STRATEGY
The submarine choice
Perspectives on Australia’s most complex defence project
September 2014
Cover image: Periscope © Matthias Kulka/Corbis; US Navy frigate through the periscope of the submarine USS Rhode Island. US Navy photo by Patrick Nugent.
ASPI’s publications—including this paper—are not intended in any way to express or reflect the views of the Australian Government. The opinions and recommendations in this paper are published by ASPI to promote public debate and understanding of strategic and defence issues. They reflect the personal views of the author(s) and should not be seen as representing the formal position of ASPI on any particular issue.
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September 2014
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First published September 2014
Published in Australia by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute ASPI
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National Library of Australia cataloguing-in-publication entry
The submarine choice: perspectives on Australia’s most complex defence project ISBN: 9781925229011 (ebook : pdf)
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INTRODUCTION 5
THE SUBMARINE CHOICE 7
Presentation summaries—ASPI’s 2014 International Conference
INDUSTRY ISSUES 32
How to buy a submarine: Part 2
Andrew Davies and Mark Thomson
ALLIANCE CONSIDERATIONS 45
The alliance dimension of Australia’s future submarine
Benjamin Schreer
REGIONAL SURVEY 50
Asia’s submarine capability, 2014
Harry White
RECENT THE STRATEGIST BLOG POSTS 55 A realistic future submarine—at last— Andrew Davies 55
The elephant in the conference room— Mark Thomson 57
China’s emerging undersea capability and the implications
for Australia’s future submarine— Benjamin Schreer 59
Submarines by the dozen?— Andrew Davies and Mark Thomson 61
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 63
In April this year ASPI staged a conference called The Submarine Choice. We brought together a group of
distinguished speakers to discuss the reasoning behind, and the options for, what’s almost bound to be Australia’s most expensive and complex defence project—the replacement of the Collins class submarine fleet some time next decade.
Because of the scale of this enterprise, it’s important that there’s a broad consensus on all aspects of the Future Submarine project, from the strategic rationale that underpins it, through the industry arrangements that will deliver the boats, to the actual materiel solutions eventually chosen. That’s why we invited a range of distinguished speakers, including military and academic strategists, policymakers, project managers and representatives of many of the firms that might have a role as the project takes shape.
My own view is that we must start with strategy. In Asia we see a worrying pattern of military strategic competition over disputed territories. The regional security architecture is underdeveloped and defence spending across much of the region is climbing. Our wider region is by no means all downside—indeed, opportunities for growth and cooperation remain strong. But this isn’t a time for retrenching significant defence capabilities.
The government should look hard at what roles and missions it wants the submarines to perform and should think about broad capabilities, not just platforms. The Future Submarine will be part of a broader force, and a broader alliance structure. In an uncertain world, the ANZUS alliance is becoming more—not less—important to Australia.
Moreover, there are regional and global partnership implications, as the Prime Minister’s visit to japan earlier this year made clear. There’s an obvious potential for Australia to strengthen relations with japan and with a number of European players. There’s an industry core to this, but also a broader strategic point—Australia can use the submarine choice to strengthen key bilateral ties.
The scale of the submarine choice is so large that it has the potential to crowd out other necessary acquisitions.
Australia can’t afford to under-invest in critical land and air systems or, for that matter, in the surface fleet. Further new investment areas, for example in space and cyber, are emerging. A sustainable submarine choice is one that allows the rest of the ADF to develop as well.
As the government has made clear, the Future Submarine project can’t be seen as a special case of job creation—
to avoid the problems we had with the support of the Collins in its first decade of service, the industry outcomes should be sustainable, long term and believable. Australian industry needs to work within an increasingly globalised marketplace and the submarine project will almost invariably bring together technologies from a range of
suppliers. But the success of the Future Submarine will also depend on some highly prized—and thus closely held—
technologies from trusted partners. Bringing those elements together is no small challenge.
In these pages you’ll find a summary of each of the talks that were given at the conference, and they contain a range of perspectives on each of the issues mentioned above. As well, we’ve included some analytic insights from ASPI.
Mark Thomson and Andrew Davies write on the complex suite of industrial options. Benjamin Schreer shares his thoughts on the role the Future Submarine might play in alliance operations with the United States. And, to show that Australia’s submarines will have to operate in an increasingly contested environment, Harry White presents a survey of regional submarine capabilities and plans.
Although the delivery of the first of class might still be more than a decade away, this is now a rapidly moving endeavour. The conference was only a few months ago, but several new possibilities and perspectives have come to light, either through public statements by officials or in the broader discussion of what has always been a topic of significant interest to the defence and general press. Perhaps the timing of our conference helped to shape emerging thinking on the submarine choice. Certainly few procurement projects have been held to such close public scrutiny before even reaching first-pass cabinet consideration.
Interested readers can stay apprised through ASPI’s publications, including short pieces on our blog The Strategist, where we’ll present our perspectives on developments as they occur. To that end, we’ve included some recent blog pieces in this volume to help bring the story of the Future Submarine project up to date.
Finally, I’d like to record my thanks to the participants in the conference, whose willingness to share their remarkably varied and often candid views made the event the success it was. And the ASPI team who organised and ran the conference did a superb job. It was a team effort, but special thanks are due to Benjamin Schreer, who coordinated the program and the speakers, and to our Events Manager Lynne Gozzard and Daniel Nichola for their efforts in making the event run smoothly. And I’d like to thank our conference sponsors, without whom we couldn’t have staged such a successful event: Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Thales, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems and Raytheon Australia.
Peter Jennings Executive Director
ASPI’s 2014 International Conference
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) hosted its 2014 International Conference, The Submarine Choice, on 8–10 April at the Hyatt Hotel, Canberra.
With the government moving closer to deciding on Australia’s Future Submarine, the conference aimed to bring together senior policymakers, high-level military officials, leading industry representatives and academics from Australia and around the world to discuss key aspects of what will arguably be the most expensive and technologically complex defence capability project in the history of the nation.
In eight sessions consisting of formal presentations and open forum discussions, the conference showcased different perspectives on the Future Submarine’s strategic, economic and industry dimensions, with a view to informing government’s decision-making. Topics included:
• The Strategic Context
• The Navy’s Perspective
• The Role of Submarines in US Pacific Strategy
• Regional Perspectives
• Design Options
• Industry and Economics
• Project Management
• Lessons from Abroad.
The conference attracted the following high-quality speakers and summaries are provided:
• Senator the Hon David johnston, Minister for Defence — page 10
• Admiral Harry B Harris jr, Commander, US Pacific Fleet — page 21
• Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, Chief, Royal Australian Navy — page 11
• Rear Admiral Phillip G Sawyer, Commander Submarine Force, US Pacific Command — page 15
• David Gould, General Manager Submarines, Defence Materiel Organisation — page 26
• Rear Admiral Gregory Sammut, Royal Australian Navy, Head Future Submarine Program — page 14
• john Coles, Author, Coles Review — page 27
• Simon Todd, Lead, Future Submarine Integrated Project Team — page 18
• Chris Edmonds, Design Manager, Future Submarine Program — page 20
• Admiral Gary Roughead (ret.), 29th Chief of US Naval Operations — page 29
• Donald C Winter, former US Secretary of the Navy — page 25
• janis Cocking, Chief of Maritime Division, Defence Science and Technology Organisation — page 28
• Hans Christoph Atzpodien, Chairman, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) — page 31
• Stephen Ludlam, Chief Executive Officer, ASC Pty Ltd — page 22
• Thomas G Mahnken, US Naval War College — page 12
• john Birkler, Manager Maritime Programs, RAND Corporation — page 24
• Colonel Ngong Boon Kheng, Commanding Officer 171 Squadron, Republic of Singapore Navy — page 17
• Vice Admiral Charles-Henri du Ché, Admiral International Relations and Partnerships, French Navy — page 16
• Vice Admiral Michel Accary (ret.), Special Advisor Submarines, DCNS — page 30
• Andrew Davies, Senior Analyst, ASPI — page 13
• Mark Thomson, Senior Analyst, ASPI — page 23.
The conference also included a welcome reception sponsored by Thales and a private dinner sponsored by Lockheed Martin at the Hyatt before the first day of proceedings. Following the conference’s first day, TKMS sponsored a pre-dinner networking event and Northrop Grumman sponsored a dinner in Anzac Hall at the Australian War Memorial. Attendees praised all the events highly. The conference as a whole was supported by Lockheed Martin and Thales as prime sponsors and Northrop Grumman, Raytheon Australia and TKMS as sponsors.
All sponsors expressed their satisfaction with the conference.
Video of all conference proceedings and the PowerPoint slides used by conference speakers are available on ASPI’s website (www.aspi.org.au/events/the-submarine-choice-aspis-international-conference,-canberra).
The conference was very well received. Over the two days of proceedings, the conference attracted more than 220 attendees. Completed evaluation forms recorded entirely positive feedback, particularly in relation to the quality of the speakers and the conference’s organisation. Responses on all returned evaluation forms stated that the conference had achieved its aim and confirmed that all of the attendees would recommend the conference and its future iterations. The conference also generated significant media coverage: it was mentioned in more than 80 news reports before, during and after the conference.
ASPI asked attendees to submit feedback on the key messages that emerged from the conference’s proceedings.
The most recurrent themes mentioned included:
• the lack of agreement from Defence, the Navy and the Australian Government on design, capability requirements and numbers for the Future Submarine project
• the need to optimise the requirement to achieve a deliverable project at an acceptable level of risk
• the need to have one person in charge of the project
• the sovereign risk implications of the row between TKMS and the Swedish Government over Kockums
• the comment by the Minister for Defence that an evolved Collins or a new design are the options ‘we are left with
… at this particular time’
• The statement by TKMS Chairman Dr Hans Christoph Atzpodien that TKMS could deliver the Future Submarine with an order of 12 boats for around $20 billion ($16 billion less than ASPI’s estimated project cost of $36 billion).
This paper provides a record of the conference as well as ASPI’s reflections on its proceedings. The first section summarises the speeches delivered at the conference. These summaries were prepared by ASPI based on
recordings of the presentations given. Any implied emphasis reflects ASPI’s judgement. The full presentations may be viewed on ASPI’s YouTube channel. The second half of this paper then analyses key aspects of the strategic, economic and industry dimensions of Australia’s Future Submarine choice, and offers some recommendations to inform the government’s decision-making.
ASPI STRATEGY
Mr Peter Jennings—Introduction
ASPI’s 2014 international conference, The Submarine Choice, has assembled perhaps the most knowledgeable gathering ever held in Australia about matters to do with submarines. ASPI decided on this topic because of its relationship to ASPI’s core business: systematic and careful analysis of strategy and force structure decision-making, supported by a close understanding of budget realities. While in past years ASPI has held conferences on broad themes about international and, in particular, Asia–Pacific security, our aim for 2014 is to inform government thinking and broader national understanding on one of the biggest and most consequential defence capability decisions ever faced by an Australian government: Australia’s Future Submarine choice.
Eight rules of thumb highlight the approaches that government will need to apply in making the submarine choice:
1. Government’s consideration of the submarine choice should lead with strategy. A key policy challenge for the government will be grappling with the mix of risks and opportunities presented by Australia’s wider region.
2. Government should look hard at what roles and missions it wants the future submarine to perform. The only way to think sensibly about Australia’s submarine requirements is to take a disciplined approach to thinking through what capabilities Australia really needs.
3. Government should think about broad capabilities, not just platforms. Success in military operations stems from integrating capabilities into a fighting unit. The critical question is: how will the Future Submarine fit into a broader Australian warfighting concept, given that the submarine will be part of a broader force and a broader alliance structure?
4. Look at alternatives to deliver capability outcomes, even if only to be assured that the original proposal is the right one.
5. Consider the alliance and regional implications. The submarine choice—in a strategic if not an industry sense—has to be understood in terms of its impact on US alliance expectations, opportunities and risks, but also its implications for regional–global partnerships with japan and with a number of European players.
6. healthy scepticism is a virtue in an incredibly challenging business like submarine acquisition.
7. remember that there’s a wider Defence Force. The scale of the submarine choice is so large that it has the potential to crowd out other necessary acquisitions anticipated in the Defence Capability Plan. A sustainable submarine choice is one that allows the rest of the ADF to develop as well.
8. Industry outcomes should be sustainable, long term and believable. The least useful situation is one in which there are rapid fluctuations in plans, major year-on-year changes to spending profiles and rapid redesigns of capability requirements.
Mr Peter Jennings is the Executive Director of ASPI.
Senator the Hon David Johnston—The importance of the Future Submarine for Australia
Excerpted from Senator Johnston’s full presentation as delivered, which is available on ASPI’s website.
Those of you who know me appreciate the strong interest I have in submarines. They are a highly potent asymmetric capability of strategic importance to our island nation. Their importance is unlikely to abate; rather, they will grow in significance as we see their acquisition expanding right across North and Southeast Asia. They are a critical element in our maritime security planning.
The Australian Government is acutely aware of the importance of having a highly capable submarine force,
especially given the rapidly changing strategic circumstances in our region. Our election commitment was to make a decision on our Future Submarines within 18 months of being elected.
In the lead-up to the last election I gave my support to Defence’s charted course for the Future Submarine
program—the suspension of investigations into Option 1 (an existing off-the-shelf design) and Option 2 (an existing off-the-shelf design modified to incorporate Australia’s specific requirements with respect to combat systems and weapons) and more detailed investigation of Option 3 (an evolved design that enhances the capabilities of existing off-the-shelf designs, including Collins) and Option 4 (a bespoke new design). So we are left with options 3 and 4 at this particular time.
In truth, our requirements are probably far more complex than ever Collins was. Ideally, we are seeking a
comparable capability to a nuclear submarine with diesel–electric motors inside. There are four primary objectives for the Future Submarine enterprise that I can identify, and these are:
• Firstly, to deliver an enduring regionally dominant superior conventional submarine capability.
• Ensure that our new submarine capability is affordable, and that is a very important part of the whole programme.
• To ensure Australia is able to sustain a superior conventional submarine capability into the foreseeable future in a cost-effective way.
• To avoid, of course, a submarine capability gap.
We have also committed to ensure that work in Australia on the replacement of the current submarine fleet will be centred around the South Australian shipyards. As a government, we want to give Australian industry every chance of success, as I have said, but let me be very, very clear: our primary and dominant purpose is to ensure that we provide Navy with a submarine which meets its requirements. A submarine is not industrial or regional policy by other means or another name.
The previous government did develop the Integrated Project Team with the intention that it be able to advise government as an ‘informed customer’ on the way forward for this vital program. I still do not know what the potential costs of a new design submarine or an evolved Collins submarine might be, and I’m very concerned about that.
There has been a lot of speculation about whether we need 12 boats. Let me be clear on this subject: my primary focus is not about numbers but on the capability and availability of boats required to meet the tasks set by government.
I propose to take to government this year, in support of the White Paper, a plan that balances up cost, capability and risk. The full details of this will be outlined in concert with the delivery of our new white paper.
Senator the Hon David Johnston is the Minister for Defence.
ASPI STRATEGY
Vice Admiral Ray Griggs—Submarines in Australia’s maritime strategy
It’s important that, as we look at the upcoming White Paper process, there’s a broad understanding of the role of submarines in Australia’s defence strategy. Submarines are a critical element of our maritime strategy.
We’re not looking at trying to deliver a science project that lives on the boundaries of the laws of physics. What we’re looking at is probably best characterised as a contemporary version of the Collins class capability. Yes, as the Prime Minister says, this will be a significantly more capable submarine. And that improvement in capability can be achieved over time by evolving the design. This doesn’t mean any decisions have been made with respect to any of the options that are before the government. As you’ve heard from the Defence Minister, government is understandably using the White Paper process to reconfirm in its mind what the right submarine options and numbers are.
For Australia, our submarines provide us with strategic weight in a way that no other ADF asset or combination of ADF assets does. By strategic weight, I mean that submarines are a capability that shapes or changes the behaviour of other nations and the calculus of their leaders. And what are submarines designed for? They’re an offensive capability, intended to sink ships and other submarines. Yes, they do other tasks, but this offensive capability is the bread and butter of the trade. Because of their potency, our submarines can have a powerful conventional deterrent effect.
This deterrent effect operates in two distinct ways. The first is fairly well known—their offensive capacity means a potential adversary must consider whether the use of force against Australian interests is wise, achievable or without risk of an Australian response. This is an immediate, direct deterrent effect.
But there’s also a much longer term deterrent impact. Because we have such capable submarines in the ADF order of battle, any potential adversary must be able to defeat our submarine capability. And, as many in navies and air forces around the world can testify, antisubmarine warfare is one of the more complex maritime warfare disciplines to be effective at. It takes a range of expensive high-end capabilities—surface, air and subsurface units—which must be developed and maintained over many years.
As we contemplate the direct cost of the new submarine program for Australia, I think we should always balance that against the considerable cost impact that the investment we make imposes on others to try to counter the effect of our submarine capability. This aspect of the submarine discussion is largely absent in the public domain; if we’re truly thinking strategically, it needs to be there, front and centre.
Submarines provide the Australian Government with options to take action in our national interest. Importantly, the government can exercise those options to act at any time of Australia’s choosing and under almost any conceivable threat scenario. And we can act as our interests dictate, either as part of an alliance, within a coalition or unilaterally.
So, as we discuss all the different characteristics of our submarines, we need to keep coming back to the strategic impact of different decisions. Decisions about capability, stealth, range and endurance all have an effect on the strategic weight we gain from our submarine capability. We can’t say exactly where or when Australia will need its future submarines and all the strategic weight they bring. But their deterrent effect will continue to play a significant role in contributing to the security of our inherently maritime region—through their preparedness to fight and win at sea.
Vice Admiral Ray Griggs is Chief of the Royal Australian Navy.
Dr Thomas G Mahnken—Naval strategy under conditions of anti-access/
area-denial
In peacetime, navies safeguard global and regional order through three means: safeguarding the free flow of trade, ensuring the maintenance of stability, and conducting military training and exercises that deter aggression and assure allies. In wartime, they use credible power to project influence where it’s needed. This forms the backdrop for understanding trends and impacts upon navies.
Modern navies face interrelated challenges, which we can break down into three core areas. First, economic: the rising costs of platforms and personnel are creating smaller—yet more effective—navies. Second, the shifting balance of power and investment means that some states are trading off naval power while others, such as China, are expanding theirs. Third, the growth and spread of precision strike, along with the advent of cyber
capabilities and the growing significance of the space domain, conspire to make precision targeting of vessels at sea more doable.
These challenges have created competition between power projection and anti-access capabilities. Until recently, there’s been a clear advantage to the power projection and precision strike capabilities of Western powers—perhaps no more evident than in the 1991 Gulf War. Harnessing precision strike has been a key part of success in power projection for the US. But we’re now entering a more challenging environment, triggered by the rise in anti-access/
area-denial (A2/AD) strategies. The threshold issue of the next cycle of maritime capability development will be dealing with this challenge. The growth and spread of precision strike capabilities are creating a dynamic in which power projection has become more challenging.
While the spread of precision positional information and strike capabilities will be uneven, we can expect to face a broadly more challenging operating environment that will create both opportunities and challenges. The opportunity to provide precise locational data to people and platforms around the globe will enhance navigation and will also lead to better networked navies. However, the ubiquitous and cheap availability of precision strike will also create challenges, including making fixed points on the surface, such as bases, more vulnerable. Mobile forces will also be more vulnerable, and the stealth of submarines will be even more valuable.
A significant concern is that this trend could undermine the very purpose of navies. Accepting restrictions on free navigation, for example, would erode the norms that surface fleets have been upholding for decades. And a decreasing willingness to deploy navies would weaken assurance and deterrence in the international system.
Ultimately, if power projection becomes more risky, more costly, or both, leaders may be less likely to safeguard global order.
In summary, the key attributes for Australia’s Future Submarine in the light of these trends will be interoperability, stealth, endurance and precision strike capabilities. Stealth will be particularly important in an era when surface fleets are more constrained, and endurance will be significant given the vulnerability of fixed infrastructure. We’re at a critical juncture in deciding the extent of the threat posed by A2/AD and how we’ll deal with it.
Dr Thomas G Mahnken is the Jerome E Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security at the US Naval War College.
ASPI STRATEGY
Dr Andrew Davies—Trends in submarine and antisubmarine warfare
The key questions that need to be grappled with in force structure decisions are:
1. What is Australia’s strategic approach to security in the 21st century?
2. What military strategy (or strategies) support that approach?
3. How can those military strategies be operationalised (and what are the materiel solutions)?
4. What are the risks associated with the materiel solutions and how can they be mitigated?
The Future Submarine will be in service until well after 2050, so it’s important to reflect on technology and trends in modern warfare. The likely continued exponential growth trend in computer power and bandwidth, known as Moore’s Law, will affect every field of endeavour, and submarine operations will be no exception. In the past 40 years, the density of computing power on a chip and computer clock speeds have increased over 1 million times, and a similar increase can be expected in the next 40 years. While submarine stealth has improved steadily as well, keeping ahead of sensor and processing capability, we shouldn’t take the relative advantage of the submarine for granted; history shows that major platforms can be overtaken by technological advances.
There’s been a recent levelling out in improvements in submarine acoustic signature noise management (both radiated and flow noise), while processing power continues to increase. The result will be increased opportunities for submarine detection. Technological advance in underwater operations is more likely to lead to increased detectability of submarines than decreased. Moore’s Law is likely to create four key advantages for antisubmarine warfare forces:
1. increased processing power, allowing even weak signals to be sorted from noise
2. networked processing power, so that signals from multiple sensors over a wide area can be integrated
3. increased bandwidth (and more efficient use of bandwidth), making moving volumes of data between sensors and processors faster
4. remotely operated or autonomous systems with enhanced processing power and ability to transmit collected data to a central processing point.
The result might well be a revolution in antisubmarine warfare. Enhanced processing combined with a ‘swarm’ of dispersed sensors across a wide area could detect subtle signals, making sneaking into monitored waters fraught with danger for a submarine.
Technological advances tend to cut both ways, and all is not lost when it comes to the future of submarines.
However, the design of the Future Submarine needs to take account of these trends, which have the net result of making penetration of adversary space in chokepoints more difficult. The Future Submarine will need to be able to stand off further from adversary-controlled waters and exert influence through long-range remotely operated or autonomous sensor and weapon systems in the form of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). Endurance and payload—especially important for the deployment of multiple UUVs—will be paramount.
Nuclear attack submarines have these characteristics, but that isn’t an option for Australia. The two broad options are:
• invest heavily into designing a large, fast, long-range boat that can operate at high levels in a future characterised by advanced anti-access technologies
• temper our ambitions and settle for a fleet that can operate in less than the most challenging situations.
Dr Andrew Davies is a senior analyst at ASPI.
Rear Admiral Gregory Sammut—Where do Australia’s submarines need to operate?
A number of key considerations should guide the development of Australia’s Future Submarine (FSM):
1. Submarines are an offensive capability that work best ‘up-threat’. In this context, the importance of stealth can’t be overlooked, considering that around 50% of the world’s submarines will be operating in the Asia–Pacific region in the near future.
2. The offensive advantage of submarines could be undermined during reactive operations in shallow waters.
German U-boats sent to attack the D-Day force in the English Channel during World War II demonstrated that submarines don’t work well as ‘crocodiles in the moat’.
3. The twin issues of range and endurance are critically important for the FSM. Considering the large distances between some of Australia’s own ports alone—such as the 2,259 nautical miles between Fremantle and Darwin—
the ranges to cover by the FSM will be vast. Submarine operations also depend on the ability to remain on station for sufficient periods, which needs to take into account fuel requirements as well as crew size.
4. Payload and sensor capability are also essential. Payload’s needed not only for the storage of weapon systems but also for the potential requirement to employ Special Forces, electronic warfare equipment, and in some cases the specialist personnel needed to operate such equipment. When it comes to sensors, the hydrophone count matters when you’re trying to find very quiet threats while maintaining tactical advantage.
The FSM will need to operate offensively, calling for sufficient stealth, as well as range, endurance, payload and sensor capabilities. Moreover, the FSM needs to be interoperable with the US. While that doesn’t mean Australia needs the largest conventional submarine with all the ‘bells and whistles’, we need to be mindful of what’s important and remain fully aware of what we trade off as we contemplate the FSM.
Rear Admiral Gregory Sammut is Head of the Future Submarine Program.
ASPI STRATEGY
Rear Admiral Phillip G Sawyer—The role of submarines in US Pacific strategy
The US and Australia share a long history of cooperation in the submarine space. For instance, Brisbane was critical as a resupply and rest port for US submariners during World War II. Today, a team of US submariners is stationed in Perth in support of the Australian submarine force, while an Australian team based at Pearl Harbor supports the US submarine force.
The US submarine force in the region remains very strong. About 60% of the US submarine force is located in the Pacific: 30 SSNs, 8 SSBNs and 2 SSGNs, as well as 11,000 submariners. Forward-deployed nuclear submarines are an integral part of US military strategy to deter major conflict in the Asia–Pacific region and to safeguard the freedom of the seas, which is critical for the security and prosperity of the US.
US submarine forces operate forward through a combination of rotational deployments from the US and the forward stationing of submarine tenders and submarines in places like Guam. Next year, USS Topeka will bring the total of permanently based nuclear attack submarines in Guam to four. Guam also serves as the forward operating base for SSGNs, which provide 365 days of coverage in the Western Pacific. The Guam-based submarines provide the ability to conduct longer routine patrols in the region while also reducing response time for contingency operations in the Western Pacific. To that end, the US has devoted considerable resources to Guam, including building new facilities and a submarine training centre. Guam is an apt location to conduct bilateral and multilateral submarine exercises. A second SSGN based in Diego Garcia provides all-year presence around the Arabian Peninsula and the Indian Ocean.
The US carefully monitors submarine acquisition trends in the Asia–Pacific theatre. Vietnam has just acquired advanced diesel–electric submarines. Bangladesh has signed a submarine deal with China. India is acquiring SSNs and SSBNs. And Thailand has built some infrastructure for future submarine operations. These developments will increase the risk of submarine collisions, which makes investments in submarine rescue capability a priority for every nation operating submarines. Improved water-space management and agreements in the Asia–Pacific will become much more important as the undersea domain becomes more crowded. The US looks forward to playing a role with its submarine nation partners in working through water-space management agreements and submarine rescue procedures.
Rear Admiral Phillip G Sawyer is the Commander Submarine Force of the US Pacific Fleet.
Vice Admiral Charles-Henri du Ché—French strategy for submarines
The submarine—with levels of mobility, versatility and stealth that are getting better and better—is not only a very potent weapon, but also a deeply political tool. This is why—taking into account the manpower and industrial and financial investment that they imply—they must be suited to specific strategic requirements. For the French Navy, France’s very large exclusive economic zone and its interests overseas require long-range submarines. This requirement is shared with Australia: Australia’s navy—and especially its submarine force—is linked to Australia’s geography and world interests.
From the French point of view, the driving force behind our submarine force was the creation of France’s nuclear deterrent force at sea. Maintaining a credible continuous at-sea deterrent of three SSBNs during the Cold War demanded enormous feats of secrecy, reliability, security, education and training. The French Navy now possesses four SSBNs and six SSNs.
The size and shape of France’s submarine force haven’t changed since 1996. The longevity of this submarine force can be explained by a combination of two factors. First, proof of the requirement through operational success recognised at the political level—the delivery of unbroken continuous at-sea deterrence requires four SSBNs, and the operational need to have three SSNs deployed justifies a squadron of six. Second, control of acquisition and running costs, without which—irrespective of operational utility—confidence in the submarine force would be lost at the joint headquarters level and the political level.
Achieving success in developing the Barracuda class of SSNs required first listening to the feedback from the operational side and from industrial experience to determine the minimum finances required, and then making choices about what was essential. Learning from innovations of previous classes of submarine was also key.
Permanent linkages between industry and the users, but also the presence of an active broader technological and defence industry base, allowed France to successfully run the Barracuda project without the price exploding.
For sure and credible submarine forces, six necessary conditions must be met:
• Determine and justify real operational needs to make the right decisions for the right target.
• Build and maintain a submarine that is operationally effective to ensure a good return on investment and an operational advantage, which will then be attractive to personnel.
• Control costs over the long term for both acquisition and upkeep.
• Have a robust national organisation able to make the right capability-based decisions balanced with value for money.
• Have a sustainable defence industry able to collaborate seamlessly and openly for the long term, with active research and development supported at the highest levels, with the ability to absorb lessons from previous classes of submarine and also from current operational feedback, and with frank and honest dialogue over technological and financial limits on the desired capabilities.
• Train and operate across the full spectrum of operations—including with the other services—to build credibility with political and military authorities and also to motivate crews, without which there is no submarine capability.
Success is about the virtuous circle of dialogue and cooperation between the operators and the contractors, which demands experience, honesty and, above all, continuity.
Vice Admiral Charles-Henri du Ché is the Admiral for International Relations and Partnerships in the French Navy.
ASPI STRATEGY
Colonel Ngong Boon Kheng—A Singaporean perspective on submarine rescue
As navies develop submarine capabilities, it’s necessary to build up a submarine rescue capability—be it individually or collectively—as a parallel development. The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) submarine force has gained much operational experience in submarine escape and rescue (SMER) capability over the past decade through participation in various internal, bilateral and multilateral exercises. The knowledge gained has reinforced the RSN’s belief in the need to build a viable organic submarine rescue capability to respond swiftly to emergencies. SMER capability is vital to the management of worst-case scenarios involving distressed submarines.
There are two main options for SMER capability development: raising organic submarine rescue assets or leveraging partner navies with existing rescue capabilities. On the one hand, establishing an agreement with a partner navy can promote mutual understanding and deepen navy-to-navy relations, while at the same time saving the costs of raising and maintaining an indigenous SMER capability. On the other hand, having organic assets allows for faster response and coordination and avoids reliance on external counterparts. An organic rescue capability can either be raised within the navy, which requires significant investment of naval resources and manpower, or leveraged from available commercial expertise and resources, with suitable mechanisms to allow the navy to exercise command and control over the capability.
The RSN has opted for a commercially owned, commercially operated approach rather than raising a new naval capability. This approach has proven to be more cost-effective and less resource intensive, from both manpower and training perspectives. This public–private collaboration provides three chief benefits. First, it allows the RSN access to the highly specialised field of submarine rescue while leveraging the ship construction capability of Industry. Second, it delivers a means of achieving a reliable rescue service without taxing the already lean manpower of the RSN. And third, it has enabled the rapid build-up of an organic submarine rescue capability for the RSN, taking only four years from conceptualisation to operationalisation.
Building and maintaining strong networks for multilateral submarine rescue is key as more countries in the region acquire or enhance their submarine capabilities. The RSN’s efforts to promote regional SMER cooperation have included hosting and participating in exercises and professional forums. To date, the RSN has established bilateral submarine rescue arrangements with the Indonesian Navy, the Royal Australian Navy and the Vietnam People’s Navy. The safety of lives at sea is paramount, and the urgency of a distressed submarine incident means that the importance of submarine rescue cannot be overemphasised. The RSN is ready to join the larger SMER fraternity in a concerted and purposeful commitment to the growth of submarine rescue in the region in conjunction with submarine acquisition decision-making.
Colonel Ngong Boon Kheng is the Commanding Officer Submarine Squadron of the Republic of Singapore Navy.
Mr Simon Todd—Submarine capability: requirements definition for Australia
The Future Submarine Integrated Project Team (IPT) comprises a mixture of industry (mostly Australian) and government (Defence Materiel Organisation, Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Capability Development Group and Navy) personnel. Most of the team of approximately 60 come from industry. Six team members come from the UK and two from the US, and there’s considerable US engagement through the NAVSEA Peer Review Team.
The IPT’s remit includes generating an organisation with all the necessary information, infrastructure and
know-how to operate as an ‘intelligent customer’, so that the Commonwealth is equipped to direct and manage the Future Submarine design and build program, whatever option is selected by government. While the IPT’s technical focus is principally on a new submarine design, most of its products are likely to be used whatever design option the government selects for the program.
The following key assumptions and derived requirements underpin the IPT’s work:
• Australia will maintain a regionally superior conventional submarine capability, principally enabled through continued access to sensitive American and British technologies.
• The Australian Government places considerable value on its strategic alliance with the US, and on submarine interoperability.
• Australia’s submarine requirement is unique and won’t be met by an off-the-shelf solution, so the government should be prepared to commission and manage a new design and shouldn’t expect any export sales for the Future Submarine.
• The IPT is directed to ‘grow sovereign submarine enterprise capabilities’ in order to be able to generate and manage an independent submarine capability.
• Australia’s Future Submarines will be assembled in South Australia, so any design created overseas must be imported and matched to Australian shipyard practices.
Central to the IPT’s program is the generation of a design brief—an encapsulation of Australia’s requirements.
The government is likely to commit considerable engineering and technical resources both to ensure compliance with the brief and to acquire sufficient technology transfer and knowledge to enable Australia to discharge its responsibilities as an owner and a user. Submarine safety is a chief driver: there are no international standards, and Australian safety legislation places specific responsibilities on designers and operators.
The IPT is also charged with generating cost and schedule forecasts for a new design; delivering a procurement strategy; growing Australia’s sovereign submarine enterprise capabilities and capacity for the future; engaging with industry and government organisations to facilitate the formation of the total national enterprise that will deliver Australia’s Future Submarine capability; and advising on organisational and commercial arrangements for the SEA 1000 program.
Australia has no track record of designing submarines, rendering it inconceivable that Australia could undertake the Future Submarine design without significant overseas help. So the IPT intends to engage a proven submarine design house to assist with the design of the submarine. The IPT is working so that the government will be ready to select a preliminary design in late 2016 or early 2017 (consistent with the in-service dates mentioned by the Defence Minister). The IPT’s task of deciding how the design house engagement will work to produce an acceptable balance of risk to the Commonwealth is especially vexing. Although we’ve been offered many opinions on this matter, there’s no obvious winner. The IPT isn’t seeking to select the design house at this stage—that’s at least a year away.
Much needs to be done in the short term to maintain momentum in the program, including determining how the engagement of an overseas design house might affect access to key US and UK technologies necessary to deliver a capability edge in the region; access to the intellectual property required to operate and sustain the boats safely and
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effectively; and finding a business model that’s attractive to the Australian Government and its principal industrial partners, the design house and its parent government.
Then there’s the question of how much the Future Submarines will cost to design, build and sustain. Despite many unknowns remaining, the IPT’s efforts to address affordability include challenging the ambitious 2009 White Paper requirement, keeping requirements in check (focusing on a requirement best characterised as ‘Contemporary Collins’), and having a robust design and requirements management process. At this stage in the acquisition process, there’s no need for a commitment to final numbers, other than what’s necessary to avoid a capability gap—
and that’s really only an issue after the early 2030s.
Mr Simon Todd is the Lead of the Future Submarine Integrated Project Team.
Dr Chris Edmonds—The new design option
Australia should pursue the new design option for its Future Submarine for a number of reasons. First, by definition the world market can’t provide a regionally superior submarine. Second, Australia’s regulatory standards
and the issue of reliability—the distance between Australia and its strategic partners—dictate a high level of self-sustainment. Third, the capability requirements—interoperability with the US Navy and other partners, and the range and endurance necessitated by geography (submarines are offensive weapons, and the best place to use them is up-threat) are specific to Australia.
Determining the best value for money for the Future Submarine requires undertaking cost–capability trade-offs in a highly complex and unique environment, and understanding the costs of designing, building and sustaining any of the potential alternatives. In turn, that requires an understanding of the cost base and the drivers of those costs.
Understanding the connection between design options and costs is the focus of the IPT.
The task, ultimately, is to provide a submarine that can fight and win, and the IPT is working to derive the appropriate measures of effectiveness for the future boats. For offensive weapons, measures of effectiveness include kill probability and vulnerability to detection. Other tasks, such as intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance, have other measures of effectiveness. Amalgamating these measures to determine their combined benefit requires an understanding of the operational environment and strategic goals relating to the FSM, including the current and future threat environment. Operational requirements need to be set in a solid way without being too optimistic—the right level of ambition is needed. And once the required performance is clearly defined, we should avoid pushing the technology too far and resist the temptation to alter performance requirements once they are set.
The IPT is right at the start of this process, looking at Australia’s submarine solution space and working
hand-in-glove with the Capability Development Group. The aim is to start initial/preliminary design, but everything that the IPT is doing at the moment is in essence exploring that solution space. It’s not about making finalised decisions—it’s too early for that—but about informing the government about what that affordable capability should be.
Understanding the design well enough to make intelligent decisions in the trade space of capabilities and project risks is important, as is understanding the design to allow for an upgrade path to maintain a capability edge. The IPT is working closely with the seaworthiness team to understand the government’s legislative responsibilities.
Maintaining and evolving the capability into the future requires maintaining the customer capability and the industrial base, as well as the ability to generate all of the fundamental inputs to capability, including research and development, tactics and training. If Australia is to pursue this goal, then a way needs to be found to manage and contain the risk and the associated costs, and it has to be an enduring capability, rather than a one-time procurement. That way we’ll be able to evolve the design between batches of submarines, rather than moving to completely new designs at intervals.
The IPT is working towards a sovereign capability of a world-class and reliable SSK, excelling in its required role, and designed by Australians (with international support) for Australia. The FSM will constitute a battle-winning combat edge with offshore support where required and with best-of-breed military-off-the-shelf equipment. We’ll get there through a clear, stable, underwritten capability requirement, with batch procurement to stabilise the design process—which reduces integration risk through certainty of design data.
Dr Chris Edmonds is the Design Manager of the Future Submarine Program.
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Admiral Harry B Harris Jr—Dinner speech: The evolution of US Pacific strategy
The main reason why the US Pacific Fleet maintains a strong presence throughout the Indo-Pacific in support of the US strategic ‘rebalance’ is to support vital US national interests tied to a region that’s emerged as the driver for the global economy. In this context, China’s recent assertive maritime behaviour is of concern. Beijing’s declaration of an air defence identification zone was done unilaterally without prior consultation with other parties, and over disputed waters. Its maritime sovereignty claims have no basis in, or relationship to, international law, such as the area within the so-called ‘nine-dash line’. China’s neighbours are concerned, and attempts to unilaterally change the status quo would negatively affect regional stability. There are both growing uncertainty in the region and increasing tensions, which could lead to dangerous miscalculations.
These challenges underscore the importance of the US remaining active and strong in the Indo–Asia–Pacific. The US has key interests in this region, and Washington takes its treaty commitments seriously. The US strongly opposes coercion as a means to resolve territorial disputes and believes that a peaceful resolution to territorial disputes is in the interests of all nations of the region. For this reason, the US applauds the recent decision by the Republic of the Philippines to take its ongoing territorial disputes with China to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.
The US is focused on working with regional allies and partners to maintain security, stability, prosperity and peace. RIMPAC 2014 is a case in point, with 23 participating nations, including for the first time ever Brunei and China. China’s acceptance of the RIMPAC invitation has been an important milestone. Despite the aforementioned concerns, the US welcomes the emergence of a peaceful, responsible and prosperous China as a positive contributor to Asian stability and as a member of the community of nations. It’s in the best interests of all that frictions are managed and misunderstandings at sea are prevented through sustained navy-to-navy dialogue and practical cooperation on maritime challenges.
When it comes to its future submarine capability, Australia has a choice to make: to be a relevant maritime power or not. There’s scope for deeper cooperation between the US and the Royal Australian Navy. US Marines are now rotating through Darwin. After more than a decade of fighting ashore, the US Marine Corps is returning to its roots and deploying from Navy ships. The emerging Australian amphibious force and new naval ships, such as the new Hobart class air warfare destroyers, increase the potential for enhanced cooperation and interoperability.
Admiral Harry B Harris Jr is the Commander of the US Pacific Fleet.
Mr Stephen Ludlam—The view from Industry
One key question about Australia’s FSM is whether its design should be based on a military-off-the-shelf (MOTS) or modified MOTS solution. Those in favour argue that these options will reduce risk and will be cheaper. However, Australia has unique geographical requirements, demanding a submarine that’s bigger and can travel further than many existing designs allow. Moreover, the initial acquisition cost of a submarine is only a third of its total lifetime cost—the other two-thirds are for maintenance and sustainment. Because submarines are very complex to build and difficult to maintain, the only in-depth way to understand the design is to build them in-country.
Australia must also be able to maintain and service the FSM onshore; we can’t rely on other countries to do so, particularly in times of crisis. Accordingly, even if Australia were to buy offshore, the government would still need to be across the intricate details of the design to maintain the submarine effectively and efficiently. And if two-thirds of the FSM’s costs are in maintenance and only one-third in build, there’s a strong case for Australia to become expert at designing submarines.
It makes sense for Australia to both design and build the Future Submarine in-country. This also becomes apparent when considering the option of selecting a MOTS design and modifying it to suit Australia’s operational requirements. A modified MOTS option is pretty much akin to a new design, and a time-consuming and expensive process, which in the end might not produce the best possible platform. The complexity of a modified MOTS approach shouldn’t be underestimated and would have to be thought through very carefully to make sure Australia doesn’t end up in a de facto new development and design program.
In contrast, either the evolved Collins or the new design option would constitute an excellent outcome for national security, the ADF and Australia’s naval shipbuilding industry. It would provide the base for a continuous build program that would benefit over time from increased productivity and lower costs. In this context, the counterargument about high labour costs disregards the fact that a premium in workforce-related expenses is only required at the start or restart of the program. It’s also important to note that pay rates in Australia are broadly comparable to those in shipbuilding industries around the world. There’s no reason why Australian shipbuilding can’t be efficient and effective, like the top-end shipyards around the world, provided there’s perseverance, lean manufacturing, increased productivity, motivation and good leadership.
A key lesson from the Collins program is that the design needs to be right from the very beginning. That’s why it should be proven through either prototype or a land-based test facility before the building starts. The sooner the preferred builder can be brought into this process, the better. There needs to be an interactive discussion between the designer and the builder to make sure the design is something that can not only be built, but subsequently maintained.
Australia’s one of only a handful of nations with the ability to produce its own submarines and the opportunity to be innovators, not improvisers. The FSM program provides a great opportunity to develop an affordable and highly productive industrial base, which will create jobs and provide for Australia’s national and economic security and prosperity for generations to come.
Mr Stephen Ludlam is the Chief Executive Officer of ASC Pty Ltd.
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Dr Mark Thomson—An economic perspective on defence and industry
Apart from the unqualified success of the Anzac program and, I hope, the local completion of the two massive landing helicopter dock vessels, there have been serious problems in every major naval shipbuilding program undertaken in Australia. In many instances, the problems reflect the intrinsic technical difficulty of what industry has been asked to do, and often the cause is the pursuit of Australia-unique requirements.
The most common explanation proffered for the trials and tribulations experienced by local naval projects is the stop–start, boom–bust demand schedule from Defence. Many in industry and some in government believe that we need to move to a ‘continuous build’ program, in which vessels are delivered in a never-ending stream. One problem with this approach is that it would constrain the ability of future governments to make decisions, as a continuous build program would lock the government into maintaining the size of the submarine and surface fleets, thus fixing the minimum size of a large and expensive part of the force structure. From a public policy perspective, it would lock in a substantial chunk of what was previously discretionary spending. And a permanent shipbuilder and its workforce would also have every incentive to lobby to preserve their privileged position and expand it to the extent feasible.
The seeming certainty of a 12-boat Future Submarine build has evaporated—quite properly, as the new government will determine the number of boats to be built on the basis of strategic and operational analysis yet to be
undertaken. Nonetheless, the potential benefits of a continuous build option remain relevant to decision-making, especially if an enduring indigenous submarine design and build capability remains a policy goal. But the
government appears to be backing away from a commitment to 12 submarines. I’m not sure that these positions can be reconciled. I’m not convinced that there’s a business case for a continuous build with 12 boats, and I’m certain that there isn’t for a smaller fleet.
Similarly, the scale of Australian demand for warships—11 surface combatants— makes the business case for a continuous build program tenuous. Either it would have to work at a glacial pace, or the Navy would have to reduce the life-of-type of its vessels. The question becomes: is the added cost of replacing vessels more frequently (offset to some extent by fewer mid-life upgrades) justified by the savings and benefits of continuous build?
I’m not sure it is. While such a program would allow the shipyards to progressively deliver higher productivity, thereby reducing costs and lowering the risk of schedule delay, the cost of more frequent replacement would be hard to overcome. Even assuming a favourable learning-curve benefit from continuous build, against this would be several countervailing costs, including the added cost of more frequent replacement, and added costs from maintaining administrative and managerial overheads continuously rather than for a limited time, both in industry and in the Department of Defence.
The question of the acquisition strategy for the Future Submarine is critical. While it may be too early to answer some of the obvious questions, the sooner they’re thought about and debated in public, the better the chance of making the project a success. (See Pages 32–44 for more details on the acquisition strategy.)
Dr Mark Thomson is a senior analyst at ASPI.
Mr John Birkler—Building the right industry skills
Designing submarines and managing their production are extraordinarily complex endeavours, made even more complex in Australia’s FSM program because key program decisions have yet to be made, including desired performance (displacement, speed, range and so on), whether the design will be derivative or new, the level of acceptable risk, government–industry roles and responsibilities, and when the first-of-class is required.
For Australia to design a new, conventionally powered submarine to replace the Collins, RAND studies show that it’ll need a domestic workforce of roughly 1,000 skilled draftsmen and engineers in industry and government to create and oversee the design. Such a workforce doesn’t exist in Australia today, but one could be cultivated over the next 15 to 20 years under the right circumstances. By collaborating with foreign design partners rather than relying exclusively on a domestic design workforce, Australia could shorten the duration and lessen the costs of designing a new submarine.
The RAND study into Australia’s domestic submarine design capabilities estimated that designing a conventional submarine today would require an effort of 8 million to 12 million man-hours over 15 years from a workforce of fully proficient, experienced submarine design personnel. This translates into a labour pool that, at its peak, would involve 600–900 submarine-proficient draftsmen and engineers in industry plus 80–175 oversight personnel in government. While government employs enough oversight personnel to meet its peak demand in most skill areas (although the availability of some may be in question insofar as they’re involved with other naval and commercial programs), that’s not the case for Australian industry, where acute shortfalls exist in multiple skill areas.
There are a few options for Australia to close these gaps and be in a position to develop and acquire the FSM using domestic design capacities. RAND’s analysis identified two industry options and one preferred option that makes the most sense for government:
• Industry Option 1: hire and train personnel from within Australia. This would require recruiting and training draftsmen and engineers with no submarine experience. Not only would this workforce need more man-hours and a longer schedule to design the new submarine, it would need to shrink as the design program nears completion. But the result would be a capability to design submarines solely within Australia.
• Industry Option 2: infuse submarine-experienced personnel from abroad—by recruiting internationally, by having Australia-based companies draw from their international offices, or by partnering with another country’s design organisation. This would shorten the schedule and lessen the cost. The advantage of this approach would be that international personnel could return to their home countries as the new design program winds down. The disadvantage is that new submarine design programs in the US and UK may preclude the availability of experienced submarine design personnel from those countries, and Australia might not be left with the total capability needed to design a new submarine.
• Preferred Government Option: draw core personnel from the Collins class to start the Future Submarine
program, then grow new personnel. This option would draw from the Collins-class experience, reduce the risk of under-resourcing the Collins class and other programs, and be likely to incur reasonable costs in training.
Mr John Birkler is the Maritime Programs Manager at the RAND Corporation.
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Dr Donald C Winter—Systems integration
Systems engineering and integration (SE&I) skills are critical to the successful development of complex systems such as submarines. Multiple approaches have been employed in the US to obtain and apply such skills, with varying degrees of success. The optimal approach for any program depends on multiple factors, including the diversity of stakeholder priorities and agendas; the maturity of the design concept; the complexity of design, physical and functional integration challenges; and the available sources of SE&I skills and experience.
After the end of the Cold War, a push to adopt commercial practices took hold in the US military. The P-8/Boeing 737 program provides a good example of the successful adaptation of a commercial product, leveraging an ongoing production activity to derive a valuable military capability by utilising an invested base of technology, tooling, personnel and production capabilities to order quantities of an effective platform on an annual basis. In most cases, however, the effort required to adapt commercial products has been grossly underestimated. The difficulties faced in transforming commercial coastal ferries into the littoral combat ship capability are a case in point; significant changes were required to accommodate the multi-mission modules that were being separately procured and to deal with the unique requirements of naval operation rather than commercial operation.
The ‘prime integration contract’ approach has in general proven to be less than satisfactory and difficult to execute successfully. Challenges arise from contractors attempting to optimise system solutions and from dealing with multiple stakeholders with potentially conflicting priorities and agendas. This approach fundamentally diminishes the ability of the government—and the military in particular—to influence the design and production approach.
The result is that the course often becomes one of optimising a specific acquisition as opposed to optimising the enhancement to the fleet. The improvement to the fleet’s capability is always more important than how much ship you can buy with a given dollar, and the two are not necessarily the same when one considers issues such as crew size, sustainment costs and sparing.
The SE&I efforts needed for success are very diverse, and some SE&I products, such as concepts of operations, system specifications reflecting trades of stakeholder priorities, and verification and validation requirements, must be developed by the military with support from trusted agents. Design and physical integration are often best contracted out to industrial organisations with appropriate skills because generic systems-engineering skills are inadequate; what’s needed is knowledge of technologies and the application domain. Moreover, oversight by an SE&I trusted agent is invaluable. New systems create major SE&I challenges, with multiple stakeholders with differing priorities and multi-level trades without historical baselines. For these projects, an SE&I team must be established in a timely manner to provide conflict-free advice and counsel.
Every program is unique, requiring an honest assessment of SE&I capabilities and weaknesses as well as necessary SE&I functions and potential sources. There never seems to be enough time to do it right, but it will take more time to do it wrong.
Dr Donald C Winter is a former US Secretary of the Navy.
