Unilateral opening of the Green Line by TRNC

In the new year’s message to his people in 2003, Mr. Denktaş mentions that on a path to the solution to the Cyprus issue, they are “on the same side with the motherland” (“Tarih Bizi Affetmez”, 2003). However, the reality of the situation was different. The solution and how it should be formed was different for Mr. Denktaş and he was subject to pressure from both

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Turkey and its newly elected government, and the Turkish Cypriots. Mass demonstrations by the public for reconciliations between the Turkish and the Greek side had been going on since the previous year of 2002, while the negotiations between Mr. Denktaş and Mr.

Klerides were bearing no fruit due to the uncompromising stance of Mr. Denktaş on reunification based on a federal solution. In Turkey, AKP was just elected in the November of 2002, and they had a different vision for a solution to the Cyprus problem, which supported a federal solution, contrary to Mr. Denktaş’s views. Then chairman of AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated his support to the Turkish Cypriots just a day later than Mr. Denktaş’s new year’s message, by saying that the demonstrations of 30-40 thousand in Cyprus cannot be ignored (“Halkı Bir Kenara İtemezsiniz”, 2003). At a first glance to this picture, it is obvious that the number one political elite considered almost as a father figure, was now stuck between the changed demands of the patron state, and the increasing pressure in the domestic constituency.

Most striking evidence of public support to reunification is a survey conducted in the disputed region of Morphou. This region was demanded by the Greek Cypriots in all negotiations, and Mr. Denktaş was adamant in not relinquishing it. However, in the survey the residents of Morphou were asked if they would approve of the transfer of Morphou to the Greek side, and 75% of them remarked that if it makes a solution easier, then Morphou could be given away (“Güzelyurt, Çözüm ve AB'ye Hazır”, 2003). Meanwhile support for Denktaş was at an all-time low at just 27.1% according to another survey (“Denktaş’a Destek %27.1”, 2003).

Demonstrations continued to gather impressive numbers of Turkish Cypriots, numbers estimated at 60,000 and all of them asking for the resignation of Denktaş, a solution, peace and EU (“Bu Sesi Duyun!”, 2003). Republic of Cyprus had come to an end in its accession process and was going to join the EU in the 2004 expansion without the Turkish Cypriots if a solution was not reached by then. Turkish Cypriots and Turkey both, had expressed their support for the Annan plan and a referendum was in the mentions. However, Mr. Denktaş would not budge, and even stated that even if there is a yes in the referendum for the existing plan, he would not sign it (“Mevcut Plana Referandumda…”, 2003). While support for

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Denktaş declined, the main opposition CTP’s leader was constantly meeting with important positions in Turkey, Republic of Cyprus and EU.

The third version of the Annan plan was presented to the sides on February 27, and on the same day another demonstration was held by the Turkish Cypriots to express support for the plans (“Halk Kararını Yineledi:…”, 2003). Kofi Annan, then the General Secretary of the UN had asked both sides to hold referendums for the plan’s approval and wanted the leaders to meet up in the Hague to sign an agreement for referendums (“İmzasız Referandum”, 2003).

While this was met with support from the Turkish Cypriots, and both sides agreed to meet in the Hague, the answers to the call for referendum were not decided yet, and Mr. Denktaş would state that “it is not time for a referendum yet” (“Denktaş: Referanduma gitme zamanı…”, 2003). This was to be followed by a meeting for the discussion of a referendum in the TRNC parliament, while unions were to be on strike in schools and workplaces, and shopkeepers were to shut down in support of the referendum (“Kritik Gün”, 2003). However, the meeting could not be conducted due to the absence of UBP deputies, which formed the majority of the government along with Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party, DP). After the blockage of the referendum discussions by the party Mr. Denktaş founded, political parties of TRNC and Mr. Denktaş would go to Turkey to discuss the referendum. (“Gözler Anavatanlarda”, 2003). Before the meeting, Mr. Erdoğan stated that “if Cyprus is not solved, they will not let us in the EU” (“Kıbrıs Çözümlenmezse…”, 2003), while Mr. Denktaş said that he would not decide alone and Turkey should also decide (“Kıbrıs Çözümlenmezse…”, 2003). At the end of the discussions, the position of Turkey was clear as they stated that the decision is for Turkish Cypriots to make (“Karar Sizin”, 2003), which meant that in the end, the Turkish Cypriots would have to decide for themselves.

On March 9, another meeting was to be conducted in the parliament about the referendum issue, but UBP did not send its deputies to the parliament again and as a protest to that the main opposition parties CTP and Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi (Socialist Liberation Party, TKP) decided to boycott the parliament until March 30, and announced that they would hold a plebiscite (“30 Mart’ta Referandum…”, 2003). The Turkish Cypriots were hopeful about

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the meeting in the Hague on March 10 but after the intense talks there was no result, the negotiations had failed (“İpler Koptu”, 2003) and Kofi Annan, the UN, EU, and USA blamed Denktaş for his attitude in the negotiations (“Dünyada Öfke”, 2003). The failure in the Hague only resulted in an increase in the intensity and frequency of the public demonstrations and calls for resignation while Turkey’s prime minister at the time, Abdullah Gül remarked that

“there is still a chance for a solution” (“Gül: Lahey’de Kapılar…”, 2003). Symbolic referendums were attempted to be held but were met with heavy resistance from the TRNC police and unions went on another strike to protest the attitude of Mr. Denktaş (“Halk İradesine Polis Copu, 2003). Cracking under the pressure, Mr. Denktaş presented 6 articles to the Republic of Cyprus for agreement and the third article mentioned easing the regulations for passage between the two sides (“Denktaş’tan Açılım, 2003). Turkish Foreign Ministry welcomed these articles and Mehmet Ali Talat, CTP’s leader met with Mr. Erdoğan to discuss a possible solution (“Talat Erdoğan’la ‘Çözüm’ü Konuştu”, 2003). Two more hits for Mr. Denktaş’s presidency came as the report of Kofi Annan published a report, blaming the failure of the process on Mr. Denktaş (“BM’den Denktaş’a Suçlama”, 2003) and Republic of Cyprus signed the agreement to join the EU without the Turkish Cypriots (“Ve Rumlar İmzayı Attı”, 2003). After this, as Mr. Denktaş realized that he could not block the will of the Turkish Cypriots anymore as public dissatisfaction grew and the borders were opened to passage on April 23, 2003.

While this thesis accepts the opening of the borders as an important event in TRNC and Cyprus history, it should be mentioned that in the process leading up to it, the discussions around the Annan plan and whether it should be accepted is the main motivator of this result.

Mr. Denktaş believed firmly in a more Turkish identity for Turkish Cypriots and represented devotion to Turkey and its continuous existence in TRNC (Y. Vural, personal communication, April 5, 2021). Turkey and its governments had always respected and stood behind Mr. Denktaş’s decisions too, up to the point where AKP was elected. The policies implemented by the AKP government contradicted the attitude of governments past.

Furthermore, it could be argued that the proposed solution, public support for it and patron’s willingness to implement the Annan plan have also contributed to an ontological insecurity

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occurring in Mr. Denktaş himself. He had always seen the Turkish Cypriot identity as one close to Turkey, often in a hierarchical relationship as Turkey is the motherland and TRNC the yavru vatan (baby-land). From Mr. Denktaş’s perspective, the sentiments of kinship and unwavering support and solidarity resulting from it characterized the relationship between the two states. Therefore, in this process we can observe elite navigations, or at least attempts at it in a situation where both the domestic consensus and patron’s demands are against the top political elite.

When it was clear that the situation cannot be navigated the only way to deal with the increasing pressure was to open the borders. There are some details that go with the wording of the decision and whether Denktaş and Turkey were somehow convinced to open the borders. First of all, in our interview one participant has rightly pointed out that the wording

“bilateral opening of the borders” and any terms surrounding it are politicized ones (Y. Vural, personal communication, April 5, 2021). The border was never technically closed, as the Republic of Cyprus allowed passage and it was TRNC who was blocking off passage to the north of the island, some would claim that this is merely granting freedom of passage. As for convincing Turkey and Mr. Denktaş to open the border, there are two important aspects to consider. One is that since the public pressure was so high, four out of the 5 participants in the interviews mentioned that if the borders were not opened by the hands on the government, they might have even been torn down by the public. This would result in an almost Berlin Wall like moment in the history of TRNC, seriously delegitimizing Mr. Denktaş’s presidency and his party’s governance.

Second point is that while the decision had to be discussed with Turkey, the AKP government did not require much convincing. At that time, they had been just elected, with the legitimacy of their government still unproven as the military was against their election out of concerns that they represented a radical Islamist approach. However, AKP was on board with the decision, as they were much more serious about joining the EU at that time. Erdoğan’s words were mentioned in the earlier paragraphs, and the solution of the Cyprus issue has been a key part in Turkey’s EU accession process. In order to show good will, and not to jeopardize the

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process, the governing party and its components always displayed support to the mass demonstrations and overall political will of the Turkish Cypriots for reunification. One of the parties that had to be convinced, although no data is present on this claim, had to be the Turkish military. The borders are controlled by TSK’s force in TRNC, and they have always adopted a more hard line approach to the Cyprus issue as a solution consisting reunification would jeopardize Turkey’s national interests in the East Mediterranean. Due to the heavy involvement of TSK in the GKK, it would not be an illogical assumption to think that the Turkish military had to be convinced of this decision, but since no data could be acquired on this during the research, this thesis will not speculate more on this issue.

Although there are clear attempts by Mr. Denktaş to dictate patronage towards his cause of non-unification by consulting Turkey at each decision, hence displaying elite navigations, there is another political elite who was demanding patronage through meetings with the patron state’s officials. Mehmet Ali Talat, who was the opposition leader at the time, would become the president of TRNC just two years later in 2005. Known for maintaining good relations with Turkey throughout his career, he had multiple meetings during the first quarter of 2003 with officials from Turkey in order to discuss the situation. When asked if Mr. Talat asked for any support from Turkey throughout the process, he mentioned that he asked for support from Turkey to convince Mr. Denktaş to accept the Annan plan. While CTP was only an opposition party at that time, he explained that he was personally managing the relationship established between CTP and Turkish government about a solution to the Cyprus issue. He further mentioned that with his suggestion Ertuğrul Apakan, a Turkish diplomat, came along with Mr. Denktaş and Mr. Talat after a visit to Ankara. He also stated that Mr.

Apakan was an important figure to convince Mr. Denktaş. Mr. Denktaş did not like Mr.

Erdoğan because he wanted reunification and therefore, he would not be able to convince Mr. Denktaş but Mr. Apakan could (M.A. Talat, personal communication, April 14, 2021).

The analysis of the events which unfolded in 2003 that led to the opening of the borders has revealed that elite navigations can be performed in multiple ways on different levels of governance of a client state. The attitude of Mr. Denktaş reveals what happens when the

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ontological security of an elite is threatened, as it was mentioned earlier that while ontological security of states is important, since the individuals guide the states, their ontological security also matters. On one hand, for Mr. Denktaş unification meant assimilation of the Turkish Cypriots. The demands of the patron to solve the Cyprus issue and lack of domestic support led him to defy and attempt to dictate patronage in this issue. He defied by rejecting to agree in the negotiations, and he dictated, as his ideas were not shared, through diplomacy by meeting with multiple important positions in Turkey to express his thoughts on the Annan plan. When he realized he did not have neither the patron’s nor his public’s support, Mr.

Denktaş allowed the borders to open in order to cool the tensions down. While this worked to end the mass demonstrations, he would not be re-elected in 2005. On the other hand, we have Mr. Talat who demanded patronage against Mr. Denktaş because he did not represent public will anymore and was in the way of Turkish Cypriots achieving their goal of unification and the consequent end of isolation by joining the EU along with Republic of Cyprus. For this thesis and elite navigations, the actions of Mr. Talat mean that although the patron’s demands did not threaten his and the general public’s ontological security at the time, because other threats were present to it such as the president of the country jeopardizing the solution for the Cyprus issue, he chose to demand patronage through diplomacy. If anything, the patron’s support enhanced the sense of ontological security for Mr. Talat and the Turkish Cypriots in this event.