Wissenschaftszentrums Berlin für Sozialforschung
FS III 95-103
German Unification, Democratization and the Role of Social Movements: A Missed Opportunity
Dieter Rucht
Berlin, Juni 1995
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH (WZB) Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin
Telefon (030) 25 491-0
of Social Movements: A Missed Opportunity.
Discussion Paper FS III 95-103.
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.
the breakdown of the repressive communist regime. However, they failed to achieve their far-reaching goal of establishing a radical democracy based on the inclusion of all seg- ments of East German society. Instead, the 1989 revolution, though initially headed by the movements, led to a "turn within the turn" that eventually facilitated the quick and largely unconditional replacement of East German institutions with their West German counterparts. The central argument of the paper is that this outcome and the more gene- ral failure to prevent it, was largely overdetermined. Both factors internal to the move- ments and, above all, a largely unfavorable context structure which was beyond the mo- vements' control led to their marginalization. Under these conditions, the movements could not influence the process and result of German unification. Therefore, it would be wrong to blame them für having missed a historical opportunity to realize a societal or- der that, according to their perspective, would be truly democratic. The case is also used to point up some of the Iimits of contemporary movement theory, rooted as it has been in the study of movements in democratic contexts.
Zusammenfassung
Die Bürgerbewegungen der DDR waren darin erfolgreich, daß sie den Zusammenbruch des repressiven kommunistischen Regimes mit herbeigeführt hatten. Aber sie scheiterten mit ihren Vorstellungen einer radikaldemokratischen und im Umgang mit den Schwachen solidarischen Gesellschaftsordnung. Entgegen dem Willen der Bürgerbewegungen mün- dete die ursprünglich von ihnen angeführte Revolution vom Herbst 1989 in einer "Wende in der Wende" mit dem Ergebnis einer schnellen und weitgehend bedingungslosen Über- nahme des westdeutschen Institutionensystems. Dieses Scheitern der Bürgerbewegun- gen, so die These, war überdeterminiert Bewegungsinterne Faktoren, vor allem aber ei- ne Reihe von Kontextbedingungen, die außerhalb der Einflußmöglichkeiten der Bürger- bewegungen lagen, sorgten für die Marginalisierung der Bewegungen und das von ihnen so nicht gewollte Ergebnis des deutschen Einigungsprozesses. Somit wird auch der Auf- fassung widersprochen, die Bürgerbewegungen hätten eine historische Chance zur Errei- chung einer in ihrem Sinne wahrhaft demokratischen und sozialen Ordnung verpaßt An diesem speziellen historischen Fall zeigen sich zudem einige Grenzen der Erklärungskraft gegenwärtiger Theorien sozialer Bewegungen, die vor allem auf die Normalbedingungen westlicher Demokratien zugeschnitten sind.
GERMAN UNIFICATION, DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY?
1Dieter Rucht
German unification was a unique historical event. Two countries with a common past that diverged after World War II, developing different institutions and cultures, united within a short and breathtaking period. Today the process of unification has been largely completed and for the most part West German institutions have been tranfeered to the East.2 Most people in both East and West Germany welcomed this institutionalization of Western style democracy. However, there were also groups in both East and West Ger- many who opposed this outcome. They did not want a mere "transplantation" of West German institutions; instead, they wished to create new institutions allowing greater de- mocracy, participation and social rights for citizens.
In the brief period between late 1989 and Spring 1990 such aspirations did not appear unrealistic. Although it was initially unclear if and when German unification would take place, there were reasons to believe that unification would not result in a territorial ex- pansion of West Germany but rather in a new state based on compromises between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democrarie Republic (GDR).
In the GDR, dissident groups and movements3 were carriers of such a belief. During the crucial period of the so-called Wende (a decisive shift or turn); they dared to challen- ge the communist regime. The groups did not wish to adopt the West Germanmodel but instead wanted to fundamentally reform the GDR according to the concept of a "third way" between stalinism and capitalism, and at a later point, to create a united German state based on the idea of an active and participatory society. This new order would ex-
1 A previous version of this paperwas presented at the World Congress XVI of the International Poli- tical Science Association in Berlin, August 21-25, 1994. Affiliation of the author: Wissenschaftszen- trum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin. I am grateful to Tho- mas Cusack, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, Christiaue l.emke, Piotr Sztompka, Sidney Tarrow and several members of the WZB research unit "The Public and Social Movements" for their cotnments on an earlier version of this paper, and to Steve Porter for bis assistance in editing the text.
2 For a thorough analysis of the process of German unification, see Karte (1994). See also Czada (1994), Gros (1994), and Hancock and Welsh (1994).
3 For an analysis of the emergence and development of these groups see, for example, Knabe (1988), Allen (1989), Minnerup (1989), Rink (1991), MüHer-Enbergs et al. (1991), Haufe-Bruckmeier (1993), Probst (1993), Faktor (1994) and Pollack (1994). See also the analysis of the causes and forms of disaffection and dissent in the GDR by Ramet (1984) and the arguments about the different situation of the GDR groups as compared to those in Hungary and Poland by Szab6 (1991).
pand elementary democratic rights as they were secured in West Germany as weil as in- corporate some elements of the former GDR, such as extensive social rights and some state ownership of property. 4
Although we know that these expectations were not fulfilled, we do not understand exactly why this happened. It seems amazing that the citizen groups in the GDR, with their large following during the Wende, and the wide acknowledgement of their role in the mass mobilization against the communist regime, could not achieve their goals. "The transformation of East German society got underway in 1989 with a paradox: those who were to become the most prominent actors rode a wave of dissatisfaction that dröve their fellow citizeus not so much into their arms as into those of their West German country- men and -warnen." (Torpey 1992:21)
The fact that thc preferences of the citizen groups differed widely from the preferen- ces of the population of the whole would be too simple an explanation of this paradox.
While the goals of these groups and the citizenry did indeed diverge, several other fac- tors also came into play. This paper aims at a fuller undcrstanding of why these groups failed to achieve their goal of radical democracy and why unification happened the way it did. Before presenting an explanation of this outcome based on factors both internal and external to the groups, however, I will first describe the transition stages, beginning with the 'rise of hope for radical democracy, the seeming probability of this hope being fulfil- led, and finally the eventual disappointment when it became clear the radical vision would not materialize.
Although the course of events in Bast Germany was in many ways special, even when compared to the transformation of Bastern Buropean countries, it also exhibits some mo- re general traits and lessons. First, the outcome of the East German revolution was not really what its driving forces were struggling for. Those who successfully overcame the repressive regime were largely unable to shape the new situation. Instead, other forces entered the political stage and contributed to a result that was not intended by the initia- tors of political change. This pattern of unintended consequences Iooks quite familiar to students of historical revölutions (Stzompka 1993: 319). The East German case is in line with the general observation that revolutionaries not only tend to underestimate the more
4 See the collection of citizen movements' declarations and programmes in Schüddekopf (1990), Gransow and Jarausch (1991), and Müller-Enbergs (1992).
subtle endurance of the former power-holders but also the impact of other political for- ces that may profit from the post-revolutionary situation. Second, this case may teil us something about the strengths and Iimits of two approaches--that of resource mobilizati- on and that of political opportunity structure. These approaches are designed to explain social movement mobilization and impact. Here I argue that these concepts are of limited value as long as they focus on stable structures as they exist in Western democracies. Fi- nally, the East German case may invite us to speculate about the possibility of an alterna- tive course of events as has been occasionally done by social historians ( e.g., Moore 1978, chpt. 11). Whereas I would easily admit that in various crucial historical situations social movements have failed due to their own strategic errors, I do not assume that this applies to the East German citizen movements. Rather I will argue that the general out- come of German unification was overdeterniined and therefore the niovements did not miss an opportunity. Although they could have avoided some pitfalls and thus achieved a stronger political position during the transition, this would not have changed the overail outcome.
1. After the revolution: The rise and fall of an experiment
In order to understand the citizen movements' failure it is important to see how the Wende came about and what happened immediately after the fall of the regime.
Surprisingly, for all actors involved, the regime collapsed within only a few months. It seems that two factors preconditioncd this break-down; whereas two others worked as triggering forces.
The first causal factor is due to the fact that the GDR, as weil as other Bast European regimes, performed badly in both economic and political terms, particularly since the mid-1970s. As a result the communist regimewas passively tolerated at best, and found little support among large segments of the population (Lernke 1991; Reißig 1993: 55). In reaction to this Iack of performance and legitimaty, political elites in the USSR initiated the processes of Glasnost and Perestroika in the second half of the 1980s. This move- ment towards reform as a second and probably decisive factor that preconditioned the Wende in the GDR. Ironically, the situation in the USSR which usually was perceived as a model for the GRD now helped to undermine the legitimacy of the East German go-
vernment. Available data show that regime support decreased dramatically during the 1980s (Lohmann 1994: 59). Unlik:e the Soviet government, its East German counterpart deliberately demonstrated its unwillingness to reform or compromise through several highly symbolic events. 5 This striking immobility increased the sense of estrangement from and bitterness towards the regiln this volatile situation two triggering factors came into play. The firstwas the mass emigration of GDR citizens (initially facilitated by the Hungarian government) that dramatically destabilized the regime by creating a sense of immediate crisis. The second was the changing behavior of dissenters within the country.
After the scope of the exodus--usually undertaken on an individual or family level--bad become visible, masses of citizens poured into the streets and shouted "We want to leave!" At the same time the "exit" option chosen by many people served as a catalyst for opposition groups which did not want to leave but instead remained to fight for change. In mass demonstrations the former slogan "We want to leave!" began to be re- placed by "We are staying here!" The use of the "voice" option by opposition groups combined with the "exit" exerted further pressure on the regime.6
Publicly and with much greater numbers than ever before these groups dared to criti- cize and challenge the government, eventually encouraging a revolutionary but peaceful mass movement that lead to the definitive breakdown of the regime (Opp and Voß 1993;
Lohmann 1994). Let us first briefly examine this wave of mass mobilization and the rela- ted role of the citizen movements and then describe the two subsequent periods of de- mocratic experimentation and the transplantation of West German institutions.
5 Recent telling events weie, for example, the repression against the Umweltbibliothek (Environmental Library) in Berlin (November 1987), the interdiction by East German authorities to prevent distribution the reform-minded Soviet journal Sputnik (January 1988), the repression of peaceful protesters during the annual memorial in honor of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg in Berlin (January 1988), the obvious manipulation of local elections (May 1989) and measures under- taken against those who protested against this manipulation, the symbolic support by some GDR of- ficials for the Chinese government immediately after the bloodshed in Tiananmen Square (June 1989) and the unresponsive way in which the authorities celebrated the 40th anniversary of the es- tablishment of tbe GDR after the mass exoduswas already underway (October 1989).
6 For the application of these concepts to the Wendesee Hirschman (1993). Richter (1994: 127) refers to this combination of exit and voice as "the dual revolution of 1989." Strikingly, tbe revolt in June 1953 was also preceeded by an increase in people who left tbe country (Ulricb 1990: 7).
Die Wende: A moment of madness
Beginning in September 1989 the mostcourageaus civil rights activists publicly articula- ted their dissatisfaction with the regime. In Leipzig on September 4th, several hundred documented their willingness not only to remain in the country but also to struggle for democratic rights; three days later, several hundred people gathered at the Alexander- platz in East Berlin to accuse the regime of having distorted the communal elections re- sults of the previous May. As signs of the regime's weakness accumulated, ordinary citi- zens began to join the protests. The peak of mass mobilization was already reacged in October (see Figure 1). In Leipzig the number of demonstrators increased from 20,000 on October 2nd to 300,000 on October 23rd, and to more than 400,000 on November 6th.7
Figure 1:
Evolution of Protest Events in the GOR, 1989/90 quantity
60.---~
month/year Source: Eberwein et al. (1991 :25)
Whercas the protesters demanded political reforms, every day thousands of people chose another option: they left the country in search of a better life in West Germany. 'This exoduswas particularly prominent in the first week of November but then decreased as the weakening of the regime increased (see Figure 2).
7 For the special profile and dynamics of the Leipzig events see Breitenborn and Rink (1991), Opp (1991); Opp and Voß (1993), and Lohmann (1994).
Figure 2:
Migration from East to West Germany, 1989/90 migrants in thousands
140.---~
120+---~---~---4
1189 2189 3189 4189 !'w'89 &'89 71891!189 91891018911189121891190 2190 :wo 4190 5190 &90 7190 &'90 9190
month/year
Source: Hartmut Wendt, "Die deutsch-deutschen Wanderungen Bilanz einer 4Cl-järigen Geschichte von Flucht und Ausreise.", in: Deutschland-Archiv, 1991, Heft 4, s. 386-395.
During this period the fate of the regime, and thus the future of the GDR, was still an open matter.8 Changing the status quo was the only factor that united the oppositional old guard, the new members of the recently created opposition organizations, the citizens in the streets, and open-minded members of the Communist Party who argued for a fun- damental renewal of the regime_9 Demands for a market economy and German unificati- on were not yet prevalent; instead, these groups pleaded for a "different GDR."10 As they experienced the "power of numbers" (Denardo 1985) in a "moment of madness"
(Zolberg 1972) many people were euphoric about their ability to make history and shape the future according to their will. Both on the governmental and grass-roots Ievel a series of measures were announced and partially implemented in order to organize the reform process in the GDR.
8 On November 15 President Gorbatschev Jeclared that German unification, although not being im- possible, "is not an issue of present politics" (Karte 1994: 230). A similar statement was made by President Modrow on January 11th, 1990.
9 For the ideas of reform-oriented communist intellectuals, seeLand and Possekel (1994).
10 See the voices of leading activists and critical intellectuals as documented in a collective volume of that period (Knabe 1989). For instance, Reinhard Schulz (one of the co-founders of Neues Forwn) wrote at the end of November 1989, "For us, unification is not at stake ... Hence wedanot want to become an appendix as a twelfth state of the FRG." (Schulz 1989: 168f.) In front of more than a half million of demonstrators in East Berlin, Stephan Heym, a reform-minded socialist novelist, said:
"finally ... we can build socialism, not Stalinism, but a true socialism." (Speech reprinted in Schüd- dekopf 1990: 207f.)
Democratic experiments in a vacuum of power
The period between late 1989 and mid-1990 in the GDR was an exceptional situation.
Obviously, the communist party had not only lost legitimacy but also much of its former power. In particular the party's steering committee, the Politbüro, was dissolved after a purely symbolic attempt to renew its leadership. The parliament, the Volkskammer, also lacked legitimacy because it was not based on democratic electimis before March 1990.
Following the May 1990 treaty detailing the monetary, economic and social union of the two German states the Volkskammer was perceived as an intermediary institution without a future. In addition, the entire administrative and judiciary apparatus from the national to the locallevel was in a state of confusion and disarray. Hence, after four de- cades of a strictly authoritarian regime there ensued an unexpected institutional vacuum, marked by a considerable lack of state power and ah extreme sense of fragility, uncer- tainty and disorientation in the polity. Formally this status lasted until the unification treaty became valid on October 3rd, 1990. But even after-Wards many regulations existed only on paper and could not be implemented due to a lack of experienced personnel and other resources in East Germany.
As the communist leadership was forced step by step to make symbolic and then sub- stantial concessions the citizen movements became more institutionalized. They began to influence the formal powerholders and to intervene in political affairs. The activists initia- ted public dialogues, created citizen committees, and finally established Round Tables along the lines of other East European countries, particularly Poland (Weiß/Heinrich 1991). Very soon the Round Tables became the mostvisible institution to shape the East German society during this period (Thaysen 1990). Beyond the central Round Table and it's 17 working groups in East Berlin, many other Round Tables were established at the district and locallevel throughout East Germany. These new institutions took on some of the functions of the government, although they lacked the legitimacy of elections. As a rule they were composed of members from the "old" and the "new" forces, i.e. delegates from parties in the Volkskammer on the one band, and members of independent citizen movements (andin some cases, free-standing personalities) on the other. Each force bad the same number of delegates and the sessions were mostly chaired by representatives of the Protestant church. The aim was to discuss the country's problems, deflne adequate measures and implement these measures in collaboration with the government.
Until the elections in March 1990 the composition of Volkskammer had not signifi- cantly changed. This meant that the communist party still had an overwhelming majority and therefore retained formalleadership in both parliament and government. At the same time both institutions were largely discredited and therefore relatively weak. Institutions and groups lacking constitutional or legal powers were thus able to exert some measure of control over the government, share power, and initiate and implement measures for both reactive crisis management and proactive reform. Through this extraordinary dual government of old state institutions and civil self-government--a situation quite typical for the transformation process in Bastern Europe--the central Round Table became a key player.
As part of its concessions the Politbüro suggested the establishment of the central Round Table on November 22, 1989, an idea originally proposed by the citizen move- ments. According to the Politbüro this table was to bring tagether the old parties with
"other political forces" to discuss a new electoral law and constitutional reform. The central Round Table first met on December 7 without a clear mandate. From the vie- wpoint of the old forces the Table was an unwillingly accepted but necessary means to retain power by a strategy of co-optation.11 The goal of the old regirne was to irnprove its low credibility with the population while keeping as much control as possible over future developments. From the viewpoint of the new forces it was not only a democratic forum for discussion but also a tool to control and influence the government and share responsibility for the country's fate. Although insisting that the government led by presi- uent Hans Modrow was not legitimate anu thus was to be considered as only transitory, the Round Table did not make a serious effort to replace the government and seize po- wer, 12 probably because it also lacked the legitimacy of a democratic vote. Instead it re- stricted itself to exerting control, claimed veto power vis-a-vis the government, and sent delegates to governmental meetings.
11 Glaeßner (1991: 25) states that representatives of the government initially exhibited "obstructive be- havior" vis-a-vis the Round Table. Only when pressed were they ready to compromise. For a more detailed analysis of governmental efforts to instrumentalize the Round Table see Thaysen (1990).
12 According to Wolfgang Ullmann, an outstanding figure of the citizen groups and Minister from February through April1990 in the Modrow-government, the Round Table was not conceived as "a representative committee, a kind of emergency parliament, but as some sort of an extraordinary senate which bundles up all still existing authorities in order to support the State in recreating effec- tive institutions." (Cited in Schulz 1991: 26)
Despite sharp disagreement with the government the central Round Table was not an outspoken antagonist. There was an underlying agreement between the Modrow-led
"government for national responsibility" and most representatives of the Round Table not to "sell out" the GDR to the FRG. Initially the aim was to keep an independent but drastically reformed GDR. When voices in favor of unification later became dominant, the underlying consensus was to unite both states through a gradual process in which equal partners would conduct negotiations. By late 1989 and early 1990 a majority of polilical forces in the GDR believed that a unified German state should be truly de- mocratic and pluralistic but at the same time more egalitarian and solidarity-oriented than the capitalist "elbow-societies" of the West.
During this transitory period between the breakdown of the old regime and the key decisions towards German unification there was both high pressure and and readiness to deal with a with a broad range of serious problems. In particular, the central Round Ta- ble engaged in discussing and initiating a series of measures not only to stabilize the si- tuation but also to reform the country. As we can see from the brief discussion that fol- lows, the Round Table achieved mixed results as it dealt with these problems:
Security service. Spurred by protest actions and public opinion, the Round Table suc- cessfully put pressure on the government to dissolve the infamous State Security Service, the Staatssicherheit (Stasi). Through their coordinated efforts the opposition forces also successfully opposed a governmental initiative creating a new intelligence agency. Rela- ted to these activities were efforts to prevent governmental agencies and in particular the intelligence service from destroying documelits. Whereas in some cases opposition groups arrived too late to save these docurrients, in many other cases they managed to seize huge amounts of secret service materials. With the support of the Round Table and the citizen movements the activities of the Stasi were partly documented in publications ( e.g., Mitter and Wolle 1990) and expositions. Later an administration was created to ar- chive and evaluate the huge amount of material.
Electorallaw. Another immediate goal of the Round Table was to influence the con- ditions under which the first democratic elections at the national Ievel took place (eventually held on March 18th, 1990). Unlike the government which only wanted re- presentatives of regular political parfies to be allowed to nominate candidates, the Round Table and its supporting groups fought for less restrictive access which would enable the citizen movements to also nominate candida:tes. Although the movements' position was finally accepted, they failed in their effort to have (in accordance with their idea of Ba- sisdemokratie, a kind of grass-roots democracy) elections at the locallevel followed by elections at the national Ievel.
Constitution. The citizen movements considered the creation of a new constitution as the cornerstone of their attempt to establish a vital participatory democracy. A new constitution was still perceived as important even as unification of both German states became more and more apparent. At this point a new constitution was supposed to pro- vide creative input for the negotiations concerning unification. A special subcommittee of the Round Table drafted parts for such a constitution.
However, the governmental parties in the Volkskammer were not willing to accept this proposal in spite of their earlier agreement to a new constitution based on the 1949 version with additional proposals from the Round Table. Without previous discussion a majority of the parliament (167 for and 179 against) rejected the draft constitution on April 26th, 1990. Moreover, they refused to allow the representative from the Round Table who submitted the constitutional proposal to speak in Parliament and did not wish the proposal to be discussed in subcommittee. When it became obvious that at least some decisions on the constitution were required, on May 5 the parliament transferred to the government the task of elaborating these constitutional proposals, thus depriving itself of one of its most original competencies.
In reaction the citizen movements attempted to mobilize the public. Although they distributed the draft for the new constitution and collected more than 200,000 signatures their attempt eventually failed. Afterwards a new initiative composed of individuals and groups from both German states (Kuratorium für einen demokratisch verfaßten Bund deutscher Länder; Bachmann 1992) was launched in order to promote a constitution for a newly unified Germany. But the constitutional issue found only a weak resonance in the wider public, and efforts to establish a new constitution received only weak support in both the GDR and the FRG (before and aftcr unification). Although a parliamentary committee for constitutional reformwas established in the West German Bundestag, its final report of November 1993 did not promote major changes.13 Far..:reaching constitu- tional reform was encouraged neither by the majörity in parliament nor by the wider pu- blic.
A similar attempt was made to create new constitutions for the five new Bast German Länder (states). These attempts intensified from May 1990 onwards14 and later resulted in a new constitution for each Land. In cantrast to the nationallevel some constitutional elcments proposed by the citizen movements were adopted, although they usually consi- sted of "weaker" versions.
Whereas the citizen groups and the Round Tables achieved at least modest results on the issues listed above, these groups failed to even partially achieve their aims on other issu- es. Let us briefly consider three basic goals:
Maintenance and expansion of social rights. Closely related to the idea of institutiona- lizing radical democracy was that of securing extensive social welfare rights. At the cen- ter of these efforts was the formulation of a Sozialcharta (social charter) which guaran- teed work and housing, the "humanization" of Iabor, free education and health care, social welfare for underprivileged groups and a certain share of state property for every citizen. The Volkskammer accepted the Sozialcharta with some modifications, but the proposal was not implemented due to a lack of resolirces and the expectation of unifica- tion.
Stabilization and democratization of the economy. The already existing economic cri- sis intensified with the breakdown of the communist regime in Bast Germany and other
13 For recent discussions on constitutional reform see Guggenberger and Meyer (1994) and Berlit (1994}. .
14 Already in July the Volkskammer passed a bill in örder to reestablish the former Länder that had existed until 1952.
Eastern European countries. Astheborders with the West were opened internal markets partially collapsed when West Germans goods and services bccame available. At the sa- me time, exports from East German producers to Eastern European countfies decreased or even ceascd, further aggravating the crisis. In addition, many people in the civil ser- vice and in non-competitive firms lost their jobs. Given the economic situation, the weak government and approaching unification, the Round Table had little opportunity to pre- vent or soften the impact of the economic crisis. Although proposals for economic regu- lation and stabilization were discussed at the Round Table and among subgroups within the citizen movements, this was a purely discursive enterprise that had no real impact.
The attempts to reorganize the economy in terms of democratic decision-making and collective ownership were also largely in vain. Still believing in the ideas of democratic socialism, most representatives of the citizen movements · initially sought to democratize decision-making in firms by establishing Verwaltungsräte (administrative councils) com- posed of representatives of workers, management and experts. To steer the national eco- nomy the Round Table propösed the establishment of a working group which would in- volve representatives from government, the oppositional groups and independent ex- perts. The first task for the working group would be to elaborate legal conditions for both individual firms and the overallnational economy. The aimwas not to privatize the entire economy but instead to retain certain sectors tinder public ownership. Again the Volkskammer and the Modrow-government were not receptive to the proposals of the Round Table and the citizen movements. In December 1989 the government rejected their proposal to create administrative councils in firms. Instead it transferred most po- wers to the Generaldirektoren (general directors) and excluded worker and trade union participation.
Influencing the process of German unification. Unlike most Bast Germans who from early 1990 onwards wanted unification as soon as possible (Korte 1994: 101), the citizen movements and the central Round Table concentrated on slowing the pace and establis- hing conditions on the unification process. They preferred to first stabilize political, eco- nomic and social order in the reformed GDR and then to implement step-by-step unifica- tion based on an equal partnership between the states. 15 The citizen movements opposed the integration of East Germany into the existing institutional setting of West Germany and instead argued for a newly designed German Republic that would combine the vir- tues of both form er states while avoiding their negative aspects.
This vision proved to be unrealistic. The unification process accelerated and the citi- zen movements in the East as weil as their Western Counterparts were relegated to the role of mere spectators. It is hardly an exaggeration to state that the expectations and suggestions of the Round Table and the citizen movements were completely irrelevant and had little impact on German reunification. In consequence, these forces also failed to achieve their ultimate goals of a participatory democracy.
The decline of the reform movement is perfectly illustrated by the fate of the central Ra- und Table. During its final weeks in February and March 1990 it came under attack from conservative forces. The main criticism was that the Round Table had abandoned its in-
15 This was the main reason why most representatives of the citizen movements argued against the first treaty that immediately prepared for unification between the two states (Vertrag zur Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion) (Enbergs 1991: 103, 105).
itial role of controlling the government and had instead become an instrument to stabilize the government. Correct or not, it became clear that the Round Table's existence would be short and that most of its proposals would not be implemented. Not surprisingly, me- dia attention soon shifted away from the Round Table. Its sixteenth and last session on March 12, 1990--when the Round Table rejected the adoption of the West German constitution--received little media coverage (Thaysen 1990).
In spite of their short existence and low policy impact, one should not underestimate the significance of the Round Tables on other grounds. Besides the ad-hoc citizen committees that were engaged to dissolve the Stasi and to prevent the disappearance or destruction of its secret documents, the Round Tables were outstanding institutions du- ring the power vacuum. They were a direct expression of an ernerging civil society. They served as a public forum for ret1ection and discussion.16 They were an instrument to exert at least some control over a government that was stilllargely anchored in the ideas of the past. They helped to mediate conflicts and prevent violent clashes. One should note, however, that close artd competent observers disagree on the overall value of the Round Tables. Whereas some perceive them as "pre-schools of democracy" (Ullmann 1990) in which citizens proved not only their autonomy vis-a-vis the state but also their sense of responsibility for the future of society, others emphasize the Round Tables' latent functi- on of channeling dissent to the advantage of the communist government.17
The transplantation of the West Germanmodel
As evidence grew that the GDR was in a state of fundamental crisis, many viewed Ger- man unification as a fast and effective solution for the GDR's problems. The forces that promoted a reformed but autonomaus GDR began to lose support and were overwhel- med by the quick steps towards unification.18
16 With the Round Tables "the illegal or semi-legal counterpublies of pre-October became the genuine pub!ic forum. In part they were an institution of interrogation and relevation, in part a kind of moral tribunal ... The Round Tables to which citizen movements and parties sent delegates served to find consensus and to direct the interests among the forces of renewal. They were forums in which the Staatspartei (the communist party being merely identical with the state) and state power were submitted to severe defeats in front of operating cameras." (Zwahr 1993: 143).
17 For the latter perspective, seeJensReich "Weich abgewickelt." (DIE ZEIT, December 9th, 1994, p.
7)
18 The singer and writer Wolf Biermann bitterly stated: "There are only minor groups still interested in a socialist project: the powerholders from yestenlay and their prefered victims from yesterday: leftist
The general tenor of the mass demonstrations during the later phases of the Wende as well as the Volkskammer election results in March 1990 were clear signs that a majority of the populationnot only wanted quick unification but was also prepared to adopt West German institutions (Lohmann 1994:79). The first major step in this direction was the
"Treaty on Monetary, Economic and Social Union" of May 18, 1990, followed by the Volkskammer decision on August 23 to join the Federal Republic on October 3, the
"Unification Treaty'' of August 31 and eventually the Moscow treaty of September 12 in which the four Allied nations agreed to German unification and accepted the full so- vereignty of a united Germany.
Although unitication was formally agreed to by two autonomaus German govern- ments, in substantial terms there was a large asymmetry. The GDR was in such a weak position that West Germany could largely dictate the conditions for unification. The re- sult was a Beitritt ( entry, joining) according to Article 23 of the Constitution instead of an integration in which each state would retain elements of its former institutions. The GDR and all of its constitutional argans and administrative bodies ceased to exist on October 3, 1990, whereas those of the FRG remained essentially unchanged. In other words, German unification resulted in a territorial expansion of the FRG. Thus virtually all Bastern legal structures and institutions either had to be built from scratch or reorga- nized according to the West German model. This increased East Germany's dependence on Western experience and material support, thus contributing--mainly in the years after unification--to the irnpression of many East Germans of being treated as inferior or even being "swallowed" and "colonized."
During the later stages of mass demonstrations the citizen movements had already lost their initial key role and orienting function. Being the first authentic voice of the opposi- tion they were soon paralleled and then overshadowed by st:rong and so far unheard voices. Many citizens sought unification according to the slogan "Deutschland einig Va- terland" (Germany, united fatherland) rather than co-existence, national identity19 rather than international solidarity, and a market economy rather than democratic socialism.
The tone of the mass demonstrations became more tense and aggressive. In some instan-
christians and radical leftists. The oppositional minority of the dark years has again moved into a minority position." (DIE ZEIT, March 2nd, 1990)
19 For more information about the shift from socialism to nationalism, see Smith (1991).
ces members of the citizen movements were openly harassed when they dared to questi- on the demands of their co-demonstrators.
Large parts of the population were also ignorant, passive, skeptical or even critical of several initiatives and proposals of the Round Tables. Whereas measures directed against the Stasi were generally applauded, most of the economic propositions received little support. Political initiatives such as the proposal to conduct communal elections before national elections were also not weil received. In general, most of the people who had been used over the decadcs for political purposes by the regime were reluctant to accept the citizen movements' idca that they should now engage in a process of permanent poli- tical activity geared towards societal self-management.
In the eyes of most Bast Germans the citizen groups had played an important and ho- norable role as critics and opposition to the old regime. These groups, however, were not seen as instrumental for shaping the future and bringing about German unification.
Mass support for the citizen movements, which was an expression of dissatisfaction with the old regime rather than positive identification with the movements aims, declined. At the same time, other political forces became more prominent, either because they were scen as continuation to the old communist regime or as a tool to overcome it completely.
After the first democratic elections it was clear that political parties were gaining gro- und at the cost of the citizen movements (which partially competed with the regular par- ties). To a surprising extent and speed the established party system of West Germany was expanded to Bast Germany. To most Bast Germans the debate within the citizen movements over whether or not to bccome a party was largely irrelevant. Even when gi- ven the chance to vote not only for regular parties (including the quickly reorganized Blockparteien (bloc parties) that until recently had supported the communist regime) but also for politische Vereinigungen (which basically meant the citizcn movements), Bast Germans gave the citizen movements only modest support. Although these movements had played an extraordinary role in initiating the Wende, had a visible presence via the Round Tables, and served to prevent complete political disintegration, within a few months the movements were reduced to the level of "ordinary" interest groups. With poor electoral results and declining membership the citizen movements only survived as a marginal political force. Consequently, their concept of an active civil society also lost relevance. Now after several years this project appears to have been a naive dream that
was limited to a short period of transition during which "actors" seemed to stronger than
"structures".
2. Why radical democratization failed
Since the Wende East Gennany has undergone a fundamental process of democratizati- on. Most of the rights acquired by both citizen groups and the broader population are now formally guaranteed, and in this sense the citizen groups were successful. However, the groups' hopes to achieve a radical democracy "from below" was not fulfilled. Instead the revolution ended in a "Wende in der Wende" (Meuschel 1992: 316ff.), that is a transformation in the transformation. Only after the initial quests for a socialist reform did the demand for rapid unification and the largely unconditional adoption of West German institutions became dominant.
The fact that the overwhelming majority of the population simply had different prefe- rences compared to the citizen movement activists does not sufficiently explain the out- come of the Wende. What else prevented the citizen movements from achieving their goal? Are there theoretical concepts that could instruct us for such an explanatory task?
First, one could think about theories of revolution. Whereas these may give as an ade- quate answer on why the communist regime eventually was overcome, it appears that they are hardly designed to explain what happened after the revolutionary Wende. What happened during 1990 was no Ionger a revolution but a crucial and rapid shift in power constellations. Second, one could think about theories and concepts concerning social movements. Here I will briefly consider two approaches that might have an explanatory potential for our task: the concepts of resource mobilization and political opportunity structure.
Resource mobilization theories tend to ignore the aspect of grievances and deprivati- on but focus on organizational capacities that facilitate or restriet mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Jenkins 1983). Basically, they Iook for factors internal to a movement. I will use this perspective not only to assess organizational factors but also the role of ideological "resources" that had an impact on the movements capacity to gain and m:a:intain support, and to influence the course and result of German unification.
A movement's failure or success cannot be explained only in terms of its internal ca- pacities. Particularly in our case, where many and powerful actors came into play, and where windows of opportunity were quickly opened and closed, it is important to assess the contextual factors that either facilitated or restricted the movements' impact. In this regard, one could ask for the explanatory potential of the so-called political opportunity structure approach which I will consider in the second Ievel of my analysis.
Factars internal to the movements
The dissident groups that formed during the late 1970s and 1980s were strongly shaped by their environment. Having emerged and survived within the niches of a repressive re- gime, the groups' raison d'etre and activities were adjusted to this setting. In particular, the groups were hampered by a conceptual vagueness when presenting ideas to the pu- blic as well as an organizational structure that could not respond to the demands of a more open environment. I will briefly elaborate on these two aspects.
1. In terms of ideology, the groups had a strong moral orientation. They took literally the premises of socialism and constitutionalism, denouncing and finally trying to bridge the gap between theory and praxis. The majority of the groups, with the prominent exception of the Initiative für Frieden und Menschenrechte (Templin and Weißhuhn 1992), explicitly took a socialist stance and sought to reform rather than abolish the GDR. Only in 1988 and 1989 did most groups begin to realize that reforming the system would not be possible. They began to define themselves as outspoken opposition groups vis-a-vis the existing political regime. The groups were able to condemn elements of both socialism and capitalism but they had no ideas of how an alternative societal and political order should appear.20
This conceptual vagueness was not disadvantageaus in the first period of the Wende, when most political forces were attempting to remove the existing political regirne. Mter the quick breakdown of the regime, however, the groups' strong moral orientation tage- ther with their conceptual vagueness became a hindrance. Given their deep mistrust in a1l political power the groups faced two conceptual problems: initially, to define their role
20 In ietrospective, Bärbel Bohley, one of the most prominent representatives of the oppositonal groups, stated: "The citizen movement hat many illusions, but no concept for the whole country."
(Interview in die tageszeitung, November 9th, 1994, p. 5).
during the power vacuum, and then, to define the new order that was to be constructed.
To the extent that remnants of the old regime still existed the groups knew quite well whom to identify as an opponent and how to act effectively in reducing their opponents' influence. In contrast, the groups had more difficulties when dealing with other political forces that, at least in a superficial way, employed a similar politicallanguage about the need for reform, democra:cy and pluralism, but were organizationally more experienced, less reluctant to engage in the power game and more determined to seek their own ad- vantages.
After the old regime was abolished and public debates about the future of the GDR and the steps towards unification began, the groups could no Ionger rely on their past experiences. What was now at stake at the conceptuallevel was to define and promote concrete solutions that the population at large found attractive. This task required a kind of "political marketing" in a competitive situation with which the groups were unfamiliar and in which they were not prepared to act. Moreover, many of the groups did not wish to become engaged in such an instrumental power game whose rationale was to under- mine the position of competitors, to form tactical alliances, and to gain broad support at the tost of ideologicai purity.
In sum, the citizen groups were weakened by their conceptual framework in several ways. First, due to their idealistic conception of democracy, they were reluctant to seize power and compete with other groups that were difficult to define as opponents. Second, the groups bad evolved in response to a regime that no Ionger existed. Their abstract conceptions of democracy, liberty and soiidarity were not sufficient to define a new order beyond the socialism that the groups had experienced and the capitalism they knew indi- rectly. In terms of building political institutions and running an economy which was to be no Ionger commanded by the state, the groups knew more about what to avoid than what to achieve. Unlike the politicai forces that were stilliinked to the old regime or tho- se who simply wanted to adopt West German institutions, the citizen movements offered mere ideals that, simiiar to the earlier promises of the communist regime, were not likely tobe realized in the near future. Given their past experiences with the communist regime and the present state of disarray and crisis, for those who wanted an end to insecurity as soon as possible such conceptual vagueness was hardly attractive. Third, during the crucial period when the future path had yet to be defined, the citizen movements split into two factions, the "GDR-improvers who mainly engaged for a renewal of the country
including a maximum of democracy and the promoters of German unification" (Zwahr 1993: 138).
2. In addition to a weak conceptual framework, the initial organizational structures of the movements were devised to cope with a hostile institutional environment, for examp- le occasional state repression. They were forced to keep a low organizational profile in order to survive. The groups were relatively small, informal and only loosely coupled, if at all. 21 They had learned to live in a marginal and constantly endangered position, one where they were stigmatized, controlled and repressed by a clear-cut opponent. Denied access to mass publies and the polity the groups had neither the chances nor the resour- ces to develop large organizations and agitate the larger population. They were limited to meeting on a largely informal basis or to acting within the boundaries of church instituti- ons, and to conduct purely symbolic acts of dissent. These acts often contained an indi- rect political message which could be easily understood by the population at large but was difficult for state authorities to overtly suppress. In this sense the groups' organiza- tional weakness was instrumental to both their survival as weil as their ability to obtain a marginal visibility which in some cases expanded when dissident acts were reported by the West Germanmedia (West Germantelevision was widely and attentively watched in the GDR).22
However, the groups' organizational structures no Ionger served such instrumental purposes under the new circumstances when repression ceased and the masses began to pour into the streets and join the opposition groups. At this point the groups were over- whelmed with the parallel tasks of breaking the remaining powers of the regime, integra- ting new adherents into existing or newly-formed groups, and developing a convincing strategy for political change within a constantly changing environment. Although local chapters as weil as thematically specialized subgroups quickly formed, these usually lak- ked a solid and experienced core of personnel, a common identity among the groups and the organizational means to translate their abundant human resources into functioning working structures--structures that would allow decision-making on all Ievels, an effi- cient division of Iabor and concerted action within and between the movements. Conse-
21 It was estimated that the groups had a maximum of 10,000-15,000 members before the Wende (Pollack 1990: 221f.). Efforts to coordinate at least some parts of these groups on a regional or even nationallevel were made in 1987/88 but did not result in a strong network.
22 For the role of West German mass media during the Wende see Feige (1990), Hesse (1990), and Lindgensand Mahle (1992).
quently a large number of highly motivated but inexperienced group members were sim- ply sitting through many long meetings in order to discuss what could and should be do- ne. But for the most part these newcomers came from different social backgrounds, ha- ving neither the experience to work in informal political groups nor a clear vision of whe- re to go or what concrete task with which to begin. Leaving aside external influences, the confused internal situation also frustrated and discouraged many newcomers in the recently expanded groups. The groups' membership decreased almost as fast as it had ri- sen, returning to the "hard core" of group activists. Once again they found themselves a marginal group, although they now operated within a very different environment that was no Ionger repressive and thus provided less orientation and motivation for meaning- ful political action.
The movements' conception of grass-roots democracy, their holistic approach to po- litics and their naive vision of a politics ruled by moral principles proved to be inadequate when confronted with more instrumentally oriented competitors both inside and outside the groups.23 This brings me to a closer look at the changing context structure in which the movements operated.
Factars external to the movements
The concepts of political opportunity structure (Tarrow 1983; Brand 1985; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1991) and context structure (Rucht 1994) are designed to analyze social movements within the relatively stable environments of Western democracies. According to these concepts variables such as access to the polity, stability of political alignments, chances for forming alliances, and divisions among elites are seen as crucial for the scope of movement mobilization. This mobilization is in turn considered to be a key factor for a movement's impact upon policy.
Although these concepts can be used to analyze and assess the impact of the citizen movcments in the GDR, they are also limited insofar as the Wende can be considered a special case. First, as stated above, the situation was unstable and could not allow a gi- ven actor to implement a prefixed strategy. Instead the changing conditions required a
23 Already in December 1989 the Demokratischer Aufbruch and the Social Democratic Party prepared to leave the loose alliance of citizen movements (Schulz 1991:33).
constant reevaluation of opportunities and a corresponding change of tactics. Second, some variables specified by the opportunity/context structure apptoaches were simply ir- relevant. For example, political alignments as measured by voting patterns were either the artificial result of non-democratic elections or were only later established as a pattern.
Third, some additional and unique factors came into play. For instance, the mass exodus from the GDR was a crucial condition that stimulated rather than weakened mass pro- test. Another important factor was the FRG, whose mere presence bad a strong impact on the options of all actors within the GDR.24 Finally, in terms of the later stages of the Wende, it is relatively difficult to link mass mobilization to policy outcomes. Whereas during the initial stages the mass mobilization served to express a largely unanimous op- position to the existing communist regime, later this mobilization was no Ionger targeted towards one clear-cut goal but instead moved in several directions. The message of mass mobilization was not clear, thus providing an opportunity for various actors to interpret it as they pleased and also leaving room for back-stage actors to influence political mat- ters.
In sum, it is difficult to mechanically apply explanatory schemes developed for largely different settings to the GDR. Instead we must remain aware of the specificities of our case. During this period in the GDR most of the contextual factors did not work in favor of the citizen movements during the latcr stages of the Wende. I will discuss five factors that help to explain why the movements' mission to establish radical democracy failed:
(1) thc persistence of some of the old forces, (2) the shift from movement politics to the electoral arena, (3) the Iack of cultural resonance of the movements values within the broader populace, ( 4) the political impact of the FRG on East Germany and (5) the dou- ble pressure of mass exodus and economic crisis that required an immediate response.
1. Those forces which still represented or bad a strong ideological affinity with the old regime were able to keep some of their power and support. Certainly some of the most prominent communist Ieaders were forced to resign and the old communist party SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) was transformed into the new Party for De- mocratic Socialism (PDS). The less discredited second-rank Ieaders, however, now ente- red the political arena and for a short period bad a majority in both the government and the Volkskammer. They also created the PDS and cleverly adopted the language of re-
24 This specifity oftheGerman case is emphasized by Offe (1994).
form and pluralism. Thus the communist/socialist Ieaders succeeded in retaining a relati- vely large following which was still bound to the past and/or, for whatever reasons, pre- ferred something similar. These political forces and social groups had an ambivalent rela- tionship with the citizen movements: on one hand, they were regarded as the main oppo- nent because the movements had triggered the break-down of the old system and thus contributed to the lass of power and privileges experienced by the communist elites and their close followers. On the other hand, the communist groups and large parts of the ci- tizen movements both agreed that the adoption of capitalism as it existed in the FRG would be a mistake. This is the main reason why in spite of some conflicting aims the former antagonists were able to cooperate, even when they were tagether in the same government. 25
However, this partial convergence of interests was not attractive in the eyes of many citizens. Although they acknowledged the past achievements of the citizen movements, most were dubious about their capacity to determine the future, as can be seen from the rapid demobilization of the movements and their modest electoral results.
2. A second factor which contributed to the marginalization of the citizen movements was the shift from demenstratians and direct actions to the (national) electoral arena.
This shift occurred earlier than the movements wished and, contrary to their intentions, began with national instead of local elections. Moreover, it was initially unclear whether or not actors outside the regular parties would be allowed to nominate candidates. To some extent this situation created confusion, competition, and even severe disagreements within and between the various citizen movements. Same did not hesitate to form a party organization while others were divided and actually split into separate parties and move- ments. Still others renounced becoming a party altogether although they risked not being allowed to nominate candidates for the forthcoming elections.
Even after it became clear that movement-like groups would have the right to nomina- te candidates for national elections, for several reasons these groups still faced more obstacles in comparison to the regular political parties: already weakened by the inde- pendent formation of the Demokratischer Aufbruch and the Social Democratic Party, the movements competed in the elections as three separate organizations, Bündnis 90
25 Note that the Modrow government included eight ministers without a special portefolio from the ci- tizen groups.
(itself composed of three sub-groups), Griine-Unabhängiger Frauenverband, and Akti- onsbiindnis Vereinigte Linke (composed of two subgroups). The previous internal discussions about whether or not to present candidates for the election tagether with three competing electoral groups instead of one broad alliance gave most voters the im- pression that the movements lacked determination and unity. In cantrast the established parties had clear profiles and more visible leadership. The organizational structure of the established parties were designed to campaign and "compete" in elections. As parties, they did not engage in bitter internal debates about whether or not to present candidates for elections. Moreover, due to their Ionger existence some of the parties (such as the communist party and the so-called bloc parties) still had resources and knowledge of campaigning in elections. The bloc parties and the newly fouilded Social Democratic Party were strongly supported by their West German counterparts with financial aid, facilities and expertise. Clearly this external support went beyond mere assistance and was a major source of Western influence. Some observers have characterized this ±irst electoral campaign as more a competition between West German Parties on Eastern territory than a competition between genuine East German groupings.
In terms of campaign themes there wcre also substantial differences between the citi- zen movements and their parties and niost "established" parties. As stated previously, the movements tended to promote a vague societal project and were hostile to rapid and un- conditional German unification. In addition thc movements had no clear target groups and instead tended to address "the people ". Their language and argumentation resonated mainly with particular segments of the intellectual and cultural elite. In cantrast each of the established parties bad a distinct ideological profile, a relatively simple message (which was for the mostpartrapid unification) arid in most cases a traditional following to whom they could directly appeal.
All these differences led to correspondingly different electoral results. The more established parties received the lion's share of the vote with the alliance of conservative parties ("Allianz für Deutschland") led by the conservative Christian Democratic Party as the clear winner.26 Unlike the Social Democratic Party the conservative party relied on
26 The Conservative Alliance got 48.1 percent of the vote, the Social Democratic Party only 21.8 per- cent. According to Smith, the alliance won the election for four reasons: "they categorically rejected socialism, they unequivocally embraced national unification, they affered optimism to the voters rather than pessimism, and their organization was better." (Smith 1991: 243)
an existing infrastructure in the Bast. Leaders of the conservative parties (especially tho- se in West Germany) also put more emphasis on speedy unification and were less re- luctant to make promises. Their populist message paid off in the election.
Although they were not overly optimistic the citizen movements fared worse than they expected. Tagether the three alliances received only 5.05 percent of the vote in the first national elections after the fall of the regime. The movements did somewhat better in the communal elections on May 6 (between 5.5 and 17 percent in the city districts), but again polled relatively low in the state elections oh October 14 and the national elections in the then unified Germany on December 2. These results indicate that a large majority of Bast Germans did not perceive the citizen movements as advocating their interests.
3. The electoral failure of the citizen groups is not only the result of situational factors but also unveils a structurally rooted gap between these groups and the broader popula- tion. In terms of their social background, cultural codes and ideology the citizen groups constitute a very special subset of the East German population (Blattert, Rink, and Rucht 1994). Apart from a brief moment during the revolution they did not really reflect the feelings and claims of the broader population. Both their goal of a grass-roots democracy based on permanent activism and their disregard for the "consumerist" motives of their compatriots sepanited the citizen groups from the broader population. The vast majority of the populace was tired of promises for the long-term future. Instead of engaging in new and risky experiments for social change, these people bad more trust in the "tested"
and "reachable" solutions" of the West.
Some of the citizen groups attempted to downplay or to ignore this difference betwe- en them and the broader population. Others considered themselves as an avant-garde whose responsibility was to educate the people. Still others complained about the unwil- lingness or ignorance of the majority to make the right choice, or the widespread apathy among the population. Probably each of these reactions contributed in widening the gap between the groups and the broader population. In short, the movements did not find the
"cultural resonance" (Gamson and Modigliani 1989:5) which would have been required to come closer to their goals.
As a rule cultural values are deeply rooted and uifficult to be changed within a short period (Brown 1984). As we can learn from the German past and from other examples, negative experiences with authoritarian or even totalitarian regimes do no necessarily re- sult in an outcry for democracy, not to speak of calls for radical democracy. In this light,
