Peacekeeping Forces Today and Tomorrow Regional Capacity Building - the European
Union Model
Brigadier General Ian ABBOTT, OBE, United Kingdom Assistant Chief of Staff Policy and Plans Division
European Union Military Staff
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the kind words of introduction. It is a privilege and a pleasure indeed to provide an overview of the European Union model and to demonstrate what the EU has to offer as a regional organization in contemporary crisis management to this year's Austrian Blue Helmet Forum.
The European Union
The European Union has evolved over decades based on the European Union Treaties which have been adjusted many times. As a result, the EU has become a complex and complicated institution. You may be aware of the
“European House” and its three pillars. Of particular importance, in terms of regional capacity building to deal with the contemporary security environment, are pillar 1 encompassing the European Community, and its Commission, and pillar 2 representing the Common Foreign and Security Policy including the European Security and Defense Policy, based on inter- governmental structures, that is the consensus of 25 Member States supported by the General Secretariat of
Peacekeeping For ces
Today and T om
orr ow
Regi onal C apac ity Buil ding - the Eu
ropean
Union Model
Bri gadie r General
Ian A BBOTT, O BE, United K
ing dom
Assistant Chief of Staff Policy and Plans Division
Europe an Union Milita ry Sta
ff
Thank you, Mr. Chair man, for the kind words of
introduction. It is a pri vileg e and a pleasure i
ndeed to
provide an overview of the European Union mod
el and to a re ffer as EU has to o the e what rat demonst
gional
organization in contemp orary
crisis ma nagem
ent to this
yea r's Austrian B lue Hel
met Forum.
The Eur ope an Un
ion
The European Union has evolved over decades b
ased on
the European Union Treaties which h
ave been a
djusted
many times. As a
re sult, the EU has bec
ome a comple
x are of the e aw and complicated institution. You may b
“E uropea n House”
and its three
pillars . Of p artic ular
importance, in terms of reg
ion al capacit
y building to deal
with the c ontem porar y s ecu rit y e nvironme nt, a re pilla
r 1 and i ty, muni ropean Com he Eu ng t encompassi
ts
Commission, and pillar 2 repres enting th
e Common
Forei gn and Securit y
Policy includin
g the European based on e Policy, and Defens Security
inter-
gove rnmental structures, that is
the consensus of 25
Member States supported b y the G ener
al Secr etariat of
the Council of the European Union, the Head of which is the Secretary General and High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana.
It has been recognized that the European Union has become a global actor sharing in the responsibility for regional and global security. The EU is the most extensive and developed model of political integration of states based on law and freedom. It is also the world’s largest aid donor, and it is a top trading power. The European Member States sharing similar economic and strategic interests must be prepared, willing and capable to support, protect or defend these interests, if necessary, in particular in view of the recent developments in the strategic environment. In other words, the EU has acquired a strategic dimension.
Security Strategy
In meeting the needs of this new strategic dimension and building its capacity, there are a number of principle requirements that have been identified. There is a requirement to set the overall political, strategic and conceptual framework within which the EU will conduct its business. This is reflected in the new European Security Strategy (ESS) approved by the European Council in 2003. It signals a new approach, building upon the concepts of responsibility, prevention, capability and partnership in both a regional and a global scale.
the Council of the European Union, the Head of which is
the S ecretar
y Gen eral and Hi gh R
epr esentat
ive for the
CFSP, Javier Solana.
It has be en reco
gni zed t hat the European Un ion has
become a global actor sharing
in the responsibi lity
for e most y. The EU is th rit ecu obal s gl l and iona reg
exte nsive a
nd deve loped model of
political integra
tion of
states based on law and freedom
. It is also the wor
ld’
s
largest aid donor, and it is a top trading pow
er. The similar economic and European Member States sharing
strateg ic inte rests must be prep
are d, willing and
cap able
to support, protect or def end these inter ests, if ne
cessary, opment devel he recent ew of t ar in vi icul in part
s i n t he
strategi c environment.
In other words, the
EU has
acquired a strate gic dime
nsion.
Secu rity S trat egy
In me etin g the need s of this ne w strate
gic dimension a
nd
build ing its capaci ty, t here are a
number o f pr inci ple
requir eme nts that h
ave be en ide
ntif ied.
There is a al, str rall politic nt to set the ove eme requir
ate gic and
conceptual framewo rk w
ithin which the EU will conduct
its business. This is r efl
ect ed in the new Eu
rope
an e European (ESS) approved by th egy Security Strat
Council in 2003. I t signals a new approach, building
upon the concepts of responsibility, pr evention,
cap abilit y a nd part
nership in both a reg
iona l and a
global scale.
European Security Strategy- Key Threats
The key threats the EU is facing are not unique to the EU. In fact they are very similar to those identified in NATO’s Strategic Concept of 1999. None of the key threats is of a purely military nature, but rather a complex, multi-dimensional, and dynamic character. In some cases they are interrelated. The worst case would be a combination of all. Equally, no crisis region looks like another; rather each is unique. Consequently, the EU believes that none of the threats can be dealt with by purely military means; and each crisis region requires an individual, tailored, whilst comprehensive response.
Also, threat prevention cannot start too early.
ESS Imperatives for the European Security &
Defense Policy (ESDP)
As a consequence, the ESS has set clear imperatives for the European Security and Defense Policy: The EU is determined to become more active, more capable, and more coherent, willing to work with Partners upon which it is also relying. Three strategic objectives have been set:
a) First, given the nature of the new threats, the EU
must engage early; the ambition is to act, whenever possible, before a crisis occurs or escalates.
b) Second, the EU puts particular emphasis on creating
stability in its strategic neighborhood; the aim is to promote an arch of well-governed states from the East to the Mediterranean region.
Eu ropean Secu rity S trategy- Key Th
reats
The key t hreat s the EU is faci
ng ar e not uni
que t o t he
EU. In fa ct the y a re very simila
r to those ide ntif
ied in
NATO’s Strategi c Concept of 1999. Non
e of t he ke
y ther a e, but ra atur ry n y milita purel ts is of a threa
comple x, mult
i-dime nsiona
l, and d yna mic c har act er.
In
some c ase s they a
re inte rre late d. The wor
st case
would n looks gio be a combination of all. Equally, no crisis re
like another; rathe r e ach is unique. Consequentl y, the EU
believes that none of the thr eats can be dealt with by
purely militar y m
eans; and each crisis regi
on req
uires an response. individual, tailored, whilst comprehensive
Also, threat prevention c annot start too earl
y.
ES S Im perati ves for
the E urop ean Secu rity &
Defe nse P olic y (E SDP)
As a consequenc e, the E
SS has set cl
ear i mperat ives for
the European S ecurity
and Defense P oli
cy:
The EU i s
dete rmine d to be come
mor e a ctive , mor e ca pable, a
nd with Partners upon which to work more coherent, willing
it is also r ely ing.
Three stra tegic objective
s ha ve b een set:
Fir a)
st, gi ven the na ture
of the new threa
ts, the EU
must engage
earl y; t he ambi tion i s t o act , when ever
possibl e, before a cri
sis occurs or escalat
es.
Second, the EU puts par b)
ticular emphasis on cre ating
stability in its strat egi
c neig hborhood; the
aim is to
promot e an arch
of wel l-g overned st ates
from t he
East to the Mediterranea n re gion.
c) Finally, the Strategy underlines the importance of international law and the role of the UN, for which the term “effective multilateralism” has been coined.
In order to meet the strategic challenges the EU draws on a variety of suitable means that should complement each other in a coherent way throughout the entire crisis management process, from conflict prevention and crisis resolution to cessation of conflicts and post- conflict stabilization.
ESDP Reality
On the basis of the political-conceptual framework described thus far, within a few years of its creation ESDP has now become reality. And I would like to dwell on that briefly. It is true that the ESDP is in its infancy, but a lot has been achieved. ESDP is in the field. Since 2001, the political-military structures, the Brussels based ESDP planning and decision making “machinery”, which I will come on to shortly, is up and running.
The NATO-EU arrangements substantiating their strategic partnership have passed their first tests. A number of exercises were conducted simulating the preparation of EU-led operations both with and without recourse to NATO. In total, seven civil and military missions have been successfully launched in the past five years. And the capabilities development process has a fresh impetus.
Fina c)
lly, the Str ate gy u nderline
s the importa
nce of
intern ationa l law a
nd the r ole of the UN, for
whic h
the te rm “ef fec tive multila tera
lism” ha s bee n c oin ed.
In o rder to m eet th e stra teg ic chal len ges t he E U draws on
a variety o f suitable me ans that should compleme
nt each ire ent ghout the throu way erent other in a coh
cris is
man agemen t p rocess, from
confl ict p reventi
on and cts and confli on of cessati n to tio s resolu crisi
post-
conflic t st abilizat
ion.
ES DP Reality
On the ba sis of the
politic al-
conc eptua l fra mewor k
described thus far, with in a few ye
ars of its c
reation o dwell I would like t y. And ESDP has now become realit
on that br iefl y.
It is tr ue tha
t the ESDP i s in its
inf anc y,
but a lot has been achieved. ESDP is in the field. Since
2001, the political-military structures, the
Brussel
s based y”, whi achiner ng “m maki ecision ESDP planning and d
ch
I will come on to shortl y, is up and running
.
The NAT O-EU
arr ang em ents substa ntiating
thei r
strategi c partnership have
passed their first tests. A
number of ex ercises were
conducted simula
ting the tions both with and without pera preparation of EU-led o
rec ourse to NATO.
In total, se
ven c ivil a nd milita ry
missions have been successfully launch ed in the past five
year s. And the ca
pabilitie s deve
lopment pr oces
s ha
s a fresh impetus.
ESDP Structures - Situation Assessment, Planning Capacities
Having provided a little of a contextual background, I will now move on to have a look at the EU's ESDP decision making structures. In 2000 in Nice, the European Summit decided to establish new ESDP structures within the overall institutional framework, consisting of:
The Policy and Security Committee (PSC)
performing political control over and strategic guidance on every ESDP operation,
The EU Military Committee (EUMC) providing
military advice to the PSC and exercising military direction of all military activities within the EU framework,
And the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis
Management (CIVCOM) providing civilian advice to the Policy and Security Committee (PSC).
These key Committees are supported by the General Secretariat of the Council, i.e. the General Directorate External Affairs supporting the PSC and CIVCOM, and the EUMS working for the EUMC, whilst at the same time providing in-house expertise for the SG/HR at the political-strategic level. As a result, we, in the EUMS, are serving two masters, the EUMC and Mr. Solana. (Note also the Policy Unit (can be considered as the expanded Cabinet for the SG/HR) and the Joint SITCEN.) Being parochial for a moment, the EUMS is a true multinational unit commanded by a Director General (a three-star general officer) and currently consisting of 5 Divisions
ESDP Stru cture s - Situ ation A ssessm
en t, Planning
Capaci ties
Having provided a little of a contex
tual backgr ound, I
will now move on to have a look at the EU's ESDP decision making struct ures. In 2000 in Nic
e, the
Europe an Summit de cide
d to esta blish new
ESDP
struc tur es within the overa
ll institutional f rame
work, of: consisting
The Polic y a
nd Sec urit
y Committe e (P
SC)
perf ormin g politic al c
ontrol ove r a
nd strate
gic operation, y ESDP ce on ever guidan
The EU Milita ry Co
mmittee ( EUMC) providing
military advice to the PSC a
nd exe rci sing milita
ry s within the EU activitie ry ll milita tion of a direc
framewo rk,
And the Commi
ttee f or Civil ian
Aspect s of C
risis n advice ivilia oviding c COM) pr IV nt (C eme Manag
to
the Policy and Sec
urit y C ommitte e (
PSC).
These key Committees are supported b
y th e Gener
al orate rect Di eral he Gen .e. t l, i ounci he C at of t ari Secret
External Affairs supporti ng the PSC and C
IVCO M, and
the EUMS wor king
for the EUMC, whilst at th
e sa
me R at the pertise for the SG/H time providing in-house ex
political- str ateg ic le vel.
As a re sult, we, in the E
UMS, a re
serv ing two maste
rs, the EU
MC and Mr. Solana. (Note an be t (c cy Uni oli he P also t
consider ed as t
he expanded
Cabine t for the SG/HR) and the
Jo int SI TCEN.) B
eing
paro chia l f or a mome nt, the
EUMS is a tr ue multina tional
unit commanded by a Director Gen
eral (a t hree-st
ar of 5 Divisions y consisting currentl ficer) and eral of gen
and some 150 staff provided by all Member States and serving on a nominally 3-year rotational basis. The flag officers are selected by the EUMC and appointed by the SG/HR. Our main operational functions are early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning.
Crisis Management Process
As I alluded to earlier, the EU is able to bring a unique combination of means and instruments, both civil and military to bear on the management of crises and potential crises. Institutionally, the EU strives towards a consistent overall approach towards crisis management with consensual decision making as its basis. As you might expect, there is a comprehensive process required to provide the necessary agreed direction and guidance.
The key to the EU's process is its phased approach to crisis management which enables the development of a common political understanding of the potential crisis and the subsequent determination of whether EU action is considered appropriate. If it is, then an ad-hoc, cross- body, Crisis Response Coordinating Team, will draft the EU's high-level Crisis Management Concept which, once approved by the Council, is the catalyst for more detailed strategic options, be they military, civilian or police.
This illustrates the process, using military strategic planning as a basis. It shows the range of planning products on the left axis from the high-level CMC to the production of CONOPS and the range of bodies that produce, assess, agree and approve the various stages of the EU's response.
and some 150 staff
provi ded b y al l M em ber S tat es and
serving on a nominally 3-
year rotational basis. The fla
g
officers are sele cted by t
he EUMC and appointed b
y the tions are e l func ationa in oper SG/HR. Our ma
arl y
warn ing, situation a
ssess ment, and strate gic plann
ing .
Crisis M anagem
ent Pr oce ss
As I allude d to earlie
r, the EU is ab
le to b rin
g a unique combination of means and instruments, both civil and
military to bear
on the ma nagem
ent of cri
ses and
potentia l crise s.
Institutiona lly,
the E U str ive s towa
rds a gem isis mana s cr ard h tow oac ll appr nt overa consiste
ent
with consensual decision making as its basis.
As you
might ex pect, there is a
comprehensive proc
ess required ed direction and gre y a essar to provide the nec
gu idance.
The key to the EU's
process is its phased approach to
crisis ma nagem
ent which e nab
les the deve
lopment of a
common political understanding of the potentia
l crisis ation of whether EU and the subsequent determin action
is consi dered approp
riat e.
If i t i s, t hen an ad-ho c, cross-
body, Crisis Response Coordi
nating Team, will
draft the gement Concept whic el Crisis Mana gh-lev EU's hi
h, once
approved by the Council, is th
e catal yst for more detailed
strateg ic options, be they
military , civilia n or polic
e. ic ateg str military ocess, using s the pr ate This illustr
planning as a basis. It shows the r
ang e of p lanning
products on the left axis from the hig h-level CM
C to the
production of CONOPS and the range of bodies that
produce, assess, a gre e and approve the va rious stages of
the EU's response.
EU - Military Command and Control – Options
Because the Union does not have a standing C2 structure (other than the Military Committee and the EUMS in Brussels), when a crisis is being identified and an EU action is deemed appropriate, the EU will compose an ad hoc military chain of command for the conduct of the particular CMO. One of the first issues that will need to be resolved is the designation and appointment of the Operation Commander and the respective OHQ.
Currently, two basic command options for EU-led crisis management operations have been developed: those with or without recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities. The first one is founded in the so-called Berlin-plus arrangements agreed upon by the EU and NATO in March 2003 – interestingly in the midst of the transatlantic and intra-European rifts on Iraq. In this case, DSACEUR is appointed the EU Operations Commander acting at the military-strategic level with SHAPE acting as host to the EU Operations HQ (OHQ).
For the latter case, the so-called autonomous EU operations, a number of EU Member States have offered their national HQ facilities to potentially provide a basis for an EU OHQ and Force HQ (FHQ) respectively, with multinational augmentation. At present 5 Member States - France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the UK - have committed an HQ, to act as host to an EU OHQ, to the Headline Goal Force Catalogue.
EU - M ilitar y Com
mand and Cont rol – Opt
ion s
Bec ause the Union does not have a st
anding C2 st ructure
(othe r tha n the Milita ry Committe
e a nd the EU
MS in nd an EU ied a ntif ing ide crisis is be n a ls), whe Brusse
action is de em
ed a ppropria te, the EU will compos
e a n a d
hoc military chain of
command for the conduct
of the will need s that st issue fir f the One o ular CMO. partic
to
be resolved is the designa tion and appointment of the
Operation Commander and the respe
ctive OHQ.
Currently, two basic co
mmand options for EU-led crisis
manage ment operations
have been d eveloped:
those with
or without recourse to NATO common assets and ne is founded capabilities. The first o in the so-called
Berlin-plus arran
gement s a
gre ed upon b
y the EU and
NATO in March 2003 – interestingly
in the midst of the ts on rif an rope a-Eu nd intr ntic a satla tran
Ira q. In this c ase ,
DSACEUR is appointed the EU Operations Commander
acting a t the military
-strateg ic le vel with SHAP E actin
g
as host to the EU Operations HQ (OHQ ).
For the latte r case, t
he so-called autonomous EU
operations, a number of EU Membe
r States h ave
offered rovide a lly p ntia es to pote ciliti l HQ fa nationa their
basis
for an EU OHQ and Force HQ (F HQ) respective
ly, with
multinational augm entation. At present 5 Membe
r States K - h the U y and Ital eece, y, Gr German e, - Franc
ave
committe d an HQ, to a
ct a s host to an EU OHQ
, to the
Headlin e Goal Force C ata log ue.
EU - Military Command and Control – Structure To this end and regardless of the chosen command option, HQs will have to be activated, augmented and fully integrated in a command structure consisting of a mixture of permanent (largely Political and Strategic level bodies) and non-permanent elements. The key decisions are taken by the Council, which may delegate the Political Control and Strategic Direction of the operation to the Political & Security Committee. The EU Military Committee, assisted by the Military Staff advises the PSC. The Chairman of the MC has a special role in the chain of command, acting as the point of contact for the OpCdr. In principle, a three-level military command chain exists. The Op Cdr, appointed by the Council, with his non-deployed OHQ at the military- strategic level, is responsible for planning the operation, forming and preparing the force, coordinating the deployment and for the conduct of and support to the operation. The Force Commander, with his Force Headquarters - comparable to a NATO CJTF-HQ - which will be deployed into theatre, is responsible for the conduct of the operation in theatre, at the operational level. Finally, at the tactical level, the required number of component commands, also deployed into the area of operations. As I said earlier, this command chain is generic and every operation will have a command chain specifically tailored to its requirements. It may well be that in a number of cases a more direct two-level chain may be sufficient, or that additional specific component commands may need to be set up. Obviously each level will also have to establish the necessary horizontal links with Member States, local authorities, International EU - M
ilitar y Com
mand and Cont rol – St
ru ctu re
To this end and rega rdless of the chosen command ented and activated, augm option, HQs will have to be
full y integ rat ed in a comma
nd struc tur e c onsisting of
a
mixture of perm
ane nt (la rge ly Politic al a
nd Str ateg
ic he ke ermanent elements. T level bodies) and non-p
y
decisions are tak en b y t he Council, which ma
y dele gate
the Politic al Contr
ol a nd Strateg
ic Dire ction
of the
opera tion to the Politic
al &
Secu rit y Committe e.
The EU Military y the assisted b Committee, Military
Sta ff
advises t he P SC . The Chairm
an of the MC has a speci
al
role in the chain of command, actin
g as the
point of leve three- , a inciple n pr . I or the OpCdr ct f conta
l milita ry
command chain ex ists. The Op Cdr,
appointed b y the
Council, with his non- deploye
d OHQ at the military- e for planning the op c level, is responsibl strategi eration,
forming and p repa
rin g the force, coordinati
ng the
deployment and for the
conduct of and support to the
operation. The Forc e Commander, with his
Force -HQ - which JTF able to a NATO C Headquarters - compar
will be deployed into theatre, is responsible for the conduct of the operation in theatre, at the ope
rational red equi l, the r leve tactical at the lly, l. Fina leve
number
of component command s, also deployed into the
area of
opera tions. As I sa
id ea rlie r, this c omma
nd chain is omma a c on will have rati ry ope nd eve c a eri gen
nd c hai n
speci fic all y ta ilored to its r equir
eme nts. It
may well be
that in a num ber of cas
es a m ore di
rect two-l eve l chai n
may be suf ficient, or tha
t additional specific component eed to be set up. Obviously commands may n each level
will also have to establish the necessary horizontal links
with Membe r Sta tes , loc al a uthor ities,
Inte rnationa l
Organizations and non-governmental organizations impacting on the operation.
Crisis Management Tasks – Capabilities
In response to a crisis, the EU's particular characteristic is its capacity to mobilize a vast range of both civilian and military means and instruments. In 1999 the EU set itself the Headline Goal 2003 aiming at developing the capability required to deploy a joint/combined contingent of up to corps size within 60 days. Based on the forces assigned by Member States to the Force Catalogue 2003, the EU’s assessment is that it now has the operational capability across the full range of the so-called Petersberg Tasks, i.e. from humanitarian operations through peacekeeping to peace enforcement - limited and constrained by a number of significant shortfalls. These deficiencies are more or less the same ones that the European NATO Allies also suffer and pertain mainly to those strategic capabilities that are essential for rapid deployment and sustainment of operations far abroad.
The progress achieved by the European Capability Action Plan to address options for remedying the shortfalls by rationalizing Member States efforts in a very tight budget situation so far is limited. This disappointing result and the evolving strategic environment gave reason for the EU to move capability-building to a new dimension. In 2003 it decided that it needed to look beyond the near future and set new goals for the further development of ESDP capabilities with a horizon of 2010, reflecting the European Security Strategy and drawing on lessons
Orga nizations and non-g overnmental or
gan iza tions
impacting on the op eration.
Crisis Managem ent Tas ks – Capabil
ities
In respons e to a c
risis, the EU 's p
articula r ch
aract eristic is
its cap aci ty to mobilize a va
st ran ge of both civilia
n and ans and instruments. In 1999 the EU set itself military me
the Headline Go al 2003 aiming at d
evelopi ng th
e
cap abilit y re quired to deplo y a
joint/combine d conting
ent
of up to corps size within 60 da ys.
Bas ed on the forc
es e 2003, e Catalogu Forc er States to the by Memb assigned
the EU’
s asse ssment is tha
t it now ha s the ope
rationa l
cap abilit y ac ross the f ull r
ang e o f the so-ca
lled from humanitarian operations Petersberg Tasks, i.e.
through pe acekeepin
g to peac e enforcement - limited and
constrained by a numbe r of sign
ific ant shor tfal
ls. The
se the hat e ones t he sam ess t or l ore encies are m defici
Europe an NATO Allies
also suf fer
and per tai
n mainl y to
those str ateg ic ca pabilitie s that a
re esse ntial f or r apid
deployment and sustainm
ent of operations far
abroad. Capabilit ean Europ y the d b ieve ach ess ogr The pr
y
Action Plan to address options for rem edy
ing the
shortf alls b y ra tionalizi
ng Me mber Sta
tes e ffo
rts in a d. This ar is limite get situation so f tight bud very
disappointing result and the evolving strategi
c
environment ga ve re ason for the
EU to move a new dimension. building to capability-
In 2 003 it
decided that it needed to look beyond the ne ar future and
set new goals for the further development of
ESDP
capabilities with a horiz on of 2010, reflecting
the lessons g on and drawin tegy y Stra European Securit
learned from EU-led operations. Thus, new tasks have been added, reflecting the EU’s comprehensive approach to crises management.
Military Crisis Management Operations
Since 2003 the EU has conducted three military operations:
Operation CONCORDIA in Macedonia followed
the NATO Operation ALLIED HARVEST and was the first one under ‘Berlin-Plus’.
Operation ARTEMIS in East Congo was the first
autonomous one in support of the UN with France acting ac a framework nation. It showed that the EU is capable of launching an operation on short notice and deploying forces in a difficult environment in order to respond to an acute crisis until the UN forces were able to take over. ARTEMIS made the case that there was a role for ESDP in Africa, and it had a significant impact on ESDP capabilities development.
Finally, Operation ALTHEA was launched end of
last year as a follow-on to NATO’s SFOR. Up to now, it is running smoothly and performing successfully. A few days ago, the first six-monthly review has been submitted by both the EU Special Representative, Lord Ashdown, for the political and civilian aspects, and the EU OpCdr, General Reith, for EUFOR.
learned from EU-l
ed operat ions. Thus, new tasks have
been added, re flect
ing the EU’s com pre
hensive approach
to crises manage ment.
Milit ary Cr isis Managem
ent Opera
tions
Since 2003 the EU has c
onduc ted thr
ee
military operations:
Operation CONCORDIA
in Macedonia follo wed
the NATO Operation ALLI ED HARVES
T and was
the first one under ‘Berli n-Plus’.
Op
eration ARTE
MIS in East Con
go w as the fir st
autonomous one in support of the UN with F
rance
acting a c a frame work nation. It
showed that the EU ation on short g an oper aunchin is capable of l notice
and deployin g fo rces in a difficult environment
in
order to respond to an acute crisis until the UN fo
rces
were able t o t ake over. A RTEM
IS m ade t he case t
hat d a ca, and it ha n Afri DP i e for ES there was a rol
signif ican t impact on ESDP c
apa bilitie s deve
lopm ent.
Finall y, Opera tion A
LTHEA was launched end of ar as a follow-o last ye n to NATO’s S
FOR . Up to
now, it is running smoothly and pe
rforming
successfully. A few da
ys a go, the first six-mon
thl
y al EU Speci y both the submitted b s been w ha revie
Representative, L ord As hdown, for the political and
civilia n aspe
cts, and the EU OpCdr , Ge
neral R eith,
for EUFOR .
Military Capabilities - "Headline Goal 2010"
(HG2010)
The "Headline Goal 2003" is to be succeeded by a
"Headline Goal 2010", now clearly focusing on rapid response and bringing qualitative criteria to bear. The EUMS is now developing new, complex scenarios, based on operations involving separation of parties by force, embargoes, disarmament, military advisory roles, post conflict stabilization or consequence management after a natural or man made disaster to include a terrorist attack, in order to determine the capabilities required and to identify illustrative Force Packages
Military Capabilities - "Headline Goal 2010"
(HG2010) The "H eadline Goal 2003"
is to be succeeded b y a
"H eadline Goal 2010",
now clearly focusin g o
n rapid ria to bear. qualitative crite ing ring response and b
The
EUMS is now developing new, comple
x sc ena rios, ba sed
on operations involving separ ation of p
arties b y f
orce, s, post ole y r advisor tary ent, mili am rm oes, disa barg em
conf lict sta biliza tion or conse
quenc e manage
ment after a
natur al or man ma de disaste
r to inc lude a
terro ris t a ttack ,
in orde r to de termine
the cap abilitie s requir
ed a
nd to ort an es to supp kag e Pac orc F illustrative identify
effective response to c rises. The European
Defense
Agenc y f or integ rat
ed d efe nse c apa bilitie s deve
lopme
nt dinate oor tter c tes to be r Sta to help Membe ned is desig
and s ync
hronize defe
nse str ate
gy, c apa
bility
development, budge ts and s ystem inv
estment and f last summer, the efforts. As o and technology research
Agency is up and running . It
will work for harmoniz ation
of milita ry re
quirem ent s, esta blish benc
hmarks a nd
deadlin es for achievi
ng t he "Headl ine Goal
20
10" and on armaments, in order to foster industrial cooperation
put the a ims into prac
tice. Mor eove r, it will c ontribute
to
a longer-term vision which requires an
integrated tary tes mili r Sta g Membe includin oach appr
pla nners ,
industry, and acad
emia, economic and social inst itutions.
For me, the Agen
cy’s a
pproach looks similar to that of lopment & Ex t Deve Concep perime
ntation ( CDE) within
the scope of NA TO’s Tra
nsformation philosophy.
to support an effective response to crises. The European Defense Agency for integrated defense capabilities development is designed to help Member States to better coordinate and synchronize defense strategy, capability development, budgets and system investment and research and technology efforts. As of last summer, the Agency is up and running. It will work for harmonization of military requirements, establish benchmarks and deadlines for achieving the "Headline Goal 2010" and foster industrial cooperation on armaments, in order to put the aims into practice. Moreover, it will contribute to a longer-term vision which requires an integrated approach including Member States military planners, industry, and academia, economic and social institutions.
For me, the Agency’s approach looks similar to that of Concept Development & Experimentation (CDE) within the scope of NATO’s Transformation philosophy.
Military Capabilities – “Battle Group Concept (BG Concept)
The EU Battle Group Concept, as initially proposed by France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, is a salient model and specific form of the EU’s rapid response elements providing the minimum militarily effective, coherent joint force package capable of stand-alone operations or for the initial phase of larger operations.
The United Nations have already expressed an interest, with particular reference to the African theatre. The ambition is to be capable of sustaining two concurrent BG operations on a permanent basis, out of a set of 13 BG the Member States have committed themselves to provide by 2007. Since the beginning of this year the EU is capable of launching one BG operation. Work is currently underway on the range of potential missions, on the involvement of individual Member States, on C2 arrangements, training and certification of forces concerned and the relationship with the NATO Response Force (NRF), which is also drawing on the same pool of national forces. That said it is important to note that rapid response is a complex issue, involving advance planning, efficient decision taking and implementation and not just in the military area but also in the civilian area.
Civilian Capabilities
Military capabilities are important but the experience in the Balkans and in Afghanistan shows that a combination of civilian and military means is needed in order to be successful. Within its civil-military approach the EU has Milit
ary Capabilit ies – “Bat
tle Group Conc ept (
BG t) Concep
The EU Battle Group
Concep t, as initia lly p
rop osed b y
Fran ce, the United Kingdom, and G
erman y, is a salient
model and specific for m of the EU’s
rapid response milita oviding the minimum ments pr ele
ril y ef fec tive,
coherent joint for ce p
ackage c apable of sta
nd-alone
opera tions or f
or the initial pha
se of larg er oper ations.
The United Nations have alread y ex pressed an int
erest
, re. The can theat he Afri o t ce t eren ular ref partic with
am bition is to be
cap able of sustaining two concurrent
BG operations on a pe rm
anent basis, out of a set of 13 have tes r Sta the Membe BG co
mmitted the mse
lves to
provide by 20 07. Since the be
ginnin g o f this year the EU
is capable of launching one B G ope
ration. Work is f potential missions, on e range o rway on th currently unde the involvement of individual Member States, on C2
arrangem ents, t
rai ning and cert
ifi cation of forces
concerned and the relatio
nship with the NATO Response ), which is al e (NRF Forc so drawing on th
e same pool of
nationa l for
ces. Th at sa
id it is impor tant to note
that rapid
response is a complex issue,
involving advance p lanning
, implementation and not just and efficient decision taking
in the milita ry a
rea but also in the
civilia n are
a.
Civilian Capabilit ies
Military capa bilities a
re importa
nt but the e xpe rie nce
in tion bina com t a istan shows tha han and in Afg ns alka the B
of c ivilia n and milita ry
mean s is nee
ded in orde
r to be
succe ssful. Within its c ivil-
military appr oac h the EU ha s
established six priority areas to support the civilian dimension of crisis management: police, rule of law, civil administration, civil protection, monitoring and those special capabilities required to support EU Special Representatives in the various regions.
At the end of last year the EU Member States committed themselves to assign quite an impressive number of civilian experts to the various priority areas, and of them agreed to create a multi-national European Gendarmerie Force capable of filling a specific gap between police and military capabilities in the field. However, currently the EU would be unable to deploy at short notice ‘hard’
civilian missions of a larger scale into crisis areas.
Member States’ capabilities need to be drawn from scarce resources committed in domestic affairs. There are no coherent, structured, trained and equipped units on stand-by yet and, thus, not readily available or rapidly deployable.
Civilian Crisis Management Operations
On the civilian side, four civilian operations have been launched since 2003. The EU Police Mission in BiH, is now complementing the military Operation ALTHEA.
The EUPOL PROXIMA in Macedonia followed the EU Operation CONCORDIA. Last year saw the rule of law mission EUJUST in GEORGIA. EUPOL in Kinshasa will be complemented soon by the advisory and assistance mission EUSEC to the DRC in support Security Sector Reform initiatives there.
established six priorit y ar
eas to support the civilian
dimension of crisis ma
nagem ent: polic e, r
ule of la w, civil d those administration, civil protection, monitoring an
special capabilities req uired to support EU Special
Representatives in the various re gions.
At the e nd of last year the EU M embe
r Sta tes c ommitte d
them selve s to assig
n q uite an impr essive
number of and eas, y ar iorit ious pr var rts to the n expe civilia
of them
agr eed to cr eate a multi-na tional Eur
opean Ge ndar merie
For ce c apa ble of f illing a spe cif ic gap be twee
n polic e a nd
military capa bilities in the
fie ld. However
, c urr
ently the y at short notic o deplo EU would be unable t
e ‘hard’
civilia n missions of a la
rger scale into cr
isis area s.
Membe r Sta tes’ c apa bilitie s need
to be draw n fro
m are s. There air aff d in domestic ommitte es c esourc ce r scar
no coherent, structur ed, trai
ned and equipped units on
stand-by yet and, thus, not readil
y av ailable or rapidl
y ble. deploya
Civilian Crisis M anage
ment Opera
tions
On the c ivilia n side, f
our c ivilia n opera
tions have been
launched since 2003. Th e EU Police Mission in B
iH, is LTHEA. ration A ry Ope g the milita mentin now comple
The EUPOL PROXIM
A in Macedonia followed the EU
Operation CONC ORD
IA.
Last year s aw th e rule of l
aw L in Kinshasa ORGIA. EUPO ST in GE mission EUJU
will be complemented soon b y the
advisory and
assistance mission EUSEC to the DRC in support
Secu rit y Sec tor Re for m initia tives the
re.
Civilian Capabilities – Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008)
Therefore, the EU decided to adopt the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. It defines strategic parameters for civilian crisis management for a systematic development of civilian capabilities. Generally, the approach is modeled on what has been done in the field of military capability planning and will lead to the creation of generic multi- functional Civilian Capabilities Packages.
Civilian / Military Co-ordination
This leads me to a brief excursion on a concept which is crucial for success of coherent civil-military crisis management, which has become something of a mantra in Brussels but, at the same time, is our biggest challenge: co-ordination. Given the multitude of instruments, bodies and actors involved in complex ESDP planning and conduct of operations; given the legal and institutional constraints within the EU, a remarkable portion of daily efforts has to be spent ensuring proper co-ordination. Ideally, there should be a culture of co-ordination in everybody’s mind, however, there is a saying in Brussels that “everybody calls for co- ordination but nobody wants to be coordinated”. In order to enhance both the EU’s capacity for coordinated strategic planning for joint civil-military operations and its capacity to run operations autonomously a Civilian- Military Cell is being set up within the EUMS. At the same time, with a view to further improving the EU- NATO relations, transparency and mutual assistance, a Civilian Capabilities –
Civilian Headline G
oal 2008 (CHG 2008)
Therefore, the E U de
cided to adopt the Civilian Headline
Goal 2008. It defines s trate
gic pa rameters fo
r civilian
crisis ma nagem
ent f or a syste matic de
velop
ment of h is oac appr y, the rall s. Gene abilitie n cap civilia
modele d
on what has been done in the field of militar y c apabilit y
planning and will lea d t
o the crea tion of
gene ric multi-
func tional Civilia
n Capa bilities Pa
cka ges .
Civilian / Milit ary Co- ord
ination
This l eads me t
o a bri ef excursi on on a concept
whi ch i s
cruc ial f or succ ess of c
ohere nt civil- military
cr
isis a mantra become something of ment, which has manage
in Brusse ls but, at th
e sa me time , is our
biggest
challenge:
co-ordination. Given the multitude of
instruments, bodies and actors involved in complex
ESDP planning and co nduct of op
erations; gi ven the
lega l and institutiona l constr
aints within the EU, a
remarkable po rtion of dail
y effort s has t
o b
e spent y, there shou Ideall co-ordination. roper ensuring p
ld be a
culture of co-ordination in everybod y’s mind, h owever
,
there i s a sayi ng i n Bruss els
that “ever
ybod y cal ls for co
- rde In o coordinated”. ants to be ordination but nobody w
r
to enhance bot h the
EU’s capaci ty for coo rdi
nated
strateg ic pla nning f
or joint c ivil-mil
itary opera tions and
its capacity to run op erations autonomousl
y a
Civilian- t up within the EUMS. ing se Cell is be Military
At the
same time, with a vie
w to f urt her impr oving t
he EU-
NATO rel ati ons, transp
arency and mut
ual assist ance, a
permanent EU Cell at SHAPE as well as a permanent NATO Liaison Element at the EUMS is being established. Within this new division military and civilian personnel are able to work within the same structure and contribute their respective experience to the planning process from the very outset. Its main task is to conduct Strategic Contingency Planning on request of the SG/HR or the PSC. Additionally, it is envisaged that the Cell will also form the key nucleus of the EU Operations Center, located in Brussels, which can be activated through multinational augmentation provided by both the EUMS and Member States, for joint civil-military operations of a limited scale and of limited associated risk. If developed carefully and successfully the Civil- Military Cell including the inherent Operations Center capacity could give the EU the unique capability of a focal point, compared with other multinational organizations, to use all available resources in a concerted manner for all phases, from conflict prevention to post conflict stabilization. Moreover, as a consequence of the Civ-Mil Cell establishment, in future the EU will be able to count on three command and control options for crisis management operations, not merely the two that I showed you earlier.
Civilian / Military Co-ordination - BiH Example
Just to give you a practicable example: The General Concept for the EU mission in BiH, including a military component, had to be coordinated:
a) In-house: within the General Secretariat between the
permanent EU C
ell at S HAPE as wel
l as a perm
anent
NATO L iai son Elem
ent at t he EUMS is bei
ng and w division military s ne blished. Within thi esta
civilian personnel are able to work within the same
struct ure and contri
bute t hei r respect
ive ex perienc
e t o t
he s main task is to t. It ry outse e ve rom th ess f proc planning
conduct Strategi c Contingen
cy Planning on
reques t of the
SG/HR or the PSC. Additiona
lly, it is envisag
ed
that the era the EU Op us of cle ey nu the k orm lso f Cell will a
tions
Cent er, locat
ed in Brussel s, whi ch can be
act ivat ed
throug h multina tional a
ugm enta tion provide
d by both the
EUMS and Me mber
State s, f or joint c ivil-
military d assoc nd of limite e a scal limited tions of a opera
iat ed
risk. If developed c
are full y and successfull
y th e Civil-
Military Cell inc luding the
inhere nt Operations
Cente
r a ility of pab ca the EU the unique ould give y c acit cap
focal point, compared with other multi national
organizations, to use all available resources
in a revention rom conflict p phases, f er for all concerted mann
to post conflict stabiliz ation.
Moreover, as a consequence
of the Civ-Mil Ce
ll establishme nt, in f
utur e the EU will
be able to count on three
command and control options nt opera nageme crisis ma for
tions, not merel y the t
wo that
I show ed you e
arlier.
Civilian / Milit ary Co- ord
ination - BiH Exam
ple
Just t o g ive you a pra cti
cable ex ampl
e: The Gener al
Concep t for the EU miss ion in BiH, inc
luding a military
component, had to be coordinated:
In-house: within the Ge a)
nera l Secre
taria t betw een the
EUMS and a number of civilian directorates,
b) Inter-pillar: between the Secretariat and the
Commission, and
c) Between the Member States in the EUMC,
CIVCOM, and the PSC.
In theatre both the EUSR and EUPM are placed in the civil chain of command up to the SG/HR, whereas COMEUFOR is reporting to CEUMC through the OpsCdr. Nevertheless, the EUSR has to promote overall political guidance to ensure that both EUFOR and the EUPM are supporting the overall EU policy in an optimal manner. The co-operation with the Head of Mission of the Commission in BiH remains a challenge and has to take account of the universal notion: “who pays sets the rules”.
International Co-operation
Whilst of course the EU, with its range of crisis management instruments, could act alone, the complexities and size of potential contemporary crises mean that, not only is it desirable, but quite often necessary to act in concert with other International bodies to make best effect of what are ultimately limited resources and so avoid unnecessary duplication of effort.
Such an approach is well demonstrated by the EU's current engagement with various international and regional organizations. The EU has a strategic partnership with NATO under the "Berlin-Plus"
arrangements, where under certain circumstances the EU has recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities.
EUMS and a number of
ci vilian dir ect orat es,
b) Inter -pillar : bet ween
the S ecretari
at and the
Commission, and
Betw c)
een the Me mber State
s in the EU
MC,
CIVCOM, and th e PSC.
In the atre both the EUS R and EUPM are plac
ed in the
civil c hai
n of c omma nd up to the SG/HR, wherea
s
COMEUFOR is r epor
ting to CEUMC thr oug
h the
OpsCdr. Nevertheless, the EU
SR has to promote overall e tha to ensur nce guida political t both EUF
OR a nd the
EUPM are supporting the over
all EU polic y in an
optimal
manner. The co-op era
tion with the Head of Mis
sion of and ha nge halle ins a c ema iH r the Commission in B
s to
take account o f the
universal notion: “ who p
ays sets the
rules”.
Intern ation
al Co-op erati
on
Whilst of cour se the EU, with its rang
e of c risis
manage ment instruments, could act alon
e, the
comple xitie
s and size of pote
ntia l conte mporary
cr
ises it desirable, but quite often mean that, not only is
necessary to act in concert with other I
nternationa l bodies
to make best e ffe ct o f wha t a re ultima tely
limited duplication o nnecessary so avoid u resources and
f ef fort.
Such an appro ach is
well dem onstrat
ed by t he EU 's
cur rent eng age ment w ith vari
ous intern ation al a nd
regi onal organiz
ations. The EU has a
strate gic erlin-Plus" partnership with NATO under the "B
arrangem ents, whe
re und er cert
ain ci rcumst
ances the EU
has r eco urse to NATO co
mmon asse ts and c apa bilitie s.
This format is the second of the two command options I described earlier and is currently demonstrated by the EU operation being undertaken in Bosnia with EUFOR. Of course the EU-UN relationship is very important and is being taken forward under the guise of a Joint- Declaration. Issues that are at the heart of ongoing work are the use of the EU Battle groups to provide a 'rapid response' bridging capability to UN missions, ESDP support to wider DDR/SSR initiatives in Africa - an issue that is probably beyond the capabilities on any one international organization, and EU support to international Disaster Relief, recently brought to the fore by the aftermath of the Indonesian tsunami. Last but by no means least; the EU is actively involved supporting the African Union in Africa, particularly with regard to Sudan/Darfur. Whilst contributing to the crisis management in Sudan, it can also being considered as contributing to regional capacity building in terms of indirectly supporting the building of AU capabilities.
Training and Exercises
But of course none of this can be achieved without training and practice, testing and validating of concepts and procedures and so I will now turn to Training and Exercises. Here is an overview of the 'big picture' of the EU's approach to Training and Exercise issues which is seen to comprise of three major elements:
Education - teaching of basic skills and knowledge,
normally a national responsibility;
This format is the second of the two command options I
described ea rlier and is c
urrentl y demonstrat
ed by the EU Bosnia with EUFOR. Of aken in operation being undert
course the EU -UN relati
onship is ver y important and is
being taken forw ard
under the guise o f a
Joint- ing at the heart of ongo Issues that are Declaration.
work
are the use of the EU Battle groups to provide a ' rapid
response' brid gin
g c apa bility to UN missions,
ESDP - an issue support to wider DDR/SSR initiatives in Africa
that is pr obabl
y be yon d the capa
bilities on an y on
e
international orga nization, and EU support to
intern ationa l Disaste
r Relie f, r ece ntl y br ough t to the
fore but by Last of the Indonesian tsunami. e aftermath by th
no means least; the EU is activel y involved supporting
the Af ric an Union in Afr
ica , p artic ularl y with reg ard
to risis to the c ibuting t contr r. Whils rfu Sudan/Da
manage ment in Sudan, it can also being considered as
contr ibuting to reg
ion al c apac ity buildin g in te
rm
s of capabilities. building of AU g the indirectly supportin
Trai nin g and Exerci
ses
But of course none of this can be achieved without
trai ning a nd prac
tice, testing and v
alida ting o
f conc
epts ning a n to Trai nd so I will now tur res a ocedu and pr
nd
Exerci ses. Here is an overvi
ew of t he
'bi g pi ctur e' of t he
EU's approach t
o T rai ning and Ex ercise i
ssues whi ch i
s nts: leme jor e three ma ise of to compr seen
Education - teaching
of basic skills and knowledge,
norma lly a nationa l respo
nsibilit y;
EU-oriented training - geared towards 'teamwork' in EU CMO, including mission-induction training. And finally;
Exercises which provide the opportunity to practice
the most complex procedures and provide training opportunities for management staff and other high- level bodies and officials.
EU training in ESDP aims to complement that training being undertaken by Member States and, by adopting a holistic and coordinated approach on training matters, to enhance the efficiency of Crisis Management Operations conducted by the EU. The EU's training regimen will contribute to a European security culture under ESDP by:
Strengthening synergies between various EU level
training initiatives;
Increasing the interoperability between all involved
actors;
Focussing on the civil/military as well as civil/civil
co-ordination within ESDP.
As such, EU training objectives are designed:
@ The strategic level to:
a) develop a common ESDP culture;
b) provide personnel for EU instances who are able to
work efficiently on all ESDP matters, and to
c) provide MS personnel familiar with EU policies,
institutions and procedures.
EU-orient
ed t raini ng - geared towards
'team work
' i n
EU CMO, including mis sion-induction training.
And
finally;
Exercises which provide th
e opportunity to practice
the most c omple
x proc edur es and provide training
opportunities for management staff and othe
r hig
h- . level bodies and officials
EU trai ning in ESDP a ims to comple
ment tha t tr aining
being undertaken b y Me mber States and, b
y ado pting
a tters, to aining ma holistic and coordinated approach on tr
enhance the effi cienc
y o f C risis Mana gement Operations
conducted by the EU.
The EU's trainin g re
gim
en will er ESDP b y culture und securit contribute to a European y:
Strengthenin
g s yne rgies between various E
U l
evel tives; ning initia trai
Inc rea sing the inter
opera bility be twee
n a ll involve
d
actors;
Foc ussin g on the civil/milita
ry a s we ll as c
ivil /ci
vil ination within ESDP. ord co-
As such, EU training objecti ves are d esi
gned :
@ Th e strategic l
eve l to :
a) develop a common ESDP
culture;
provide personnel b)
for EU instances who
are abl e to
work e ffi cie ntl y on all E SDP ma tters, a
nd to
c) provide MS personnel
familiar with E U polic
ies,
institutions and pr ocedur
es.
@ The operational level to:
a) prepare personnel to take part in EU-led operations,
and to
b) facilitate interoperability.
@ The tactical level the training objectives may apply to cover
a) generic,
b) pre-mission and
c) in-theatre training.
First EU Exercise Series
As I alluded to earlier, Exercises provide the opportunity to test and validate the building blocks of training. The EU's first exercise series, started in 2002, is about to come to a conclusion with Military Exercise 2005. The first cycle aimed at exercising, slice by slice, the whole of the EU Crisis Management Process and its subordinate procedures. To this end, a generic scenario depicting a deteriorating situation between two Countries on a fictitious island, 'ATLANTIA', has been used as a basis for four exercises (Crisis Management Exercises – CMEs):
CME 02 was initially considering the issue of the
Crisis Management Concept and the subsequent development of Military and Police Strategic Options.
As the Berlin-plus issue found a political solution at
the end of 2002, CME/CMX 03 was dedicated at exercising the arrangements between the EU and
@ The operational level to:
a) prepare p
ersonnel to t ake
part in EU-l ed operati
ons, and to
b) fac ilitate interoper abilit y.
@ The t act ical le vel t he t rai ning objec
tiv es
may apply to cover
a) gene ric ,
pre-mission and b)
c) in-theatre training
.
First E U Exerci
se Seri es
As I a lluded to ea
rlie r, E xer cises provide the opportunit
y blocks of training. The to test and validate the building
EU's first ex ercise serie
s, started in 2002, is a bout to
come to a c
onclusion with Milita ry Ex
erc ise
2005. The ice, t y sl ice b ng, sl ercisi at ex med le ai cyc first
he whol e
of the EU Crisis Mana gement
Process and its subordinate
procedures. To this end , a g
ene ric scenario depicting
a
deteriorating situation be tween two Countries on a TIA AN TL fictitious island, 'A ', has b
een used as a basis
for four exerci ses ( Crisi
s Man agement E
xer cises –
CMEs ):
CME 02
was initia lly
conside rin
g the issue of the
Crisis Management Concept and the subs
equent e Str and Polic y Militar lopment of deve
ate gic
Options.
As the B
erlin-plus issue found a political solution at
the end of 2002, CME/CMX 03
was dedi cated
at U and ween the E ents bet gem arran the sing exerci
NATO when the EU is envisaging an EU-led operation with recourse to NATO capabilities and common assets. It ended-up with consideration on the tasking for Operational Planning for Civilian and Military Instruments.
CME 04 will exercise the interaction between
Brussels and an EU OHQ set-up from a national parent HQ, the UK PJHQ. The major aim is twofold:
exercising the Activation Process of an OHQ and developing a CONOPS with a multinationalized OHQ.
MILEX 05 is scheduled for later this year to exercise
the interaction between an EU-OHQ, hosted by the French CPCO, and an EU FHQ from the 2nd German /US Corps.
As I speak, the next five-year exercise program (revised annually) which will articulate the second series of exercises is being discussed. It will naturally move on from the previous series aiming to develop the EU capabilities and validate more recent concepts and institutional developments.
Conclusion: ESDP Reality
To sum up, regarding ESDP a lot has been achieved, but a lot remains to be done. The EU has acquired a strategic dimension. It has been recognized that the EU’s profile will to a large extent remain that of a ‘Civilian Power’, as trade and development continue to play an essential role to promote security and stability. At the same time, the EU’s capabilities both in the military and civilian domain NATO when the EU
is envisagin g an EU
-led
opera tion with rec
ourse to NATO c apa
bilitie s an d
common assets. It ended-up
with consideration on
the n and or Civilia nning f l Pla Operationa for tasking
Military Instr ume nts.
CME 04
will exe rci se the intera
ction be
tween a national an EU OHQ set-up from Brussels and
pare nt HQ, the
UK PJHQ. The major
aim is twof old:
exerci sing the Activ
atio n Process of an OHQ
and
developing a CONOPS with a multinationa
lized OHQ.
MILEX 05 is sche
duled for late r this yea r to e xer cise
the interaction betwe en
an EU-OHQ, hosted
by the ch CPCO, and an EU FHQ from the 2nd Ger Fren
man
/US Corps.
As I spe ak, t he nex t fi ve-ye ar ex ercise
progr am (revi sed
annually) which will articulate the second s
eries of
exe rci ses is be ing disc
usse d. It will natur
all y move on
fro m the p
rev ious serie
s aiming to de velop
the EU nt concepts a ece e r lidate mor s and va abilitie cap
nd
institutional de velopme nts.
Conclu sion: E
SDP Reality
To sum up, reg arding E SDP a lot has
been a chie ved, but
a lot remains to be done. Th e EU has acquired a strategi
c
dimension. It has been
reco gniz ed that the EU’s
profile
will to a la rge ex tent r ema in that of
a ‘ Civilia n Power’
, a
s ole ial r ssent n e to play a nt continue velopme nd de e a trad
to promote secu
rit y a nd sta bilit y. At the same time
, the
EU’s c apa bilitie s both in the
military and c ivilia n doma in
have been but need to be further improved, in particular in terms of rapid reaction. Regardless of the EU’s efforts and achievements in this respect, its capacity to make an impact depends on its co-operation with its strategic partners.
have been but ne ed to be furthe
r improved, in particular
in terms of rapid reaction. Re gardless of the EU’
s efforts make ty to paci ct, its ca nts in this respe veme chie and a
an
impact depends on its co-operation with its strategi
c
partners.
