TheSumma Halensisshares many sources and concerns with William of Auvergne but develops this shared material differently, laboring to avoid the dangers of Wil-liam’s approach by construing providence largely through formal and final
causali- Aristotle,Physics2.1, inThe Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 1, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1984), 329. Against this standard translation and interpretation, Helen Lang reads Aristotelian nature as a passive principle of being moved. See Helen Lang,The Order of Nature in Aristotle’sPhysics:Place and the Elements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 40–50.
William of Auvergne,De trinitate, c. 11 (Switalski, 76).
William of Auvergne,De trinitate, c. 11 (Switalski, 77).
William of Auvergne,De trinitate, c. 11 (Switalski, 79). Miller provides a series of examples from theDe trinitateandDe universoto show that William did grant true causal efficacy to created natures.
These examples, however, can be read within the general framework of causing with respect to sen-sory data. See Miller,‘William of Auvergne on Primary and Secondary Qualities,’272–4.
William of Auvergne,De trinitate, c. 12 (Switalski, 79).
Gilson addresses this to some degree in his exploration of how William presents all creaturely esseas participation in God’sessesuch that God remains most intimate to all creatures. See Étienne Gilson,‘La notion d’existence chez Guillaume d’Auvergne,’Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge15 (1946): 62–9. Caster takes exceptions to Gilson and Masnovo (see above, n. 3) in Kevin J. Caster,‘The Real Distinction Between Being and Essence according to William of Auvergne,’
Traditio51 (1996): 201–23 and treats William’s views in light of influences on his thought in Kevin J.
Caster,‘The Distinction between Being and Essence according to Boethius, Avicenna, and William of Auvergne,’The Modern Schoolman73 (1996): 309–32.
William of Auvergne,De universoI-I, c. 26, 622.
ty.³⁴This construal significantly escapes the consequences (or seeming consequen-ces) of William’s emphasis on efficient causality, an emphasis that risks defining the integrity of created secondary causality against the efficacy of divine creative cau-sality. The Summists begin with the most basic question, whether there is provi-dence, and respond principally with the authority of Boethius and of Augustine.³⁵ The primary issue at stake concerns the apparent disorder within creation. The Sum-mists respond:‘Although things in the world, when considered in themselves accord-ing to their own mode, seem to be disordered in the world, nonetheless, with respect to providence they are well ordered; thus, with respect to providence itself there is neither confusion nor disorder [in the world].’³⁶The Summists elaborate upon this with theGlossthat providence always orders to the good what in itself is disordered.
A more focused challenge to the very existence of providence concerns evil. The gen-eral strategy applies in this specific case; providence orders evil to the good such that evil becomes useful for the progress and perfection of good.³⁷
If the Summa Halensisbegins its treatment of providence in broad agreement with William’s central concerns, matters change drastically with the second topic,
‘what is providence’. The Summists, frame the question in terms of whether provi-dence pertains to wisdom (glossed in terms of formal causality), will (glossed in terms of final causality), or power (glossed in terms of efficient causality).³⁸ In a stark departure from William, the Summists argue providence can principally be re-duced to wisdom and to the good, thereby shifting the emphasis away from efficient causality and towards formal and final causality.³⁹As the Summists write:
there are two (things) in providence, namely seeing (videntia) or cognition, because to see before (providere) is to see (videre), and something added beyond this [seeing], namely causality. Prov-idence names a certain causality of order or governance and rule. According to the meaning (ratio) of seeing, [providence] introduces (importat) cognition and knowledge. According to what is added beyond that, by which it indicates (notat) the causality of governance or order, [providence] names the good will of God, which itself is the governor of things. Thus, by virtue
See Posti,‘Divine Providence,’58–63 for a brief but useful discussion of theSumma Halensis.
Several texts from Augustine served as authorities on providence, but none elicited quite as many questions asDe diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 24 (PL 40:17).
SHI, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C1 (n. 195), p. 282.
SHI, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C1 (n. 195), p. 283. Posti identifies two scholastic strategies (acciden-tal and instrumen(acciden-tal) for addressing providence and evil among the medieval scholastics and argues theSumma Halensisemploys both (Posti,‘Divine Providence,’62–8). On this theme, see also Oleg Bychkov,‘Decor ex praesentia mali:Aesthetic Explanation of Evil in Thirteenth-Century Franciscan Thought,’Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales68 (2001): 245–69.
SeeSHI, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), p. 285. On the relationship of these theological and philosophical categories, see Philotheus Boehner,‘The System of Metaphysics of Alexander of Hales,’
Franciscan Studies5 (1945): 366–414.
SHI, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), p. 286.
of the first [i.e. seeing], [providence] pertains to wisdom; by virtue of the second [i.e. causality of governance], it pertains to the will.⁴⁰
Following this, the Summists acknowledge that providence relates to or at least can be reduced to power, and thus to efficient causality, but only as it is co-understood with knowledge and will.⁴¹ I will elaborate the force and consequences of the shift from emphasizing efficient causality to emphasizing formal and final causality, but it is worth dwelling for a moment on the change itself and its terms. The Summists do not simply trade one category of Aristotelian causality for another (though they do this); the Summists also link the causal categories to the trinitarian appropriations of power, wisdom, and will. By employing these typical categories of appropriations, theSumma Halensisaccomplishes several things. One, it expands the frame of refer-ence for divine providrefer-ence from a unitary divine nature to a trinity of divine per-sons.⁴² Two, it builds upon its own earlier considerations of divine attributes to clar-ify providence. These two points are not unrelated, and I hope it will suffice here to focus on the second.
Broadly speaking, theSumma Halensissituates providence within the larger in-vestigation of divine knowledge, a consideration following directly the treatment of divine power. As the examination of divine power unfolds, the Summists introduce distinctions and qualifications that clarify the limits—not of divine power itself—
but of its concrete instantiations and to attempts at exploring the created order through reflections on divine power. The process begins with possible limitations to divine power and by distinguishing finite and infinite power. A ‘finite power can in its totality be educed in its act, while an infinite power can be educed in act but not in its totality, for this contradicts its infinity.’⁴³ In other words, no partic-ular act exhausts an infinite power, and so God’s providential ordering of all reality reflects the particular application of an infinite divine power unlimited in itself and absolutely but concretely specified and directed. The question then becomes what concretely specifies and directs an infinite power in specific acts?
The Summists clarify this complex relation while addressing a series of topics and aided by several distinctions, the most basic of which is betweenpotentia abso-lutaand potentia ordinata.⁴⁴ This distinction, the Summists emphasize, implies no
SHI, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), p. 287.
SHI, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), p. 287.
See Boyd Taylor Coolman,‘A Cord of Three Strands is not Easily Broken:The Transcendental Bro-cade of Unity, Truth, and Goodness in the Early Franciscan Intellectual Tradition,’Nova et Vetera16 (2018): 561–86.
SHI, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, M2, C1 (n. 140), p. 219.
SHI, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, M2, C2 (n. 141), pp. 220–1. See Lawrence Moonan,Divine Power: The Medi-eval Power Distinction up to its Adoption by Albert, Bonaventure, and Aquinas(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 131–44.
limitation on divine power. There can be no such limitation.⁴⁵This is so‘even though the flowing out (egressum) in act of the divine power is always concomitant with will, justice, goodness, foreknowledge, and reason (ratio), which are the same reality in God but differ according to the reason of [our] understanding.’⁴⁶Potentia ordinata does not represent a limited power but only an ordering of unlimited divine power
‘according to the plan (ratio) of divine preordination of justice rendering to each ac-cording to merit’.⁴⁷Just because something can be done does not mean it should be done. Full recognition of this guides the Summists’approach to divine power. Such is evident when the Summists question whether God could have made things better than they are. This depends on a distinction,
because we can consider things in themselves (and according to this whatsoever thing can be made better), or [we can] consider things within the universe of things (and according to this it should be conceded that they cannot be made better with respect to the power of the thing made but can be made better with respect to the power of the one making).⁴⁸
Even if only implicitly, this frames or sets the stage for treatments of providence. Un-like William’s narrow focus on divine power refracted through efficient causality, the Summa Halensisemphasizes the unlimited divine power as ordered according to a set of divine attributes identical in themselves but distinct in our understanding of them. The Summists apply a similar principle to differentiations in modes of divine causality.⁴⁹
Returning to providence, the Summists specify that providence chiefly pertains to wisdom operating as formal causality and to will operating as final causality. Prov-idence can be reduced to power operating as efficient causality, but only insofar as power is co-understood with knowledge and will. Knowledge and will are not there-by rendered as limits on power, nor are formal and final causes construed as limits on efficiency. Rather, theSumma Halensisassumes a coincidence of causes and an identity of attributes in God, weaving together Aristotelian approaches to causality and theological notions of divine simplicity.⁵⁰ These principles must be kept in
SHI, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, M2, C3 (n. 142), p. 221.
SHI, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, M2, C3 (n. 142), pp. 221–2.
SHI, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, M2, C2 (n. 141), pp. 220–1. Posti frames arguments of this type as reinter-pretations of middle Platonic notions of conditional fate (Posti,‘Divine Providence,’24–8) and ar-gues such notions were received in scholastic thought through the mediation of Boethius. The Sum-mists employ a parallel in Christology in distinguishing various forms of possibility. They define the ability or possibility of justice (posse de iustitia) as possibility according to the fittingness of merit (posse secundum congruentiam meritorum). This all falls within a discussion of considering power not absolutely but as ordered by justice. SeeSHIV, In1, Tr1, Q1, C4 (n. 4), pp. 15–6.
SHI, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, M3, C1 (n. 143), p. 223.
SHII, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti1, M1, C2 (n. 7), p. 16.
On the coincidence of causes in Aristotle, see Robert Bolton,‘Why Does Aristotle Need Four Caus-es?,’inLa Causalité chez Aristote, ed. Lambros Couloubaritsis and Sylvain Delcomminette (Paris:
Libraire philosophique J. Vrin; Bruxelles: Éditions Ousia, 2011), 27–46. SeeSHII, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2,
mind when the Summists present providence as the‘plan of the exemplar considered in the divine art’(exemplaris ratio consideratur in arte divina).⁵¹ By introducing exem-plarity, the Summists are specifying the particularities of divine formal causality in a significant manner.
The Summists make clear that formal exemplarity does not posit separate forms existing independently in an ideal realm with actual created realities being merely lesser imitations such as in the case of mathematical forms. The Summists note Ar-istotle and Avicenna reject such understandings of formal causality.⁵² They approve instead Seneca’s distinction betweenideaandeidos, with the former as eternal exem-plars and the latter as the forms of individual substances.⁵³ The focus remains on Seneca’s use ofidea, according to which the Summists stress the unity of the eternal exemplar, itself identical with the first efficient cause. The plurality or diversity of ef-fects no more multiplies or diversifies the exemplar cause than the efficient cause.⁵⁴ The exemplar cause further extends beyond what was, is, and will be actual to the full range of infinite divine possibility.⁵⁵When considered in terms of knowledge, the exemplar cause includes or extends to evil as well as to good. The exemplar cause can also be considered in a narrower sense as divine art. Thus considered, the divine art orexemplaris ratioarranges (determinat) goods alone.⁵⁶
Having specified what providence is, the Summa Halensisturns to how provi-dence works, first noting two fundamental elements involved in proviprovi-dence: cogni-tion and causality—itself divided as in habit and in act.⁵⁷With respect to cognition and habitual causality, providence is eternal. Insofar as it causes in act, providence is temporal.⁵⁸This does not, of course, compromise providence’s simplicity. Perhaps the most interesting reflections emerge in response to the question‘whether provi-dence is a cause of things and in which genera of cause?’⁵⁹Before specifying limited
Ti1, M1, C2 (n. 7), p. 16. Coolman articulates well the theological significance of this correlation for the Summa Halensisand the early Franciscan intellectual tradition in Coolman,‘A Cord of Three Strands.’
SHI, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), p. 288. Thomas Aquinas’preferred definition of provi-dence,ratio ordinis rerum in finem, seems something of a response. See Thomas Aquinas,Summa TheologiaeI, q. 22, a. 1, 263.
SHII, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti1, M2, C1 (n. 9), p. 18. See Aristotle,Metaphysics12.4–5, inThe Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1691–2 and Avicenna Latinus,Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina7.3, 366–75.
SHII, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti1, M2, C1 (n. 9), p. 18, citing Seneca,Epistle58 (Seneca,Epistles, vol. 1, Epistles 1–65, trans. Richard Gummere (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1917)). The Sum-mists also distinguish intelligible forms in the soul. On this sense of form, see Dag Nikolaus Hasse,‘Avicenna’s‘Giver of Forms’in Latin Philosophy, Especially in the Works of Albertus Magnus,’
inThe Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Metaphysics(see above, n. 11), 225–49.
SHII, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti1, M2, C2 (n. 10), pp. 18–9.
SHII, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti1, M2, C3 (n. 11), p. 20.
SHII, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti1, M2, C4 (n. 12), p. 21.
On this distinction, see alsoSHII, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti1, M1, C1 (n. 6), p. 15.
SHI, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar1 (n. 197), pp. 288–9.
SHI, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 199), pp. 289–91.
senses in which providence functions as final and efficient cause, the Summists highlight the role of formal exemplar causality. They write:
We concede that providence is a cause and with respect to cognition and seeing (videntia) (…) is a formal exemplar cause. This is so because just as in the science of building the exemplar cause of a house is in the builder, so also the exemplar cause of everything going to be made is in the divine science. The divine science itself is called the idea of things, and Boethius says provi-dence exists (se habeat) according to the mode of a plan (ratio) or of the exemplar cause in the builder.⁶⁰
Providence is in the divine science as the eternal exemplar for all creation. This re-lates to the temporal unfolding or actualization of the eternal plan. Unlike in the case of a builder, there is no failing in the divine fulfillment or actualization of the eternal exemplar. The formal exemplar cause can thus be identified with eternal providence as cognition in the sense of God’s understanding of what amongst the infinite range of possibilities will be actualized or created as divine participations. This last ele-ment must not be forgotten, for it is part and parcel of what ensures this formal ex-emplar causality retains its exex-emplar status. Providence can also be considered in terms of causality and is also eternal when causation is considered in habit or habit-ually. This would, in the divine science, correspond to the eternal plan as cause of its temporal actualization or unfolding. Providence’s causality in act is temporal. The Summists treat the causality of providence in act largely in terms of efficient causal-ity and largely in response to the Damascene’s presentation of providence as the bona voluntas Dei.In this sense providence‘governs and rules the whole’.⁶¹
The Summists also grant a qualified role to final causality in providence, despite rejecting providence as a final cause of things.⁶² The argument to which the Sum-mists respond weaves together passages from Augustine and Boethius to identify in turn providence with thesummum bonum, the summum bonumwith the end of all things, and therefore providence with the final cause of all things. Following Avi-cenna, theSumma Halensisfurther qualifies the end as moving the efficient cause.⁶³ It also notes that thesummum bonumhas two meanings insofar as‘an end brings a thing to completion (terminat)’and as‘things are ordered in themselves just as to a terminus’.⁶⁴Assembling these various pieces, the Summists conclude:
The end that moves the efficient is in providence, which thus possesses in itself the power for ordering all things as an end, but not by reason of bringing a thing to completion. Nevertheless, according as it possess the reason of an end, it is more referred to the efficient itself. Providence
SHI, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 199), p. 290.
SHI, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 199), p. 290.
SHI, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 199), p. 290:‘We say that providence is not a final cause of things.’
The editors here refer to Avicenna,Sufficientia1.11.2 (SHI (n. 199), p. 290, n. 10):‘Finis movet ef-ficientem ut sit efficiens.’
SHI, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 199), p. 290.
therefore is thesummum bonum, and thesummum bonumpossesses the aforementioned two meanings, one of which fits to providence.⁶⁵
That is, providence is not itself the end of things as their completion. Nonetheless, providence can be called an end and an efficient cause, but ‘it is called efficient in as much as it communicates or diffuses itself, and providence is called good (bonum) according to this meaning (per hanc rationem).’⁶⁶This presentation of an ef-ficient cause as self-communicative or self-diffusive obviously reflects typical scho-lastic framings the Dionysian good as self-diffusive.⁶⁷This is important for a few rea-sons, one of which relates to understandings of finality or final causality. The Summists’ construal of efficiency or efficient causality framed in the Dionysian terms of the self-diffusive good shifts dramatically the terms of efficient causality in William’s treatments of divine providence. More specifically it shifts the general sense of efficiency away from a moving cause exerting force or control to a creative act infusing all things with an innate yearning for thesummum bonumas their origin and end framed formally. This is important, among other things, for the Summists’
approach to chance.
Questions of chance and fortune entered scholastic reflections on providence through Aristotle’sPhysicsand reflections thereon. Within thePhysicsand its inves-tigations of the workings of nature, Aristotle considers chance (automaton) and luck (tyche).⁶⁸The inquiries include whether they should properly be regarded as causes (or explanations) and how they relate to the other causes (or explanations). Going against the grain of previous approaches, Aristotle grants chance and luck genuine explanatory power and broadly classifies them under the explanatory heading of final causality. Events occur by luck when the events are sufficiently explained nei-ther by necessity nor by intention but only through the addition of an accidental cause.⁶⁹ Aristotle presents luck as a subset of chance. Events occur by chance when the end achieved varies from the natural or intended end through the interven-tion of an external accidental cause.⁷⁰Chance and luck are not causes in their own right or in addition to the standard four causes but rather remain always posterior to and dependent upon intelligence and nature working according to the four causes or explanations.⁷¹ Aristotle’s basic strategy of folding chance and luck within the larger
SHI, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 199), p. 290.
SHI, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 199), p. 290.
SHI, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 199), p. 290.