INTRODUCTION
From 1993 to 2002, United States Atlantic Command (USACOM), formerly Atlantic Command (LANT-COM), implemented a reorganization initially meant to foster a new ethos of joint operations throughout the Armed Services community. USACOM quickly implemented significant changes during a period of heightened tension within one of its Areas of Respon-sibility (AOR), and did so efficiently and effectively.
During the next 8 years, however, regions were real-located to other commands, and USACOM became increasingly functional in focus. In the wake of a new massive reformation throughout the Defense com-munity in 2002, USACOM lost all of its operational capacity and became the purely functional command U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). For the next decade, the command positioned itself as the promi-nent laboratory for transformation concepts. In 2002, USJFCOM ran the most expensive and extensive ex-ercise in U.S. history to test those theories, MILLEN-NIUM CHALLENGE 2002, but with mixed results.
Now, in 2011, USJFCOM is being de-commissioned.
Arguments about the reasons and effects of this reor-ganization are polarizing. Some argue that in an era of limited resources, commands without an operational
focus are superfluous, while others suggest that US-JFCOM has successfully fulfilled its functional pur-pose. The most compelling argument may lie between these two.
In the early fall of 1994, a large American force was gathering against a small Caribbean nation. Paratroop-ers from the 82nd Airborne Division mustered on the
“Green Ramp” at Pope Air Force Base, Fayetteville, NC, to be issued their ammunition and board C-130 cargo aircraft. Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Divi-sion were already aboard the USS Dwight D. Eisenhow-er off the coast. Naval aviation, Air Force fightEisenhow-ers, and Army helicopters stood by, while Marines prepared for a possible amphibious landing. Operation UP-HOLD DEMOCRACY was about to commence.
Simultaneous to the military prepositioning of forces, a small group of diplomats was meeting with Haitian leaders. In January 1991, Jean Bertrand Aris-tide was instated as President of Haiti. His tenure was cut short, however, by a military junta that overthrew Aristide’s government and controlled Haiti for more than 3 years. In an attempt to reinstate President Aris-tide, the U.S. Government under President William Clinton imposed tough economic sanctions, which created a flood of refugees from Haiti and, it was hoped, brought the junta to a more congenial position with regards to American demands.
Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell led the diplomatic contingent to Haiti. They informed their hosts that American paratroopers were in the air and the full military might of the United States would be brought to bear against the Haitian government if Aristide was not allowed to return to the island and peacefully assume his role as President. Faced with
overwhelming odds and certainly reflecting on Amer-ican success in Panama (and more recently in Iraq), the military leaders of the junta capitulated and, for the most part, violence was avoided.
Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was the first military operation for a new unified command re-organized just months earlier under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) was cre-ated to do more than act as a headquarters for com-mands from the various services, and its responsibili-ties were larger than the regions over which it had control. Formed under the supervision of Powell in the early-1990s, USACOM was the new unified com-mand tasked as the advocate for joint training, joint provision, and joint integration for all continental U.S.
(CONUS)-based forces. It was organized to provide trained joint forces from the United States to other combatant commands around the world if mission requirements exceeded the internal forces of the sup-ported command; additionally, it was responsible for the defense of North America, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Caribbean Sea.
Rather than form a new unified command to ac-complish this goal, Powell decided to give the mis-sion to Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) and allow its commander in chief (CINC), Admiral Paul D. Miller, to reorganize to meet the new mission requirements.
This feat was not accomplished in a vacuum. LANT-COM had an AOR that spanned the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea. Missions were ongoing in the Caribbean due to the escalating tensions with Haiti and responsibilities still existed from the Cold War towards the Azores and Iceland. Yet in the spring of 1993, LANTCOM staff developed a sound
implemen-tation plan that, within months, was accepted by the Secretary of Defense and the President, and allowed for the success just 1 year later of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.
The following years would continue to change USACOM’s structure and mission. Gradually, AORs were given to other commands. Initially, the com-mand surrendered the Caribbean to U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM); this move was followed by the loss of the Atlantic to U.S. European Command (EUCOM); finally, in 2002, USJFCOM was divested of its role as defender of CONUS with the formation of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). At the same time, new functional organizations were placed under its control, refining its focus as the joint advo-cate for all U.S. forces.
In October 2002, after 9/11 and the rapid escala-tion of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), USACOM was renamed U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and divested of all of its operational requirements.
The command accepted its role as a purely functional command, focused on developing concepts derived from the Pentagon, Washington, DC-directed pro-grams of Transformation and the Revolution in Mili-tary Affairs (RMA). This focus was best exemplified in the largest joint exercise in history, MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002 that produced mixed results and one very public controversy. Additionally, many of those opposed to the concept under which USJF-COM was formed remained hostile, and some who were responsible for USJFCOM’s creation ultimately joined its enemies’ camp. While the reorganization of USACOM in 1993 was a success, the eventual reality in 2002 of USJFCOM as a purely functional command
focused on joint operation advocacy and transforma-tion limited its perceived relevance in the GWOT and allowed those in opposition to the concept to move for its disestablishment.
THE NAVY’S BACKYARD: ATLANTIC