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The Asian Development Fund

USD, PPP

5. Strategic Options

5.4 The Asian Development Fund

The ADF faces already today a client base in terms of aver-age per capita income levels that the AfDF will reach not even by 2025. The ADF provides support to LICs and has a focus on the poorest countries, such as Afghanistan and Nepal, climate change prevention and mitigation urgent for the shareholders of the ADF.

The ADF is a major provider of concessional loans and grants in Asia and the Pacific, with a focus on basic in-frastructure. The key mandate for the ADB and ADF under ADF XI will be to reduce poverty in the poorest countries, such as Afghanistan, Nepal, and Tajikistan, but other countries which are MICs, such as Vietnam and Sri Lanka, also receive substantial amounts of concessional loans. Within the mandated region, the ADF simply does not find many LICs any longer (unlike the AfDF), but more poverty and unfilled basic needs than any other regional development bank. By 2025, our projections show that populous countries such as Bangladesh and Cambodia will graduate the operational cutoff; likewise, India will exceed the historical cutoff by then.

This scenario makes strategic decisions discussed in sec-tion 4 with respect to redefining cutoffs, concessional transition finance, subnational eligibility, as well as concessional finance for disaster prevention and mitiga-tion urgent for the shareholders of the ADF. The ADF is a major provider of concessional loans and grants in Asia and the Pacific, with a focus on basic infrastructure. The

ADB has recently presented a new proposal to enhance ADB’s financial capacity through a modified manage-ment of its capital resources. The proposal entails termi-nating ADF loan operations and combining ADF loans (and part of ADF liquid assets, projected to be USD 35.3bn in total) with the OCR balance sheet in January 2017. This would increase OCR equity from a projected USD 17.9bn to USD 53.2bn. ADF would henceforth provide only grant assistance, while ADB would continue concessional lend-ing through its OCR window (ADB, 2014).

ADF countries would benefit from receiving enhanced financial assistance of concessional loans and grants on the same terms as currently provided. The advantage of merging ADF with OCR resources would be raising lever-age and lending capacity without compromising ADB´s credit standing and borrowing capacity in international capital markets. ADB’s equity base would almost triple, the minimum equity-to-loan ratio would be set higher (from the current 25 percent to 37 percent to 40 percent), and the loan portfolio would become more diversified.

The major disadvantage could be lowered concessional funding for Asian LICs, in particular on “non-bankable”

social infrastructure spending. It is also likely to reinforce a pre-existing bias in the ADB for “bankable” projects in the profitable energy, telecommunications and transport subsectors or in agro-industry that generate hard curren-cy receipts which can be used to repay ADB hard loans.

The ADF seems hampered, however, by the skewed governance of the ADB, which will by 2025 be even less representative than today: Japan remains the largest shareholder and decision maker although China is by now, and will be even more by 2025, the larger economy (Nehru, 2012). Japan and the US are by far the biggest shareholders in the ADB with 15.7 percent and 15.6 per-cent, respectively. China, whose economy in USD terms surpassed Japan’s in 2010, has just 5.5 percent. As long as such governance issues are not seriously addressed by raising voices, votes and contributions by China (and India), multilateral concessional finance risks balkaniza-tion with the establishment of alternative institubalkaniza-tional channels, such as the future BRICS Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (Pilling, 2014). Another negative consequence of uneven representation is the negative impact on capital resources (to which China could amply provide) and hence lending capacity.

Financial constraints on both the ADF and ordinary capital resources (OCR) are stretching ADB’s capacity to the limit. If ADB is to maintain meaningful levels of in-volvement in ADF countries, it has to find creative ways to enhance its financial capacity – or it has to change representation as Japan´s fiscal resources are limited by rapid ageing, with the risk to turn Japan into a “middling donor” (Sawada, 2014). Although Japan is the largest fi-nancial contributor to the ADB, its policy positions are usually framed within the parameters set by the US-Japan relationship, which has effectively limited higher representation of and core funding by China and India in particular.

Appendix

Table A.1: Current (2013) IDA Recipient Countries Classified by GNI per capita

Above cutoffs Low-income

<USD 1,035

i.e., "civil works preference"

Lower-middle-income

<USD 1,205

i.e., below operational cut-off

Lower-middle-income USD 1,206 – 1,965 i.e., below historical, but above operational cutoff

Lower- and upper-middle-income

>USD 1,965

Afghanistan Cameroon Cote d'Ivoire Angola*

Bangladesh Mauritania Djibouti Armenia*

Benin Senegal Ghana Bhutan

Burkina Faso Solomon Islands India* Bolivia*

Burundi Yemen, Rep. of** Lao PDR Bosnia and Herzegovina*

Cambodia Lesotho Cape Verde*#

Central African Republic Nicaragua Congo, Rep.

Chad Nigeria Dominica*#

Comoros Pakistan* Georgia*

Congo, D.R. Papua New Guinea* Grenada*#

Eritrea Sao Tome and Principe# Guyana

Ethiopia Sudan Honduras

The Gambia Uzbekistan* Kiribati#

Guinea Vietnam* Kosovo

Guinea-Bissau Zambia Maldives#

Haiti Marshall Islands#

Kenya Micronesia, Fed. States#

Kyrgyz Republic Moldova*

Liberia Mongolia*

Madagascar Samoa#

Malawi Sri Lanka*

Mali St. Lucia*#

Mozambique St. Vincent and the

Grenadines*#

Myanmar Timor-Leste*

Nepal Tonga#

Niger Tuvalu#

Rwanda Vanuatu#

Sierra Leone Somalia South Sudan Tajikistan

Above cutoffs Low-income

<USD 1,035

i.e., "civil works preference"

Lower-middle-income

<USD 1,205

i.e., below operational cut-off

Lower-middle-income USD 1,206 – 1,965 i.e., below historical, but above operational cutoff

Lower- and upper-middle-income

>USD 1,965

Tanzania Togo Uganda Zimbabwe*

Note: *asterisks indicate blend countries, underlining indicates upper-middle-income countries, # indicates small island economy exception;

** Yemen was listed as a country below the operational IDA cutoff in the World Bank 2013 Operational Manual with a 2012 GNI per capita listed as “NA”. However, the IMF data used for the simulation in Section 3 of the present paper provided a 2012 GNI per capita of 1270 USD for Yemen. This means for purposes of the simulation that Yemen was already considered to have graduated prior to 2013.

Source: World Bank (2013)

Table A.2: Poor Populations in 2025 in Countries Projected to have > 1 Million Poor People living on less

than USD 1.25 PPP per day (thousands)

India 141,696

Congo, D.R. 64,141

Nigeria 62,257

United Republic of Tanzania 24,102

Madagascar 22,964

Indonesia 19,566

Kenya 14,704

Zambia 13,922

Pakistan 9,891

Uganda 9,759

Malawi 9,616

Mali 8,507

Brazil 8,304

Angola 8,088

Ethiopia 7,316

Mozambique 6,979

Chad 5,884

Rwanda 5,403

Haiti 5,339

Yemen 5,289

Bangladesh 5,010

People living on less than USD 1.25 PPP per day (thousands)

Benin 4,408

Senegal 3,775

Burkina Faso 3,473

Central African Republic 3,131

South Africa 2,831

Côte d'Ivoire 2,556

Nepal 2,495

Nicaragua 2,330

Liberia 2,182

Colombia 2,143

Guatemala 2,122

Ghana 2,030

Congo 1,937

Venezuela 1,808

Papua New Guinea 1,774

Honduras 1,736

Togo 1,551

Bolivia 1,328

Sierra Leone 1,234

Philippines 1,092

China 1,526

Source: Calculations based on IMF World Economic Outlook and PovCalNet Database (2014)

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