Rechtsvergleichung und Rechtsvereinheitlichung
herausgegeben von der
Gesellschaft für Rechtsvergleichung e.V.
76
Der Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz im Gesellschaftsrecht
Verhandlungen der Fachgruppe für vergleichendes Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht anlässlich
der 37. Tagung für Rechtsvergleichung vom 19. bis 21. September 2019 in Greifswald
Herausgegeben von
Peter Jung
Mohr Siebeck
Peter Jung ist Ordinarius für Privatrecht an der Universität Basel.
ISBN 978-3-16-159399-4 / eISBN 978-3-16-159400-7 DOI 10.1628/978-3-16-159400-7
ISSN 1861-5449 / eISSN 2569-426X (Rechtsvergleichung und Rechtsvereinheitlichung) Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Natio- nalbibliographie; detaillierte bibliographische Daten sind über http://dnb.dnb.de abruf- bar.
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Vorwort
Die 37. Tagung der Gesellschaft für Rechtsvergleichung vom 19. bis 21. Septem- ber 2019 in Greifswald stand unter dem Generalthema „Gleichheit“. Der vorlie- gende Band enthält sämtliche Referate, die in der Arbeitssitzung der Fachgrup- pe für vergleichendes Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht zum Thema „Der Gleich- behandlungsgrundsatz im Gesellschaftsrecht“ gehalten wurden.
Der Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz gehört zu den wichtigsten allgemeinen Prinzipien nicht nur des deutschen Gesellschaftsrechts. Gleichwohl sind viele Grund- und Teilfragen noch ungeklärt. Das ließ eine rechtsvergleichende Be- trachtung dieses insbesondere für den Minderheitenschutz wichtigen Grund- satzes interessant und lohnend erscheinen. Die fünf in diesem Band abgedruck- ten Landesberichte und der Generalbericht beschäftigen sich zunächst mit den Grundlagen (Verankerungen im Gesetz, Verhältnis zum verfassungsrechtlichen Gleichbehandlungsgebot und zu den allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsätzen, inhalt- liche Rechtfertigung, Verhältnis zur Vertrags- und Wirtschaftsfreiheit) sowie mit dem objektiven und subjektiven Anwendungsbereich des gesellschaftsrecht- lichen Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatzes. Ferner werden der Inhalt und die Rechts- natur des Gleichbehandlungsgebots sowie die Rechtsfolgen eines Verstoßes rechtsvergleichend behandelt. Schließlich bleibt noch Raum für die Untersu- chung von aktuellen bzw. praktisch besonders relevanten Spezialfragen wie die Bevorzugung von Groß- oder Ankeraktionären im Rahmen der Informations- politik der Gesellschaft oder die Zulässigkeit der Ausgabe sog. Loyalitätsaktien.
Den Landesberichten zum englischen Recht (Prof. Christopher Hare, Uni- versity of Oxford), französischen Recht (Prof. Bénédicte François, Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne), litauischen Recht (Prof. Virginijus Bitė, Mykolo Romerio universitetas, Vilnius), schweizerischen Recht (Prof. Dr. Peter V. Kunz, Universität Bern; Prof. Dr. Peter Jung, Universität Basel) und US-amerikani- schen Recht (Prof. James D. Cox, Duke University, Durham) folgt der General- bericht von Prof. Dr. Hanno Merkt (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg i. Br.).
Den Landesberichten und dem Generalbericht liegt ein vom Herausgeber in Abstimmung mit dem Generalberichterstatter erarbeiteter Fragenkatalog zu- grunde, der in englischer bzw. deutscher Sprache der Gliederung des Landes- berichts Litauen bzw. des Generalberichts zu entnehmen ist.
Ich danke der Referentin und den Referenten ganz herzlich für ihre Mitwir- kung an der Tagung und für die Veröffentlichung ihrer Beiträge in diesem Band.
VI Vorwort
Für ihre Mithilfe bei der Drucklegung bin ich Frau Esther Jundt sowie Herrn David Ballmer zu Dank verpflichtet. Herr Dr. Tizian Troxler hat mich als Fachgruppensekretär bei der Vorbereitung der Tagung unterstützt, wofür auch ihm herzlich gedankt sei.
Basel, im September 2020 Peter Jung
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Vorwort des Herausgebers . . . V
Christopher Hare
Equal Treatment of Shareholders in English Law . . . 1 Bénédicte François
The Principle of Equal Treatment in French Company Law . . . 33 Virginijus Bitė
Equal Treatment in Lithuanian Corporate Law . . . 51 Peter V. Kunz/Peter Jung
Der Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz im schweizerischen Gesellschaftsrecht 75 James D. Cox
Equal Treatment in Corporate Law: The American Experience . . . 105 Hanno Merkt
Der Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz im Gesellschaftsrecht – Generalbericht 113
Autorenverzeichnis . . . 169 Sachverzeichnis . . . 171
Equal Treatment of Shareholders in English Law
Christopher Hare
I. Introduction
When faced with the question of whether shareholders should be treated equal- ly, one’s innate sense of fair play usually impels one to provide a positive answer to that enquiry. Whilst there is undoubtedly a natural inclination in any legal system towards achieving outcomes that are consistent with notions of equality and fairness, accepting equality as an underling or organising idea is not the same as recognising equality as an enforceable legal principle. This distinction was made clear by Advocate-General Trstenjak in Audiolux SA v Groupe Brux- elles Lambert SA (“Audiolux”),1 which raised the issue of whether a minority shareholder in a public company was entitled to have its shares purchased on the same terms as other shareholders in circumstances where the purchaser had ac- quired effective control of the company. In rejecting the possibility of inferring from primary and secondary EU legislation a general principle that sharehold- ers should be treated equally, the Advocate-General stated:2
“The notion of equal treatment of shareholders runs as a leitmotif through company law in the Community and its Member States and evidently represents an essential ideal in that area of the law. However, it cannot claim to have acquired constitutional status in any legal order thus far. In national law, as in Community law, its codification is restrict- ed to individual rules in ordinary law. … Whilst some authors assume the existence of a
‘fundamental legal principle of company’, others describe the notion of equal treatment of shareholders merely as a ‘basic idea’ or a ‘simplified ideal to prevent arbitrary differ- ences in treatment by company bodies’. Many authors even see it as a ‘corollary of the general principle of justice’, whose origins are not in statute, but are non-legal, supra- positive.”
Whilst the Advocate-General’s language suggests that a notion of equal share- holder treatment might be a useful organising idea, or even an aspirational ideal, she does not recognise its crystallisation into a legal principle, let alone a funda- mental constitutional norm of the Community legal order. Indeed, whilst the
1 Opinion of Advocate-General Trstenjak, Audiolux SA v Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA C-101/08, 30 June 2009.
2 Ibid, [88]–[89] (emphasis in original).
2 Christopher Hare
Advocate-General accepted that there are particular legal manifestations of this underlying notion,3 she doubted whether the notion of equal shareholder treat- ment could be defined with sufficient precision to operate as a generally appli- cable principle with clear legal consequences.4 The Court of Justice of the Euro- pean Communities (“ECJ”) in Audiolux endorsed the Advocate-General’s views, indicating that a generalised principle of equal shareholder treatment could not be derived from the mere fact that there were particular legislative provisions that were consistent with that underlying ideal.5 Rather, the particu- lar manifestations of shareholder equal treatment were limited to the specific legislative context in which they arose.6 According to the ECJ, “it must be held that the provisions of secondary Community law to which the national court refers do not provide conclusive evidence of the existence of a general principle of equal treatment of minority shareholders”.7 Nor did the general Community principle of equal treatment assist in that regard.8
In light of the statements in Audiolux, this chapter is not concerned with the issue of whether English law recognises equality of treatment as an organising ideal that underlies the development of the law generally and company law spe- cifically. Manifestly, such an underlying aim forms part of the backbone of Eng- lish law from the constitutional recognition of citizens’ equality before the law in the Bill of Rights 16889 to the development of a distinct system of private law designed to produce fair outcomes when legal formality and rigidity pointed in the opposite direction. Indeed, the growth of the Chancery courts in medieval times and the distinct system of equitable principles that those courts developed were premised on an underlying notion of equal and fair treatment. Indeed, one of the central maxims that guided the courts of Equity in reaching their legal determinations was that “Equity is equality”.10 Given that English company law grew out of that equitable jurisdiction, it can be stated confidently that equality of treatment for shareholders is a strong impelling idea underlying the development of legal principle in company law.
Rather, this chapter concerns whether this underlying idea of equal treatment can be said to have crystallised into a legal principle of equal treatment of share- holders in English law. This legal principle could take one of two forms. Sec- tion II will consider whether it is possible to identify a general legal principle of equality that also happens to manifest itself in the English company law area or
3 Ibid, [84]–[87].
4 Ibid, [96]–[98].
5 Audiolux SA v Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA, C-101/08 [2010] 1 CMLR 39, [34]. See also Periscopus AS v Oslo Bors SA [2011] 2 CMLR 40, [40].
6 Ibid, [38], [40], [42], [50].
7 Ibid, [52].
8 Ibid, [54]–[61].
9 Bill of Rights 1688. See also Entick v Carrington (1765) 95 ER 807.
10 McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424, 445–446.
3 Equal Treatment of Shareholders in English Law
whether English company has itself developed such a general principle. It will be seen that such a high-level principle does not form part of English company law. In the absence of a generalised legal principle, Section III considers to what extent there are specific manifestations of an underlying commitment to equal shareholder treatment in the legal principles applicable to companies and corpo- rate groups (for which there is no separate regime in English law). As the Advo- cate-General made clear in Audiolux, this more fragmented legal approach rep- resents the position in both Community law and the domestic laws of Member States. English law is no exception. Any analysis concerning how equal share- holder treatment manifests itself in particular instances is, however, complicat- ed by the lack of precision regarding the meaning of that term. It is submitted that the equal treatment of shareholders has two aspects:11 first, a requirement that shareholders be treated equally by the company, which for the purposes of English law equates to equal treatment by the board of directors;12 and, second- ly, a requirement that minority shareholders be treated equally and fairly by the majority or controlling shareholders. Whilst the former aspect is relevant to both public and private companies, the latter is more likely to arise in the con- text of closely held companies, although (as the takeover context highlights) it is not limited to such companies. There is also a variety of different legal conse- quences that flow from these legal examples of equal shareholder treatment.
Section IV provides some concluding comments.
II. Foundations of the Principle of Equal Shareholder Treatment in English Law
1. Constitutional Foundations
In terms of identifying a general principle of shareholder equality, or at least the foundation for such a generalised legal principle, it is unlikely to be derived from any higher constitutional norm recognised by English law. Unlike Germany, England does not have a basic or higher law against which “ordinary” legisla- tion can be tested and, unlike the US, England has no written constitution that clearly sets out a generalised principle of equality. Rather, the English constitu- tion generally operates by way of conventions and ordinary legislation that set out constitutional principles. As these constitutional principles are contained in the ordinary acts of the legislature (such as the European Communities Act 1972 and the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA 1998”)), they are subject to amendment or repeal in the same way as any other legislative act. Whilst there
11 Mucciarelli, Equal Treatment of Shareholders and European Union Law, [2010] ECFR 158.12 Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34.
4 Christopher Hare
is a long history of English law respecting the equality of its citizens before the law, as contained in the Magna Carta 1215 and Bill of Rights 1688, neither doc- ument explicitly establishes a general principle of equality of treatment. Similar- ly, whilst there exist leading cases that have established a requirement of equal treatment in particular contexts, such as the impact of executive action on pri- vate citizens,13 none can really be generalised into a more widely applicable principle of English law. This is reinforced by the fact that even the Equality Act 2010, which is the United Kingdom’s most wide-reaching piece of legislation securing freedom from discrimination and equality of treatment in accessing services, premises, employment, associations and employment, is limited to the
“protected characteristics” of age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sex- ual orientation.14
Although matters could feasibly have changed with the United Kingdom’s accession to the European Community and then the European Union, this has not in fact been the case. As the ECJ made clear in Audiolux,15 Community law itself has not derived a general principle of equal treatment of shareholders from its general principle of equality. Nor have things altered significantly by virtue of the UK’s ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the ECHR”), which has been implemented into English domestic law by the HRA 1998. The HRA 1998 now requires all English primary and secondary legisla- tion (including the Companies Act 2006) to be interpreted in light of the “con- vention rights” contained in the ECHR,16 as well as requiring “public authori- ties” to act in accordance with its provisions.17 The “convention rights” that are most likely to provide a foundation for any general principle of shareholder equal treatment are the prohibition against discrimination18 (which could theo- retically encompass corporate conduct that is targeted at particular sharehold- ers who are consequently especially prejudiced by that action) and the protec- tion of individual property rights (which could potentially cover corporate con- duct that has the effect of expropriating shares).19 In reality, however, neither right provides a basis for recognising a general principle of shareholder equality in English law. Those rights are limited to certain closely defined acts of dis- crimination or interference. Furthermore, the English courts have refused to give the ECHR so-called direct “horizontal effect”,20 although the English courts as “public authorities” might have to give some consideration to a party’s
13 Entick v Carrington (1765) 95 ER 807.
14 Equality Act 2010, s 4.
15 Audiolux SA v Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA, C-101/08 [2010] 1 CMLR 39.
16 Human Rights Act 1998, s 3.
17 Ibid, s 6.
18 Ibid, Sch 1, Art 14.
19 Ibid, Sch 1, First Protocol, Art 1.
20 Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) [2004] 1 AC 816.
5 Equal Treatment of Shareholders in English Law
convention rights when enforcing pre-existing causes of action that are already recognised by domestic law.21 Accordingly, whilst a shareholder might poten- tially use the HRA 1998 as a means of enforcing standards of equal treatment in the context of state-owned enterprises or public utility companies,22 the rele- vant convention rights would provide little assistance to a shareholder in an or- dinary trading company when formulating such a claim against other private parties, whether the company itself or its directors or shareholders. According- ly, there is little constitutional or public law basis for a general principle of equality of treatment for shareholders in English law.
2. Private Law Foundations
Given that there does not appear to be any general constitutional mandate or foundation for the principle of equal shareholder treatment in English Law, the issue arises as to whether there may be some basis for such a principle in English private law. There is certainly no such explicit private law principle of equal shareholder treatment that has general application, particularly as English tort law operates on the basis of distinct and closely defined torts rather than an overarching principle of delictual liability, as in French law. Moreover, English contract law has generally eschewed any general principle of good faith regard- ing the formation or performance of contracts,23 although there are signs that this might be changing at least in the context of long-term relational contracts.24 Nor is there any general principle of equal treatment articulated in the Compa- nies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”). Despite this absence of any tortious, contractual or statutory basis for the principle of equal treatment, it is possible to find an un- derlying desire to attain results consistent with notions of equality between private actors in the development of a separate equitable jurisdiction in England.
a) Development of the Courts of Equity
The development of Equity can be traced back to the administration of justice in medieval England. At that time, justice was administered either at local level by the feudal barons or by the King’s courts in a manner that was consistent across the whole country, so that it was a “common law”. Local justice was intended to predominate, with the three royal courts (the King’s Bench Court, the Common
21 Human Rights Act 1998, s 6(3)(a).
22Foster v British Gas plc, C-188/89 [1991] 2 AC 306.
23Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128, 138.
24 Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trading Corp Ltd [2013] EWHC 111; Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd v Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust [2013] EWCA Civ 200 [105];
Globe Motors Inc v TRW Lucas Varity Electric Steering Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 396 [67]–[68].
See also Ilkerler Otomotiv Sanayai ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Perkines Engines Co Ltd [2017] 4 WLR 144; Nehayan v Kent [2018] EWHC 333 (Comm); Astor Management AG v Atalaya Mining plc [2018] EWCA Civ 2407.
6 Christopher Hare
Pleas and the Court of Exchequer) designed to intervene only occasionally. As the King’s courts expanded their reach and influence, the local barons objected, which in turn led to the “forms of action” available in the “common law” being frozen. Two factors led to the creation of the courts of Equity. The first was that the local courts were not able to cope with the large number of claims that might otherwise have previously been dealt with by the royal “common law” courts.
The second was the inflexible and rigid nature of the “common law”, which re- quired, amongst other things, that claimants bring their pleas within certain, specific, closely circumscribed causes of actions, known as writs. Each writ (or form of action) prescribed certain specific elements of the claim, all of which had to be satisfied in order for the claimant to succeed. There also operated strict rules of pleading and proof. This meant that if an aggrieved party could not fit his claim within the stipulated formal requirements of a writ, no remedies would be available to him and he was bound to fail in his plea. The only antidote to the common law courts’ rigidity in administering justice was by way of an appeal to the King in the form of a petition.25 These petitions relied on the residual discre- tionary power of the King to provide redress and to do justice for his subjects where, for whatever reason, justice could not be obtained through the royal com- mon law courts. As the King undoubtedly had more fascinating interests to pur- sue, this role was eventually delegated to the Lord Chancellor of the land who was able to exercise the required discretion in the King’s stead.26
This exercise of discretion relied upon a litigant appealing to the Lord Chan- cellor’s conscience,27 from which developed the separate body of legal principles known as Equity. From the very outset and through its subsequent refinement, the principles of Equity were designed to supplement the common law, which continued with its characteristic rigidity and which could not be relaxed for fear of losing the certainty associated with its application. In its early days, however, the flexibility associated with the equitable jurisdiction resulted in a series of ad hoc decisions which, rather than relying on rules and principles, granted or withheld relief on a seemingly arbitrary basis. As was noted by Selden:28
“Equity is a roguish thing. For law we have a measure … equity is according to the con- science of him that is Chancellor, and as that is longer or narrower, so is equity. ’Tis all one as if they should make the standard for the measure a Chancellor’s foot.”
Thus, early Chancery decisions were largely casuistic, with the circumstances of individual cases carrying great weight and the adjudication being highly con- textual and pragmatic. There was no abstracting methodology, no doctrine of
25 Holdsworth, History of English Law I (Methuen & Company), 402 et seq.
26 Maitland, The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I (Liberty Fund Inc., 2010), 201.
27 Ewing v Orr Ewing (No 1) (1883) 9 App Cas 34 at 40. See also Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669.
28 Selden, Table Talk of John Selden (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 64.
7 Equal Treatment of Shareholders in English Law
strict binding precedent, and, accordingly, no commitment to the values of con- tinuity, consistency, uniformity and predictability that supported and justified those doctrines developed at common law.29 Subsequently, as a result of the overwhelming increase in the number of petitions, the Lord Chancellor was compelled to delegate his jurisdiction by establishing a fourth royal court, the Court of Chancery, in which the judges purported to exercise the same powers and discretion as the Lord Chancellor and the King. It was through the estab- lishment of this more formal judicial administration that Equity gradually developed from a jurisdiction of fluid, pragmatic, conscience-based decision- making to one founded primarily upon the application of authoritative rules, maxims, principles and precedents.30 It has been suggested that this was a natu- ral judicial reaction to the arbitrariness of the early equitable jurisdiction, which attempted to make a virtue out of inconsistency.31
From 1557, decisions of the Court of Chancery began to be formally report- ed, which strengthened the basis for treating them as precedents to guide future courts in the application of equitable principles.32 Indeed, one can see that modern- day equitable doctrines operate as much through principles as their common law counterparts and no longer rely upon an intuitive appeal to con- science.33 Even as Equity was being organised into a somewhat more coherent body of law, the separate administration of equitable and common law princi- ples and doctrines meant that there remained the possibility of a conflict be- tween the different courts on the same issue. This conflict was famously re- solved in Equity’s favour in the Earl of Oxford’s Case, in which Lord Ellesmere stated that “[t]he Cause why there is a Chancery is, for that Men’s Actions are so divers[e] and infinite, [t]hat it is impossible to make any general Law which may aptly meet with every particular Act, and not fail in some Circumstances.”34 The continued tension between the common law and equitable courts, however, only heightened the risk of inconsistent decision-making depending upon the jurisdiction invoked and the location of the relevant proceedings. Accordingly, in response to this conflict of administration, the common law courts and courts of equity were subsequently fused through the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875, under which the Court of Chancery, King’s Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer, Admiralty, Probate, the Court of Bankruptcy, as well as the associated appellate courts, were consolidated to form a single Supreme Court of Judicature.35 The creation of a unified system
29 Lau Siew Kim v Yeo Guan Chye Terence [2008] 2 SLR(R) 108, [25]. See also Gee v Pritchard (1818) 2 Swan 402, 411.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Holdsworth, History of English Law (Methuen & Company), 274–278.
33 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores Ltd [1998] AC 1, 11.
34The Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615) 1 Chan Rep 1, 6; 21 ER 485, 486.
35 Tan Yong San v Neo Kok Eng and others [2011] SGHC 30, [100].
8 Christopher Hare
for the administration of civil justice effectively abolished the two distinct court systems that were tasked with applying and developing common law and equit- able principles in a separate manner. The fusion of common law and equity was, however, confined to the administration of the separate bodies of law; the sub- stantive principles developed by the common law and chancery courts remain distinct, as does the historical distinction between common law and equitable forms of relief.36
b) Equity’s Subjects: Trusts, Partnerships and Companies
As a result of the development of the courts of Chancery and general equitable principles, certain areas of private law became almost the exclusive preserve of equity. This included the law relating to trusts, partnerships and companies. In dealing with these areas, the Chancery courts also developed certain “maxims”
to guide their conscience in achieving an equitable result in any given case. Such maxims were not, however, formal rules or principles, but simply overarching guidelines. Once such maxim was that “Equity is equality”.37 A particular man- ifestation of this maxim can be found in English partnership law, which pro- vides as a “rule” for determining partners’ rights and duties in relation to the partnership that “[a]ll the partners are entitled to share equally in the capital and profits of the business, and must contribute equally towards the losses whether of capital or otherwise sustained by the firm”.38 Moreover, partners are expect- ed to treat one another fairly and English partnership law requires partners to act in each other’s best interests by imposing fiduciary duties inter se.39 Indeed, in Blisset v Daniel,40 Page Wood VC recognised duties of good faith operating between partners. Although English company law has now been put on a strong statutory footing by the CA 2006, there is no doubt that at one time or another company law has been analogised to (or said to derive from) the English law principles relating to partnerships and trusts. This remains the case nowadays.
For example, in the context of developing the principles relating to the unfair prejudice jurisdiction41 and the jurisdiction to liquidate a company on just and equitable grounds,42 Lord Wilberforce has drawn a strong link between the equitable principles applicable to the relationship between partners and the principles applicable to owner-operators in closely-held companies.43 Indeed, in
36 Ibid. See also Salt v Cooper (1880) 16 ChD 544, 549.
37 McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424, 445–446.
38 Partnership Act 1890, s 24(1).
39 Ibid, s 24.
40 Blisset v Daniel (1853) 10 Hare 493, 523–525.
41 Companies Act 2006, s 994.
42 Insolvency Act 1986, s 122(1)(g).
43 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360, 375.
9 Equal Treatment of Shareholders in English Law
O’Neill v Phillips,44 Lord Hoffmann stated that “company law has developed seamlessly from the law of partnership, which was treated by equity, like the Roman societas, as a contract of good faith. One of the traditional roles of equi- ty, as a separate jurisdiction, was to restrain the exercise of strict legal rights in certain relationships in which it considered that this would be contrary to good faith. These principles have, with appropriate modification, been carried over into company law”. Whilst the analogy with partnerships may be less perfect in publicly traded companies, the notion of equality of treatment underlying part- nerships has long been a juristic reference-point for the development of compa- ny law principles.
Besides the development of partnership law, the great invention of Equity was the trust. In supervising the enforcement of trusts, the Chancery courts re- quired a trustee to act in the best interests of the trust’s beneficiaries by impos- ing fiduciary obligations on the former45 and by requiring trustees to treat the beneficiaries in an even-handed manner.46 In relation to this last duty, in Re Pauling’s Settlement Trusts (No 2),47 Wilberforce J stated that “[t]he new trus- tees would be under the normal duty of preserving an equitable balance, and if at any time it was shown they were inclining one way or the other, it would not be a difficult matter to bring them to account”. Accordingly, a trustee was under an enforceable duty to treat beneficiaries equally. Just as with the principles of partnership law, the English courts have drawn a close analogy between the role and duties of trustees, on the one hand, and those of directors, on the other. For example, the strict principle that a fiduciary cannot make a profit from his or her position as such was originally adopted as part of trusts law,48 but then adopted as the principle applicable to directors by the House of Lords in Regal (Hast- ings) Ltd v Gulliver.49 This in turn formed the basis for the leading modern de- cision on the trustee’s duty not to make a profit from their position.50 Although there have been some attempts to unpick this analogy by the courts,51 the Eng- lish courts have continued to draw a close link between the law applicable to trustees and directors. This link has even survived the enactment of the compre- hensive statutory regime in the CA 2006, since, to a large extent, these equitable principles have been re-enacted in sections 171–177 of the CA 2006, which now set out the fiduciary duties of directors towards the company. These statutory duties reflect those recognised by Equity including the director’s duty to act in good faith, not to make an unauthorised profit and not to put himself in a posi-
44O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092, 1098.
45 Keech v Sandford (1726) Sel Cas t King 61.
46Re Pauling’s Settlement Trusts (No 2) [1963] Ch 576.
47 Ibid, 586. See also Nestle v National Westminster Bank plc [1993] 1 WLR 1260, 1279.
48 Keech v Sandford (1726) 25 ER 223.
49 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134n.
50Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46.
51 Murad v Al-Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959.
10 Christopher Hare
tion conflicting with that of the company. Moreover, the CA 2006 does not purport to codify directors’ duties: the legislation expressly provides that equi- table principles (such as those applicable to partners and trustees) can still in- fluence the development and interpretation of the directors’ statutory duties by analogy52 and may even provide a basis for recognising additional duties beyond those contained in the CA 2006.53
Accordingly, whilst neither the CA 2006 nor English private law more gener- ally recognises a general legal principle of equal treatment (given its traditional hostility to either a general duty of good faith,54 a general abuse of rights doc- trine55 or a general duty of care56), the equitable maxims relating to equal treat- ment underlying partnership and trusts law provide a justification for the spe- cific manifestations of equal treatment of shareholders in English company law.
As indicated above, however, an equitable maxim is little more than a guideline and lacks both the precision and force of a concrete legal principle.
III. Manifestations of the Principle of Equal Treatment of Shareholders in English Law
Despite the fact that no principle of equal shareholder treatment can be found in either English constitutional or private law, there are nevertheless particular manifestations of the underlying notion of equality between shareholders in various aspects of English company law. Most of the legal manifestations of shareholder equality apply to all companies, but there are particular manifesta- tions that apply solely (or apply more forcefully) to either closely held or public- ly traded companies. For example, the manifestations of shareholder equality that derive from the Second Company Law Directive and capital market laws are limited to publicly traded companies, whilst the equitable “Allen jurisdic- tion”57 and the unfair prejudice jurisdiction,58 although technically applicable to all companies, actually apply much more forcefully to closely held companies.
Overall, all companies in English law are impacted by some manifestation of the shareholder equality principle, albeit that the scope and application of any particular manifestation may alter according to the particular context. This means that there is no single one-size-fits-all justification for the various legal manifestations of equal shareholder treatment: in the context of closely-held
52 CA 2006, s 170(3)–(4).
53 Goldtrail Travel Ltd v Aydin [2014] EWHC 1587 (Ch).
54 Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128.
55 Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1.
56 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398.
57 Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa [1900] 1 Ch 656.
58 CA 2006, s 994(1).
Sachverzeichnis
Absolute Gleichbehandlung – Generalbericht 142 f.
– Litauen 63 f.
– Schweiz 84 f., 89 f.
Adressaten des Gleichbehandlungs- grundsatzes 11, 132 ff.
Affectio societatis 36 ff., 123 Agency 11, 106, 125
Aktienkategorien; s. auch class rights – Schweiz 83, 88
Aktivitätsprämien 100 ff.
Anfechtbarkeit 90 f., 152 Anteilseigentum, Schutz 38 ff.
Anwendungsbereich des Gleichbehand- lungsgrundsatzes
– Generalbericht 129 ff.
– Litauen 57 ff.
– Schweiz 81 ff.
Audiolux-Entscheidung, EuGH 1 ff.
Auflösungsrecht bei Ungleichbehandlung – Litauen 69
– Schweiz 93
Auslegung von Gesellschafterrechten 15 f., 80 f.
Ausprägungen des Gleichbehandlungs- grundsatzes
– Englisches Recht 10 ff.
– Litauen 62 ff.
– Schweiz 75 ff.
– USA 108 ff.
Austrittsrecht bei Ungleichbehandlung – England 29
– Generalbericht 155 f.
– Litauen 69 – Schweiz 93
Bereicherungsausgleich 154 Beseitigungsansprüche 154 Börsenzulassungsrichtlinie 113
Class rights 13, 15 f., 25, 30
Clause léonine; s. leoninische Klausel Deutsches Recht
– Adressaten der Gleichbehandlungs- pflicht 134
– Anfechtbarkeit 152
– Anwendungsbereich des Gleich- behandlungsgrundsatzes 130 – Begründung des Gleichbehandlungs-
grundsatzes 124 f., 126, 127 – Informationsrechte – Konzernrecht 163 – Loyalitätsaktien 161
– Mehrfachstimmrecht 160, 161 – Positive Gleichstellung 139, 154 – Rechtfertigung von Ungleichbehand-
lungen 145 f., 147 – Schadensersatz 153
– Ungleichbehandlung, Rechtsfol- gen 152, 153
– Ungleichbehandlung, Tatbestand 136 – Unterlassungsanspruch 155
– Verfassungsrecht und Gleichbehand- lung 120 f.
– Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz 147 – Zwingende Geltung des Gleichbehand-
lungsgrundsatzes 149
Dividendenausschüttung; s. Gewinn- ausschüttung
Doppelstimmrecht 46
Drittverträge mit Gesellschaftern 83 f.
Englisches Recht 1 ff.
– Abuse of rights 10
– Adressaten des Gleichbehandlungs- grundsatzes 11
– Auslegung von Gesellschafter- rechten 15 f.
172 Sachverzeichnis – Ausprägungen des Gleichbehandlungs-
grundsatzes 10 ff.
– Class rights 13, 15 f., 25, 30 – Companies 8 ff.
– Companies Act 2006 5
– Equity als Grundlage des Gleich- behandlungsgrundsatzes 5 ff.
– EuGH 1 ff., 32
– Geschlossene Gesellschaften 10 f., 106 ff.
– Gewinnausschüttung 15
– Haftung der Leitungsorgane 18 ff.
– Invalidation of corporate acts 29 ff.
– Kapitalerhaltung 21 ff.
– Kapitalmarktrecht 16 ff.
– One share one vote 12 ff.
– Partnership 8 ff.
– Privatrechtliche Grundlagen des Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatzes 5 ff.
– Publikumsgesellschaften 10 f.
– Stimmrechtsprivilegien 12 ff.
– Trust 9 f., 19 f., 29
– Unfairly prejudicial conduct 25 ff.
– Ungleichbehandlung 20 – Unterlassungsklage 19 f.
– Verfassungsrechtliche Grundlagen des Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatzes 3 ff.
Equity als Grundlage des Gleichbehand- lungsgrundsatzes 5 ff.
Ermessen der Leitungsorgane 147 f.
EuGH-Entscheidungen – Audiolux 1 ff., 32 – Marleasing 38 EU-Recht
– Audiolux-Entscheidung 1 ff., 32, 115 f.
– Börsenzulassungsrichtlinie 113 – Einfluss auf litauisches Recht 51 – Grundsatz der Gleichbehandlung 1 ff.
– Kapitalrichtlinie 51 f., 57, 113, 128 f.
– Marleasing-Entscheidung 38 – Transparenzrichtlinie 58, 128 f.
– Übernahmerichtlinie 58 Französisches Recht 33 ff.
– Abus de majorité 41 f.
– Abus de minorité 41 f.
– Administrateur provisoire 42 f.
– Affectio societatis 36 ff.
– Anteilseigentum, Schutz 38 ff.
– Begriff der Gesellschaft 36 ff.
– Clause léonine 34 f., 39 – Doppelstimmrecht 46
– EuGH, Marleasing-Entscheidung 38 – Mehrfachstimmrecht 46 f.
– Mythos des Gleichbehandlungsgrund- satzes 34 ff.
– Nichtigkeit der Gesellschaft 34 f., 38 – Realität des Gleichbehandlungsgrund-
satzes 43 ff.
– Rechtfertigung 11, 56 f.
– Rechtsgrundlagen 34 ff.
– Société par actions simplifiée (SAS) 43 ff.
– Stichentscheidungsrecht 45 f.
– Stimmrechtsprivilegien 45 ff.
– Unbestimmtheit des Gleichbehand- lungsgrundsatzes 34 f.
– Ungleichbehandlung 43 ff.
– Verfassungsrecht 33 Geschlossene Gesellschaften – England 10 f.
– USA 106 ff.
Gewinnausschüttung – England 15
– Leoninische Klausel; s. dort – Schweiz 80 f.
Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz – Absolute Gleichbehandlung; s. dort – Adressaten des 11, 132 ff.
– Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze 121 ff.
– Anteilseigentum, Schutz 38 ff.
– Anwendungsbereich; s. dort – Auslegung von Gesellschafter-
rechten 15 f.
– Ausprägungen des; s. dort
– Austrittsrecht bei Ungleichbehand- lung; s. dort
– Begründung des 121 ff.
– Deutschland; s. deutsches Recht – Drittverträge mit Gesellschaftern 83 f.
– England; s. englisches Recht – Ermessen 147 f.
– EU-Recht; s. dort
– Formelle Gleichbehandlung 86 – Frankreich, s. französisches Recht
173 Sachverzeichnis
– Funktionen 79 ff.
– Geschlossene Gesellschaften 10 f., 106 ff.
– Grundlagen 115 ff.
– Haftung; s. Verantwortlichkeit – Informationsrechte; s. dort – Inhalt 138 ff.
– Kapitalerhaltung 21 ff.
– Kapitalmarktrecht; s. dort – Konzern; s. Konzernrecht – Künftige Gesellschafter 136 – Leoninische Klausel; s. dort – Litauen, s. litauisches Recht – Loyalitätsaktien; s. dort
– Lückenfüllungsfunktion 15 f., 80 f.
– Machtmissbrauch 10, 41 f., 123 f.
– Materielle Gleichbehandlung 86 – Mehrheitsgesellschafter 60, 132 ff.
– Minderheitenschutz 79 f.
– Mitverwaltungsrechte 59, 132 – Mythos 34 ff.
– Negativer Anspruch auf Gleichbe- handlung 138 ff.
– Ordre public 61 f., 78 f., 137 – Pflicht für Leitungsorgane 18 ff.
– Positiver Anspruch auf Gleichbehand- lung 138 ff.
– Proportionalitätsprinzip; s. dort – Rechtsfolgen von Ungleichbehand-
lungen; s. dort
– Rechtsgrundlagen; s. dort
– Schadensersatz; s. Verantwortlichkeit – Schweiz; s. schweizerisches Recht – Stimmrechtsprivilegien; s. dort – Thesen 164 ff.
– Transparenzrichtlinie 58 – Treu und Glauben; s. dort – Übernahmerichtlinie 58 – Unbestimmtheit 3, 34 f.
– Ungleichbehandlung; s. dort – Ungültigkeit von Beschlüssen etc.;
s. dort
– USA; s. US-amerikanisches Recht – Verantwortlichkeit der Leitungs-
organe; s. dort
– Verfassungsrechtliche Grundlagen;
s. dort
– Vermögensrechte 59, 132 – Verpflichtung der Gesellschaft 60
– Vertragsfreiheit; s. dort – Zusammenfassung 164 ff.
Haftung; s. Verantwortlichkeit Höchststimmrecht 98 Informationsrechte – Generalbericht 156 ff.
– Litauen 71 ff.
– Schweiz 93 ff.
Inhalt des Gleichbehandlungsgrund- satzes 138 ff.
Kapitalerhaltung 21 ff.
Kapitalgesellschaft 140 ff.
Kapitalmarktrecht – England 16 ff.
– Generalbericht 115, 131 f., 156 f.
– Litauen 58 – Schweiz 76 f.
– USA 105 f.
Kapitalrichtlinie 51 f., 57, 113, 128 f.
Konzernrecht
– Generalbericht 162 ff.
– Litauen 73 f.
– Schweiz 103 f.
Kopfprinzip; s. absolute Gleichbehand- lung
Leitungsorganmitglieder
– Haftung; s. Verantwortlichkeit 18 ff.
– Unfaires Verhalten 25 ff.
Leoninische Klausel – Frankreich 34 f., 39 – Generalbericht 123, 140 – Schweiz 80 f.
Litauisches Recht 51 ff.
– Anwendungsbereich des Gleich- behandlungsgrundsatzes 57 ff.
– Auflösungsrecht 69 – Austrittsrecht 69
– Einfluss des EU-Rechts 51, 57 – Fälle 51
– Informationsrechtliche Ungleich- behandlung71 ff.
– Kapitalrichtlinie 51 f., 57 – Konzernrecht 73 f.
– Kündigungsrecht 69
174 Sachverzeichnis – Loyalitätsaktien 73
– Ordre public 61 f.
– Proportionalitätsprinzip 63 f.
– Rechtfertigung von Ungleichbehand- lungen 64 ff.
– Rechtsfolgen 67 ff.
– Rechtsgrundlagen des Gleichbehand- lungsgrundsatzes 52 ff.
– Rechtsschutz 62
– Stichentscheidungsrecht 73 – Vertragsfreiheit 57 Loyalitätsaktien – Frankreich 46 f.
– Generalbericht 161 f.
– Litauen 73 – Schweiz 100 ff.
Lückenfüllung – England 15 f.
– Schweiz 80 f.
Machtmissbrauch – England 11 – Frankreich 41 f.
– Generalbericht 123 f.
– Schweiz 79 f.
– USA 106, 108 f.
Marleasing-Entscheidung, EuGH 38 Mehrfachstimmrecht
– Frankreich (echt) 46 f.
– Schweiz (unecht) 97 f.
Mehrheitsbeschlüsse 79 f.
Mehrheitsgesellschafter – England 3, 11, 26, 30 f.
– Frankreich 41 f.
– Litauen 60 – Schweiz 79 f.
– USA 108 f.
Minderheitenschutz 79 f., 122 Mitverwaltungsrechte 59, 132 OECD-Principles of Corporate
Governance 113
One share one vote; s. Stimmrechts- privilegien
Ordre public – Generalbericht 137 – Litauen 61 f.
– Schweiz 78 f.
Partnership 8 ff.
Personengesellschaft 140 ff.
Proportionalitätsprinzip – Generalbericht 142 ff.
– Litauen 63 f.
– Schweiz 84 f.
Publikumsgesellschaften 10 f.
Rechtfertigung von Ungleichbehand- lungen
– England 20
– Generalbericht 144 ff.
– Litauen 64 ff.
– Schweiz 87 ff.
– USA 109 f.
Rechtsfolgen von Ungleichbehandlungen – England 18 ff., 29 ff.
– Generalbericht 150 ff.
– Litauen 67 ff.
– Schweiz 90 ff.
Rechtsgrundlagen des Gleichbehand- lungsgrundsatzes
– England 3 ff.
– Frankreich 34 ff.
– Generalbericht 115 ff.
– Litauen 52 ff.
– Schweiz 90 ff.
– USA 105 ff.
Rechtsmissbrauchsverbot – England 10
– Frankreich 41 f.
– Generalbericht 123 f.
– Litauen 60 f., 68 – Schweiz 76 Rückerstattungsklage – Generalbericht 154 – Litauen 68 – Schweiz 84, 92 f.
SAS 43 ff.
Schadensersatz; s. Verantwortlichkeit Schweizerisches Recht 75 ff.
– Absolute Gleichbehandlung 84 f.
– Aktienkategorien 83, 88 – Aktivitätsprämien 100 ff.
– Anfechtungsklage 90 f.
– Anwendungsbereich des Gleich- behandlungsgrundsatzes 81 ff.
175 Sachverzeichnis
– Auflösungsrecht bei Ungleichbehand- lung 93
– Austritt bei Ungleichbehandlung 93 – Drittverträge mit Gesellschaftern 83 f.
– Formelle Gleichbehandlung 86 – Höchststimmrecht 98 – Informationsrechte 93 ff.
– Kapitalmarktrecht 76 f.
– Klage auf Gleichbehandlung 92 – Konzern 103 f.
– Leoninische Klausel 80 f.
– Loyalitätsaktien 100 ff.
– Maßstab der Gleichbehandlung 84 f.
– Materielle Gleichbehandlung 86 – Mehrfachstimmrecht (unecht) 97 f.
– Minderheitenschutz 79 f.
– Ordre public 78 f.
– Partizipationsscheine 96 f.
– Prinzipien der Gleichbehandlung 80 f.
– Proportionalitätsprinzip 84 f.
– Rechtfertigung von Ungleichbehand- lungen 87 ff.
– Rechtsfolgen von Ungleichbehand- lungen 90 ff.
– Rechtsgrundlagen 75 ff.
– Rechtsmissbrauchsverbot 76 – Rückerstattungsklage 92 f.
– Stimmrechtsaktien 97 f.
– Stimmrechtslose Aktien 96 f.
– Treu und Glauben 76 – Ungleichbehandlung 90 ff.
– Verantwortlichkeit der Leitungsorgan- mitglieder 91 f.
– Verfassungsrecht 77 f.
– Vertragsfreiheit 80, 87
– Verzicht auf Gleichbehandlung 89 Société par actions simplifiée (SAS) 43 ff.
Stichentscheidungsrecht – Frankreich 45 f.
– Generalbericht 160 f.
– Litauen 73 – Schweiz 99 f.
Stimmrechtsprivilegien – England 12 ff.
– Frankreich 45 ff.
– Generalbericht 161 f.
– Litauen 73 – Schweiz 96 ff.
Transparenzrichtlinie 58 Treu und Glauben – England 8 – Frankreich 49 – Generalbericht 121 ff.
– Litauen 55 – Schweiz 76 – USA 107 Trust 9 f., 19 f., 29 Übernahmerichtlinie 58
Unfaires Verhalten, Leitungsorgan- mitglieder 25 ff., 150
Ungleichbehandlung – Bewusste 61, 134 ff.
– Gesellschaftsvertrag 39 – Haftung 152 f.
– Informationsrechte; s. dort – Interessenabwägung 20
– Rechtfertigung 64 ff., 87 ff., 109 f., 144 ff.
– Rechtsfolgen von; s. dort
– Société par actions simplifiée 43 ff.
– Stichentscheidungsrecht 45 f., 99 f.
– Stimmrechtsprivilegien 12 ff., 45 ff., 96 ff., 160 f.
– Unbewusste 61, 134 ff.
– Voraussetzungen 148 ff.
– Wachsende 43 ff.
Ungültigkeit von Beschlüssen etc.
– England 29 ff.
– Frankreich 41 – Generalbericht 150 ff.
– Litauen 67 – Schweiz 90 ff.
Unterlassungsklage – England 19 f.
– Generalbericht 155 – Litauen 69 – USA 111
US-amerikanisches Recht 105 ff.
– Closed corporation 106 ff.
– Delaware 108
– Fiduciary obligation 106, 108 – Inhalt des Gleichbehandlungsgrund-
satzes 108 ff.
– Kapitalmarkt 105 f.
– Leitungsorganmitglieder 108
176 Sachverzeichnis – LLC 107
– Machtmissbrauch 108 f.
– Rechtfertigung von Ungleichbehand- lungen 109 f.
– Rechtsgrundlagen des Gleichbehand- lungsgrundsatzes 105 ff.
– Treu und Glauben 107 – Unterlassungsklage 111
– Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz 109 f.
Verantwortlichkeit der Leitungsorgan- mitglieder
– England 18 ff.
– Haftung 152 f.
– Litauen 68 – Schweiz 91 f.
– Unfaires Verhalten 25 ff., 150 – USA 108, 111
– Verstoß gegen Kapitalerhaltungs- regeln 21 ff.
Verfassungsrechtliche Grundlagen – Deutschland 120 f.
– England 3 ff.
– Frankreich 33 – Generalbericht 119 ff.
– Litauen 54 f.
– Schweiz 77 f.
Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz 89, 109 f., 146 f.
Vermögensrechte 59, 132, 161 f.
Vertragsfreiheit und Gleichbehandlungs- grundsatz
– Frankreich 38 ff.
– Generalbericht 127 f.
– Litauen 57 – Schweiz 80, 87 – USA 111
Verzicht auf Gleichbehandlung 89
