The onset of the famine coincided with the first nuclear crisis, the death of Kim Il-so˘ng, and the final transition to the political leadership of his son. As he came to power, Kim Jo˘ng-il faced the virtual collapse of the economy and,
168 DEALING WITH A NEW NORTH KOREA
as the famine broke, social disintegration on a massive scale. The emergence of “military first” politics (s˘on’gun ch˘ongch’i) must be understood in this con- text. The military had long held a privileged position in North Korea; a pri- mary source of Kim Il-so˘ng’s legitimacy was his role as an anti-Japanese guerilla fighter. Yet “military first” politics refers to an important shift in the political, organizational, and ideological base of the North Korean regime that took place following the death of Kim Il-so˘ng, if not before. A renewed emphasis on the military emerged quite clearly during the period of the “arduous march”—the leadership’s euphemism for the deprivations of the famine—that began in 1995.
The term “ ‘military first’ politics” (s˘on’gun ch˘ongch’i) was first officially unveiled in 1997 and appeared to become the ideological cornerstone of political rule in 1998 following the end of the official three-year mourning period after the death of Kim Il-so˘ng.
The “military first” credo reflected two main political imperatives, one exter- nal, the other internal (Suh 2002; Koh 2005; I. Kim 2006). The first was a renewed emphasis on national security during the standoff with the United States over the nuclear issue in 1992–94. During periods of external threat, it is not surprising that the military would gain in stature and significance. The primary role of the military was reiterated strongly in official speeches after the onset of the second nuclear crisis in October 2002 as well.
But the timing of the ultimate announcement of the “military first” poli- tics suggests that external circumstances were not primary. Rather, this shift reflected a complex set of internal political calculations associated with the succession as well. Kim Jo˘ng-il did not have a military background, which had been a key component of Kim Il-so˘ng’s political legitimacy. Kim senior was no doubt concerned that Kim Jo˘ng-il gain control over the military before the succession. Once Kim junior assumed key military-related posts begin- ning in 1990, he was able to use his position on the National Defense Com- mission (NDC) and power over appointments and spending to shore up this crucial base of support.3 We see evidence of this before the succession and even more clearly in the wake of Kim Il-so˘ng’s death in July 1994. In constitutional amendments engineered in 1998, the National Defense Commission was effec- tively elevated above the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party as the central organ of political power. Since that time, Kim Jo˘ng-il has ruled the country from his position as chairman of the NDC rather than through either party or other government positions; the position of president was granted to Kim Il-so˘ng in perpetuity.
To this, however, must be added a third motivation that we believe has received inadequate attention: the increasing use of the military, including
Coping, Marketization, and Reform 169
paramilitary and reserve forces, both as a model of social discipline and hier- archy and as an additional instrument of control in the face of the widespread social disruption arising from the famine.4 In his speech at Kim Il-so˘ng Univer- sity, Kim Jo˘ng-il (1996) derided the party for its lack of dynamism and hinted at increasing corruption in its ranks. The military, by contrast, was lauded for its discipline and revolutionary purpose (I. Kim 2006:65–66).
The problems were also short run in nature. It is standard during food short- ages and famines for people to seek to move in search of food. However, all travel within North Korea is controlled and requires permits. As early as 1992, the government began to relax internal travel for the purpose of securing food (Ahn 1996); such movement undoubtedly accelerated thereafter and was even noted by Kim Jo˘ng-il in his December 1996 speech, cited earlier. Undocumented move- ment remained illegal, however, and thus vulnerable to low-level extortion and corruption. Good Friends interviews conducted in 2000 found that roughly half of 512 refugees interviewed had faced punishment for traveling without permits and that 70 percent either paid a fine or bribed officials (Good Friends 2004).
Not only are internal migrants vulnerable to harassment by the security forces, but they are also effectively denied protection. Of the 512 refugees interviewed, 42 percent reported that they had been robbed, and 98 percent believed that public security was a problem. In short, the government had criminalized key coping behaviors, including internal migration and various forms of exchange.
The government also moved to crack down on cross-border movement.
The right to leave one’s country is enshrined in both the Universal Declara- tion of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which the government of the DPRK is a state party. Nonetheless, the North Korean penal code prescribes sentencing of up to three years in a prison camp for unauthorized departure. Detention in these camps is characterized by extreme deprivation, torture, and high rates of death (Hawk 2003). As the food situation worsened in the mid-1990s, the number of refugees fleeing into China’s border provinces rose dramatically. This population has received increasing attention in recent years because of its size—estimates vary from the tens of thousands up to half a million—and the increasing vulnerability to forced repatriation of North Korean refugees in China.5 Interviews reveal not only that the overwhelming majority of refugees moved for food or economic reasons but that some either moved back and forth between North Korea and China or sought to do so, bringing small amounts of money or food with them (Good Friends 1999, 2004).
As the ranks of the internal migrants and cross-border refugees expanded, the North Korean government responded in a variety of ways, including estab-
170 DEALING WITH A NEW NORTH KOREA
lishing a network of ad hoc detention facilities, again characterized by extreme deprivation, torture, and, in the case of pregnant women repatriated from China, forced abortions and infanticide (Hawk 2003). Adults engaged in illegal internal movement and famine-orphaned children (the kotchebi, or “wandering sparrows”) were subject to detention in so-called 9-27 camps named after the date (September 27, 1995) when Kim Jo˘ng-il issued the edict authorizing their establishment. Males over sixteen, who had crossed the border were vulner- able, however, to incarceration in prison camps, and those suspected of more extensive engagement—frequent trips, trade, trafficking, marriage to a Chi- nese, contacts with South Koreans or Christians who were active in sheltering refugees—faced more extended incarceration in the long-term political prison camps that constitute the North Korean gulag.6
In addition to controls on movement, a second aspect of the command- and-control response to the famine and its aftermath was the use of the mili- tary to reassert authority over both the cooperative farms and the industrial workplace. One element of the new order was what Andrew Natsios calls the
“militarization of agriculture,” described in chapter 5 (1999:117): the mobiliza- tion of military reserve units (the Workers’-Peasants’ Red Guard) not only for planting and harvesting but also for security purposes. Refugee interviews make reference to corn guards sent to protect against preharvesting or diversion in 1997. They also report the growth of a phenomenon that is virtually inevitable given the combination of rationing, extreme shortages, and very high market prices for food: bribery and corruption between farmers and the military. In August 1997, the Public Security Ministry issued a decree on hoarding and theft of food that stipulated the execution of individuals involved in either stealing grain or trading in it.
The internal security forces were also called upon to address similar prob- lems that were emerging in the industrial workplace. The general breakdown of the industrial economy forced enterprise managers to engage in a variety of coping behaviors to secure the inputs required to maintain production and food to feed workers. State-owned enterprises with access to land or other resources sought to grow food or to harvest resources that could be traded for food; the deforestation along the Chinese border attests to the fact that these coping strategies were not just employed by individuals but involved well-organized efforts coordinated by either military units or enterprises in the region. This process of adaptation and spontaneous privatization from below was ultimately sanctioned by the government and institutionalized.
There is also evidence, however, that firms engaged in asset stripping and theft as well.
Coping, Marketization, and Reform 171
Scott Snyder’s early reports (1997) from the border region provide insight into these coping strategies. He found that in addition to the representatives of the central government, hundreds of trading interests representing local and provincial authorities appeared in Dandong and other Chinese cities near the border during the famine. He estimates that as many as eight hundred firms were engaged in such activity at the peak, although this number declined as their trading efforts proved less successful over time. These groups were autho- rized to conduct barter trade deals and to procure other resources on behalf of local authorities or even individual work units. For example, Snyder reports that a representative of the Hwanghae provincial government was authorized to sell scrap metal or timber resources in return for wheat flour, which was delivered to provincial authorities for local distribution.
But some of this illicit trade came from the dismantling of factories and/or involved personal enrichment. Becker (2005:190–93) relates the story from two refugees of public executions at the Hwanghae Iron and Steel Works in Febru- ary 1998 for theft of state property; this episode was confirmed by Kim Jo˘ng-il himself in an interview with a delegation of North Koreans from Japan (Mar- tin 2004:573–74). Bradley Martin (2004:551–78) presents a number of refugee accounts of work unit efforts to secure grain but also of widespread corruption and bribery in managers’ efforts to secure inputs and periodic efforts to pun- ish such behavior. Again, one of the most revealing sources of evidence on this point is the Kim Jo˘ng-il speech of December 1996, which recognizes the risks of
“letting the people solve the food problem for themselves.” The North Korean leader derided the party for maintaining inadequate control over work units and relying on “legal measures imposed by the police and other law enforcement agencies” as opposed to adequate political and ideological work that would guarantee appropriate work effort and protection of state assets.