Reports on MANPADS stockpiles worldwide put the number at 500,000 to 750,000 MANPADS (Bartak, 2005;
Berman et al., 2011; Schroeder, 2007b). However, this estimate does not appear to have much by way of evidence and stands on somewhat shaky method-ological grounds. Given the formula shown in Figure 10, we simply do not know how many operative MANPADS are available in world stockpiles. The esti-mates below are thus extremely tentative.
Counting MANPADS is not as much an issue as is to assess the state of the stockpiles. And other issues, such as safety and security procedures, transport safety and security, and proper accounting, count for as much, and perhaps more.
The examples of the major stockpiles provided below are intended to demonstrate what we know of one dimension of the problem.
Three of the major MANPADS stockpiles in the world are also the major manufacturers in terms of volume produced, numbers transferred to other countries, and variety of types. These three—United States, Russia and China—own the world’s major MANPADS inventories. They also provide us with examples of potential ways to measure stockpiles.
United States
The United States has been manufacturing MANPADS for over four decades. MANPADS are used as a tool of diplomatic policy (viz. Afghanistan and Nica-ragua), for domestic security (e.g. protecting the president), as well as a military weapon. MANPADS are deployed in maneuver units of the army and marines, and certain overseas air force bases as well.
It is also possible, though unlikely, that MANPADS are deployed by police units in e.g. New York (In From the Cold, 2011). In theory, the widespread dispersion of MANPADS makes the stockpile more susceptible to theft and leakage, though no such evidence has come to light so far.
Manufacturing perspective: 15,669 FIM-92A (Basic Stinger) and just fewer than 600 FIM-92B (Stinger-POST) missiles were produced. The last Stinger-POST rounds were produced by August 1987 (Jane’s, 2012g). Thus, around 2,000 Stingers were manufactured per year. If this number is valid for the FIM-92C (RMP) and FIM-92E (Block I), then since 1995, when the RMP entered service, some 36,000 additional units have been
produced. Excepting use, losses and theft if any, this would bring the US stockpile to around 50,000. If manufacturing continued between 1987 and 1995 at the same pace, which is possible, the total number would be 66,000.
OOB perspective: Four of the five armed services deploy MANPADS (the Coast Guard being the excep-tion) as a normal part of their Order of Battle (dispo-sition of units and forces and their equipment. There is evidence that the US Secret Service, charged with protecting the president, has a small stockpile as well. Other government-related security organiza-tions such as the Homeland Security department may have MANPADS on their inventories.
MANPADS were counted here on the basis of what is known about US doctrine for the use of MANPADS (US Army, 1984; US Army, ND) combined with the 2012 Military Balance (IISS, 2012).
• All US army divisions have MANPADS assets (72 teams with six MANPADS each in airborne divi-sions, 60 in armored and mechanized dividivi-sions, 40 in light divisions).
• Marine expeditionary forces (equivalent to a divi-sion), have 90 Stinger teams with six missiles each,
• Marine expeditionary brigades, 45 teams, and
• a marine expeditionary unit, 15 teams.
• A small number of Stinger teams are assigned to US air force bases in Saudi Arabia and Korea (Jane’s “FIM-92 Stinger”; IISS, 2012).
On this basis we estimate the minimum stockpile of ready-to-use MANPADS in the US inventory to be 45,078 missiles, and about one-third that number of gripstocks. This number does not include other govern-ment related security organizations’ stockpiles, which may number in the hundreds. We would also assume that there are, in addition, reserve stocks which might equal between one-third to equal-to the ready-to-use MANPADS, bringing the total stockpile, by our esti-mate, to 60 to 90,000 at most.
Photographic and documentary evidence: Neither de-classified documents nor photographic evidence provide any clues as to the size of the US MANPADS stockpile. Some of the documents (e.g. US Army, ND) shed light on the procedures for securing MANPADS in the field, which appear to be relatively redundant and robust. However, an audit by the General Accounting Office of the US Congress indicates that when it comes to MANPADS sold abroad, there has been a proven wide gap between doctrine and practice, in terms of inspection rigor and record-keeping (US General
Accounting Office, 2004). Whether this reflects on US military practice at home as well is unknown.
Theft and accident perspective: “… there are no (publicly) confirmed cases of successful thefts [of MANPADS] from US arsenals” (Schroeder, 2009). US arsenals in general are subject to a multiplicity of physical and other checks, and so the statement by Schroeder would seem to reflect the reality. Never-theless, it must be kept in mind that the US MANPADS stockpile is widely dispersed, accidents happen, and soldiers are notorious for abandoning weapons on the battlefield under certain circumstances.
While some cases have come to light of attempted black market transactions involving Stingers, these were almost always cases of stings conducted by US law enforcement agencies, and do not provide evidence about stockpile quality. While we doubt US stockpiling procedures are perfect, they appear nevertheless to be robust, and no cases of theft or loss in the United States have come to light.
Summary and conclusions: US stockpile
• The overall size of the US MANPADS stockpile is estimated at around 50 to 66,000 using manu-facturing data, or 60 to 90,000 using the OOB method, the higher number in each estimate is a product of the reserve stocks factor used, i.e. 50 or 100 percent reserve.
• The US stockpile appears to be widely distributed, including overseas, which would imply a certain degree of vulnerability.
• Oversight of Stingers sold abroad has been patchy, though it is unknown whether lack of oversight is also true of home stockpiles.
• There is no evidence of cases of theft or lost MANPADS from US stockpiles.
Russia
Russia started producing MANPADS after securing plans for the US Redeye. The Strela MANPADS has been manufactured since 1970 when it entered series production, and is still being produced by Vietnam and Serbia under license. Unlike the Redeye, the Strela-2 was never recalled for destruction, though it has been made obsolete in the Russian armed services. Assessing Russian MANPADS stockpiles is also complicated by the number of types produced in that country.
MANPADS are deployed in front-line battalions of the Russian army, and as part of in-depth air defense system for valuable installations and headquarters.
There is no public evidence for their presence in Air Force or Strategic Rocket Force bases, but given the Russian doctrine of air defense in depth, one may assume this is the case as well.
Manufacturing perspective: No reliable source provides information on the rate of production for Russian MANPADS. We thus have no real picture of the capacity of Russian MANPADS manufacture. As a rough estimate based on number of Igla/SA-18 produced (roughly 8,500) over a period of 27 years (series production started in 1983, and continued for export until 2010 at least) we get 300/year production, which seems somewhat low (Jane’s, 2012c). Given that thousands of MANPADS have been exported in a single tranche, it is to be assumed that production capacity is considerably greater than actual year-on-year production. The Igla-S to Venezuela were supplied within two years of contract signature (see Forero, 2010), which implies a production capacity of around 1,000/year.
A second factor needs to be considered as well. In contrast to the United States, Russia rarely destroys old and even obsolete weapons (see Box 5: Belarus’
negotiations on MANPADS destruction). Thus the total Russian stockpile most likely includes obsolete Strela-2s along with advanced Igla-S, albeit, presumably in second and third echelon (that is, reserve and home-land defense) units or stockpiles. If the Russians have been manufacturing between 300 (the minimum estimate) and 1,000 per year, for domestic purposes, we estimate the total stockpile by this method to be between 13,300 and 46,000. The higher number seems more likely.
OOB perspective: The picture for the Russian armed forces is complicated by a number of factors:
First, the Russian armed forces are still in a period of flux. The army is currently being restructured around a brigade-based structure, rather than an army corps and divisional system. Second, Russian military formations of the same type, e.g. motor rifle brigades, might have slightly different structures. Third, we could find no valid evidence of the MANPADS located on Russian navy vessels, and have made an estimate of one team per vessel (excluding submarines)as we did for the United States. Air bases and radars which are likewise protected by layered anti-aircraft assets
10,000 missiles would not be unlikely. Fourth, there is no evidence of a Russian program to destroy obsolescent MANPADS such as the Strela family. These may have been sold, destroyed clandestinely, or transferred to Ministry of Interior Border Guard or Interior Troops, which removes them from the purely military OOB, but not from the national stockpile.
In Russian doctrine, every combat battalion is protected by one platoon (we assume three sections/
teams each, with six missiles per team) of MANPADS. In addition, high value targets, air defense assets, radars, and command posts are all protected by teams, or in cases of larger assets, platoons of MANPADS operators.
Basing ourselves on the most recent edition of Military Balance (IISS, 2012), and including surface combatant vessels of the navy (N=185) with one team aboard each, and around 10,000 missiles for high value sites, we estimate the number of ready-to-use missiles at 64,160. To that should be added a reserve stock of between one-third and the ready-to-use number, bringing the current stockpile estimate to 128,320 as a likely maximum. We have assumed that the other Russian government-related security services—the Federal Border Guard Service, the Interior Troops (ODON divisions and OBRON brigades), Federal Protection Service, Railway Troops, and Federal Communications and Information Agency Troops—
are not armed with MANPADS. Should that not be the case, then we would need to add around 92 brigades worth of MANPADS (72 missiles per brigade) to an additional number of 6,624 (plus a possible equiva-lent number in reserve). At a maximum, therefore, we would estimate Russian stockpiles at 140,000.
Theft and accident perspective: Problems of securing Russian stockpiles, notably at the manufacturing end, appear to have been endemic (Pyadushkin et al., 2003). While such problems are probably more true of the early post-Soviet period, they likely persist today as well, at least to some degree. Security for existing stockpiles is sometimes poor (see for example RTCom, 2010). The situation in air defense bases which may also contain MANPADS is not much better (see Think Defence, 2010).
We have no direct evidence of thefts of MANPADS from Russian stocks. As in the United States, there have been cases of Russian stings against would-be purchasers (Williscroft, 2006, pp. 197–98). However, given the relative restrictiveness of the Russian media world, such cases as might have happened would not have reached the public.
Russia has also suffered from a number of well-recorded ammunition accidents (cf. Reuters, 2012a;
RT, 2011). These have reportedly included artillery shells and bombs, but the presence of MANPADS in such massive depots should not be unlikely. Crucially for this study, it indicates serious deficiencies in Russian stockpile safety procedures. These explosions both complicate the stockpile count, and also may be sources for MANPADS diffusion, as stocks of MANPADS accounted for as ‘destroyed in accident’ may actually have been stolen either before or after the accident.
Even more so than in the case of the United States, the Russian stockpile is spread over an enormous terri-tory and MANPADS are in the possession of numerous units. This means that vulnerability to theft and diver-sion are even greater than in the United States, all things being equal. During the immediate post-Soviet period and until the recent military reforms (2010 and after; Rossiskaya Gazetta, 2012), when pay was both late and low, it is possible that MANPADS were sold to non-state groups and individuals as a way of supplementing pay. To add to the problem, Russia has been plagued by a number of rebellions in the North Caucasus, with Chechnya being the most publicized.
Many of the rebels are former Russian army veterans who may have deserted with MANPADS, or who may have contacts within the armed forces to acquire them (US State Department, 2008).
Summary and conclusions: Russia’s stockpile
• By the manufacturing method, we estimated Russian stockpiles to be a maximum of 46,000.
The OOB method yielded a minimum of 64,000 MANPADS. If we assume a 100 percent reserve stockpile, the number would be 128,000.
• There is no evidence of the Russians destroying obsolete stocks of e.g. Strela-2A/B, which may have been transferred to Border Guard and inte-rior troops. If this is the case, the stockpile may reach 140,000 MANPADS.
• Russian stockpiles are widely dispersed and possibly poorly guarded. There is repeated evidence of leakage from SALW manufacturers, which may include MANPADS. There is evidence of poor guard practices of other munitions, and of repeated ammunition explosions, leading to the conclusion that MANPADS may be at risk as well, with possible diversions before accidents.
China23
China is the third largest producer of MANPADS with a number of versions of MANPADS, and missiles for self-propelled short-range missile systems. MANPADS are deployed in the PLA (People’s Liberation Army), and we assume the PLA Navy (PLAN) and Air Force (PLAAF). The PLA is modernizing, and is in the process of reorganizing more professionally, but it is still possible that MANPADS may be found within the local defense units as well.
Manufacturing perspective: Chinese capacities and volumes for MANPADS manufacture are unknown. We could find no indications of production volumes. Given China’s rapid industrialization, and the emphasis on modernizing the PLA, it can be expected that these are similar to the manufacturing capacities of the other two major producers.
OOB perspective: Currently, the PLA ground force is organized into 18 group armies, along with a number of independent units. Maneuver forces consist of approximately 40 divisions and about 43 separate brigades (armor, mechanized, amphibious, and infantry), supported by roughly 42 artillery and air defense divisions and brigades, and various other units.
In addition to the PLA, the PLA Navy has two amphibious divisions.
The PLA Air Force has an airborne army of two airborne divisions plus combat support elements, perhaps amounting to a third division (Blasko, 2005).
In a very detailed report, Andrew (2009) provides details of the air-defense picture for PLA maneuver elements. Every maneuver battalion includes a platoon of three MANPADS teams with six missiles each (Andrew, 2009). We take this to include brigade HQ which is usually battalion size. Divisions include 106 MANPADS controlled by the Divisional Air Defense brigade commander. Artillery brigades are protected by one platoon of 24 MANPADS.
We have no information on MANPADS deployed by the PLAN or PLAAF. For the PLAN, once again we have made the conservative estimate that surface combatants will be armed with at least one team of MANPADS, though this may not be the case for major surface combatants which have more complex air
defense suites. There is some photographic evidence that MANPADS are installed on small craft, albeit in a mounted configuration which may or may not be dismountable. The PLAN disposes of some 650 surface ships of various capacities and sizes (IISS, 2012). Assuming one team with six missiles on average (smaller combatants obviously are likely to carry less) we have 3,900 MANPADS deployed. It is likely that both PLAAF installations and those of the Second Artil-lery Force (Strategic Missile Forces) are protected by, among other weapons, MANPADS. The PLAAF has five SAM/mixed SAM Divisions, 13 SAM/ADA brigades, 10 SAM/ADA regiments, and four SAM battalions (Military Balance, 2012). If these follow the PLA pattern of 106 MANPADS per AD brigade, this represents an inven-tory of 4,100 MANPADS. The Second Artillery Corps, which is the strategic missile corps of the PLA is orga-nized into 28 brigades (IISS, 2012). Once again we have assumed that each brigade has 106 MANPADS for defense.
The total inventory of ready-to-use MANPADs would thus appear to be around 23,000. Assuming a ready reserve of around that same number, we estimate the total MANPADS holdings of China to be around 46,000.
Theft and accident perspective: In the period 1998–
2012, China reported three unplanned explosions at munitions ites (SAS, 2012). Whether this is a case of underreporting or of good management of ammu-nition stocks is hard to say. There have also been no reported cases of thefts of Chinese MANPADS. Though Chinese MANPADS have been found in individual hands or with NSAGs, these have generally been reported as being the result of transfer from a third party (US State Department, 2008).
Overall, it seems that Chinese MANPADS stocks are well guarded, and appear to be stored with due regard to safety as well.
Summary and conclusions: Chinese stockpile
Very little has been published about China’s MANPADS stockpile conditions. The absence of any information may be due to absence of problems, or to a well-controlled press.
• From the OOB perspective, it appears that Chinese stockpile consists of about 46,000 missiles of different types.
• The assessment of the stockpile relies on only one method, as no other information was available.
• There is no information that would suggest this stockpile lacks security or safety, and no evidence of leaks.
The world stockpile picture
Estimating the world’s total stockpiles is complicated by the factors noted at the beginning of this chapter:
lack of transparency, and absence of reliable data.
(Appendix A presents the publicly available data in a table.)
The data for worldwide stockpiles based on published material amounts to 153,341 MANPADS, a number far below the estimates for Russia alone. Individual state stockpiles may be of the order noted in that table, but world stockpile is likely to be several times higher.
What is also evident is the paucity of destruction in comparison to stockpiles. While large parts of some stockpiles have been destroyed, the total number of destructions does not even equal the manufacture of new weapons.