Summary — Is There Any Future for Russian Constitutional Federalism?

Developing sustainable federalism is one of the most important challenges among the other political, economic and social problems of the new transforming federation. There are at least two competing models of Russian federalism. The first is a centrally governed pretended federalism with some decentralization to silence the regions. It is based on the idea that only the federation is a state and the subjects are parts governed from above. The federal center and its legal specialists support this model. The second model is based on the idea that the subjects of the federation are states, which together

can form a federation to gain more economic and political power. The more genuinely federal model stems from the early decentralizing ideas of the Soviet Union, according to which Russia could have been developed into a confederation of Sovereign States.

The latter model is supported more or less by the regional elites and is more or less functioning in practice. Between these two models, a compromise model might be found. Apart from federalism and confederalism, there is also separatism, fighting against which is used for strengthening the center.

The centralist constitutional lawyers, however, seem to think that a confederation would be as destructive to the unity of Russia as actually splitting up. Confederation is regarded as a long step ahead towards finally splitting up. Calling the regionalist model confederal actually reflects this fear of the centralists. To prevent such a destiny they have established legal solutions for developing Russian federalism under the existing Constitution. One suggestion is that the federal treaties should be replaced with a new Federal Treaty between the federation and all its subjects (Lebedev, 1999). In this way, asymmetry would be replaced with an equal status. If the treaty would be consistent with the present Constitution, Russia would stay on quite a centralist type course of federalism. It would, of course, be a clearer model but also less democratic since democracy requires decentralization and not strict and clear central control. It is, however, not presumable that the subjects of the federation would accept such a treaty and return to the center powers, which some of them have gained by virtue of separate treaties with the federation.

If, however, federalism is going to be developed to a more decentralized direction, the Constitution has to be changed. Changing the Constitution is complicated, because it would require a three-quarter majority of the Federal Council and a two-third majority of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly (Article 134). Furthermore, changes in Chapters 1, 2 and 9 which define the constitutional structure of the federation, cannot be made unless a three-fifth majority of all the members of both chambers supports the proposition and a Constitutional Assembly is appointed. The Constitutional Assembly can either accept the amendment or revision or draft a new constitution and accept it with a two-third majority of all its members. It can also submit the draft to a referendum, in which case the constitution is considered to be adopted if over half of the voters support it (Article 135). Changing the constitution towards a more federal and decentralized basis would require a more complicated procedure. There are, however, gaps in the constitution, which have allowed the President to intensify and centralize administration through decrees and administrative decisions.

As long as no mutual political consensus has been reached, there are no legal methods to develop Russian federalism. The centralists seem to prefer a legally vague situation, which is based on administrative treaties and increases the asymmetry of the federation at the cost of clarity and constitutionality. They hope that the situation is only temporary and that sooner or later the federation is going to be unified and the legal foundation purified from obscurities. This seems to be the strategy of the federal presidential administration. The regionalists, on the other hand, regard the administrative treaties as their only available possibility to increase pressure on the federal center, which tries to strengthen its own powers relying on the constitution and its centralist interpretations.

As the regionalists have now been able to make the practice appear also on the legal level, it is highly unlikely that they will forfeit their power. They can always use passive

resistance and wait until the bureaucracy at the federal center gets tired. In practice, pure centralism is impossible in such a huge and inefficient federation.

The Chechen War (1994–96) was destructive to the development of federalism. It showed that the center is apt to use violence against a disobedient region. Disobedient subjects are forced to sign “a social contract”, which happens to be the constitution prepared by federalist lawyers and reflecting mostly centralist ideas. The support of the Great Russian regions offered Yeltsin the weapons to punish separatist ethnical movements, and blame the Chechens for all kinds of misery. Since also the Constitutional Court accepted violations of human rights in protecting the unity of the federation, it is quite clear that it is now acceptable that the federal center does not have any limits to its power, when it considers that the unity of the federation is at stake.

The war has been able to channel the frustration of not only the political leaders of the country and the military but also the disappointment of the people on the misery caused by unsuccessful economic reforms, corrupted politics and increased insecurity because of organized crime. Especially the citizens’ feelings of insecurity were cynically connected with Great Russian patriotism and channeled against an ethnic group inside the federation. History shows that such frustrations can easily be projected on an ethnic group but with serious consequences. Finding a common enemy is an easier way to unite people than finding a democratic consensus. Finding consensus in such a multicultural and multinational country as Russia is extremely difficult even in normal circumstances, without Soviet and tsarist traditions. From the point of view of historical development, the balance seems to be blurred but such a situation is more “ordinary” in Russian history. Strict centralist rules have always been circumvented or ignored until they finally wither away.

Transition increases the difficulties in keeping the asymmetric, inefficient and bureaucratic federation in existence. A state, which should exist to protect its citizens, finds it more justified to protect its own existence at the cost of the citizens. Such politics is a return to Tsarist Russia, with constant wars in peripheral areas.

Unfortunately, Russia has not been able to find a new democratic ideological basis for its existence but has turned to the old imperialist ideology. Such a development does not indicate a triumph of voluntary, efficient and democratic federalism in the near future. Those regions, which have been able to gain an exceptionally independent status, may be the next targets of the unifiers. Recent demagogy indicates that Russia may try to “take the lost empire back”. Great Russian expansion has fertile soil to grow, since the Russians seem to be sure to blame the collapse of the Soviet Union for their economic problems. A Great Russian centralized State is regarded as a normal and eligible situation in Russia. Anything deviating from the traditional model is abnormal and unfavorable to the mentality of Russian centralist bureaucracy, which can effectively hinder democratic federalism from developing.

Compared to American federalism, Russian federalism is something deeply contrary to American ideology. Limited authority of the government, based on a due process of law, is quite contrary to Russian authoritarian struggle and demand for unqualified submission to a Sovereign which, however, is circumvented in practice.

Authoritarianism, lack of transparency and arbitrary unequal treatment of the regions stem from the “feudal” system of the Russian Empire, where remote provinces were given to vassals. The Russian asymmetric development, however, shows creativity.

Unfortunately, the development is not in anyone’s control, because it is not based on a mutual convention. The situation and the relations inside the federation are so different than in the United States that Russia should be able to find its own democratic and decentralized model of federalism. The centralist aspirations of the presidential administration are doomed to fail in the long run and the splitting into parts is not out of the question either.