in formulating strategy. Andrews (Nov-Dec 1981b) characterized the creation of the corporate strategy as a vital function of the board. Burt (1980) presented a reconsideration of interlocking directorates, involving American manufacturing, in frames of the cooptive corporate actor networks. Burt (1997) highlighted the contingent value of social capital. Pennings (1980) characterized precisely the interlocking directorates. Provan (1980) investigated the board power and the organizational effectiveness among the human service agencies. Radcliff (1980) presented an analysis of the impact of the internal structure of the capitalist class on the lending behavior of banks, considering the banks and corporate lending problems. Boje, Whetten (1981) investigated the interorganizational networks. Linderberger, Ross (1981) researched the industrial organizations. The characterization of the interlocking directorates in American businesses has been done in Mintz, Schwartz (1981, 1985). The interlocking directors networks in American corporations have been researched in Mizruchi, Bunting (1981), Mizruchi (1982, 1983, 1992, 1996), Stearns, Mizruchi (1986), Mizruchi, Schwartz (editors) (1987), Mizruchi, Stearns (1988, 1994), Byrd, Mizruchi (2005). Schoorman, Bazerman, Atkin (1981) studied the interlocking directorates. Hirsch (1982) considered the culture of interlocking directorates. Mariolis, Jones (1982) discussed the centrality in the corporate interlock networks. Andrews (1983) highlighted the directors’ responsibility for the corporate strategy, researching the strategic management. Barnes (1983) formulated the graph theory in the network analysis. Bazerman, Schoorman (1983) created a limited rationality model of interlocking directorates. Burt (1983) considered the corporate profits and the cooptation.
6 Burt (2000) studied the network structure of social capital in his research in the field of the organizational behavior. Dodd, Warner (1983) wrote a research work on the corporate governance. Donaldson, Lorsch (1983) researched the decision-making techniques at the top to shape the strategic direction. Fama, Jensen M C(1983b) studied the separation of ownership and control. McAvoy, Conter, Dona, Peck (1983) considered the proposals for the increased control on the corporation by the board of directors in frames of their econometric analysis research.
Palmer (1983) investigated the interlocking directorates and the inter-corporate coordination.
Roy (1983) documented the interlocking directorate structure in the United States. Tashakori, Boulton (1983) looked at the board's role in the strategic planning. Vance (1983) accessed the corporate leadership at the boards and directors levels. American Bar Association (1984) presented its vision on the interlocking directorates. American Bar Association (2011) made some additional comments on the interlocking directorates. Caswell (1984) presented an institutional perspective on the corporate control and the network of interlocking directorates.
Hambrick, Mason (1984) studied the organization as a reflection of its top managers. Lease, McConnell, Mikkelson (1984) researched the market value of differential voting rights in the closely held corporations. Ornstein (1984) considered the interlocking directorates in Canada.
Scott, Griff (1984) reviewed the British corporate networks 1904–1976. Tricker (1984) made a research on the corporate governance. Tricker (1994a) considered the cases in the international corporate governance. Tricker (1994b) made an international review on the corporate governance. Tricker (2000) documented the history of management thought, researching the corporate governance. Tricker (2009) studied the principles, policies and practices toward the corporate governance. Useem (1984) wrote a research on the inner circle. Ziegler (1984) investigated the people integration network in the Austrian firms. Baysinger, Butler (1985) studied the corporate governance and the board of directors, focusing on the performance effects of changes in the board composition. Baysinger, Hoskisson (1990) researched the composition of the boards of directors and strategic control, paying attention to the corporate strategy. Baysinger, Kosnik, Turk (1991) considered the effects of board and ownership structure on the corporate R&D strategy. Bearden, Mintz (1985) studied the regionality and integration in the American interlock network of corporate power. Chaganti, Mahajan, Sharma (1985) considered the corporate board size, composition and corporate failures in retailing industry.
Charreaux, Pitol-Belin (Novembre 1985) created the contractual theory of organizations, applying his findings to the board of directors of French firms. Charreaux, Couret, Joffre, Koenig, De Montmorillon (1987) reviewed the new theories to manage the firm. Charreaux, Pitol-Belin (1989) characterized the boards of directors in France. Charreaux, Pitol-Belin
7 (1990) researched the boards of directors in France. Charreaux, Pitol-Belin (October 1991) considered the board of directors as a scene of confrontation between the managers and the shareholders. Charreaux (October 1993) researched the board of directors as a mechanism inside the corporate governance system. Charreaux, Debrieres (1998) considered the corporate governance issues. Charreaux (2000) studied the board of directors from the corporate governance perspective. Charreaux (2002a) investigated the financial aspects in the corporate governance problem. Charreaux (2002b) considered a shareholder as a shareholder of cognitive resources. Cochran, Wood, Jones (1985) made the research on the composition of the boards of directors and the incidence of golden parachutes. Demsetz, Lehn (1985) accessed the structure of corporate ownership, deriving the possible causes and consequences. Demsetz, Villalonga (2001) described the ownership structure and evaluated the corporate performance.
Galaskiewicz, Wasserman, Rauschenbach, Bielefeld, Mullaney (1985) estimated the influence of the corporate power, social status, and market position on the corporate in a regional network.
Meeusen, Cuyvers (1985) investigated the interaction between the interlocking directorships, the economic behaviour of companies, researching the networks of corporate power in the ten countries. Stockman, Wasseur (1985) accessed the national networks of corporate power by the means of comparative analysis of ten countries in 1976. Stockman, Ziegler, Scott (editors) (1985) edited a collection of research papers on the networks of corporate power in the ten countries in 1976. Stockman, van der Knoop, Wasseur (1990) focused their research attention on the interlocking directorships and corporate networks in the Netherlands in the period 1960- 1980. Waldo (1985) investigated the boards of directors with their changing roles, structure and information needs. Anderson (1986) characterized the new corporate directors. Norburn (1986) compared the directors in the firms and evaluated the industry performance. Shleifer, Vishny (1986) wrote a well known research paper on the large shareholders and the corporate control.
Shleifer, Vishny (1997) conducted a survey of corporate governance. Tirole (1986) Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations. Aghion, Tirole (1997) identified the formal and real authority in the organizations. Tirole (2001) researched the corporate governance problems. Tirole (2006) created the theory of corporate finance. Grossman, Hart (1986) estimated the cost and benefit of ownership in the theory of vertical and lateral integration. Glatthard (1987) characterized the state of development of firms in Switzerland in 1929 - 1983. Kosnik (1987) conducted a study on the board performance in the corporate governance. Richardson (1987) characterized the directorship interlocks and the corporate profitability. Mathile (1988) presented a business owner's perspective on the outside boards.
Hermalin, Weisbach (1988) described the determinants of board composition. Weisbach (1988)
8 discussed the outside directorships and the CEO turnover problems. Hermalin, Weisbach (1991) discussed the effects of the board composition and direct incentives on the firm performance.
Hermalin, Weisbach (1998) researched the endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO. Hermalin, Weisbach (2001, 2003) presented a survey of the economic literature on the board of directors as an endogenously determined institution. Hermalin, Benjamin (2005) described the trends in the corporate governance. Hill, Snell (1988) presented their research on the external control, corporate strategy, and firm performance in the research intensive industries. Kesner (1988) compiled a list of the directors’ characteristics during his investigation of the directors’ type, occupation, tenure and gender. Zahra, Stanton (1988) stressed on the possible implications of the board of directors composition on the corporate strategy and performance. Zahra, Pearce (1989) conducted a review and created an interactive model of the boards of directors and the corporate financial performance interdependence.
Zahra (1990) highlighted an increasing necessity for the board's involvement in the strategy formulation in the firm. Pearce, Zahra (1991) described the relative power of the CEOs and the boards of directors, making some associations with the corporate performance. Pearce, Zahra (1992) described the board composition from a strategic contingency perspective. Zajac (1988) conducted a test of the critical assumptions on the interlocking directorates as an inter- organizational strategy. Zajac, Westphal (1996) discussed the director reputation, CEO-board power, and the dynamics of board interlocks. Connors (1989) characterized the outside board members as a breath of fresh air in the firm. Fosberg (1989) researched the outside directors influence on the managerial monitoring in the firm. Lorsch, MacIver (1989) documented the reality of America’s corporate boards. Lundstrom, Ottoson (1989) discussed the bank-industry relations in Sweden, including the problems of the ownership and the interlocking directorates.
Nelson (1989) studied the strength of strong ties, considering the social networks and intergroup conflict in organizations. Rechner, Dalton (1989) evaluated the impact of CEO as board chairperson on the corporate performance. Rechner, Dalton (1991) presented a longitudinal analysis on the CEO duality and the organizational performance. Schellenger, Wood, Tashakori (1989) researched the board of director composition, shareholder wealth and dividend policy.
Singh H, Harianto (1989) studied the management-board relationships, takeover risk, and the adoption of golden parachutes. Carver (1990) focused his research on the boards that make a difference. Carver (2002) researched the corporate boards that create value for the company.
Donaldson (1990) contributed to the organizational economics and management theory.
Donaldson, Davis (1991) studied the agency theory, accenting his attention on the CEO governance and shareholder returns. Gilson (1990) collected the evidences on the changes in the
9 corporate ownership and control, when firms default. Glaus (1990) researched the control of the firms by the Swiss boards of directors. Kaplan, Reishus (1990) analyzed the outside directorships and corporate performance. Kaplan (1994a) evaluated the top executives rewards and firm performance, making a comparison of Japan and the United States. Kaplan (1994b) considered the top executives, turnover, and firm performance in Germany. Kaplan, Minton (1994) studied the problems, connected with the appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards.
Kaplan (1997) researched the corporate governance and corporate performance, comparing Germany, Japan and the U.S. Lorsch, MacIver (1989) described the reality of America's corporate boards. Powell (1990) researched the networks form of organizations. Rosenstein, Wyatt (1990) characterized the outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth.
Rosenstein, Wyatt (1994) described the shareholder wealth effects when an officer of one corporation joins the board of directors of another. Rosenstein, Wyatt (1997) looked into the inside directors, board effectiveness, and shareholder wealth problems. Barnhart, Rosenstein (1998) considered the board composition, managerial ownership, and firm performance. Burris (1991) studied the director interlocks and the political behavior of corporations and corporate elites. Davis (1991) researched the spread of the poison pill through the intercorporate network.
Davis, Greve (1997) documented the corporate elite networks and governance changes in the 1980s. Davis, Yoo, Baker (2002) created the network topography of the American corporate elite 1982-2001. Davis, Yoo, Baker (2003) investigated the small world of American corporate elite, 1982-2001. Davis, Yoo, Vast (December 2003) characterized a small world of big corporations.
Goodstein, Boeker (1991) proposed the new perspectives on the governance structure changes and the strategic change. Israel (1991) described the capital structure and the market for corporate control. Israel (1992) wrote on the capital and ownership structures, and the market for corporate control. Byrd, Hickman (1992) answered the question: Do outside directors monitor managers? Daily, Dalton (1992) established a relationship between the governance structure and the corporate performance in the entrepreneurial firms. Daily, Dalton (1993) focused on the board of directors leadership and structure, considering the control and performance implications. Daily, Dalton (1994a) researched the corporate governance problems, describing an impact of the board composition and structure. Daily, Dalton (1994b) made an empirical assessment of the corporate governance and the bankrupt firm. Daily (1995) investigated the relationship between the board composition and the leadership structure and bankruptcy reorganization outcomes. Johnson, Daily, Ellstrand (1996) completed a review and presented a research agenda on the boards of directors. Daily, Dalton (1997) described the CEO and board chair roles, held jointly or separately. Daily, Johnson (1997) conducted a
10 longitudinal assessment on the sources of the CEO power and the firm financial performance.
Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, Johnson (1998) made the meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance. Dalton, Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand (1999) completed a meta-analysis on the research issues such as a number of directors and the financial performance of firm. Daily, Dalton, Cannella (2003) described the decades of dialogue and data on the corporate governance. Dalton, Daily, Certo, Roengpitya (2003) prepared the meta- analyses of the financial performance and equity. Daily, Dalton (2005) accurately characterized the boards of directors, utilizing the empirical evidence in the practical prescriptions development. Demb, Neubauer (1992a) listed the confronting the paradoxes in the corporate boards. Demb, Neubauer (1992b) defined the “job” of the board of directors. Finkelstein (1992) accurately characterized the power in the top management teams, considering the dimensions, measurement, and validation issues. Finkelstein, D’Aveni (1994) explained the problem: How do the boards of directors balance the entrenchment avoidance and the unity of command?
Finkelstein, Mooney (2003) answered the question: How can the board process be used to make the boards better? Fligstein, Brantley (1992) solved the problem: Who controls the large modern corporation?, considering the bank control, owner control, and organizational dynamics issues. Fligstein (1995) precisely characterized the networks of power or the finance conception of control, commenting on the Palmer, Barber, Zhou, and Soysal conceptual proposal. Gerlach (1992) completed a blockmodel analysis on the Japanese corporate network. Judge, Zeithaml (1992) proposed the institutional and strategic choice perspectives on the board involvement in the strategic decision making process. Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan, Davidson (1992) conducted the research on the board composition and shareholder wealth in the case of management buyouts.
Davidson, Pilger, Szakmary (1998) described the golden parachutes, board and committee composition and shareholder wealth. Judge, Zeithaml (1992) suggested the institutional and strategic choice perspectives on the board involvement in the strategic decision process. Lincoln, Gerlach, Takahashi (1992) characterized the Keiretsu networks in the Japanese economy.
Lipton, Lorsch (1992) made a modest proposal for the improved corporate governance. Mallette, Fowler (1992) provided the characterization of the effects of board composition and stock ownership of the adoption of “poison pills”. Milgrom, Roberts (1992) wrote about the organization and management. Ottoson (1992) made the research on the network analysis and interlocking directorships in Sweden. Pearce, Zahra (1992) argued about the board composition options from a strategic contingency perspective. Pettigrew (1992) studied the managerial elites.
Pettigrew, McNulty (1995) researched the power and influence in and around the boardroom.
McNulty, Pettigrew (1999) described a role of the strategists in the board. Pye, Camm (2003)
11 concentrated on the non-executive directors’ study. Pye, Pettigrew (2005) researched the board context, process and dynamics, identifying some challenges for the future. Smith, Watts (1992) wrote on the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Wang, Dewhirst (1992) characterized the boards of directors and stakeholder orientation. Alexander, Fennel, Halpern (1993) described the board-CEO relations and organizational growth and decline. Coulson-Thomas (1993) worked on the problem of excellence creation in the boardroom. Jensen M C (1993) characterized the modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Johnson, Hoskisson, Hitt (1993) researched the board of directors' involvement in restructuring, focusing on the effects of board control versus the managerial control. Johnson, Greening (1999) described the effects of corporate governance and institutional ownership types on the corporate social performance.
Haunschild (1993) documented the impacts of the interlocks on the corporate acquisition activity. Haunschild, Beckman (1998) considered the alternate sources of information and the interlock influence. Kester (1993) studied the perspectives and challenges of introduction of the directors from banks into the boardroom in Germany, Japan and the United States. Mangel, Singh H (1993) researched the ownership structure, board relationships and CEO compensation in large US corporations. Millstein (1993) described the evolution of the certifying board.
Shivdasani (1993) characterized the board composition, ownership structure and hostile takeovers. Shivdasani, Yermack (1999) conducted an empirical analysis on the CEO involvement in the selection of new board members. Barnhart, Marr, Rosenstein (1994) evaluated the firm performance and board composition, presenting some new evidences. Barnhart, Rosenstein (1998) completed an empirical analysis on the board composition, managerial ownership and firm performance. Beatty, Zajac (1994) conducted a study on the executive compensation, ownership and board structure in the initial public offerings. Boyd (1994) studied the board control and CEO compensation. Boyd (1996) listed the determinants of US outside director compensation. Brickley, Coles, Terry (1994) researched the outside directors and the adoption of poison pills issues. Brickley, Coles, Jarrell (1997) considered the leadership structure, separating the CEO and the Chairman of the board. Brickley, Coles, Linck (1999) answered the question: What happens to CEOs after they retire?, presenting the new evidences on the career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives. Gales, Kesner (1994) conducted an analysis of the board of directors size and composition in the bankrupt organizations. Goodstein, Gautam, Boeker (1994) documented the effects of the board size and diversity on the strategic change.
Hirshleifer, Thakor (1994) considered the managerial performance, boards of directors, and takeover bidding. Huse (1994) described the board-management relations in small firms,
12 describing the paradox of the simultaneous in-dependence and inter-dependence. Huse (2005) proposed a framework for exploring the behavioural perspectives of corporate governance.
Huse, Minichilli, Shoning (2005) described the corporate boards as an asset in the new Europe, elaborating on the value of process-oriented boardroom dynamics. Huse (2007) conducted research on the boards, governance and value creation in the firms. Pugliese, Bezemer, Zattoni, Huse, Van Den Bosch, Volberda (2009) presented a literature review and a research agenda on the boards of directors' contribution to the strategy. Van Ees, Gabrielsson, Huse (2009) complemented the behavioral theory of boards and corporate governance. Krackhardt (1994) considered the graph theoretical dimensions of informal organizations in the frames of discussion on the computational organization theory. Li (1994) completed a multi-country test of the agency theory predictions, considering the ownership structure and the board composition.
Scott, Kleidon (1994) evaluated the CEO performance, board types and board performance, researching the corporate governance issues. Wasserman, Galaskiewicz (1994) described the present advances in the social network analysis. Wasserman, Faust (1994) provided some information on the methods and applications toward the social network analysis. Wasserman, Faust, Iacobucci (1994) researched the social network analysis problems. Bathala, Rao (1995) proposed an agency theory perspective on the determinants of board composition. Benassi (1995) described the governance factors in a network process approach. Blair (1995) considered the ownership and control problems, rethinking corporate governance for the twenty-first century. Blair (1999) researched the firm-specific human capital and the theories of the firm.
Blair, Stout (1999) created a team production theory of corporate law. Blair, Stout (2001) highlighted the director accountability and the mediating role of the corporate board. Blair, Stout (2006) investigated the specific investments and the corporate law. Boyd (1995) suggested a contingency model to describe the CEO duality and the firm performance. Hallock (January 1995) considered the executive pay level and the reciprocal interlocking boards of directors problems. Hart (1995) discussed the corporate governance, presenting some theories and implications. Hill (1995) discussed the social organization of boards of directors. Kini, Kracaw, Mian (1995) provided an unbiased view on the corporate takeovers, firm performance, and board composition. Klein (1995) conducted an examination of board committee structures. Klein (1998) investigated the firm performance and the board committee structure. Klein (2002) researched the audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management.
Lorsch (January- February 1995) investigated the problem of the boards empowering in the firms. Moerland (1995) paid his research attention to the alternative disciplinary mechanisms in different corporate systems. Moerland (1997) reviewed the theories and practices on the
13 corporate governance from the international perspective. Moerland (1999) explained the corporate supervision details in the Netherlands. Monks, Minow (1995) discussed the corporate governance issues. O'Neal, Thomas (1995) researched the directors networks and director selection problems, emphasizing the board's strategic role in the firm. Pfannschmidt (1995) described the multiple directorship appointments in the German firms. Wunderer (1995) researched the characteristics of the board’s president, presenting the point of view on this research problem from Switzerland. Agrawal, Knoeber (1996) characterized the firm performance and described the mechanism to control the agency problems between the managers and the shareholders. Agrawal, Knoeber (2001) answered the question: Do some outside directors play a political role? Agrawal, Chen (2010) described the determinants and consequences of disputes, involving directors in the boards of directors. Bainbridge (1996) provided some information on the participatory management within a theory of the firm.
Bainbridge (2003a), speaking on the director primacy, focused on the means and ends of corporate governance. Bainbridge (2003b) presented the board as a nexus of contracts. Beasley (April 1996) conducted an empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and the financial statement fraud. Beasley, Salterio (2001) characterized the relationship between the board characteristics and the voluntary improvement in the audit committee composition and experience. Bhagat, Black (May 10-11 1996) discussed the question:
Do independent directors matter? Bhagat, Black (1998, 1999) discussed an uncertain relationship between the board composition and the firm performance. Bhagat, Black (2000) looked into the issues of the board independence and long-term firm performance. Bhagat, Black (2002) found a non-correlation between the board independence and the long-term firm performance. Bhagat, Black, Blair (2004) accessed the relational investing and the firm performance. Bhagat, Bolton (2008) discussed the problems of the corporate governance and the firm performance. Black, Jang, Kim (2003) answered the question: Does corporate governance predict firms' market values?, using some evidences from Korea. Black, Jang, Kim (2006a) provided his research opinion on the problem: Does corporate governance affect firms' market values?, applying the evidences from Korea. Black, Jang, Kim (2006b) made the prediction on the firms' corporate governance choices, employing the evidences from Korea. Black, Khanna (2007) raised the question: Can the corporate governance reforms increase the firms' market values?, using the evidences from India. Black, Kim (2008, 2011) characterized the effect of the board structure on the firm value in an emerging market with the evidences from Korea. Black, Kim, Jang, Park (2011) considered the problem: How corporate governance affects the firm value, using the evidences from Korea. Bianco, Gola, Signorini (1996) has been interested in the
14 problem on the dealing with the separation between the ownership and the control in the firm, including: state, family, coalitions and pyramidal groups in Italian corporate governance.
Bianco, Pagnoni (March 1997) researched the interlocking directorates across the listed companies in Italy in the case of banks. Booth, Deli (1996) worked on the factors, affecting the number of outside directorships, held by the CEOs. Booth, Deli (1999) wrote an article on the characterization of the executives of financial institutions as the outside directors. Borokhovich, Parrino, Trapani (1996) considered the outside directors and CEO selection problem. De Cecco, Ferri (1996) described the commerce banks in Italy. Doz (1996) described the evolution of cooperation in the strategic alliances. Johnson, Daily, Ellstrand (1996) presented a review and research agenda on the board of directors. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (1996, 1998) considered the law and finance issues. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (1997) defined the legal determinants of external finance. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer (1998, 1999) reviewed the corporate ownership around the world. Mueller (1996) anchored the points for the corporate directors to think about. O'Neal, Thomas (1996) considered the problem of the strategic board development. Park, Rozeff (1996) described the role of outside shareholders, outside boards, and management entrenchment in the CEO selection. Romano (1996) investigated the corporate law and corporate governance. Sundaramurthy (1996) focused on the corporate governance within the context of antitakeover provisions. Sundaramurthy, Mahoney J M, Mahoney J T (1997) described the board structure, antitakeover provisions, and stockholder wealth. Yermack (1996) emphasized the fact that the higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors is frequently observed. Shivdasani, Yermack (1999) discussed the CEO involvement in the selection of new board members in the completed empirical analysis.
West (1996) wrote an introduction to the graph theory. Windolf, Beyer (1996) discussed the corporate networks in Germany and Britain in the conditions of co-operative capitalism. Windolf (2002) presented the research on the corporate networks in Europe and the United States.
Windolf (2009) investigated the coordination and control in the corporate networks in the United States and Germany, 1896-1938. Angbazo, Narayanan (1997) researched the top management compensation and the structure of the board of directors in commercial banks. Bacon, Cornett, Davidson (1997) discussed the research problems on the board of directors and the dual-class recapitalizations in the firms. Brickley, Coles, Jarrell (1997) researched the leadership structures with the separation of the CEO and the chairman of the board of directors. Cotter, Shivdasani, Zenner (1997) answered the question: Do independent directors enhance the target shareholder wealth during the tender offers? Davis, Schoorman, Donaldson (1997) presented a research toward a stewardship theory of management. Davies, Gower (1997) outlined the
15 Gower's principles of company law. Fernandez, Gomez, Fernandez (1997) described the effect of the board size and composition on the corporate performance. Geletkanycz, Hambrick (1997) identified the external ties of senior executives and highlighted the implications for the strategic choice and performance. Hallock (1997) characterized the reciprocally interlocking boards of directors and executive compensation. Huther (1997) conducted an empirical test of the effect of the board size on the firm efficiency. John, Senbet (1997) performed the research on the corporate governance and board effectiveness in the firm. Kojima (1997) made an international comparison on the corporate governance. Leighton, Thain (1997) discussed the boards of directors at the work in the firms. Loderer, Martin (1997) estimated the executive stock ownership and performance. Loderer, Peyer (September 5 2001, 2002) discussed the board overlap, seat accumulation, and share prices. Maug (1997) considered the alternative forms of corporate restructuring with particular interest in the boards of directors and the capital structure.
Podolny, Baron (1997) described the social networks and mobility in the workplace. Rebers, Beetsma, Peters (July 1997) clarified the problem on the role of collusion between the management and the board of directors. Rowley (1997) created the network theory of stakeholder influences. Rowley (1998) conducted the social network analysis. Elms, Berman, Rowley (2000) indentified the network influences on the CEO compensation. Rowley, Behrens, Krackhardt (2000) performed an analysis of structural and relational embeddedness in the steel and semiconductor industries. Rowley (June 3 2005a, b) characterized the directors networks in the board of directors of North American corporations. Rowley, Baum (2008) made the research on the dynamics of network position. Tufano, Sevick (1997) described the board structure and fee-setting in the US mutual fund industry. Miller (March 26 1997) performed the discussion on the Interlocking directorates and the antitrust laws. Uzzi (1997) researched the social structure and competition in the inter-firm networks, highlighting the paradox of embeddedness. Vasta, Baccini (1997) described the banks and industry in Italy, 1911-36, using the new evidences on the interlocking directorates. Adams (1998, 2000) identified the dual role of corporate boards as advisors and monitors of management. Adams, Ferreira (2003a) presented a theory of friendly board. Adams, Ferreria (2003b) presented the evidences from the corporate boards research on the roles of the diversity and incentives. Adams, Mehran (2003) answered the question: Is the corporate governance different for the bank holding companies? Adams, Mehran (2004) characterized the board structure and banking firm performance. Adams, Mehran (2005, 2008) described the corporate performance, board structure and its determinants in the banking industry. Adams, Almeida, Ferreira (2005) discussed the roles of powerful CEOs and their impact on the corporate performance. Adams, Ferreria (2007) created the theory of friendly
16 boards. Adams, Ferreria (2009) characterized the women in the boardroom and their impact on the governance and performance of the firms. Adams, Almeida, Ferreira (2009) tried to understand the relationship between the founder–CEOs and the firm performance. Adams, Hermalin, Weisbach (2010) explained the role of the boards of directors in the corporate governance, creating the conceptual framework and survey. Adams, Funk (2011) discussed the gender problems in the boards of directors. Adams, Hermalin, Weisbach (2010) created the conceptual framework, conducted the survey, and highlighted the role of the boards of directors in the corporate governance. Adams, Gray, Nowland (2012) answered the question: Does gender matter in the boardroom?, providing the evidences from the market reaction to the mandatory new directors announcements in Australia. Adams, Ragunathan (2012) researched the Lehman Brothers firm bankruptcy and its implications on the financial industry in the USA. Aguilera (1998) researched the directorships interlocks in the comparative perspective in the case of Spain. Aguilera, Jackson (2003) provided the dimensions and determinants on the cross-national diversity of corporate governance. Aguilera, Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) described the codes of good governance worldwide. Aguilera (2005a) proposed an institutional comparative perspective on the corporate governance and director accountability. Aguilera (2005b) considered the corporate governance and labor relations in Spain. Aguilera (2006) completed a comparative study of Italy and Spain towards the national state differences and patterns of directorship interlocks. Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, Jackson (2008) considered the problems of contingencies, complementarities, and costs in the corporate governance models. Aguilera, Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) listed the codes of good governance. Bollobas (1998) created the modern graph theory. Bolton, Von Thadden (1998) researched the blocks, liquidity, and corporate control. Carretta (1998) researched the role of information systems in the corporate governance models. Carretta, Farina, Schwizer (2006) researched the boards of directors of the financial intermediaries, evaluating their competencies, effectiveness and performance. Charan (1998) clarified the problem: How can the corporate boards create the competitive advantage for their firms. Collin (1998) researched the business groups in Sweden. Conger, Finegold, Lawler (1998) accessed the boardroom performance in the firms. Conyon, Peck (1998) researched the interconnections between the board size and the corporate performance, taking the evidences from the European countries. Conyon, Peck (1998) investigated the complex problems on the board control, remuneration committees, and top management compensation.
Conyon, Muldoon (2006a) described the small world of corporate boards in Singapore. Conyon, Muldoon (2006b) characterized the small world of corporate boards. Conyon, He (2008) provided more information on the executive compensation and CEO equity incentives in China's
17 listed firms. Denis, Sarin (1998) described the ownership and board structures in the publicly traded corporations in France. De Wulf (1998) discussed the corporate governance from the Belgian perspective. Eisenberg, Sundgren, Wells (1998) identified that the larger board size results in the decreasing firm value in the small firms. Fried, Bruton, Hisrich (1998) researched the boards of directors in the venture capital-backed firms. Gispert (1998) investigated the board turnover and firm performance in Spanish companies. Goodwin, Seow (August 1998) researched the information disclosure, relating to the board members to build the investors' confidence. Gulati (1998) described the alliances and networks. Gulati, Singh H (1998) discussed the architecture of cooperation, managing the coordination uncertainty and interdependence in the strategic alliances. Gulati (1999) researched the influences by the network resources and firm capabilities on the alliance formation. Gulati, Garguilo (1999) answered the question: Where do networks come from? Gulati, Westphal (1999) uncovered the effects of the CEO-board relations and the content of interlocks on the formation of joint ventures. Haunschild, Beckman (1998) considered the problem: When do interlocks matter?
Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, Grossman (2002) investigated the effects of institutional ownership heterogeneity and internal governance on the corporate innovation strategies. Hopt, Kanada, Roe, Wymeersch, Prigge (editors) (1998) characterized the present state of the art in the comparative corporate governance. Hopt (1998) described the German two-tier board, including the experiences, theories, reforms. Hopt, Leyens (2004) reviewed the board models in Europe, describing the recent developments of the internal corporate governance structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. Hopt (2006) researched the actual problems of the boards of directors. Hung (1998) considered the theories of governing boards. Eisenberg, Sundgren, Wells (1998) noted that the larger board size may result in the decreasing firm value in the small firms. Everett, Borgatti (1998) performed an analysis of the clique overlap. John, Senbet (1998) considered the problems of the corporate governance and board effectiveness.
Khanna, Gulati, Nohria (1998) measured the dynamics of learning alliances: Competition, cooperation, and relative scope. Klein (1998a) made a comparative analysis on the firm productivity and the board committee structure. Klein (1998b) characterized the affiliated directors in the firms with the particular focus on the directors’ effectiveness. Klein (1998c) investigated the firm performance and board committee structure. Klein (2002) researched the audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Klein, Shapiro, Young (2005) studied the corporate governance, family ownership and firm value, considering the Canadian evidences. Kose, Senbet (1998) researched the corporate governance and board effectiveness. Mac Canna, Brennan, O’Higgins (1998) characterized the national networks of
18 corporate power from the Irish perspective. Mak, Li (1998) researched the ownership structure, investment opportunities and board structure in Singapore. Lim, Mak (1999) investigated the ownership structure, board structure and corporate diversification in Singapore. Eng, Mak (November 21-24 1999) studied the ownership structure, board structure and corporate disclosure in Singapore. Mak, Phan (December 2000) researched the developments in the field of the corporate governance in Singapore for the next millennium. Mak, Li (2001) discussed the determinants of corporate ownership and board structure with the evidence from Singapore.
Mak, Kusnadi (2005) provided the further evidences on the negative relationship between the board size and the firm value. Muth, Donaldson (1998) presented a contingency approach to the stewardship theory and the board structure. Sanders, Carpenter (1998) considered the role of the CEO compensation, top management team composition, and board structure in the firm governance. Spencer (1998) discussed the Netherlands board index. Stuart (1998) conducted an investigation of the strategic alliance formation in the high-technology industry. Vafeas, Theodorou (1998) characterized the relationship between the board structure and the firm performance in the UK. Vafeas (1999) completed a comparative analysis on the board meeting frequency and the firm performance. Vafeas (2000) considered the board structure and the informativeness of earnings. Vafeas (2003) researched the length of board tenure and the outside director independence. Karamanou, Vafeas (2005) completed an empirical analysis on an association between the corporate boards, the audit committees, and the management earnings forecasts. Wagner, Stimpert, Fubara (1998) described the board composition and the organizational performance, presenting the two studies on the insider/outsider effects. Warther (1998) presented a model of the board’s relationship to the management and the shareholders, investigating the board effectiveness and board dissent problems. Watts, Strogatz (1998) discovered the collective dynamics of small-world networks. Watts (1999a) devoted his research time to the investigation on the small worlds in the corporate governance. Watts (1999b) characterized the dynamics of networks between order and randomness. Watts (1999c) described the networks, dynamics, and the small world phenomenon. Yamori (December 1998) provided the characteristics to the bureaucrat-managers in the Japanese financial institutions. Zingales (1998) discussed the problems in the corporate governance. Zingales (2000) conducted the research in search of new foundations for the corporate governance. Barabasi, Albert (1999) highlighted an emergence of scaling in the random networks. Barabasi (2002) emphasized the fact that the directors in the firms are linked. Borgatti, Everett (1999) proposed the models of core/periphery structures. Borgatti (2002) outlined the basic social network concepts. Borgatti, Everett, Freeman (2002) developed the software for social network analysis. Borgatti, Foster
19 (2003) described the network paradigm in the organizational research. Borgatti (2005) discussed the centrality and network flow problems. Borgatti (2006) identified the sets of key players in a social network. Brunello, Graziano, Parigi (January 26 1999, 2000) explained the problem: What determines board of directors' turnover in Italy? Carroll, Malcolm (August 1999) characterized the networks of the interlocking directorships in Canada and Australia. Core, Holthauser, Larcker (1999) focused their attention on the corporate governance, CEO compensation, and firm performance. Davies (1999) suggested a strategic approach to the corporate governance. Denis, Sarin (1999) researched the ownership and board structures in the publicly traded corporations. Fohlin (1999) described the rise of interlocking directorates in imperial Germany. Forbes, Milliken (1999) proposed that the boards of directors represent the strategic decision-making groups. Hillman, Zardkoohi, Bierman (1999) assumed that the corporate political strategies and the firm performance are interconnected, indicating the firm- specific benefits from the personal service in the US government. Hillman, Cannella, Paetzold (2000) stressed on the resource dependence role of corporate directors, researching the strategic adaptation of the board composition. Hillman, Keim, Luce (2001) considered the board composition and stakeholder performance, answering the question: Do stakeholder directors make a difference? Hillman, Dalziel (2003) integrated the agency theory and the resource dependence perspectives on the boards of directors and the firm performance issues. Maassen (1999) made an international comparison of corporate governance models. MacAvoy, Millstein (1999) characterized the active board of directors and its effects on the performance of the large publicly traded corporation. Maman (1999) investigated the interlocking ties within the business groups in Israel, 1974-1987. Maman (2001) researched the social capital, the career expansion of directors of business groups in Israel. Morck, Nakamura (1999) researched the banks and corporate control in Japan. Morck, Nakamura, Shivdasani (October 2000) investigated the banks, ownership structure, and firm valuation in Japan. Morck, Wolfenzon, Yeung (2005) wrote a research article on the corporate governance, economic entrenchment, and growth. Postma, van Ees, Garretsen, Sterken (1999) described the top management team, the board characteristics and the firm performance in the Netherlands. Renneboog (1999) considered such research topics as the ownership, managerial control and the governance of companies listed on the Brussels stock exchange. Rindova (1999) answered the question: What corporate boards have to do with strategy? Van Manen, Hooghiemstra (1999) characterized the supervisory directors in the Netherlands. Westphal (1999) researched the collaboration in the boardroom, focusing on the behavioral and performance consequences of CEO-board social ties. Westphal, Frederickson (2001) investigated the director experience, the election of new CEOs, and change
20 in corporate strategy. Carpenter, Westphal (2001) studied the strategic context of external network ties, examining the impact of director appointments on the board involvement in the strategic decision - making. Almazan, Suarez (January 2000) investigated the optimal corporate governance structures. Barbi (2000) considered the interlocking directorship networks, focusing on the problem: What is relevant for the evolution and change of the networks? Beetsmaa, Peters, Rebers (2000) tried to understand a role of collusion between the management and the board of directors. Blackhurst (2000) studied the multiple directorships. Braiotta (2000) wrote the audit committee handbook. Bryan, Hwang, Klein, Lilien (2000) completed an empirical analysis of economic determinants of the compensation of outside directors. Chen, Jaggi (2000) discovered the association between independent non-executive directors, family control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong. Dyer, Noboeka (2000) discussed the creation and management of a high performance knowledge-sharing network in the case of Toyota. Fiegener, Brown, Dreux, Dennis (2000) documented the cases of the adoption of outside boards by the small private US firms. Fich (2000) answered the question: Do directors who are CEOs of other firms enhance firm performance? Gargiulo, Gulati (January 2000) researched the problem:
Where do inter-organizational networks come from? Gulik, Gedajlovic, Maassen, Bosch, Volberda (July 8-11 2000) researched a service role of the boards of directors, based on the research work by Pfeffer (1972). Huat Ong, Hoon Lee (2000) tried to find the possible interconnections between the board functions and the firm performance. Kracaw, Zenner (2000) analyzed a role of bankers in the boardroom. Miwa, Ramseyer (2000) estimated the value of prominent directors, studying the lessons in corporate governance from transition Japan.
O'Sullivan (2000a) was focused on the impact of board composition and ownership on the audit quality, bringing the evidences from large UK companies. O`Sullivan (2000b) studied the corporate governance and economic performance in the United States and Germany. O'Sullivan, Diacon (2002) considered the impacts of ownership, governance, and non-audit services on the audit fees, analyzing the evidences from the insurance industry. Rhoades, Rechner, Sundaramurthy (2000) studied the board composition and financial performance, including a meta analysis of the influence of outside directors. Robert, Evans, Honemann, Balch (October 1 2000) developed the Robert's rules of order. Samra-Fredericks (2000a) completed the ‘boards- in-action’ research with the purpose to capture and analyse the directors and senior managers interactive routines. Samra-Fredericks (2000b) conducted an analysis of the behavioural dynamics of corporate governance in the UK. Scott (2000) focused on the research toward the social network analysis. Ward (2000) created the boardroom insider guidebook, aiming to improve corporate boards. Whittington, Mayer (2000) considered the European corporations’
21 strategies and structures. Agnblad, Berglof, Hogfeldt, Svancar (2001) studied the ownership and control in Sweden. Crespi, Garcia–Cestona (2001) investigated the ownership and control of the Spanish listed firms. Dehaene, De Vuyst, Ooghe (2001) evaluated the corporate performance and board structure in Belgian companies. Ferri, Masciandaro, Messori (2001) considered the corporate governance, board turnover and performance of banks in Italy. Ferris, Jagannathan (2001) studied the incidence and determinants of multiple corporate directorships. Ferris, Jagannathan, Pritchard (2003) researched the directors with the multiple board appointments.
Golden, Zajac (2001) tried to answer the question: When will boards influence strategy?
Heracleous (2001) considered the problem: What is the impact of corporate governance on organizational performance? Heracleous, Murray (2001) created a theoretical framework for the networks, interlocking directors and strategy research. Ingley, Van der Walt (2001) researched a changing role of directors in developing and maintaining corporate capability. Kroszner, Strahan (2001a, b) investigated the board connections, conflicts of interest, and lender liability in the banks. Lin (2001) created the network theory of social capital. Monks, Minow (2001) researched the corporate governance problems. Newman, Strogatz, Watts (2001), Newman (2003) researched the structure and function of complex networks. Newman (2007) developed the mathematics of networks. Okazaki, Yokoyama (October 2001) measured the extent and implications of director interlocking in the pre-war Japanese banking industry. Perry, Shivdasani (2001) answered the question: Do boards affect performance?, providing some evidences from the corporate restructuring. Postma, van Ees (2001) presented the research on the functions of supervisory boards in the Netherlands. Rhoades, Rechner, Sundaramurthy (2001) conducted a meta-analysis of the board leadership structure and financial performance, answering the question: Are two heads better than one? Schilling (July 2001) investigated the corporate governance in Germany, identifying the move to the shareholder value. Snijders (2001) completed the statistical evaluation of social network dynamics. Snijders (2003) created the models for the longitudinal network data. Stiles, Taylor (2001) considered the boards at work: How do directors view their roles and responsibilities? Tomka (2001) researched the interlocking directorates between banks and industrial companies in Hungary at the beginning of the twentieth century. Watts (2001) proposed a dynamic model of network formation. Welch (2001a, b), Welch J, Welch S (2006) described the possible practical approaches to the boardroom problems solutions findings in the firms. Baena Del Alcazar (2002) conducted the research on the nature of power, examining the governing elite and the institutional power in Spain, 1939-1992. Bainbridge (2002) discussed the group decision making in the corporate governance. Becht, Bolton, Roell (October 2002) studied the corporate governance and control.
22 Bianchi, Bianco, Enriques (2002) described the pyramidal groups and the separation between the ownership and the control in Italy. Bianchi, Bianco, Giacomelli, Pacces, Trento (2005) considered the ownership and control of firms in Italy. Bianchi, Bianco (2006) studied the Italian corporate governance in the last 15 years, emphasizing the transition from the pyramids to the coalitions. Carcello, Hermanson, Neal, Riley (2002) described the board’s characteristics and evaluated the audit fees. Chau, Gray (2002) discussed the business ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore. Everard, Henry (2002) completed a social network analysis of the interlocked directorates in the electronic commerce firms.
Faccio, Lang (2002) studied the ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Hanna, Walsh (2002) researched the small firm networks as a successful approach to innovation.
Lindgren (2002) investigated the succession strategies in a large family business group, considering the case of the Swedish Wallenberg family. Morris, Hyun Song Shin (2002) estimated the social value of public information. Perry, Peyer (September 2002, August 12 2005) studied the board seat accumulation by the executives, accenting their conclusions on the shareholder’s perspective. Sonnenfeld (2002) researched the problem: What makes the great boards great? Volpin (2002) worked on the problem of the corporate governance with the poor investor protection, taking the evidences from the top executive turnover. Bainbridge (November 2003) described the pre-commitment strategies in corporate law. Borgatti, Foster (2003) discussed the network paradigm in the organizational research. Burgess, Fallon (2003) conducted a longitudinal study of women directors in Australia. Carter, Simkins, Simpson (2003) studied the corporate governance, board diversity, and firm value. Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, Simpson (2010) considered the gender and ethnic diversity of the US boards and board committees and the firm financial performance. Dann, Del Guercio, Partch (2003) documented the governance and boards of directors in the closed-end investment companies. De (2003) researched the incidence, performance effects of interlocking directorates in the emerging market business groups, considering the evidences from India. Fich, White (2003) studied the effects of mutually interlocked boards on the CEO compensation and turnover. Fich, White (2005) explained the problem: Why do CEOs reciprocally sit on each other’s boards? Fich, Shivdasani (2006) researched the problem: Are busy boards effective monitors? Gabrielsson (2003) conducted an inquiry into the boards’ contribution to the firm performance. Gillette, Noe, Rebello (2003) researched the corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior experimental evidence. Gillette, Noe, Rebello (2008) completed an empirical investigation on the board structures around the world. Graziano, Luporini (2003) discussed the board efficiency and the internal corporate control mechanisms. Graziano, Luporini (September 2005) studied
